The second claim about ethical leadership that the editors accept concerns two specific requirements for ethical leadership. First, ethical leadership requires humility. As a leader, you must be receptive to feedback, be self-aware of your strengths and weaknesses, and in any case, humility is one of the main virtues in contemporary virtue ethics. Second, McManus *et al.* observe that "[…] ethical awareness often calls the leader to something beyond self-interest" (378). After all, even those leaders who adopt the perspective of the ethical egoist must be aware of the impact of their behaviour on others, and they must subsequently assess whether this impact is in their self-interest.

In my view, this is again exactly right. Humility and the ability and willingness to go beyond self-interest are important properties of ethical leaders. But at the same time, I also think that this list of requirements should be (much) longer. How about the requirement that ethical leaders must have knowledge of the various ethical models on offer? Is there such a thing as ethical expertise, and if so, is ethical expertise merely procedural in the sense that ethicists know their theories and are better reasoners because they study logic, or is there even substantive ethical expertise in the sense that ethicists make morally better judgments than non-ethicists? And third, are there not specific contemporary challenges in leadership contexts that demand our attention? Consider inclusiveness as one of the many possible examples here. How do we ensure equal pay, equal access to meaningful work, and how do we minimise discrimination between colleagues? Again, I think that this list of "[…] components that seem be to be *sine qua non* for ethical leadership" should have included much more (378).

Overall, this is a good introduction to ethical leadership. The main ethical theories are covered, there are many case studies and discussion questions, and the chapters are clearly written and informative.

Wouter Kalf
Universiteit Leiden

Samuel MOYN. *Not Enough: Human Right in an Unequal World.* Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2018. 277 pp.

Samuel Moyn continues to inveigh against the recent developments about the idea of human rights in this new historical book, carefully developing the themes of his previous books on the matter. His first book on the subject launches a case against human rights as "[…] the highest moral precepts and political ideals" by questioning them "[…] as an agenda for improving the world," an agenda he deemed a utopian programme. It was "utopian," he said, because it "[…] draws on the image of a place that has not yet been called into being" (*The Last Utopia*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap. 2010, 1).

In that first book, accordingly titled *The Last Utopia*, he keenly observed how strikingly recently the human rights agenda had become widespread. Despite the beginnings of this agenda with the post-war Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), only in the late seventies did the prevalence of human rights language skyrocket – and only with President James Carter were human rights invoked, moreover, as a fundamental guiding principle for

the procedures of US foreign policy. A useful chart in the appendix to *The Last Utopia* (231) counted the mentions of 'human rights' in the *New York Times* and *The Times*, and it is instructive in showing how the moral world suddenly changed. Meanwhile, most books on human rights were concerned to trace its roots to late Scholasticism, the Roman lawyers, etc. –If not before. The book made a strong impression within and beyond academia, not simply because of the amazing scholarship involved, but because it was everything but a celebration.

Most previous academic books about the UDHR were indeed celebratory of the ideal of human rights. It suffices to call to mind the narratives of, for example, Marc Agi (*René Cassin, Prix Nobel de la paix, 1887-1976*. Paris: Perrin, 1998), Mary Ann Glendon (*A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. New York: Random House, 2001), or J. Morsink (*Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), to mention just a few.

Since 2010, Moyn has been rather prolific, hewing out and polishing gems from this hidden vein of human rights history. A few years after his first book, he published *Human Rights and the Uses of History* (London: Verso, 2014), a short but important work in his project, which collects essays that draw up a survey of the 'spectacular wrongs' committed in the name of human dignity. In the following year, his *Christian Human Rights* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015) addresses the role of Christianity in the post-war period, emphasizing the limits of any universal moral creed. The 'Epilogue' of the book ends with one of those thoughtful remarks that serve as both a warning and a call to critical deliberation: "If the human rights movement does not improve states—or even the hearts of the men and women that Christianity at its most ambitious and inspiring promised to transform—it will demand replacement, in the name of its own ideals or some better ones" (181).

The group of human rights discontents includes others than Moyn, of course, perhaps most notably Alasdair MacIntyre, who considers human rights to be among the unicorns and witches (1981), Michael Ignatieff who considers them as idolatry (2000), and Pierre Manent (2018), who argues that they necessarily result in the concealment of Natural Law. These discontents, however, have usually been deemed 'conservatives'.

Moyn's membership in this group, however, has not been gained in that 'conservative' way. Instead, his very different rationale is demonstrated succinctly in the title of this his most recent book. His dissatisfaction with the contemporary human rights ideal is due to the fact that it is 'not enough'. Despite the controversies that previously surrounded *The Last Utopia,* the author is clear enough in the Preface of this new book that he is still "unrepentant" about his main thesis. "The contemporary idealism of human rights," he says, "was really as contingent in its formation and shallow in its roots as [he…] had tried to suggest [in *The Last Utopia*]." Moreover, he insists that he was right in "[…] placing stress on a North Atlantic revolution in moral sensibility, political rhetoric, and nongovernmental advocacy in the 1970s—chiefly in response to authoritarianism in Latin America and totalitarianism in Eastern Europe" (x).

But he now explains more clearly his dissatisfaction. Across modern history, the story of human rights has a number of tributaries into the often-turbid watercourse of two different imperatives, namely, sufficiency and equality: "Even when social rights

have been given their due, the ideal of material equality has lost out in our time. Before the age of human rights came, dreams of equality were taken quite seriously, both nationally and globally. In the age of human rights, the pertinence of fairness beyond sufficiency has been forgotten" (3). The adversative character of these two imperatives shows up clearly in a chart contrasting the prominence of 'human rights' and 'socialism' as used in Anglophone book titles from 1800 to 2007 (182). This graph (generated via Google Books Ngram) shows an inverse relationship between the two terms. The face-value inference is that when the language of human rights became increasingly popular after the late seventies, that of socialism declined rapidly. The deeper inference is that the two imperatives tend to crisscross rather than run in peaceful integration.

So while *The Last Utopia* could be summarized by the chart showing that the sky-rocketing references to 'human rights' unexpectedly peaked in 1977, the present book may be summarized by the chart that reveals the increasing success of human rights at the expense of socialism. The author himself describes the book as the "[…] story of how human rights came to the world amid the ruins of equality" (9). In a fuller yet somewhat apologetic statement, he remarks that "[…] as an intellectual and ideological history written out of dissatisfaction with mere sufficiency and committed to a more ambitious equality, what follows therefore pursues a dual agenda: It detects the ethical principle embedded in political action and the social imaginary, which thinkers often voice, and it also brings our ethics down to earth, showing how they exist in proximity to the politics that have inspired and obstructed them. There is no place to take sides about right and wrong except within history, as it rapidly changes from one day to the next. For the moment, at least, human rights history is worth telling because it reveals how partial our activism has become, choosing sufficiency alone as intractable crises in politics and economics continue to mount" (9-10).

The book is organized around seven main periods, each with a chapter dedicated to it. Chapter 1, bearing the title "Jacobin Legacy: The Origins of Social Justice," (12-40) goes back from the creation of the popular welfare state in 1941 to the deadliest and most violent period during the French Revolution. He presents it as a golden age in which 'sufficiency' or a minimum of provision were not yet separate from concerns about equality between individuals. This golden age was short lived, however, since Thomas Paine, who named his most famous book *The Rights of Man* in 1791, overtly expressed his commitment to sufficiency in 1796 (4). That "[…] the Jacobin synthesis of distributive sufficiency and equality" (29) implied tyrannical ruling makes us wonder how much we are ready to sacrifice for the sake of such a synthesis. Whatever the case, according to the author, the legacy of the Jacobin synthesis was always unstable and "John Rawls was the last Jacobin" (40).

Chapter 2, "National Welfare and the Universal Declaration," (41-67) begins with the famous lecture on the welfare state by T.H. Marshall, only to show that his naïve belief that "[…] there was no real choice between sufficiency and equality" (66) turned out to be an illusion contrived by the early momentum of National Welfare. In fact, it very quickly became clear that "[…] policies aiming at a social minimum not only began to falter as the postwar era wore on, but have sometimes proven compatible with the expansion rather than the reduction of material inequality" (66).

In Chapter 3, "FDR's Second Bill," (68-88) the author summarizes the development of the American human rights ideal. He begins with Roosevelt's wartime promises in his January 1944 speech, a speech in which Roosevelt presented already a new list of rights that "bears a tolerable resemblance to that consecrated years later in the Declaration of Human Rights" (69). The fulfilment of this programme quickly faded. The author shows how much things changed, to the point at which "[…] it became imaginable to champion the New Deal nostalgically while really only proposing to humanize neoliberalism" leaving behind all promises (88).

In Chapter 4, "Globalizing Welfare after Empire," Moyn addresses a theme that was already at the centre of *The Last Utopia*, namely the lack of relationship between the end of the colonial empires and the incipient human rights movement.

Chapter 5, "Basic Needs and Human Rights," (119-145) is probably one of the most interesting sections in the book. It presents the set of ideas, policies, and international institutions that took us to the 1980s when "[…] human rights were far along in their transit from principles of an egalitarian welfare package for fellow citizens to aspirations of global sufficiency for fellow humans, and their early encounter with development thinking in general and a relatively minimalist interpretation of 'basic needs' in particular was lubricant for the slide" (145). The author emphasizes the contingency of such a change as a result of that "minimalist interpretation of 'basic needs'." He ascribes the genesis of this interpretation on the loss of the previous association of human rights and the national welfare state.

In Chapter 6, "Global Ethics from Equality to Subsistence" (146-172), Moyn presents the itinerary of political philosophy in the years of the invention of global justice. So, the core of the text is fittingly devoted to the treatment of John Rawls, Charles Beitz, Peter Singer, and Henry Shue, among others. As one might guess, the author is discouraged about "[…] the defense of equality in Beitz, as in Rawls before him" (172). His concern, which he couches in familiar poetic language, is that "[…] if [the defence of equality] did little more than let fly the owl of Minerva at dusk, what was its use?" (172).

Chapter 7, almost unsurprisingly named "Human Rights in the Neoliberal Maelstrom" (173-211), is also unsurprisingly the longest in the book, but in the and it is little more than a detailed lamentation about our neoliberal age.

Moyn, in the Conclusion, (212-220) thus attempts to demonstrate that "[…] human rights became our highest ideals only as material hierarchy remained endemic or worsened" (220). He nonetheless wonders (with that aforementioned partnership of warning and call to critical deliberation): "Could a different form of human rights law or movements correct for their coexistence with a crisis of material inequality? There is reason to doubt that they can do so by changing radically—for example by transforming into socialist movements" (218).

Since there is no historical inevitability, the author finishes the book inferring a moral lesson for human rights defenders and activists: The staunch defence of human rights we find in the contemporary world emerged within a specific set of circumstances, namely, within "an unequal world" (220). How our political future will play out will depend on us looking for and employing resources that go beyond the boundaries of

simply attaining equality. He says very poignantly, "Human rights will return to their defensible importance only as soon as humanity saves itself from its low ambitions" (ibid). If we take this challenge seriously, "[…] for the sake of local and global welfare, sufficiency and equality can again become powerful companions" (ibid).

Few books risk the dive into the infinitude of sources needed to present almost one century of world history placing social and economic rights at centre stage, and even less are so pleasurable to read, or so full of interesting insights. However, even if it is unavoidable that every era rethinks its own past, the reader should not be oblivious to the fact that the author is writing this history with the dual agenda that he mentioned above (9-10), as well a third agenda, more political in character. Max Weber emphasized that the values that guide our historical research are always different from one generation to the next; Samuel Moyn clarifies in this book the values that should guide our generation. Moyn's *Last Utopia* is the most interesting book on the recent history of human rights. This volume is the most interesting challenge to recent human rights philosophy.

J. A. Colen
Universidad de Minho and University of Navarra
Anthony S. Vecchio
University of Texas at Arlington

Eviatar ZERUBAVEL. *Taken for Granted: The Remarkable Power of the Unremarkable*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018. 160pp.

Zerubavel's slim book deals, as its title says, with what is unmarked ('default') and marked in language and in the social world. As a matter of fact in the current US (etc.) social world, one speaks of 'gay literature', 'black literature', 'women's literature': all marked. But one does not speak of 'straight white men's literature', which is apparently simply 'literature': unmarked and default. As such, the unmarked also expresses social power (Zerubavel speaks of hegemony) and privilege, indeed privilege so deep that it is not even self-aware. For example "[…] many whites […] do not even view themselves as having a distinct ethnoracial identity" (57). Such, says Zerubavel, is the social power of the normal, the taken-for-granted. The notion of normality at work here has statistical elements (as Zerubavel shows among other things by noting how frequently certain expressions are found by Google), but in the end it is social and cultural, and it interestingly often reveals a 'logic' at work that is not so much dichotomous or continuous but 'bell curve-like' (my expression): a 'logic' of an average with two extremes.

The first half of Zerubavel's book is devoted to showing – with many examples – how the power of the unmarked works. The second half, which may in the end be the most interesting, is about how to 'subvert' the power of the unmarked, the taken-for-granted. Basically, this can be done in two ways. One can either mark the unmarked or the other way round – unmark the marked. A marriage between a man and a woman can be referred to as a 'straight marriage' (40) or, alternatively, a marriage between two