Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: https://hdl.handle.net/1822/69297

TítuloHow does the type of remuneration affect physician behaviour? Fixed salary versus fee-for-service
Autor(es)Brekke, Kurt R.
Holmås, Tor Helge
Monstad, Karin
Straume, Odd Rune
Palavras-chavePhysicians
Primary care
Fixed salary
Fee-for-service
Data2020
EditoraUniversity of Chicago Press
RevistaAmerican Journal of Health Economics
Resumo(s)We analyze the effects of fee-for-service versus fixed salary on the treatment decisions of general practitioners (GPs) and on patients’ health outcomes. Using rich Norwegian register data for the period 2009–13, we find that GPs respond strongly and consistently to changes in remuneration type. Compared with fixed salary, GP payment by fee-for-service leads to an increase in the supply of consultations and a higher provision of medical services (along several dimensions) per consultation. This also has significant implications for patients’ health outcomes, with a more than 16 percent reduction in the probability of an emergency hospital admission (more than 46 percent reduction for ambulatory care–sensitive conditions) shortly after a GP consultation.
TipoArtigo
URIhttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/69297
DOI10.1086/706624
ISSN2332-3493
e-ISSN2332-3507
Arbitragem científicayes
AcessoAcesso aberto
Aparece nas coleções:NIPE - Artigos em Revistas de Circulação Internacional com Arbitragem Científica

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