Winning, Losing, and Political Trust Across Political Generations

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Abstract

Citizens' trust in political institutions is central to the understanding of the way people behave in a democracy. This paper seeks to contribute to the emerging literature that investigates the relationship between voters' experiences as electoral winners and losers and political trust. Specifically, we argue that the effect of winning and losing on how voters think about their representatives in power varies depending upon individuals' prior political experiences. We contend that the process of political socialization mediates winners and losers' trust in government.

Citizens whose political values were shaped in anti-democratic regimes have different reactions to winning and losing than those individuals who have only experienced life in democracy. Specifically, winning and losing will be more important in determining political trust for voters having lived under authoritarian rule and democratic regime, what we call the "dual-regime" generation, than for voters having solely had contact with democratic institutions, what we call the "democratically socialized" generation.

Using individual-level Eurobarometer data, we address three questions: 1.) whether an individual's belongs to "dual-regime" generation or the "democratically socialized" generation has different effects on political trust; 2.) whether the strength of the effect of winning/losing on political trust is stronger for one generation than the other; and 3.) whether the effect of winning/losing among the "dual-regime" generation is stronger in new democracies than for the same generation in democracies that did not undergo a recent transition. To address these questions, we propose to compare levels of trust and the impact of winning and losing on trust among different generations across three newly consolidated democracies, Portugal, Spain, Greece, and the former East Germany and compare these to three long-time democracies, Denmark, Belgium, and the UK. This allows us to see if there are differences among the dual-regime generation in the newer democracies relative to the same generation in countries that have stable democracies.

First, we hypothesize that the older, dual-regime political generation is more or less trusting because they have experienced a breakdown of an entire political system and have witnessed a value-laden fight for political transparency and participation. Thus, they know first-hand that political regimes are vulnerable and volatile even after the regime has consolidated. We found that this experience the older generation in newer democracies tend to be more trusting than the those who have only known the regime in which they live and for which they do not have powerful politically charged expectations. The fact that they have experienced the worst in political life, where trust is unheard of, gives the democratic regime a cushion of support because these older individuals are more willing to give a democratic government the benefit of the doubt.

Second, we argue that those individuals who in the past experienced repression may place a greater emphasis on winning and losing in elections because they have a comparatively higher probability of believing that systems can and do break down. Thus, compared to their younger compatriots and people of their own generation who have not experienced breakdown, winning will have a stronger positive and losing a stronger negative effect on trust because there is some probability that elections will not be held again, thus determining winners and losers for the foreseeable future.

Introduction

> "Popular confidence in democratic institutions is at the heart of representative government. Widespread confidence reduces the potential for radical change to the system, but it also encourages a constructive desire for social reform" (McAllister 1999: 202).

Political trust is a central pillar of democratic theory and for the past 30 years it has occupied the minds of many political scientists devoted to the study of democratic governance. It is an essential element to popular control of policy and support for the democratic regime, both diffuse and specific (Easton 1965) because as a "valued commodity in democratic polities" (Marsh 1971), confidence in the ruling political institutions helps determine individual attachment to the political framework and the workings of the existing political system. Disenchantment, distrust, and cynicism—in a word dissatisfaction—contribute to political alienation (Citrin 1974; Lockerbie 1993) and undermine the very essence of democracy. When people trust in the regime and its institutions, they are more likely to participate in politics so as to change their lives (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993; Jennings and Niemi 1981). They are less likely to want to change it (Lambert et al. 1986; Topf 1995) because they are satisfied with the institutional arrangements and this contributes to their legitimacy and stability in the long run (Easton and Dennis 1969). Trust in political institutions influences how people look and feel toward the government and ultimately how they behave. "Democratic institutions are believed vulnerable to breakdown in times crisis unless rooted in shared norms of political trust, tolerance, respect for human rights, willingness to compromise, moderation, and belief in democratic legitimacy." (Norris 1999: 264).

Miller (1974b) argues that political trust has a different meaning or significance in different political systems. In newer democracies, trust in governmental institutions may be more of a vote of confidence in the form of government, whereas in democracies that have been

in existence for a longer time, distrust in government may be associated with the partisan hopes of "voting the rascals out" (p. 989). In newer democracies, the institutions are in the process of stabilizing so the citizens have not yet had the opportunity to have positive political experiences. In the first years of democratization, these institutions are adjusting (Dahl 1989; Converse 1969) and are still in a precarious phase.

In these newer democracies it is likely that those individuals coming out of the authoritarian regime have different ideas and attitudes regarding the new regime than do those individuals having been socialized in democratic values from the start (Converse 1969). Holmberg (1999) argues that political trust can be conditioned by the "differing social backgrounds, cognitive abilities, party identifications, and values" (p.114). It is plausible to argue that political events, such as the revolutionary overturn of a dictatorship, could constitute a distinctive mark on those having lived it. It would distinguish or mark their social backgrounds from others and would thus create a particular political generation.

Kenneth Newton (1999) has suggested that political trust studies have not given political experience its due attention (Abramson 1979; Jennings 1987; Sears and Valentino 1997). Having experienced life in an authoritarian regime, the revolutionary generation knows what it is like not to be able to participate in political life, to have their opinions suppressed and to be reprimanded, threatened and even punished for doing so. This generation of political citizens also knows first-hand that political regimes are vulnerable and volatile, having witnessed to the breakdown of the dictatorial regime. It is highly likely that belonging to this generation of folks would make a difference when explaining political trust and support for the democratic regime. Not only that, it can affect how citizens feel about winning and losing.

In this paper, we test how belonging to the "revolutionary" or "dual regime" generation or the "democratically socialized" generation affects citizens´ confidence in the governing institutions, and how, if at all, they condition winning and losing in democracy. How does

regime experience affect trust? And what will the end of the older revolutionary generation signify for the confidence in democratic governance? Drawing on the political socialization literature, we contend that citizens now living in democracy but whose political values were shaped in antidemocratic regimes view democracy in a different light than do those having only known the "rules of the democratic game" (Converse 1969). Do they trust more or less? We argue that political socialization in a regime other than the democratic regime will either increase or decrease an individual´s trust in the new democratic regime.

We begin by reviewing the literature in the context of our research question and develop our argument. Using Eurobarometer individual-level data, we test our hypotheses and discuss the impact of differences in political experience on political trust.

Political Socialization and Political Trust

A critical conditioning aspect of political confidence in a governing regime is political socialization. Its importance lies in the preadult preparation and formation of values that young adults carry on in some way throughout adulthood. Considerable debate has surrounded political socialization as either an ongoing process or a process that precedes political involvement. The two opposing views mark the essence of central debates in nearly three decades of research on the socialization process.

David Sears (1975; 1983) discusses five different types of effects on preadult political predispositions. These vary from the "lifelong openness" view to an extreme opposite, the "persistence " perspective (Sears and Valentino 1997). The first posits that individuals are perpetually reactive or responsive to changing realities. The "persistence" hypothesis asserts that although people may be aware of the political events going on, particular values and attitudes are acquired in their early formative years and accompany them while conditioning their rationality.

Between these two extremes of the socialization continuum, lie the life-cycle hypothesis, the impressionable years hypothesis, and the generational effects hypothesis, where according to the life-cycle proposition individuals express changing ideas and exhibit changing values as they age. "…certain kinds of change are endemic to the life course." (Jennings and Niemi 1981:118). Thus, younger individuals, irrespective of the particular time or political era will think and act in a way convergent toward the older individuals as they pass through time (Jennings and Niemi 1981; Niemi and Jennings 1991).

The remaining two hypotheses, the impressionable years hypothesis and the generational effects hypothesis, can both be interpreted as impacts resulting from events that occur during a given period in time: 1.)the impressionable or critical years according to the hypothesis that bears the same name, or 2.) any time period according to the generational effect hypothesis. These impacts set the individuals having witnessed these events apart from those not having done so. The literature points out a few examples of highly salient political generations such as the "Depression generation", the "protest generation" and the "Civil War generation" (Jennings 1987; Sears and Valentino 1997). These individuals pertaining to these generations exhibit a distinct characteristic in a political sense and are easily labeled according to the particular political or historical event that generated the common ground among them. It is plausible to argue that their political views and behavior in the face of occurring exogenous social and political phenomena may likely be tainted.

All five socialization hypotheses can be expressed or summarized as period effects, where individuals of all cognitive ages are marked by the current occurrences in their surrounding; age effects, where political attitudes vary depending on the age of individual; and cohort effects where particular attitudes are common to individuals born in a particular point in time (Sears 1975).

A Generational Theory of Political Trust: The Role of Political Regime Experience

> "In general, … the conclusion is that *economic conditions* are more important than social ones, but together their impact is negligible when compared to such factors as *political*, *cultural*, or *historical* circumstances." (McAllister 1999: 201, 203 italics in the orginal).

We often read of life-cycle explanations of political trust, where an individual´s affect for the governing regime changes with age. Next to the winner/loser effect (Anderson and Guillory 1997) or the "hometeam effect" (Holmberg 1999), age has been given considerable attention where confidence and support for democracy are concerned. It is perhaps the demographic variable showing the most consistent effect (Newton 1999; Listhaug and Wiberg 1995; Dennis 1991; Inglehart 1999). Generally speaking, political trust is positively correlated with age, where older more experience individuals tend to feel integrated in the political system and to participate in the election process (Lockerbie 1993; Topf 1995; Listhaug 1995). Younger individuals are less inclined to identify with a party and are less loyal, therefore politically more flexible (Erikson et al. 1980; Abramson 1979; Converse 1969; Inglehart 1999).

Notwithstanding this life-cycle relationship between political trust and age, it is plausible to argue a coexisting generational hypothesis between trust and a given political event. In this way, exogenous political events emerge as critical socializing and "catalyzing" agents (Sears and Valentino 1997). Traditionally, the political socialization literature points to the family as being the most influential agents in setting political predispositions (Hyman 1959; Almond and Verba 1963; Langton 1969) and school (Almond and Verba 1963; Hess and Torney 1967). More recently, specific exogenous, historic, and/or political events or socioeconomic changes have been noted to play a significant role in shaping one´s affect for a regime (Abramson 1979; Jennings 1987; Sears and Valentino 1997). The more pronounced or visible these experiences, the more likely it will be that those individuals coming of age during these periods will emerge as a salient group or a "generational unit" (Mannheim 1952) of a

given degree of likeness in political outlook. The event will characterize the generation and emerge as its symbolic mark and according to the generational hypothesis will manifest itself in its political attitudes and behavior.

In this paper, we propose that theory and history suggest potential generational differences. We focus on regime changes as the political system changes that become the critical political event identifying different political generations.

The change in regime in some Western European countries provides political scientists with an opportunity to study generational effects. Whereas considerable research has been conducted on the economic effects on political trust in the U.S. and Western European democracies, very few studies have focused on the political factors other than the "hometeam effect" so that cross-cultural comparative research on the impact of political events is lacking in this respect.

We hypothesize that individuals belonging to or having been cultured in an authoritarian regime and subjected to radical change such as the breakdown of the governing structure as they know it will react differently as they adjust to the new emerging political institutions than will the generations of the "relevant" political socialization age" (Converse 1969) that have only known these new democratic institutions. We test this argument by sorting out generational effects from maturation effects due to age. The difference in political trust could be attributed to the idea that the democratically socialized generation also happens to be the younger of the two generations and are, therefore, in a different stage in the life-cycle. However, in this case, history suggests that they may be due to the fact that they belong to an entirely new political group of individuals.

Ian McAllister (1999: 194) speaks of the need to incorporate the role of democratic experience in our line of argument where political confidence is considered. He presents a simple scatterplot of confidence against the number of years a democracy has been in existence

based on the 1990-91 *World Values Survey* and suggests that the highest tier of political confidence is typical of the longer, more stable democracies, and the lowest tiers, less well-established or more recent democracies.

Kenneth Newton´s (1999) distinction and comparison of political trust in early and more contemporary democracies is consistent with this idea. He speculates that in newly established democracies there should be less distrust given a more narrow scope in governmental intrusion and a more loyal relationship between citizens and the parties. There are relatively speaking lower expectations in these early democracies. This is in part because politics is more ideological, religious, and socially based in these countries than the "catch all" party politics of the more stable democracies. People rely on the politically more knowledgeable elite to ensure a smoother process of nation-building than they do in older democracies characterized by the individualistic, pragmatic, and more critical outlook on political governance. Democratic standards grow over the years, and, for this reason, it becomes increasingly difficult to satisfy them (Miller and Listhaug 1990).

This line of reasoning inspired our research question: whether people socialized in two different regimes vary in how they trust in democratic, representative institutions, so that one political generation will deem these institutions more trustworthy than the other. In countries where this generational distinction applies, political trust may be more than a life-cycle explanation. Because those belonging to the first group or generation are also older than the second group, the dominant position on the effect of age on political trust would lead one to suspect that they would trust more (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995). However, given the role of political experience as a socialization agent, there may be more going on than just an age or life-cycle effect. These citizens are not just an older generation but they are a different political generation unto themselves.

Which political generation trusts more is a matter of hypothetical evaluation. As we see

it, there are two lines of reasoning here. The experience of what political oppression is like and the satisfaction of overcoming it may tip the trust level in a democratic regime in a positive direction. The fact that the new regime came about as a result of these individuals´ discontent may have a cognitive, value-laden affect for the new regime. Individuals may bring their attitudes toward the new institutions in line with their victorious accomplishment. According to this line of argument, then the "dual-regime" generation should feel more loyal to the new regime and, therefore, trust in it more than would the new political generation born of a democratic regime. They would be willing to give the expected ups and downs of an emerging regime the benefit of the doubt. Also, the democratically socialized generation could be more sophisticated and expect more of democracy so that they are more critical and less trusting (Inglehart 1999; Norris 1999).

On the other hand, these circumstances could work the other way around. The older, "dual-regime" generation could be less trusting precisely because they have experienced a breakdown of an entire political system. Thus, they know first-hand that political regimes are not perpetual. In addition, the older generation may have experienced some degree of political dismay or dissatisfaction as the nation-building process progressed because they may have formed high expectations for the actors and institutions in democracy and these may have not lived up to those expectations (see Anderson and O´Connor 2000 on system change effects on citizen´s perceptions). In this sense, they would tend to be less trusting than those who have only known life in democracy. So according to this viewpoint, younger citizens not having another political regime with which to compare with democracy would be more politically trusting.

> *Hypothesis 1*: Political trust differs depending on the political generations. Belonging to one generation rather than the other increases the probability of trust in the political institutions.

We also take our question a step further and enquire about the effect that the experience or inexperience with an antidemocratic regime can have on a more widely researched political effect: the winner/loser effect on the institutional confidence. Christopher Anderson et al. (2000) investigated this effect in new and mature democracies, hypothesizing that a nation´s democratic history affects the extent to which political minority and majority status or, in other words, the effect of being a winner or loser, affects people´s willingness to protest against their governing regime. They found that in newer democracies, winners have a higher stake in the system. Recently established democratic institutions inflate an individual´s stake in the system so that being in the majority in an early stage of democratic development has a greater impact on one´s sense of being a winner.

In light of these findings, regardless of whether one is a member of the "dual regime" generation or the "democratically socialized" generation, we expect that being winner should have an effect on political trust, and it should take on added significance depending on the generation. One generation should be more sensitive about having more say in what ideological inclinations should orient their nation. Lambert et al. (1986) points out that the strength of the relation between trust and partisanship should be greater in the more responsive political systems that have had time to "accumulate a reservoir of popular goodwill" (McAllister 1999: 202).

Hypothesis 2: The process of political socialization mediates winners´ and losers´ trust in political institutions so that winning and losing will be more important in determining political trust for one generation than for the other.

Data and Model

To investigate the effects of regime experience on political confidence, we conduct logit analyses using individual-level data for 12 Western European democracies in 1994. The source of these data is Eurobarometer 42, for which the fieldwork was conducted from November 14 to December 31, 1994. This is the most recent Eurobarometer that asks questions on political trust. In eleven countries, there are approximately 1000 respondents. In Germany, about 1000 respondents in both East and West Germany were surveyed. Portugal, Spain, Greece, and the former East Germany represent the newly established democracies with respondents from both political generations. The UK, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany represent the older, more stable democracies having only the democratic generation.

In addition to the trust variables, the survey also asked about questions pertaining to past voting behavior, used to construct the winner/loser variable. In addition, the survey included questions on economic perceptions, interest in politics, Left-Right self-placement questions, and the typical socioeconomic and demographic variables. We also include a generation and a regime experience variable, relying on the respondent´s age. We construct a regime experience variable that splits a nation´s respondents into two political generations, our "dual-regime" generation and "democratic" socialized generation. The generation variable divides a nation´s population into two age brackets corresponding to the age brackets of those individuals falling into the two political generations. For a description of the variables used and their descriptive statistics see Table 1. Table 2 shows the proportions of the regime experience and generation variables and Table 3 compares the means of some key variables.

Trust in the national government and in the national parliament is evenly divided between those who distrust and those who do not. Approximately three fourths of the sample respondents are 30 or older and about a quarter of these were accustomed political repression in

a dictatorial regime. In the newer democracies, this dual regime experience covers about 78% of the respondents. The typical survey respondent in the pooled sample is aged 43-44, has an education level of approximately five on a 10-point scale, corresponding to about 12 years of schooling and belongs to the lower middle class. He or she is somewhat interested in politics, scoring about a 2 on a 5 point scale, and perceives the economy to have remained the same in the previous year. Ideologically, he or she is situated in the Center, slightly tipping in a Leftist direction, and is about as likely to be a winner or a loser, with the probability of being a loser being about .2 more than that of being a winner.

[Table 1-3 about here]

The following model depicts our view of the determinants of political confidence:

$Trust = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Winner/Loser + \beta_2 Regime + \beta_3 Age + \beta_4 EconPercep + \beta_5 Ideol + \beta_6 IntPol + \beta_7 Educ + \beta_8 Class + \beta_9 Gender$ (+ β_1(*WinnerLoser*Regime)* used in the interactive model) + Country effects

where,

Trust: Political trust

Winner/Loser: Effect of winning and losing

Regime: Regime experience

Age: Exact age

Class: Social class of the respondent

(WinnerLoser*Regime): Interaction term

EconPercep: Government Support$_{t-1}$

Ideol: Left-Right score

IntPol: Interest in Politics

Educ: Level of education

Gender: Gender of the respondent

Dependent Variable

The model is estimated for each of two dependent variables: trust in the national government and trust in the national parliament. Considerable debate has been generated over the measurement of the political trust variable. This controversy is centered on the need to

distinguish between institutions and institutional actors (Citrin 1974; Miller 1974b; Listhaug 1995; Listhaug and Wiberg 1995; Miller and Listhaug 1990) and this distinction based on how this variable is measured. It is not a straightforward matter for whether the trust variable measures confidence in the regime and institutions or the incumbent political leader makes a difference to the inferences we draw and the political implications thereof. People may not trust the specific government while maintaining faith in the institutions *per se*. Miller (1974a) assumed that the trust in government scale used in U.S. studies on political trust and alienation, captures respondents´ trust in the political regime; and in a counterargument to Citrin´s (1974) opposite opinion on the matter, points out that political trust may have a different meaning for people living in different political systems. In a later publication on political trust in the Scandinavian countries, Miller and Listhaug (1990: 385) argue that what may have started out as a decline in specific support for democratic governance eventually came to affect people´s support for the political regime so that "…it would be a mistake to conclude that the increased distrust represented a superficial response to unpopular leaders or political rhetoric."

> "Distrust obviously has other implications in a two-hundred-year-old democracy than it would in a dictatorship that has been in existence for only a brief period…Distrust of government in the U.S. may, for some, be associated with the partisan bias of ´voting the rascals out´; for others, it may indicate a sense of enduring inequities in government decisions and outputs." (Miller 1974b: 989, internal quotes in the original).

We can extend this thought to include democracies that have been in existence for a short time. Citrin (1974) argued that the trust in government scale is an indicator of the approval or disapproval of the people governing these institutions.

In this paper, political trust is measured as a dichotomous variable based on a yes-no question regarding on the reliability on the national government and the national parliament. We

assume that the question wording captures respondents´ trust in the institutions themselves and not the incumbent (see appendix).

Independent Variables

The independent variables employed in this model include those of a political nature—regime experience, past vote (recoded as the winner/loser effect), ideological inclination, sociotropic economic perceptions, interest in politics and those of a socio-economic—and demographic nature—age, education level, social class, and gender.

In our additive model, *regime experience*[1] is the key variable. It is designed to estimate the effect that having been socialized in the different regime has on one´s trust in the democratic regime relative to those having lived only in democracy. In our interactive model, regime experience mediates the winner-loser effect. The logic behind this variable is that we assume a relevant political socialization age separating the Portuguese, Spanish, Greek, and East German respondents into two political "generational units" (Mannheim 1952). The cut-off age between an adolescent pre-socialized in political matters and a politically unaware adolescent is arguable, but we base our judgment on the available literature on this matter. Political socialization is thought to begin at home within the family and social groups, at school, and media contact. Which of these pulls the greatest weight when it comes to socialization gains is not a consensual matter. As discussed above, some regard the family as the primary agent of socialization (Hyman 1959; Langton 1969). Others the school and communication agents outside the family to have the greatest impact (Hess and Torney 1967). Still others believe exogenous political occurrences play an essential role (Jennings and Niemi, 1967; Sears and Valentino 1997). The question is when an adolescent politically conscious of the institutions

[1] In the sample of older democracies, this variable is replaced with the generation variable, which operationally coincides with the regime experience variable for the newer democracies. This allows us to compare the generational effects across older and newly established democracies.

and the governing structure? Chaffee and Tims (1982) refer to ´preadolescense´ and Philip Converse (1969) places a number on this age group. According to him, the age of 15 is the relevant political socialization age. Sears (1975) and Dennis et al. (1971) speak of a 8-15 range with political sophistication increasing from one extreme to the other; Stradling (1971) focuses on the 8-10 age range; and Erikson and Luttbeg (1973) opt for a midpoint in this range as they refer to children aged 13 as political beings.

These political socialization studies were all conducted in democracies that have been in existence for quite some time. In newer democracies, family is likely to occupy a comparably more relevant role because we expect that in a dictatorship with censorship in the media and in the schools, children would more likely be subjected to what they witnessed or heard going on in their homes. Adults discussed politics, especially dissenting views, in the privacy of their homes. We could argue that the frequency of political discussions in the home was greater in authoritarian regimes, than in a democracy, thus we could speculate that children would be subjected to politics sooner in these countries than in longer existing democracies.

We opted to use the age of 10 as the relevant age for the Portuguese, Spanish, and Greek respondents. The transition to democracy occurred at or about the same time frame.[2] Therefore, our reasoning led us to make 30 the dividing age between political generations. Children aged 10 in 1974 would be 30 years old in 1994, the year the survey was conducted. In the case of East Germany, the same underlying rationale would make 14 the cut-off age. Thus, those individuals comprising the dual regime generation would be 30 or older in the first three of these democracies and 14 or older in the former East Germany. All other respondents below these ages belong to the democratic generation. Critics will argue that we cannot operationally sort out the effect due to age from the effect we want to test due to regime experience, but, the

[2] The transition years are 1974 for Portugal, 1977 for Spain, and 1974 for Greece.

regime dummy, based on the age variable, is not the same thing. By estimating the same model separately for the newly established democracies and the mature democracies, we can draw inference about the difference in coefficients.

If a person voted for the party in government in the last election, the *winnerloser* effect, he or she is more likely to evaluate the economic situation in the country positively, but if he or she voted for a different party he or she is more likely to perceive the economic situation negatively. The existing literature on trust also demands that we control for *economic perceptions*. As has been the case in the literature, a nation´s economic performance will be positively related to the probability of trust.

The remaining variables are principally included as precautionary controls. These demographic variables—education, class, and gender—are not regarded as powerful determinants of trust (Listhaug 1995). However, age is of particular interest. It has been regarded as the demographic variable revealing the most consistent effect. Generally speaking, and, in accord with the life-cycle hypothesis, in political socialization, older individuals are more likely to feel more integrated in the political system. They are also experienced individuals meaning that they have lived through political and economic fluctuations and would be less likely to distrust or blame the political regime for what they could regard as temporary situations (Lockerbie 1993). Thus, we should expect to see that political trust increases with age.

Education is expected to have a negative effect on political confidence. The more educated respondents are socialized in the "political mainstream", the more informed, they tend to be and one could argue that the more likely they are to hold higher political expectations of the governing institutions (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995; Lockerbie 1989). The gender variable really could go either way. On the one hand, women are more vulnerable in a political sense than are men, and for this reason, we might expect women to be more likely to distrust the

political apparatus. On the other, the lesser female active participation in politics could make women less critical of democratic standards.

Discussion of the Findings

Tables 4 and 5 show the results of our analyses. From columns 1 and 3 in Table 4, we see that regime experience does in fact have an impact on how much individuals trust in the national government and parliament. Belonging to the dual regime political generation rather than the democratically socialized generation increases the probability of trust in these democratic governance institutions, slightly more so in the government than in the parliament.

[Table 4 and 5 about here]

The overall sample findings also show that for both trust in government and trust in parliament and in both the additive and interactive models, the winner/loser effect, economic perceptions and ideology are significant with coefficients of a similar magnitude for trust in either institution. Only the first two—winner/loser effect and economic perceptions—produce an effect when the newly established democracies are considered. As expected, identifying with the political party having won in the last election period increases the chances of having confidence in the democratic governing structures. The winners have a more positive affect for these institutions than would those individuals having voted for a party in the opposition. The political relevance of regime experience is most powerfully seen through its impact on the strength of the winner/loser effect on trust. The magnitude of the effect of this experience more than doubles when the individuals had previously lived in an authoritarian regime, thus providing evidence of a political generational effect in newly established democracies. The difference in the probability of trusting in the government among the older versus younger individuals is larger in the case of newer democracies. We are hypothesizing that this is attributable to regime experience.

Individuals´ sociotropic perceptions of how well the country has been doing economically also performed as expected. The greater the approval of the nation´s economic state, the more trusting they are of the government and the parliament. And the size of this effect is independent of the democratic history of the nation for the coefficient is very nearly the same in the pooled sample estimates and the dividing sample estimates shown on Table 5 pertaining to the two subsets of nations. Also in Table 5, we estimated the same additive and interactive models only here we divided the sample into the longer established democracies and the newer democracies. As we can see, there is no discernible difference between one set of countries and the other.

Upon examination of the demographic determinants of political trust in the pooled sample, social class and age are the only variables that appear to have an effect on political trust in the predicted direction. The higher a respondent´s socioeconomic status, the more likely that respondent will trust in the institutions. The other demographic effect on political confidence comes from the age of the individual. Although small, this effect due to age does seem to make a difference in the sense that as individuals get older, they are more likely to express trust in government. Oddly, this is not so when it comes to trust in the legislative body because, as far as we can tell, age does not matter. Table 5 tells us that this effect however does not seem to exist when it comes to trusting in the parliament in new democracies. This makes sense in these newer democracies for the democratic history is not long enough for there to be a substantial difference due to age alone.

Consistent with the inferences drawn from Table 4, we see an effect from the experience of a regime other than the democratic regime. This effect is seen in the difference of the winner/loser effect between subsets. In the additive models (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7), this effect on the probability of trust in government is nearly 3 times as large as the effect in the older democracies and twice as large in the case of trust in parliament. The generation dummy,

being calculated in the same manner as the regime experience dummy, separating those individuals aged 30 and above from those aged 29 and younger, is always scored zero on the regime experience variable, and because the regime experience variable for the newer democracies coincides with the generation dummy in the older democracies, the two models are comparable.

In the interactive models, the mediating effect of belonging to the older generation has a positive and much higher effect in the case of the new democracies, but only for trust in the national parliament. This leads us to infer that the generational gap is greater in new democracies than in old democracies. As discussed above, we understand this difference to be attributable to the common ground among the nations in each subset: the presence or absence of two political regime generations or in other words, a difference in regime experience.

Figures 1a and 1b illustratively synthesizes our findings. They compare a hypothetical situation of two typically aged, lower middle class, high school graduate males, ideologically positioned at the Center but leaning toward the Left, and fairly interested in politics that believe the state of their nation´s economic performance has remained stable for the past year. The difference between these two 44-year-olds is that one has lived in a dictatorship until he was 24, meaning he was politically socialized in an authoritarian regime. The probability of trusting in government is higher, for instance, for a Dane compared to the Portuguese man of the same age by about .3. However, the difference between the strength of this man´s winning effect on political trust and, say, that of a 25-year-old Portuguese man of the same social background is higher than the difference between a Danish 44-year-old and a Danish 25-year-old by about .23.

[Figures 1a and 1b about here]

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to contribute to the understanding of the determinants of

political trust by incorporating less well established democracies in the systematic studies of political trust and developing an explanation for why and how political confidence in the democratic institutions may differ between older and newer democracies that are usually excluded from analyses due to their short democratic history. As we found, shorter democratic experience is important to incorporate in our thinking of the development of political attitudes among the citizens living in these countries.

We proposed a generational hypothesis, whereby citizens living in democratic countries that have been in existence for a relatively short period differ in how they view the governing institutions. These individuals can be divided into two distinct political generations: 1.) those whose preadult political socialization began in an authoritarian regime and is marked by a transition to democracy, the "dual regime" generation; 2.) a new political generation coming of age in a democratic setting, the "democratically socialized" generation. Not only did we argue that the experience of the older generation in these countries would be different based on their experience with political life in a dictatorship alone, but we posited that this experience would condition each generation´s effect of winning and losing on their trust in the democratic regime.

Our results conform to the expanding body of literature on the political relevance of the effects of supporting the winning party or coalition. They show that belonging to the political majority and feeling more popular control over what and how political life treats them has a positive effect on political trust. More importantly, the evidence clearly supports our hypothesis of a second political effect—that of regime experience. We learned that while the probability of trust in the political institutions is higher in more mature democracies, the effect of people´s identification with the winners matters less in these countries than in newer democracies, possibility because there is some probability that elections will not be held again, thus determining winners and losers for the foreseeable future. Those having had the experience of two completely different governing regimes not only trust more than the younger generation,

but their feeling of being able to participate and be heard by the governing institutions is greater because of it. Thus, compared to their younger compatriots and people of their own age generation in older democracies who have not experienced breakdown, winning will have a stronger positive and losing a stronger negative effect on trust.

This raises the question of what will happen to confidence in the democratic institutions as the “dual regime” generation in the newer democracies is replaced by the younger, less trusting individuals of the “democratically socialized” generation. As a nation´s history of democratic institutions increases and as the new political generation, socialized in democratic rule replaces the older dual regime generation, this effect should diminish and be less powerful in determining individual political confidence in the system. As time elapses and the older folks die out in these countries, the democratic political generation will age. Their levels will likely approximate those of the present older generation in the more established democracies just as the democratic generations of these older democracies replaced the authoritarian generation at one point in time. If the political trust questions were available on a yearly basis, one could test to see if and how the effect regime experience on political trust changes with the passage of time, as the dual regime generation social learning process progresses. But this frequency of the political trust question does not of yet exist.

This difference is not much due to the age difference between these two groups, but rather to their political experience with the historical and political events marking their generation. All in all, we believe our analysis provides support for the need to build the contextual and historical particularities into our theorizing and models about confidence and support for democratic governance.

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Table 1: Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Description	N	Min	Max	Mean	StDev
TrustGovt	Political Trust in the national government	11325	0	1	.537	.499
TrustParl	Political Trust in the national parliament	11107	0	1	.568	.495
Winner/Loser	Respondent´s past vote (coded 1 if voted for party in government, 0 if otherwise or nonvoters)	10306	0	1	.395	.489
Regime	Dummy variable indicating experience with authoritarian regime (coded 1 if respondent experienced authoritarian regime, 0 if otherwise)	13060	0	1	.243	.429
Win/Loser * Regime	Interaction of regime with winner/loser	10304	0	1	.329	.470
Generation	Dummy variable indicating whether the respondent belongs to an older or younger generation (coded 1 if belonging to older, 0 if belonging to younger).	13060	0	1	.734	.442
Win/Los * Generation	Interaction of Generation Winner/Loser	10304	0	1	.088	.283
Age	Exact age of the respondent	13061	13	98	43.545	17.863
Ideology	Left-Right score (coded –1 if Left, 0 if Center, and 1 if Right)	12132	-1	1	-.099	.741
Economic Perceptions	Sociotropic perception of national economic performance (high means greater approval)	12763	1	5	2.845	.999
Interest in Politics	Interest in politics (high means greater interest)	12977	1	4	2.331	.928
Gender	Dummy variable indicating gender (coded 1 if male and 0 if female)	13063	0	1	.493	.500
Education	Education level of the respondent (high means higher level of education)	12952	1	10	4.824	3.210
Social Class	Class of respondent (high means upper class)	12090	1	5	2.347	1.057

Table 2 Generational Frequencies

Generations	Pooled Sample
Older Generation	73.4%
Younger Generation	26.6%
Dual Regime	24.3%
Democratic Regime	75.7%

Table 3 Mean Comparisons

	Old Democracies	New Democracies	Dual Regime	Democratic Regime	Winners	Losers
TrustGovt	.589	.423	.566	.448	.678	.463
TrustParl	.606	.485	.591	.498	.682	.511
Win/Los	.414	.351	.399	.383	--	--
Age	43.315	44.074	--	--	47.591	41.805

Table 4: Logit Results of the Determinants of Political Trust, Pooled Sample

Variables	Government Additive	Government Interactive	Parliament Additive	Parliament Interactive
Winner/Loser	.684***	.462***	.496***	.331***
	(.052)	(.059)	(.052)	(.059)
Regime	.357***	-.013	.259**	.003
	(.125)	(.136)	(.125)	(.134)
Winner/Loser * Regime		.912***		.671***
		(.122)		(.120)
Age	.003**	.004**	.003*	.003*
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Economic Perceptions	.464***	.454***	.426***	.419***
	(.027)	(.027)	(.026)	(.027)
Ideology	.145***	.161***	.087***	.097***
	(.033)	(.034)	(.033)	(.033)
Interest in Politics	-.017	-.008	.021	.028
	(.029)	(.030)	(.029)	(.029)
Education	-.016	-.017*	.011	.010
	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)
Social Class	.124***	.130***	.081***	.084***
	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)
Gender	-.018	-.020	-.006	-.006
	(.050)	(.050)	(.050)	(.050)
Belgium	.461***	.407**	.489***	.470***
	(.175)	(.180)	(.174)	(.177)
Denmark	1.101***	1.034***	1.194***	1.166***
	(.170)	(.175)	(.170)	(.172)
France	.896***	.798***	.615***	.568***
	(.171)	(.177)	(.170)	(.172)
Ireland	.428**	.378**	.155	.140
	(.179)	(.184)	(.177)	(.179)
Italy	.266	.222	.547***	.529***
	(.180)	(.184)	(.179)	(.180)
Luxembourg	2.162***	2.123***	1.797***	1.795***
	(.255)	(.258)	(.236)	(.238)
Netherlands	1.251***	1.211***	1.091***	1.082***
	(.172)	(.177)	(.170)	(.172)
UK	.150	.067	.254	.211
	(.166)	(.171)	(.165)	(.167)
West Germany	.835***	.759***	.881***	.846***
	(.176)	(.181)	(.176)	(.178)
Greece	.352***	.266**	.561***	.511***
	(.124)	(.133)	(.123)	(.128)
Portugal	-.309**	-.410***	-.116	-.178
	(.133)	(.145)	(.133)	(.140)
Spain	-.189	-.239*	.417***	.398***
	(.130)	(.138)	(.130)	(.134)
Constant	-2.261***	-2.121***	-2.095***	-2.010***
	(.193)	(.199)	(.194)	(.197)
N	7915	7915	7820	7820
Pseudo R^2	.112	.117	.084	.087
Log Likelihood	-4823.089	-4794.634	-4853.413	-4837.644
% Correctly Predicted	67.61	67.50	65.88	65.78

Note: East Germany is the reference category.

Table 5 Logit Results of the Determinants of Political Trust in New and Established Democracies

	Established	Democracies			New	Democracies		
	Government		Parliament		Government		Parliament	
Variables	Additive	Interactive	Additive	Interactive	Additive	Interactive	Additive	Interactive
Winner/Loser	.404***	.243*	.306***	.158	1.317***	1.094***	.907***	.483**
	(.062)	(.129)	(.062)	(.127)	(.097)	(.228)	(.096)	(.226)
Generation/Regime	-.064	-.130	.145	.083	.402**	.311*	.276**	.122
	(.095)	(.105)	(.094)	(.106)	(.162)	(.181)	(157	(.172)
Winner/Loser * Regime		.204		.188		.272		.518**
		(.145)		(.143)		(.252)		(.249)
Age	.006**	.006**	.002	.002	.000	.000	-.001	-.001
	(.003)	(.003)	(.002)	(.002)	(.004)	(.004)	(.003)	(.003)
Economic Perceptions	.444***	.444***	.420***	.420***	.484***	.480***	.420***	.413***
	(.032)	(.032)	(.032)	(.032)	(.050)	(.050)	(.048)	(.048)
Ideology	.207***	.140***	.111**	.109**	.062	.058	.085	.078
	(.040)	(.031)	(.040)	(.040)	(.063)	(.063)	(.061)	(.061)
Interest in Politics	-.008	-.007	.029	.030	-.021	-.018	.003	.009
	(.036)	(.036)	(.036)	(.036)	(0.53)	(.053)	(.052)	(.052)
Education	-.018	-.018	.018	.018	-.007	-.009	.007	.003
	(.013)	(.013)	(.013)	(.013)	(.174)	(.018)	(.017)	(.017)
Social Class	.141***	.140***	.107***	.106***	.097*	.099*	.005	.007
	(.031)	(.031)	(.031)	(.031)	(.052)	(.052)	(.050)	(.050)
Gender	-.003	-.004	-.005	-.006	-.054	-.056	.001	-.003
	(.059)	(.059)	(.060)	(.060)	(.094)	(.095)	(.091)	(.091)
Belgium	-.352**	-.355**	-.362***	-.365**				
	(.127)	(.127)	(.130)	(.130)				
Denmark	.275**	.276**	.310**	.311**				
	(.122)	(.122)	(127)	(.127)				
France	.035	.033	-.275**	-.278**				
	(.120)	(.121)	(.122)	(.122)				
Ireland	-.378***	-.375**	-.692***	-.689***				
	(.130)	(.130)	(.132)	(.132)				
Italy	-.531***	-.527***	-.308**	-.304**				
	(.130)	(130)	(.133)	(.133)				

Table 5 Continued

	Established Democracies				New Democracies			
	Government		Parliament		Government		Parliament	
Variables	**Additive**	**Interactive**	**Additive**	**Interactive**	**Additive**	**Interactive**	**Additive**	**Interactive**
Luxembourg	1.372***	1.369***	.949***	.946***				
	(.221)	(.221)	(.202)	(.203)				
Netherlands	.461***	.464***	.239*	.243**				
	(.122)	(.122)	(.122)	(.123)				
UK	-.697***	-.700***	-.613***	-.616***				
	(.112)	(.122)	(.115)	(.115)				
Greece					.378***	.372***	.567***	
					(.143)	(144)	(.137)	
Portugal					-309**	-.320**	-126	-.146
					(149)	(.149)	(.144)	(.145)
Spain					-.153	-.159	.460***	.452***
					(143)	(.144)	(.139)	(.140)
Constant	-1.367***	-1.320***	-1.326***	-1.280***	-2.421***	-2.331***	-1.858***	-1.706***
	(.183)	(.186)	(.186)	(.189)	(.290)	(.302)	(.280)	(.289)
N	5646	5646	5569	5569	2269	2269	2251	2251
Pseudo R^2	.098	.098	.081	.081	.129	.130	.079	.081
Log Likelihood	-3425.989	-3425.026	-3399.199	-3398.375	-1360.996	-1360.418	-1435.700	-1433.522
% Correctly Predicted	67.27	67.43	67.32	67.19	68.09	68.09	63.75	63.26

Notes: 1. East Germany is the reference category in the case of the new democracies and West Germany is the reference category in the case of the established democracies.

2. The additive models in the case of the established democracies were also run without the age variable to check our suspicion that the inclusion of this variable was causing the generation variable to fall to insignificance. We found that the generation dummy with the age variable is statistically significant in all cases.

3. We also ran the interactive models without the generation/regime dummies to avoid having a multicollinearity problem given that the age variable would be present in the generation/regime dummy and in the interaction term. The exclusion of these variables produced only one important change and that is that the winner/loser interaction term is statistically significant but not the regime dummy *per se* in the case of trust in government for the new democracies.

Figure 1a and 1b Change Comparison in the Predicted Probability Trusting in the Government due to Winning and Losing in Portugal and the UK

1a.



1b.



Predicted Probability of Political Trust in Government

	Portuguese		Dane	
	Additive	**Interactive**	**Additive**	**Interactive**
Δ Winner/Loser	(.400 -.308)= . 092	(.618 –. 292)= .326	(.716 - .627)= .089	(.731 - .634)= .097

Appendix: Question Wording

The data for this study are found in the 1994 Eurobarometer (#42).

Political trust in Government.

Can you rely on the national government?
1 yes
0 no

Political trust in Parliament.

Can you rely on the national parliament?
1 if yes
0 if no

Winner Loser Effect.

Which party did you vote for at the last "General Election"
1 if voted for the party(ies) in government
0 if otherwise

Economic Perceptions.

Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that …
5 A lot better
4 A little better
3 Stayed the same
2 A little worse
1 A lot of worse

Ideology.

Left-Right scale
-1 if on the Left
0 if on the Center
1 if on the Right

Interest in Politics.

To what extent would you say you are interested in politics?
1 A great deal
2 To some extent
3 Not much
4 Not at all

Education.

Age when respondent stopped full-time education
10 categories where high means more years of schooling

Gender.

1 if male
0 if female

Age.

How old are you?
Exact age in years.

Social Class.

If you were asked to choose one of these five names for your social class, which would you say you belong to?

1 Working class
2 Lower middle class
3 Middle class
4 Upper class
5 Upper middle class