The Baltic states' securitisation discourses and practices in the face of Russia's assertiveness

Daniel Ferreira Correia

UMinho | 2017

Universidade do Minho
Escola de Economia e Gestão

Daniel Ferreira Correia

The Baltic states' securitisation discourses and practices in the face of Russia's assertiveness

outubro de 2017



Universidade do Minho
Escola de Economia e Gestão

Daniel Ferreira Correia

The Baltic states' securitisation discourses and practices in the face of Russia's assertiveness

Tese de Mestrado
Mestrado em Relações Internacionais

Trabalho efetuado sob a orientação da
Professora Doutora Sandra Dias Fernandes

outubro de 2017

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Sandra Dias Fernandes, for the patient guidance and advice she has provided me. I have been very lucky to have a supervisor who cared so much about my work and who took the time to give me detailed suggestions on how to improve my dissertation.

I must also express my gratitude to my mother and my brother José, for encouraging me in all of my pursuits and standing by my side unconditionally.

Abstract

Owing to the Russian Federation's growing assertiveness in the international arena, amply demonstrated by the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the three Baltic states – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – have been presented as potential targets of the Kremlin's revisionism. In fact, the presence of significant Russian minorities in those three countries, Russia's offensive military exercises and the Atlantic Alliance's vulnerability in its eastern flank has sparked off a debate about the risk of the outbreak of a military conflict between NATO and Moscow. The Baltic sea region's geopolitical importance thus provides a strong rationale for this study. Applying the theoretical framework of securitisation, in conjunction with the strategies of othering proposed by Diez (2005), this dissertation analyses how Russia has been constructed in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in terms of security discourse and practices. More concretely, we aim to answer the question whether Moscow's actions in Ukraine in 2014 have led to a (re)securitisation of Russia in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. We argue that from 1991 to 2004, Russia was predominantly articulated as an existential threat. After achieving their two most important foreign policy desiderata in 2004 – accession to NATO and to the EU – the Baltic states have shifted their focus to the pan-European recognition of their historical subjectivity. From 2004 to 2014, the Baltic-Russian relations were mainly informed by the existence of mutually exclusive narratives, and practices of normative othering, whereby both the Baltic republics and Russia have sought to depict the other as "false Europe", have become prevalent. Finally, we concluded that, since 2014, processes of securitisation have once again become dominant in the Baltic countries, particularly in the military sphere. However, we found some nuances: while Latvia and Lithuania's securitisation has been more intense and comprehensive, Estonia has adopted a more balanced approach, stressing its resiliency rather its vulnerabilities.

Keywords: Securitisation; othering; Baltic states; Russia.

Resumo analítico

Em virtude da crescente assertividade da Federação Russa na arena internacional, amplamente demonstrada pela anexação da Crimeia em março de 2014, os três estados bálticos – a Lituânia, a Letónia e a Estónia – têm sido considerados putativos alvos do revisionismo do Kremlin. Com efeito, a presença de minorias russas significativas naqueles três países, o jaez dos exercícios militares russos no Báltico e a vulnerabilidade da Aliança Atlântica no seu flanco leste têm desencadeado um debate sobre o risco de eclosão de um conflito entre Moscovo e a NATO. A importância geopolítica do Báltico constitui, por conseguinte, uma justificação pertinente para a elaboração desta dissertação. Aplicando o quadro teórico da securitização, complementado com as estratégias de "othering" enunciadas por Diez (2005), esta dissertação visa analisar como é que a construção da Rússia nas três repúblicas bálticas se tem consubstanciado em discursos e práticas de segurança. Mais concretamente, pretendemos aquilatar se as ações de Moscovo na Ucrânia em 2014 se têm traduzido na (re)securitização da Rússia na Lituânia, Letónia e Estónia. Defendemos que, entre 1991 e 2004, a Rússia foi predominantemente articulada como uma ameaça existencial. Após a concretização dos seus dois principais desideratos em matéria de política externa em 2004 – adesão à NATO e à EU – os estados bálticos deram prioridade ao reconhecimento pan-Europeu das suas narrativas históricas. De facto, entre 2004 e 2014, as relações russo-bálticas foram sobretudo afetadas pela existência de narrativas históricas mutuamente exclusivas, e as práticas de "othering" com base nos valores, através das quais as repúblicas bálticas e a Rússia procuraram apresentar o outro como "Europa falsa", tornaram-se dominantes. Finalmente, concluímos que desde 2014 que os processos de securitização se têm tornado novamente hegemónicos nas repúblicas bálticas, particularmente na esfera militar. Contudo, identificámos algumas nuances: enquanto os processos de securitização na Letónia e da Lituânia se têm caracterizado por uma maior intensidade e abrangência, a Estónia tem privilegiado uma abordagem mais equilibrada, enfatizando mais a resiliência do país do que as suas vulnerabilidades.

Palavras-chave: securitização; "othering"; estados Bálticos; Rússia.

List of Contents

Introduction......1

Chapter I – Securitisation as a form of othering......9

1.1 Security Studies after the Cold War: the emergence of the Copenhagen School......9

1.2 Processes of securitisation: how threats are constructed......10

1.3 Securitisation as an extreme othering process......15

Chapter II – The Baltic states and Russia: a history of recent security interdependence......19

2.1 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the century XX: from independence to occupation......20

2.2 The Principle of Legal Continuity and the Baltic states' citizenship laws......23

2.3 Baltics' pre-enlargement foreign policy: the quest for Euro-Atlantic integration as existential politics......27

Chapter III – Baltic-Russian relations (2004-2014): moving towards (de)securitisation?......34

3.1 The Baltic States' post enlargement foreign policy......34

3.2 "Memory wars" in the Baltic-Russian relations: a new form of existential politics?......42

3.2.1 The Baltic states' securitisation of memory......42

3.2.2 Russia's securitisation of memory: the opposite view......45

3.3 Bilateral relations between the Baltic republics and Russia (2004-2014)......50

3.3.1 Lithuanian-Russian relations (2004-2014)......50

3.3.2 Latvian-Russian relations (2004-2014)......53

3.3.3 Estonian-Russian relations (2004-2014)......56

Chapter IV – The impact of Russia's intervention in Ukraine on the Baltic states: (re)securitisation in discourse and practices?......61

4.1 Russia's actions in Ukraine and its impact on the Baltics: a brief contextualisation......61

4.2 Lithuania's security discourse and practices since 2014......63

4.3 Latvia's security discourse and practices since 2014......69

4.4 Estonia's security discourse and practices since 2014......76

Conclusion 82

Annexes 88

Annex 1 – Map of the Baltic states 89

Annex 2 – Territorial changes of the Baltic states after 1940 90

Annex 3 – Key projects of military cooperation of the Baltic republics 91

Annex 4 – Military spending of the Baltic states as % of GDP (2013-2018) 93

Annex 5 – Baltic states' population by ethnicity (2017) 94

Annex 6 – Titular ethnic groups as percentage of the population (1945-1989) 95

Appendices 96

Appendix 1 – NATO Summer School "NATO Beyond the Warsaw Summit: Adapting to the New Realities" (Czechia, 10-15 July, 2016) 97

Appendix 2 – University of Tartu's Summer School "Transition stories from the USSR to the EU: reasons and consequences" (1-14 August, 2016) 98

Appendix 3 – Internship at the Embassy of Portugal in Helsinki, Finland (5 December, 2016 – 1 June, 2017) 99

Sources 100

Primary sources 100

Secondary sources 117

Abbreviations

CEE – Central and Eastern European

CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States

CSDP – Common Security and Defence Policy

EEAS – European External Action Service

EU – European Union

OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

ISAF – International Security and Assistance Force

PCA – Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team

Introduction

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought an end to the bipolar international order that had emerged in the wake of World War II, leaving the United States of America as the sole world superpower. The Russian Federation, the main legal successor of the Soviet Union, lost a quarter of its territory (Fernandes 2015, 119), after the regaining of independence of the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and the advent of new states in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Asia. After the August 1991 failed putsch by hard-line members of the Soviet Union's Communist Party, Moscow had to “cope with the collapse of the political, economic and security system and with the collapse of the state itself” (Sherr 2013, 43).

Despite the loss of its superpower status, Russia continues to perceive itself, in line with the Tsarist and the Soviet traditions, as a great power whose special and legitimate interests lie in the countries that emerged from the Soviet Union’s implosion (Fernandes 2013a, 133-8). In April 1993, the Russian Security Council outlined a “near abroad” foreign policy concerning the post-Soviet states (Galbreath, Lasas e Lamoreaux 2008, 34). That very expression – “near abroad” –, which reflects an intermediate category between domestic and *truly* foreign affairs, corroborates the importance of the post-Soviet space in the Kremlin’s foreign policy (Buzan and Waever 2003, 405). As noted by Brodie (1994, quoted in Safire 1994), the expression has a political rather than geographical or demographical connotation:

> "Russia's political classes have difficulty viewing the republics on its periphery as fully sovereign entities; (the) use of the term near abroad, in addition to qualifying their independence, signifies to the 'far abroad' that Russia claims certain rights in the region that transcend traditional diplomatic conventions."

The above-mentioned doctrine has two main priorities. First of all, it seeks to retain the Kremlin’s control over those newly established countries, which are fundamental to Russia’s perceptions of threats (Fernandes 2010, 266; Jonson 1998, 172). Rather than being based on military force, the Kremlin has mainly sought to establish its control through the manipulation of those countries’ domestic politics and the exploitation of their economic dependence on Moscow (Buzan and Waever 2003, 409). The second key priority is to preclude any outside power, in particular the United States, from achieving a strategic position in the region.

The post-Soviet space's central role in Moscow's great power self-perception has led to the vehement opposition to NATO's eastern enlargement, or "expansion", in the Kremlin's parlance (Lavrov 2017, quoted in RT 2017). From Russia's perspective, the Alliance's enlargement would bolster the influence wielded by Washington at Russia's expense (Trenin 2011, 101; Ponsard 2006). Even though the Kremlin's stance regarding the European Union's presence in the "shared neighbourhood" (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) has been received with less animosity, the Eastern Partnership[1] (EaP) has been met with wariness (Fernandes 2009). In addition to Moscow's scepticism about the idea of multilateralism advocated by the European Union, the EaP's "eventual (and indirect) benefits are predicted to be outweighed by the expected negative consequences of a predominantly geopolitical nature", the most significant of which being the undermining of Russian-led initiatives in the region (Zagorski 2011, 41).

However, it is crucial to take into consideration that the post-Soviet space is by no means a homogeneous one (Fernandes 2013a, 127; Freire 2013, 103). In that context, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania stand clearly apart from the other states that emerged from the Soviet Union's collapse:

> "Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are analysed together because the three make up a common European micro-region, sharing a similarly painful modern history and, in recent years, a trajectory from the Soviet Union to the European Union. Naturally, there are key differences. Lithuanians are Catholic and often consider themselves Central European, while the Estonians are Lutheran (or actually agnostic, according to the latest data) and increasingly Nordic; and Latvia has considerable Catholic, Lutheran and Orthodox minorities (Auers 2015, 3)".

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania's "painful modern history" cannot be dissociated from Moscow's. In that context, the Baltic-Russian relations have been marked by strong security interdependence throughout the last century. The three Baltic republics proclaimed their independence in 1918 following the collapse of the Russian Empire and fought their independence wars against (albeit not exclusively[2]) the Soviet Union, which would subsequently

1 Promoted by Poland and Sweden, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) is part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (NEP) and was officially launched by the EU during the Prague Summit on 7 May 2009. This joint initiative involves the EU, its member states and six eastern European partners: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. For an in-depth assessment of the EaP, see Fernandes (2010, 280-6).

2 For more about the Baltics' Wars of Independence, see Kasekamp (2010, 95-106), Plakans (2011, 266-336) and Brüggeman (2003).

recognise their sovereignty in 1920. After a brief period of independence (1918-1940), Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were subjected to three occupations, first by the Soviet Union (1940-1941), then by Nazi Germany (1941-1944) and, once again, by the USSR (1944-1991). The Kremlin has refuted the Baltics' accusations of occupation and maintains that the three republics voluntary joined the Soviet Union (Onken 2009, 43).

After proclaiming their independence in 1991, the "Baltic states first securitised a Russian threat intensively both for domestic nation-building reasons and because this seemed to them a way to attract Western support and solidarity" (Buzan and Waever 2003, 415). Accordingly, Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius have sought to dissociate themselves from Moscow, namely by declining to be part of the Commonwealth of Independent States, better known as CIS (Buzan and Waever 2003, 414; Galbreath, Lasas e Lamoreaux 2008, 34). Post-Soviet initiatives were perceived as a threat and, in the case of Lithuania, constitutionally securitised. Russia, on the other hand, has accused the Baltics of violating the rights of their ethnic Russians and recurrently criticised the Latvian and Estonian citizenship laws (Satkauskas 2001, 139).

The Baltic republics' security concerns vis-à-vis the Kremlin led them to seek membership in both the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, and to stress their place within the Western normative framework and deny Russia's (Kesa 2011, 84). While Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius' quest for integration in the two most important Euro-Atlantic structures had existential overtones and was perceived as the only way to mitigate their precarious geopolitical position and prevent their future inclusion in Moscow's sphere of influence, Russia perceived the Baltics' accession to the Atlantic Alliance as a threat (Karabeshkin and Spechler 2007).

Despite the Baltics' expectations that the membership in both NATO and EU would serve as "icebreakers in the Russian-Baltic relations" (Mikhelson 2003, 275), the relations between the Baltic republics and Moscow have not improved since 2004 owing to a mutual, deeply-rooted lack of trust (Berg and Ehin 2009, 4; Trenin 2011, 48). Moscow sees the Baltics' post-2004 foreign policy as being anti-Russian, a perception exacerbated by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia's support for the "colour revolutions" in Georgia and in Ukraine (Galbreath, Lasas e Lamoreaux 2008, 142). While the Baltics perceive the Euro-Atlantic integration of those countries as essential to their security, the Kremlin has seen that support as an attempt to sabotage its position in the "near abroad".

Furthermore, the relations between Russia and the Baltic republics have remained strained owing to the existence of mutually irreconcilable narratives regarding their shared history during

World War II (Kattago 2008, 432; Grigas 2013, 127). On the one hand, Russia emphasises the Red Army's decisive role in defeating Nazism and liberating Europe from German rule, perceiving any criticism towards the Red Army or the Soviet Union as a sacrilege (Trenin 2014). A representative example of the Kremlin's "public sanctification and securitisation of the remembrance of the Great-Patriotic War" (Mälksoo 2015, 231) was president's Medvedev decision to create a commission to counter what has been perceived as attempts to falsify history to the detriment of Russia's interests (Filatova 2009).

On the other hand, Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius criticise Moscow for not acknowledging their forced incorporation into the USSR and the crimes committed by the communist authorities, namely the 1941 and 1947 mass deportations (Lehti, Jutila and Jokisipilä 2008, 398; Racevskis 2007, 47; Kasekamp 2010, 145-46). Since their accession to the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, the Baltics have sought the "pan-European acknowledgement of Eastern European sufferings in the war" (Mälksoo 2009a, 660). More concretely, the Baltics states, as well as other Central and Eastern states, have attempted to "institutionalise politically and juridically a particular remembrance of the communist totalitarian regimes" at the European Union and OSCE's level (Mälksoo 2015, 226). This "clash of narratives" (Mälksoo 2009b, 98) reached its zenith in April 2007, when Tallinn's decision to relocate a Soviet war monument was met with hostility by the Kremlin and was followed by a wave of cyberattacks targeting Estonian websites (Traynor 2007).

The Baltic-Russian relations have been further deteriorated by the Kremlin's growing assertiveness in the international arena, in particular by the military interventions in Georgia (2008), and particularly in Ukraine (2014). Although the Kremlin appears not to be "seeking a full military confrontation with the West", but rather "mid-level conflicts or crises, enough to build up a siege mentality and galvanise public support" that are "not enough to risk serious confrontation" (Wesslau and Wilson 2015, 2), the Baltics have been alarmed by Russia's assertiveness and sought the reinforcement of NATO's eastern flank (Reuters 2014a).

However, the Kremlin's growing assertiveness does not confine to military interventions. In fact, Moscow has also been actively pursuing a "heavy metal diplomacy" whose main components are "threats of potential military action, wargames which pointedly simulate such operations, the deployment of combat units in ways which also convey a political message, and intrusions close to and into European airspace, waters and even territory" (Galeotti 2016a).

Russia has also used its vast energy resources and policies as a geopolitical tool (Maness and Valeriano 2015, 11). More concretely, the Kremlin has used its gas and oil resources to reward its allies ("petro-carrots") or to punish the states that refuse to conform to Moscow ("petro-sticks"), namely the Baltic states, Ukraine and Georgia (Newnham 2011, 134). After the Soviet implosion, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania remained greatly dependent on Russia's energy resources, owing to "limited energy resources[3], geographic proximity, and the legacy of Soviet era infrastructure" (Grigas 2013, 40). While there was a degree of interdependence during the 90's, the energy relations evolved into one-sided Baltic dependence on Russia when Moscow cut-out the Baltic states from the transit business" (2013, 41) and chose to develop its own export infrastructure and increasingly relied on the Russian ports on the Baltic sea, namely in Primorsk.

Taking into consideration Russia's growing assertiveness in its "near abroad", the following research question is formulated: has Moscow's 18 March 2014 annexation of Crimea led to a (re)securitisation of a Russian threat in the Baltic states? Two hypotheses are tested:

1 – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (de)securitised Russia after their accession to the Atlantic Alliance and to the European Union in 2004.

2 – There has been a (re)securitisation of Russia in the three Baltic countries since the former's intervention in Ukraine in 2014.

The decision to study the construction of Russia as a threat in the three Baltic republics – which takes place against the background of the security interdependence between the former and the latter –, can be justified on the grounds that the annexation of Crimea and the Kremlin's role in the pro-Russian insurgency in Eastern Ukraine (Sutyagin 2015; NATO 2014; Girkin 2014, quoted in Dolgov 2014) – a claim denied by Moscow (Demirjian 2015) –, has sparked off a debate on whether Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are the next target of the Kremlin's revisionism (Berman 2014; Thieme 2014; Solovjova 2016). NATO's former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe has raised the possibility of a Russian attack against the Baltics:

> "I think he (Putin) would love nothing more than to see NATO destroyed. What better way of destroying NATO than to snatch the Baltic states, threaten NATO with nuclear weapons? NATO backs off, NATO collapses as an alliance. I don't think that's too far-fetched" (Shirreff 2016, quoted in Friedman 2016).

3 The only noteworthy exception are Estonia's vast shale oil resources (Kearns and Tuohy 2015).

The predictions that the Baltic sea may be next flashpoint between the Kremlin and NATO are based on Russia's military exercises and military build-up near the Baltics' borders. As pointed out by Lucas (2015, 2), Russia had been conducting "aggressive surprise military exercises where the scenario involves attack" against some of NATO Eastern members even before the onset of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in March 2014. The prime examples were Zapad-09 and Ladoga 2009, in which Russian troops rehearsed the invasion and occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as an attack with nuclear weapons against Warsaw (Lucas 2015, 8). Moscow's growing assertiveness has made not only the three Baltic republics, but the whole "Baltic sea region a test case for European security" (Major and Voss 2016). By way of example, in March 2013, four Russian Tupolev Tu-22M3 bombers simulated a nuclear attack against targets in Stockholm (Oliphant 2016). While assessing the likelihood of a military conflict in the Baltics is *not* one of the goals of this dissertation, the geopolitical importance of the Baltic sea region, as underlined above, provides a strong justification for this study.

Whereas the time period covered in this dissertation stretches from 1991 and the present, the greater focus will be on events that took place after 2004 (Chapter III) and 2014 (Chapter IV). The rationale for this choice is twofold. Firstly, the chosen frame period allows us to gauge whether the Baltic states' integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures in 2004 have contributed to mitigate what in the 90's seemed to be the Baltics' perennial concerns vis-à-vis Russia. Secondly, Moscow's 2014 military intervention in Ukraine marks "an important watershed in Europe's security" (Nünlist and Thränert 2016) that has aggravated the Baltics' sense of insecurity vis-à-vis Moscow (Jakniunaite 2016, 6), and therefore, it is pertinent evaluate what changes have occurred in the Baltics' security discourse and practices since 2014.

The Copenhagen School's theory of securitisation was chosen as the theoretical framework because the dynamics and concepts outlined in that theory capture the logic of the Baltic states' articulation of Russia as a threat. Rather that aiming to determine whether threats are "real", securitisation focuses on how a securitising agent is able to persuade an audience of the existence of a threat to a valued referent object (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998). Taking into consideration that securitisation processes tend to be dominated by powerful actors within the state (Emmers 2013, 134), the securitising agents we focus on are the foreign policy establishments of the Baltic states, in particular the heads of state, but also chiefs of government, ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs and other members of the cabinet, as well as members of both national and European parliaments.

It is important to stress that securitisation can be understood as a form of othering or, to be more precise, as the most extreme version of articulating the "other" in international relations. In the Baltic-Russian relations, practices of normative othering, whereby the other is depicted as inferior and accused of violating universal principles, have coexisted with securitisation processes. By way of example, the Baltic states and Russia have denied the other place within the Western normative framework (Morozov 2005). In light of the above, we draw upon Diez's discursive strategies of othering (2005) in order to refine our theoretical framework and analyse the nuances in the Baltic states' construction of Russia.

A multiple case study is the research strategy chosen to answer the research question. According to Yin (2003, 14), the single case study and the multiple case study are two variants of the case study design. This approach helps construct robust and detailed explanations of a case or a set of specific cases, based on a thorough and intensive examination. The multiple case study variant was chosen because it enhances the explanatory power and the generalisation potential of the findings (Miles and Huberman 1994, 172). Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are chosen as case studies because, as mentioned above, they form a common micro-region, share a very similar historical trajectory and have similar security concerns (Auers 2015, 3; Buzan and Waever 2003, 414-16; Miniotaite 2003).

In order to provide an answer to the research question and test the outlined hypotheses, this dissertation is based on qualitative research methods. Both primary and secondary sources are analysed. The main primary sources analysed are speeches, interviews, remarks and articles by the respective foreign policy establishments mentioned above. The method of discourse analysis is pertinent because it helps "to map the emergence and evolution of patterns of representation which are constitutive of a threat image" (Balzacq 2011, 39). The secondary sources used are scientific articles, books and policy briefs. Particular attention is devoted to Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian websites in English language, such as *Delfi*, *the Baltic Times*, *Latvian Information Agency*, *Public Broadcasting of Latvia* and the *Estonian Public Broadcasting*.

The participation in the Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI) Summer School "NATO Beyond the Warsaw Summit: Adapting to the New Realities" (July 2016), co-sponsored by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division, and in the University of Tartu "Transition Stories from the Soviet Union to the EU: Reasons and Consequences" education programme (August 2016), substantially contributed to this dissertation. Appendices 1 and 2 provide a brief list of both Summer Schools' programmes.

The six month internship undertaken at the Embassy of Portugal in Finland was also instrumental in gaining first-hand knowledge of Estonia's foreign and security policies. Since 2011, the Portuguese Permanent Mission to Finland has also covered Estonia. Appendix 3 provides a concise list of the tasks performed during the internship.

In order to answer the research question, this dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter I is devoted to the theoretical framework. We start by briefly situating the emergence of the Copenhagen School within post-Cold War Security Studies. Then, we provide our definition of securitisation, contrasting it with the securitisation original framework (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998). Lastly, we show how securitisation can be understood as the most extreme strategy of othering.

Chapter II analyses how the Baltics and Russia's security perceptions have become closely interlinked as a consequence of their recent shared history. Firstly, this chapter explains how the period of Soviet occupation forms the background against which the contemporary Baltic-Russian relations take place. Then, we proceed to show how the Baltic states have securitised Russia in their discourses and practices since 1991. The articulation of Moscow as a threat manifested itself in the decision to anchor their independence in the principle of legal continuation, in the adoption of exclusionary citizenship policies (Latvia and Estonia) and in their quest for integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures.

Chapter III seeks to ascertain whether Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia's accession to the EU and NATO led to a (de)securitisation of Russia. Firstly, we examine the Baltics' foreign and security policy between 2004 and 2014. Then, we (1) evaluate the Baltic-Russian relations during the time frame indicated above against the background of the securitisation of historical narratives, and finally we (2) assess the bilateral relations between each Baltic republic and Russia until 2014.

Chapter IV aims to analyse whether Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been (re)securitising Russia following the latter's military intervention in Ukraine. We begin by briefly contextualising Russia's intervention in Ukraine in 2014. Then, we analyse the impact of Moscow's actions in Ukraine on the Baltic republics, in terms of discourse and relevant policy changes. The nuances in Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius' responses will be carefully assessed.

Chapter I – Securitisation as a form of othering

1.1 Security Studies after the Cold War: the emergence of the Copenhagen School

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Empire, coupled with the emergence of transnational security challenges, risks and threats (Sperling 2007, 263), has generated a debate on whether the realist core assumption of the sub-field of Security Studies[4] are still valid. As recalled by Morgan (2007, 24), the collapse of the Cold War brought an end to the bipolar order that neorealists had deemed as inherently more stable and durable, and even more significantly, the Soviet Union collapsed owing to internal developments, and not due "to a great war or systemic pressures". Traditionally, security ought to be conceived as freedom from any objective military threat to the state survival in an anarchic international system (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998, 203-4). In other words, the thing to be secured – the referent object – was the state, and security would depend upon military power. In that regard, one of the proponents of the traditional concept of security is Walt (1991, 212), according to whom:

> "The main focus of security studies is easy to identify, however: it is the phenomenon of war. Security studies assume that conflict between states is always a possibility and the use of military force has far-reaching effects on states and societies (...). Accordingly, security studies may be defined as the study of the threat, use, and control of military force".

In the last two decades, the realist hegemony in the discipline has become contested, and there have been attempts to broaden the agenda of the field. In that regard, it is pertinent to stress the central role played by the Copenhagen School[5], whose contributions have challenged the traditionally limited scope of Security Studies by deepening and widening the concept of security (Sulovic 2010). "Deepening" because Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998) emphasise that

4 It is pertinent to stress that we start from two key premises: Security Studies are treated here as a sub-field of International Relations (Collins 2013, Walt 1991, 212; Terriff et al 1999, 12) and its emergence as a distinct field of study dates back to the post-World War II period (Buzan and Waever 2013, 395).

5 The "Copenhagen Coterie of International Relations" (Neumann 1996, 162), more commonly known as the "Copenhagen School" of Security Studies (McSweeney 1996), emerged at the Conflict and Peace Research Institute (COPRI) in Copenhagen (Collins 2016) and is generally taken to include Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, and an array of other, more loosely associated, researchers (Munster 2012).

security should be opened to referent objects other than the state, namely individuals, social groups and the environment, and "widening" due to the adoption of a sectoral approach. More concretely, while Security Studies have traditionally attached "permanent priority to one sector (the military) and one actor (the state) plus any links or crossovers from other sectors that relate directly to the use of force" (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998, 207), the Copenhagen School expand the security agenda to four additional sectors, each one identifying concrete types of interaction – environmental, economic, societal and political (Buzan 2015).

However, broadening of the subject matter can threaten the intellectual coherence of Security Studies as a distinct sub-field of International Relations (Collins 2013, 2). As summarised by Emmers (2013, 132),

> "A crucial question, though, is whether the concept of security can be broadened to such an extent without losing its coherence. There is a risk if overstretching the definition of security, with the result that everything, and therefore nothing in particular, ends up being a security problem."

In order to avoid the risk mentioned above, the authors associated with the Copenhagen School maintain that it is possible "to retain a distinctive subject area and to restore intellectual coherence to the wider agenda" by drawing a difference between politicisation and securitisation (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998, 208), as it will be demonstrated below. Securitisation theory is premised on a constructivist notion of security, in the sense that "security is a quality actors inject into issues by securitising them" (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998, 204), and therefore, the focus of the analyst is not determine if a threat is "real" (Sheehan 2005, 53), but rather to determine if something is successfully articulated as such. In other words, by focusing on processes of securitisation – the social processes through which something is constructed as a threat – rather than on "objective" threats, the Copenhagen School authors offer "a constructivism-all-the-way-down counterpoint to the materialist threat analysis of traditional Strategic Studies and realism" (Buzan 2015, 5).

1.2 Processes of securitisation: how threats are constructed

A process of securitisation involves a referent object and a securitising agent, and it occurs when the latter portrays the former as being existentially threatened, thereby legitimising the

adoption of extraordinary measures aimed at ensuring its survival (Emmers 2013, 133; Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998, 36). The rhetorical structure of securitisation or, in other words, the "internal" conditions of the speech act, must follow "a plot that includes an existential threat, a point of no return and a possible way out" (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998, 33). Therefore, security issues' distinctiveness rests on the sense of urgency and absolute priority that is attached to them (Hough 2008, 18; Mälksoo 2006, 278).

In addition to presenting an issue as an imminent threat, a successful securitisation only takes place if a relevant audience also acknowledges the existence of an ostensible threat to a valued referent object. If that recognition does not take place, the discursive construction would merely constitute a securitising move (Brandão 2015, 47; Emmers 2013, 124). In other words, the securitisation model involves two stages: (1) presenting an imminent and existential threat to a valued referent object and (2) an acceptance by a relevant audience of the threat articulated by the securitising agent.

As emphasised by Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998, 36) and Roe (2008, 632), a security action is customarily performed on behalf of, and in connection with a group of people. In light of that, it must be noted that securitisation processes tends to be dominated by powerful actors that occupy a privileged position within the state, particularly its authorised representatives (Emmers 2013, 134). In fact, the greater the power and influence (social capital) wielded by the securitising agent the more likely is the securitising move to be successful. The state's political elites, particularly in western liberal democracies, tend to predominate over other potential securitising actors by virtue of the legitimacy derived from having been chosen by the electorate (Collins 2005; Emmers 2013, 134).

In addition to the securitising actor's social capital, the other external elements of the speech act are the "features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitisation" (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998, 33). This "other facet is contextual" (Balzacq 2005, 182) since it refers to the "heuristic artifacts (metaphors, political tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.)" which are "contextually mobilised by the securitising agent" with the aim of prompting "the audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions)" (Balzacq 2011).

According to the securitisation model (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998), the success of the securitising move does not hinge on the implementation of extraordinary measures. "Extraordinary measures" are here defined as measures that go beyond rules ordinarily abided

by and are therefore located outside the usual bounds of political procedures and practices" (Emmers 2013, 135). Some illustrative cases would be "levying taxes or conscription, placing limitations on otherwise inviolable rights, or focusing society's energy and resources on a specific task" (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998, 24). According to Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998), a successful securitisation would not *necessarily* entail the adoption of exception measures:

> "We do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to be adopted, only that the existential threat has to be argued with enough resonance for a platform to be made which it is possible to legitimise emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, points of no return, and necessity" (1998, 25).

However, "resonance" has been considered a problematic category (Salter 2011). As a matter of fact, if the category mentioned above is taken as the fundamental criterion to determine whether the audience has validated the claim articulated by the securitiser, a fundamental question would inevitably arise: how can "resonance" be adequately assessed (Williams 2011a, 217)? Acknowledging that limitation, Salter (2011, 121) maintains that policy change is an inseparable part and the touchstone of every successful securitisation process:

> "There must be some *public policy change, either in discourse, budget, or in actual policy*: resonance is simply too unstable a category to really evaluate, and can lead to analysis by counter-factual (though no measure was taken, there might have been, would have been, could have been)." (The italic is ours).

Floyd (2011, 428-29) also underlines the centrality of policy change:

> "A securitisation is complete only if the warning/promise made in the speech act is followed up by a *change in relevant behaviour by a relevant agent* (the securitising actor or someone instructed by the same) that is *justified by this agent with reference to the declared threat.*" (The italic is ours).

Taking that into consideration, a successful securitisation would thus be comprised of both a discursive (speech act and a shared understanding between securitising agent and audience) and a non-discursive (security practice) components (Emmers 2013, 135; Floyd 2010, 52-4; Salter 2011).

Processes of securitisation should be seen as an intensification of normal politics[6]. In fact, there is no clear-cut contrast between the sphere of normal politics, where problems "are dealt with by ordinary measures once more" (Floyd 2011, 436), and the sphere of security, as both realms are part of the same continuum (Mälksoo 2015, 229; Williams 2011b, 459). While some authors tend to portray securitisation processes as leading to anti-democratic measures (Laustsen and Waever 2000, 708), "the extent to which securitisation necessitates a lack of openness and deliberation has been over-exaggerated" in the context of liberal democracies (Roe (2012, 251). As pointed out by Roe (2012, 260), "extraordinary politics (in the form of the expedition of legislation, for example) does not mean an abandonment of legislative mechanisms" because "a degree of scrutiny and oversight nevertheless remains", even if the legislative process is significantly accelerated.

The opposite of securitisation is desecuritisation, and it occurs whenever a certain issue departs from the sphere of "emergency politics" and returns to the ordinary political sphere (Aras and Polat 2008). Even though Buzan, Waever and Wilde demonstrate a normative commitment towards desecuritisation by noting that desecuritisation should be pursued as a long-term goal (1998, 29), we contend that securitisation should not be taken as intrinsically "good" or "bad" (Emmers 2013, 136). In fact, whereas the securitisation of an issue can give "previously unjustifiable security actions an unwarranted basis of legitimacy" (Grayson 2003, 339) and be exploited to limit civil liberties, restraint the influence of opposition forces or "detain political opponents without trial", securitising can also provide the impetus to mobilise sustained political and popular support tackle complex issues (Emmers 2013, 136).

Despite the claim that securitisation is "an essentially intersubjective process" (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998, 26-31), one of the most problematic aspects of the Copenhagen School's securitisation framework is "the under-theorised conceptualisation of the audience and its role in securitisation processes" (Léonard and Kaunert 2011, 74). While it can be argued that the motives for not providing a rigid definition stem from the fact that every audience is case specific, it can also be contended that, it is vital to establish the characteristics common to all audiences owing to the essential role they play in the securitisation framework (Vaughn 2009, 273).

---

6 While the notion of "normal politics remains unpacked by the Copenhagen School" (Mälksoo 2006, 278), the "normal politics" inferred in the framework of securitisation are those of liberal democracy (Aradau 2004).

In that context, we follow the definition provided by Balzacq (2011, 8-9), according to which an "empowering audience" has two main characteristics: a direct relationship with the issue being discussed as a threat and the power to authorise the adoption of measures aimed at tackling that threat. As noted by Roe (2008), the audience can be divided into the general public, which provides "moral" support, and policy-makers - in particular parliaments - that can provide the "formal" support to implement exceptional measures (Roe 2008). Even though "moral" backing influences and to a larger extent determines "formal" support, the two should not be conflated as it is only "the formal decision by an institution (for instance, in the form of a vote by the Parliament, Security Council, or Congress) that mandates the government to adopt a specific policy (Balzacq 2011, 9).

Furthermore, we believe it is debatable that securitisation can be simultaneously conceptualised as a "self-referential practice", in which an issue "becomes a security issue not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such" (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998, 24), and as an "intersubjective process" (1998, 30) based upon a negotiation between the securitising agent and the audience (Williams 2011a, 213; Léonard and Kaunert 2011, 60; Balzacq 2005, 177-8; Silovic 2010, 5). "How can the act of speaking security be performative if it relies on the consent of the audience" (Vultee 2011, 77)? In fact, whereas the Copenhagen School presents securitisation as an interactive process based upon the fundamental relationship between the securitiser and the empowering audience, that very relationship has not been addressed in the original model (Williams 2011a, 213). Therefore, the Copenhagen school "seems to lean towards self- referentiality, rather than intersubjectivity" (Balzacq 2005).

In conclusion, the main objective of the analyst is not to assess whether there is indeed a "real" threat to the very existence of a valued referent object, but rather to assess, not only if the securitising actor was successful in staging something as an existential threat, but also if that depiction has been accepted by a relevant audience and translated into relevant policy change.

According to Buzan and Waever (2003, 44), securitisation and desecuritisation processes in the international system predominantly manifest themselves and are more visible in regional clusters. A regional security complex (RSC), a theory introduced by Buzan (1991), refers to a geographically coherent set of two or more states whose security perceptions are closely interlinked (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998; Buzan and Waever (2003). Owing to that security interdependence, the security problems of each state within the complex cannot be examined

apart from one another (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998, 12). The security interdependence among the states of those complexes is both a deep and durable feature, and it can be characterised as positive (friendship) or negative (enmity).

A prime example of states whose relations are marked by security interdependence are the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and Russia. Despite the imminent prospects of those three Baltic republics accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures, Buzan and Waever (2003, 415) stress that "at the opening of the twenty-first century, the Baltics states are in the Russia-centred complex irrespective of how much dislike this", on the grounds that, despite being part of the West for most purposes, "security-wise they are not" (2003, 413). The Baltic-Russian relations are marked by negative security interdependence: while the Baltics' primary security concern has been Russia, Moscow has securitised the Russian-speaking minorities of the Baltic states, depicting the three Baltic republics (particularly Estonia and Latvia) as posing a threat to those Russophone communities (Buzan and Waever (2003, 431). Furthermore, security interdependence has also characterised the Baltic-Russian relations after Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania's accession to the Atlantic Alliance and to the European Union in 2004, especially on the "memory front", as it will be analysed in chapter IV.

Whereas our objective is *not* to assess whether the Baltic states are part of a Russia- centred or an EU-centre security complex, the security interdependence between Russia and the Baltic states is the background against which this study takes place. More concretely, our main goal is to assess if securitisation processes have dominated the discursive construction of Moscow in the Baltics. In other words, the aim is to analyse if Moscow has been depicted as an existentially threatening "other" by Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius and, concurrently, if the Baltics' depiction of Russia has been translated into specific policy actions.

1.3 Securitisation as an extreme othering process

As emphasised by Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998, 120), threats are premised on an inherent depiction of something as posing a threat to some "we"– and often thereby contributing to the construction or reproduction of "us". In other words, securitisation is a form of othering (Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998, 120), in the sense that it presupposes an unambiguous demarcation between what we aim to protect and the "other" that presents a threat to it. Therefore, "to speak security is to employ a discourse of danger inter-subjectively depicting that

which is different from self as an existential threat – and therefore as other to self" (Jaeger 2000, 23). Williams (2003, 519-20) also stresses that the ability to establish the limit of a given identity, to contrast it to what is not, "to cast this as a relationship of threat or even enmity" is indispensable to a successful securitisation.

However, practices of othering do not inevitably entail the articulation of difference as an existential threat. As noted by Hansen (2006, 5), "constructions of identity can take on different degrees of 'Otherness,' ranging from fundamental difference between Self and Other to constructions of less than radical difference". Mälksoo (2009, 66) makes a similar point, stressing that it is possible to differentiate "between shades of otherness in the scale between difference and outright threat to self's identity".

Central to all practices of othering is the notion of identities. The concept of national identity refers to relatively stable set of conceptualisations and expectations about the self (Ehin and Berg 2008, 9). Some authors, particularly McSweeney (1996, 83), contend that the Copenhagen School (CS) reifies identities, treating them as mere "objective realities, out there to be discovered and analysed". As stressed by Booth, the core of the disagreement between McSweeney (1996) and Buzan and Waever (1997) is the notion of identity: while the former sees it as a process, the latter, while not treating it as fixed, claim that they tend to become relatively constant and sedimented (Booth 2005, 36). Even though they may not be fixed and, therefore, are subject to change, Buzan and Waever (1998, 205) point out that "identities as other social constructions can petrify and become relatively constant elements to be reckoned with". Once identities become sedimented, beliefs and institutions change only slowly (Theiler 2003, 254).

Despite the debate regarding the notion of identity, there is still a lack of consensus on how to understand the relations between self and other (Berenskoetter 2007, 657), namely whether (1) a spatial/external other is needed for the construction of identity and (2) if othering invariably leads to the construction of the other as an outright threat (Morozov and Rumelili 2012, 29).

With regard to the first question, it must be stressed that "identities are always constituted in relation to difference because a thing can only be known by what is not" (Rumelili 2004, 29), and as a corollary to that, the emergence of a global identity will never be possible, as all identities must be comprised of frontiers and a sense of Other (Brown 2001, 131). Diez (2004, 320) also underlines the interdependence of identities, underlining that "our own identity is foundationally linked to the other, and these are present whenever we invoke" ours.

Processes of identity construction can involve the articulation of difference vis-à-vis a past identity, but they may also involve external/spatial others (Abizadeh 2005, 58). One prime example of constructing identity having the self's past as other is the European Union, whose "other", as eloquently put by Waever (1998, 90), has predominantly been "Europe's own past which should not be allowed to become its future". However, it must be taken into consideration that temporal and exclusionary forms of difference are becoming more prevalent. In that context, Diez (2004, 325-33) underlines that forms of "geopolitical" (or "traditional") forms of othering, in which identity, politics and geography are closely interlinked, have become more and more frequent since the 90's, including in the European Union, citing the othering of Islam and Turkey as prime examples.

As regards the second question, it should be highlighted that, even though identity construction generally involves some form of antagonism and negativity, the relations between self and other are not necessarily characterised by patterns of reciprocal exclusion and the depiction of the other as an outright threat to one's identity (Morozov and Rumelili, 2012; Rumelili 2004, 29). As pointed by Morozov and Rumelili (2012), othering can also be characterised as being hybridizing practices that involves both positive and negative representations, as it is the case with some "liminal entities"1, part European and part not European. Others, namely Berenskoetter (2007, 658), even consider that identity can be constructed through "positive otherness", claiming that the negative other simultaneously defines and presupposes a positive other (the friend).

In order to further illustrate the different forms of othering, Diez (2005, 628-29) proposes the existence of four categories[7] to demonstrate the existence of multiple strategies of constructing "self" and "other" in international politics:

1. First strategy: Representation of the other as an existential threat.
2. Second strategy: Representation of the other as inferior.
3. Third strategy: Representation of the other as violating universal principles.
4. Fourth strategy: Representation of the other as different.

---

7 In his response to Diez's article (2005), Manners (2006, 178) identified one more strategy of othering: the other as self. According to him, the other is invariably part of the self, as it embodies the otherness that the self aims to expunge from itself. As a result, while projecting this representation externally, the self "tends to view the other through the lenses of its 'inner demons'" (Korosteleva 2012, 58).

While the first strategy corresponds to the notion of securitisation and was already analysed, the other strategies need to be further clarified. In the second category – depiction of the other as inferior and backward – the self is articulated as superior to the other. In that respect, practices of Orientalism (Said 1979), which largely correspond to "a particular Western style of defining, dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient that produces the alleged Western superiority and hegemony over the East", are a classic example of this strategy (Mälksoo 2010, 56).

While it is also premised on the notion that the self's superior, the third category is a stronger version of the second. As noted by Diez 2005 (628), in this normative strategy of othering, the standards of the self are not merely perceived as superior, but of "universal validity", leading to accusations of disregard for universal principles. Accordingly, "it becomes a duty of the self to enforce value-alignment onto the other, for the universal good" (Korosteleva 2012, 58).

In the fourth category, there is no evident value-judgment, as the "other" is only articulated as different. Despite still imposing an identity on the other, Diez (2005, 628) considers it preferable to the other three strategies, as it is far less likely to grant legitimacy to "harmful interference with the other" (2005, 629).

As it was demonstrated, practices of othering do not necessarily entail the construction of the other as an existential threat. In other words, practices of othering do not necessarily equate to securitisation moves. Taking into consideration the existence of multiple forms of othering, our primary objective is to assess the Baltic states' security discourses and practices vis-à-vis Russia.

Chapter II – The Baltic states and Russia: a history of recent security interdependence

In the book *Baltic Facades: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since 1945*, Purs (2012) contends that the expression "Baltic states" is an artificial one that does not take into account the conspicuous ethnic, cultural and historical differences between the three Baltic republics. As emphasised by the former president (2006-2016) and minister of Foreign Affairs (1996-1998 and 1999-2002) of Estonia:

> "Unfortunately most if not all people outside Estonia talk about 'The Baltics'. This is an interesting concept, since what the three Baltic States have in common derives almost entirely from shared unhappy experiences imposed upon them from outside: occupations, deportations, annexation, sovietisation, collectivisation, russification. What these countries do not share is a common identity" (Ilves 1999).

In that regard, whereas Latvians and Lithuanians are Baltic peoples that speak the only two surviving Baltic languages – Latvian and Lithuanian (Cerpa 2001) –, Estonians are Finno-Ugric people linguistically and ethnically closely related to the Finns (Mawhood 2015). Furthermore, while Estonia is keen to refer itself as a Nordic country (Ilves 1999) and Lithuania as a Central European state (Brazauskas 1997), Latvians, owing to the country's geographical position (Annex 1), is more likely to stress its attachment to its Baltic image (Kesa 2011).

As regards historic differences, it must be emphasised that unlike Estonia and Latvia's, Lithuania's statehood goes back to the Middle Ages, first as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and then, from 1569 until its final partition by Prussia, Austria and Russia in 1795, as part of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (Elsuwege 2004, 4; Kasekamp 2010; Plakans 2011).

In spite of the differences mentioned above, the three states located on the Baltic Sea's eastern coast belong to the same geopolitical space, have a recent shared history and, above all, similar security concerns informing their foreign policy priorities (Praks 2015, 189; Miniotaite 2003, 211-13; Made 2011). While Huntington's (1996, 231) classification of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as the eastern boundary of Western Civilisation may be considered too simplistic, and not taking fully into account the Baltic countries' complex and multi-layered history, "he does capture the geographic vulnerability of the small Baltic nations, located in a flat[8], boggy, forested

8 The highest point in the Baltic states is the Suur Munamägi ("Great Egg Hill"), located in southeastern Estonia, is 318m high (Bousfield 2004, 34).

and sparsely populated region fought over by larger, more powerful neighbours for more than eight hundred years" (Auers 2015, 8).

Despite the differences listed above, the recent historic trajectory of the Baltic republics is very similar. In fact, before the outbreak of the conflict in 1914, the present-day states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were part of the Russian Empire[9]. Following their declarations of independence in 1918, the three Baltic republics fought successful independence wars against (albeit not exclusively) the Soviet Union, which would subsequently recognise the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian independence in three separate peace treaties signed in 1920 (Raun 1994). However, the Baltics' independence would be short-lived, ending abruptly in June 1940.

2.1 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the century XX: from independence to occupation

After more than two decades of independence (1918-1940), during which they became full-fledged members of the League of Nations, the three Baltic republics were first occupied by the Soviet Union on the eve of the Second World War, then by Nazi Germany (1941-1944) and once again by the USSR, between 1944 and 1991.

The prelude to the occupation of the Baltic republics was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact[10], signed in August 1939 by the URSS and Nazi Germany. The Nazi-Soviet Pact included a secret protocol, in which Berlin and Moscow delineated their spheres of influence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Poland and in the Romanian regions of Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and Hertz (Davies 2006, 146-7). The three Baltics were assigned to Moscow's control[11] and, as a consequence, they were invaded and occupied by the Red Army in June 1940.

As emphasised by Mazower (1999, 264), the Baltic republics met a far worse fate than the rest of Eastern European states, as "they were to be absorbed within the Soviet Union and subjected to a conscious policy of Russification". By way of example, a former Estonian

9 With the exception of the region of Klaipeda (also known as Memel), which had been part of Prussia and came into Lithuania's control in 1923 (for more information on the Memel dispute, see Encyclopedia Britannica 2016).

10 Officially known as the "Treaty of Non-aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" (German History in Documents and Images 2016).

11 According to the original protocol, "the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR" (The New York Times 1988). However, on September 29 Lithuania was relegated to the Soviet sphere of interest in exchange for a larger part of Poland (Davies 2006).

Constitutional Assembly member and presidential candidate in 1992[12], noted "that like the French in Algeria, the Russians expected the subject people to communicate with them in the language of the colonisers" and "language discrimination hit the Estonians even in public services", where Russian was made mandatory and Estonian became optional (Taagepera 1991, 479).

In addition to the de facto loss of independence, the Soviet occupations, in particular the longest one, represented territorial losses (Annex 2) and significantly altered the demographic composition of Latvia and Estonia[13] (Aalto 2005, 260; Viktorova 2007; Kasekamp 2010, 140; Auers 2015, 29-30; Mole 2012, 128-38). In that context, there is a discrepancy between Estonia and Latvia's current borders and the ones that were initially established by the 1920 Tartu and Riga Peace Treaties, respectively. After the incorporation of Estonia and Latvia into the USSR, Stalin transferred the territory around Jaanilinn (Ivangorod), situated on the right bank of the Narva river, and the Petserimaa (Pechory) region, as well the Abrene region, corresponding to 5% and 2% of the Estonian and Latvian territory, respectively, into the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic (Mole 2012, 129-30).

Lithuania, on the other hand, regained territory after its incorporation into the Soviet Union, namely its historical capital, Vilnius, which was occupied and annexed by Poland in 1920 and 1922, respectively, as well as the coastal city of Klaipeda (also known as Memel) from Germany. However, it should be mentioned the southernmost Baltic republic also lost a part of its territory to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Belarus and had a minor border dispute with Minsk over the Adutiskis railway station (Auers 2015, 29-30).

In addition to the above-mentioned territorial changes, the decades of Soviet occupation were marked by forced population transfers that led to significant changes in the ethnic composition of the Estonian and Latvian populations. The first massive deportation took already place in 1941 and its "main objective was to eliminate the nation's cultural, business, political, and military elite" (Altau 2015). In the second massive deportation (March 1949), also known as Operation "Coastal Surf", over 90,000 Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonian citizens were expelled from their countries (Strods and Kott 2002). Almost three-fourths (73%) of the citizens deported were

---

12 Rein Taagepera came third in the first round of the 1992 Estonian Presidential Elections with 23.4% (109,631) of the vote. Lennart Meri was elected president in the second of voting, which was held in the Estonian parliament (Estonian National Electoral Committee 2016, 83). The Estonian head of state has been chosen by the 101 members of the Parliament (Riigikogu) ever since.

13 For more information, see Annex 7.

women and children under the age of 16 (2002, 20). Owing to the high level of mortality among the Baltic “special settlers” – an expression which was used by the Soviet authorities –, “an entire population category was sent to slow extinction in the Siberian woods” (Misiunas and Taagepera 1990, 101). Pohl (1999) considers that the actions performed by the USSR amount to genocide, since they deliberately created the conditions whereby a national group would suffer unsustainable rates of mortality[14]. Unlike the 1941 deportation, whose main aim to decapitate the Baltic states' political and intellectual elite, the operation Priboi's main aim was to enforce collectivisation and to suppress the armed resistance of the Forest Brothers, the Baltic partisans that waged a guerrilla war against the Soviet forces until the mid 50's (Naimark 2010, 89; Mertelsmann 2016, 184-5; Laar 2007; Luksa 2010).

Whereas the ethnic composition of the Baltic States was considerably homogeneous in 1945, the lasting Russian occupation of Estonia and Latvia changed the ethnic makeup of those countries. To be more precise, at the end of World War II, the percentage of indigenous population was high in Latvia (80%), and even higher in Estonia (94%) (Kasekamp 2010, 154-155). However, the massive influx of industrial workers from Russia led to a sharp decline in the number of ethnic Estonians and Latvians during the Soviet occupation. By the year 1989, the percentage of titular Estonians and Latvians was only 62% and 52%, respectively (Kasekamp 2010, 154-155; Kattago 2008, 432; Plakans 2011, 153-158).

With regard to Lithuania, it must be noted that the percentage of ethnic Russians is significantly lower in comparison to the other two Baltic republics[15] (Galbreath, Lasas and Lamoreaux 2008, 28). Unlike Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania's ethnic composition did not change drastically during the last decades, as ethnic Lithuanians made up 79% and 80% of the total population in 1945 and 1989, respectively (Kasekamp 2010, 155). There were a number of reasons that prevented a dramatic change in the ethnic composition of Lithuania. According to Kasekamp (2010, 155), the main causes for the limited demographic changes were the fierce guerrilla warfare waged by the Lithuanian Forest Brothers, which dissuaded Russians from migrating to the country, the existence of fertility rates higher than in the other two Baltics and the influence wielded by the native members of the Lithuanian Communist Parties. In addition to that, the lack of intensive industrialisation in the country largely precluded the influx of a large

14 For a different view, see Polian (2001, quoted in Coleman 2001).

15 However, the Russian minority living in Lithuania is still significant, numbering 176,900, representing 5,8% of the total population (Lithuania Statistics 2015).

migrant labour force (Herd and Lofgren 2001). Lastly, Lithuania has a less long tradition of Russian settlement than the other two present-day Baltic republics, since the country only came under Russian dominance after the disintegration of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1795), which is more than a century after the incorporation of the then northernmost Baltic provinces into the Russian empire.

2.2 The Principle of Legal Continuity and the Baltic states' citizenship laws

In 1991, following more than four decades under Moscow's control, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have proclaimed their independence on the basis of legal continuity (Onken 2009, 40). In other words, the Baltic republics do not consider themselves as newly independent states, but rather as a continuation of the interwar republics that existed between 1918 and the beginning of the first Soviet occupation in June 1940 (Vikotorova 2007, 46-47). As a corollary to that, rather than having seceded from the USSR, the Baltic republics regained their independence following 50 years of foreign occupation (Zalimas 1999, 7). Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius' base their argumentation on the *ex injuria jus non oritur* principle, which postulates that illegal acts under international law cannot have legal consequences. Therefore, it can be contended that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were never legitimately part of the Soviet Union (Elsuwege 2015; Annus 2011, 26).

In addition to the above-mentioned principle, it can be contended that the Soviet annexation violated the bilateral treaties signed between the Baltic governments and the USSR, namely the Soviet-Latvian Non-Aggression Pact (1926), the Soviet-Estonian Non-Aggression Pact (1932), the Soviet–Lithuanian Non-Aggression Pact (1926), the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1932) and the three Mutual Assistance Treaties signed by the URSS and each Baltic republic in 1939.

In response to the Soviet annexation of the Baltic republics, most Western countries[16], namely the United States, have never recognised Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as Soviet Republics throughout the Cold War. Washington vehement opposition was informed by the Stimson Doctrine of 1932 and was made explicit in the so called "Welles Declaration", in which the then Secretary of State Welles claimed that Washington is "opposed to predatory activities no matter

16 Sweden was one of the few exceptions: Stockholm recognised the Baltics' incorporation into the Soviet Union de jure in 1944 and extradited to the Soviet Union 170 former Baltic soldiers who had been conscripted into the Waffen SS and had fled Soviet re-occupation (Reinfeldt 2011, quoted in The Swedish Wire 2011).

whether they are carried on by the use of force or by the threat of force" (Welles 1940, quoted in Fink 2015). The American position was more recently confirmed through the signing of the Baltic Charter, in which the Clinton Administration reiterated that Washington did not recognise the "forcible incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into the USSR" (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1998).

The Kremlin, however, has strenuously denied that the Soviet Union forcefully incorporated Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1940, claiming that the three Baltic republics voluntarily decided to join the URSS and, therefore, their independence ceased to exist as soon as they were de facto incorporated into the Soviet Union (Loeber 1999, 7; Onken 2009, 43). As a consequence, Moscow considers the three Baltic neighbours as former Soviet Republics and, therefore, as newly independent states (The New York Times 2005).

Natalia Narochnitskaya, former Duma MP, has claimed that the incorporation of the Baltic republics into the Soviet Union was completely legitimate, unlike the independence of the (sic) "semi-fascist" Baltic regimes in 1920 (Narochnitskaya, quoted in Morozov 2001, 232). In a recent interview to a Swedish newspaper, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, even accused Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius of not showing gratitude towards Moscow for letting them go "peacefully" in 1991 (Lavrov 2016, quoted in Associated Press 2016). The Russian Prosecutor General's announcement that the legality of a 1991 decision granting the Baltic states independence would be reviewed, together with the reopening of the 25-year criminal case against Lithuanians who had refused to be drafted to the Soviet Army in 1990-91[17], are yet two representative examples of how Moscow's narrative regarding the Baltics' independence and statehood is at odds with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia's (Grigas 2015; Hyndle-Hussein 2015, 2).

Not only does the principle of legal continuity constitute the bedrock of the Baltics' statehood, but it is also the background against which the current Baltic-Russian relations take place. The state continuity of the Baltic republics was clearly enshrined in the Baltics' declaration of independence. On 20 August 1991, the Supreme Council of Estonia adopted the Resolution on the National Independence, whereby it was stipulated that Estonia's de jure independence had never been suspended (Parliament of Estonia 2016). Furthermore, the new constitution, which was adopted in the following year, was partly linked to the interwar constitution of 1938, further cementing the principle of legal continuity. Likewise, Lithuania proclaimed the Re-Establishment

17 This decision would affect approximately 1,500 Lithuanians who avoided or hid from the Soviet draft following Vilnius's declaration of independence in March 1990 until Moscow officially confirmed Baltic independence the following year (Grigas 2015; Parks 1990).

of the State of Lithuania and Latvia adopted a similar resolution On the Restoration of Independence of the Republic in 1990 (Latvian Supreme Court 2016).

As Jaeger (2000) pertinently stresses, the Baltics' practices of inscribing the principle of historical continuity in state foundations can be defined as a kind of securitisation, "as they cast the entire state project as precarious if not firmly connected to the historic one". In other words, non-recognition of their legal continuity is perceived in the Baltic capitals as a threat to their very independence and statehood legitimacy.

The mutually exclusive views about whether the Baltic states are newly independent states or the continuation of the interwar Baltic republics is one of the major points of contention in the Baltic-Russian relations. "Even if Estonia (and the other two Baltic republics) is a state in hibernation (or one to be resurrected from the grave) was little more than a legal fiction, it nonetheless was one upon which real actions have been based" (Visek 1997, 330). In that regard, one of the most important corollaries of the principle of legal continuity was the citizenship laws adopted by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

Of the three Baltic republics, Lithuania's 1989 and 1991 citizenship laws were by far the most inclusionary ones, as Vilnius decided to grant automatic citizenship to all permanent citizens, without any language proficiency requirements and regardless of nationality (Onken 2009, 46; Herd and Lofgren 2001, 280). However, it was emphasised that the laws mentioned above did not mean that that the pre-war Lithuanian citizenship had become invalid, thereby reiterating that the Republic of Lithuania was a restored – and not a new – state (Mole 2012, 87). With respect to the Vilnius' citizenship law, it is important to bear in mind that, as it was explained above, the Soviet occupation of Lithuania did not lead to drastic changes in the ethnic composition of its population during, and therefore, the Russian-speaking community living in the country was not as significant as Estonia and Latvia's.

Differing greatly from Lithuania's "zero-option" citizenship policy, both the Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws, adopted respectively in 1995 and 1994, have been informed by more exclusionary views, and are based upon the principle of *jus sanguinis* (Mole 2012, 146). In that context, Estonia reinstated (albeit with some amendments) the 1938 Citizenship Law, and Latvia temporarily re-established the 1919 Citizenship Law. As a consequence, only the citizens of the interwar republics and their descendants were granted automatic citizenship in 1991. The other residents, who became stateless when the Soviet Union ceased to exist, are required to go

through a naturalization process in order to become Estonian and Latvian citizens[18] or, in alternative, adopt the citizenship of a third state (for example, Russia).

One of the main arguments used to justify the pertinence of Riga and Tallinn's citizenship laws[19] was the fact that, from the legal continuity standpoint, the Soviet era migrants that settled in Estonia and Latvia were technically illegal immigrants and, therefore, were not eligible to citizenship (Taagepera 1991, 480). Another rationale for the above-mentioned laws was given by the former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, who underlined that "setting standards for citizenship through language requirements is a way to break the isolation of the ethnic Russians and improve the prospects of at least integration" into the Latvian and Estonian societies (Bildt 1994).

Even though they did not preclude the granting of automatic citizenship to non-Estonians and non-Latvians, the reinstitution of the interwar citizenship laws was, according to the former deputy prime-minister of Estonia Rein Mullerson, motivated by a desire for ethnic purity[20] (Müllerson 1994, 312). As Herd and Lofgren (2001, 276-8) have noted, Estonia and Latvia have securitised the threat posed by their Russian-speaking "colonial"[21] minorities to the "dominant position of the titular nation" and also to their very independence as sovereign states. The implicit aim of those laws was to assure that the first post-occupation legislative elections had "overwhelmingly ethnic Estonian and Latvian electorates" (Auers 2015, 81). In order to stabilise their national identities after almost five decades under Soviet control, the Baltic republics, in particular Latvia and Estonia, needed to cement the Soviet/Russian "Other", which led to the exclusion of the Russian-speaking minority, and by extension, of the Russian language and culture as far as possible (Mole 2012, 83).

The perceived threat posed by the sizable Russophone communities was clearly encapsulated in the words of the former Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1992-1994) and member of the

---

18 In Latvia, the percentage of non-citizens has dropped from 29% (approximately 730 000) in 1995 – when the naturalization process began – to 12% (257 377) in July 2015. Therefore, 84% of Latvia's residents are now citizens. "As of 31 July 2015, 143 061 persons have been granted Latvian citizenship through the naturalization procedure" (Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015a). In Estonia, the share of persons of undetermined citizenship has drastically decreased from 32% in 1992 to 6.1% in January 2016. From 1992 to June 2015, a total of 158 532 persons have acquired Estonian citizenship through the naturalisation process. The majority of these residents chose to do during the 1990s, with "more than 110 000 people between the years 1992 and 2000)" (Estonia.eu 2016).

19 The citizenship laws of Estonia and Latvia are very similar, with the sole important difference being that non-citizens cannot vote in municipal elections in Latvia (Moore, Kathleen 2003). However, both Estonian and Latvian non-citizens cannot vote in parliamentary elections.

20 Only 8-10% of restored citizenship included non-Estonians (Geistlinger and Kirch 1995, 72).

21 For a discussion on whether it is appropriate to speak about the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states as "colonisation", see Annus (2012).

European Parliament (MEP), Georgs Andrejevs: “Russia, by using its diaspora as a fifth column (...) is seeking to create a situation enabling forces which are not Latvian to come to power and to annex Latvia to Russia” (Andrejevs 1993, quoted in Spruds 2009, 107). Likewise, Endel Lippmaa, a former Estonian minister during the governments of Edgar Savisaar (1991-1992) and the first government of Tiit Vähi (1992), stressed that “granting Estonian citizenship to non-ethnic residents, including Russians, could ruin the republic’s sovereignty from within” (Lippmaa 1992, quoted in Mole 2012, 83). In other words, the first years after Estonia and Latvia’s (re-)independence were marked by the perception that the Russian-speaking minorities were disloyal to the state and a potential instrument that could be used by Moscow to sabotage both countries independence from within.

2.3 Baltics’ pre-enlargement foreign policy: The quest for Euro-Atlantic integration as existential politics

The pre-enlargement foreign policies of the Baltic states had three major components: “restoration, redress and deterrence” (Galbreath, Lasas and Lamoreaux 2008, 59). More concretely, the main objectives of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were to restore their interwar republics, rectify to the extent possible the effects of their forced incorporation into the Soviet Union and securitise the threat posed by the Kremlin, namely by precluding their inclusion in Russia’s sphere of influence and seeking integration with the West.

After regaining their independence, the Baltics’ decision to adopt an unambiguous pro-Western foreign policy and seek the full integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, particularly the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, was only clearly expressed in the mid-1990’s, after the idea of neutrality was discarded (Miniotaite 2003, 214; Scerbinskis 2005, 165). According to Auers (2015, 198), even though the goal of Western integration was soon agreed upon, the three Baltic republics “maintained a façade of neutrality” until the last Russian troops left their countries in 1993 (Lithuania) and 1994 (Estonia and Latvia), “in order to avoid antagonising” the Kremlin.

The Baltics’ rejection of neutrality is intimately connected with their recent history, as their neutral stance in World War Two did not avoid their occupations by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (Meri 1995). The perception that neutrality was not an option to be considered was corroborated by the former Estonian ambassador to the Atlantic Alliance, Harri Tiido: “We've

been trying different options during previous century, they didn't work. So now, we are trying to get all the security guarantees we can find, and NATO is definitely the only hard security guarantee available" (Tiido 2003). Prior to NATO's Riga Summit (2006), the former Latvian president used the same argument by noting that "Latvia tried to be neutral before the Second World War, but nobody respected that neutrality", and therefore, "a sure way of ensuring the integrity of our territory and the sovereignty of our nation" was to attain NATO membership (Vike-Freiberga 2006, quoted in Cameron 2006). Despite sharing the same foreign policy priorities, the Baltic republics, rather than coordinating their efforts, decided to operate separately and, sometimes, even as rivals[22], stressing their unique geographic and historical features (Miniotaite 2011, 105). In fact, even the main military cooperation projects of the three Baltic republics (Annex 3) were fundamentally brought together by third parties, namely Denmark, which were "primarily thinking about their own national security interests and the possibility to bandwagon the USA by supporting Washington's role to limit" Moscow's influence in the Baltic sea region (Molis 2009, 31).

The decision to apply for NATO membership – which was more contentious than the application for EU membership owing to Moscow's staunch opposition – was only openly stated in 1994. It was that year that the Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas sent a letter to NATO's Secretary General Worner, expressing the Lithuanian political parties' consensus regarding NATO membership and requesting Vilnius' accession to the Alliance (Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). The former Estonian president, Lennart Meri, also stated in 1994 that Tallinn's main foreign policy goals were the "early integration into the EU, WEU and NATO" (Meri 1994).

The decision to apply for EU and NATO membership was mainly informed by the Baltic republics' security concerns towards Moscow (Jakniunaite 2009, 123). The Baltic republics, as small states, lacked the capabilities for guaranteeing their security vis-á-vis a great power like Russia. As emphasised by the current Lithuanian MFA and former minister of National Defence, Linas Linkevicius (1998), "Lithuania is not in a position to guarantee security on its own (i.e., autonomously), bearing in mind its size, resources, economic strength, and geopolitical situation", thus "collective security guarantees are essential for security". In that context,

22 The Baltic republics' rivalry manifested itself in disputes during the 90's, namely between Estonia and Lithuania regarding meat imports – which became known as "meat war" (The Baltic Times 1998) –, and between Estonia and Latvia, and between the latter and Lithuania regarding the demarcation of the maritime borders (The Jamestown Foundation 1996).

“historical experiences, geopolitical proximity and the assertiveness of Russia” contributed to and exacerbated the existence perceptions dominated by insecurity and enmity vis-à-vis their Eastern neighbour (Spruds (2009, 106). According to Bajarnas (1995, 13), (t)he most acute foreign and security policy challenge facing all three Baltic states is the management of their relations with Russia: “(I)t is clear that Baltic security will always be in jeopardy as long as Russia is hostile and authoritarian. The most serious problem which the Baltic states face is Russia's reluctance to accept Baltic independence”.

The accession to the Atlantic Alliance was securitised in the Baltic states, as integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures was perceived as a decisive step to mitigate the insecurities vis-à-vis the Kremlin, as well as the most effective way of safeguarding, not only the security, but first and foremost the very sovereignty and independence of those states. Estonian President Lennart Meri (1996) emphasised that “the guarantee of the survival of Estonia lies in the integration of our country with European and Atlantic structures”, words that corroborate the existential overtones and the utmost urgency that imbued the Baltic quest for Euro-Atlantic integration.

The integration into the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union was also framed as a central component of the Baltics’ broader “return” to Europe (Herd and Lofgren 2001). As noted by Pavlovaite (2005, 199), the “return to Europe” rhetoric was not merely a way of asserting these countries’ “Europeaness”, since it has also served the purpose of distancing themselves from their significant “other”, epitomized by Russia. “After regaining their independence, the Baltic states have been constructing their political identities in terms of the East/West opposition. They have been creating narratives of belonging to the West, with the East as their threatening other” (Miniotaite 2003, 214). As a consequence, only by joining the two organizations that symbolise the West can the Baltic republics avoid their past irreversibly (Lehti 2005, 37). Owing to the civilisation affinity between these states and the West, the “return to Europe” is an essential step because “we acknowledge a certain civilisation as our own, a certain political culture, certain intellectual and spiritual values and general principles” (Meri 1998).

Joining the Western institutions was perceived in the Baltic republics as a move that would confirm and solidify “their belonging to the Western civilisation” and the final act of liberation from Moscow rule (Fofanova and Morozov 2009, 24). For this reason, the Baltics sought to avoid political ties with Russia and the other former soviet states at all costs, as it was evident by their refusal to be part of the Commonwealth of Independent States, also known as CIS (Auers 2015, 196). Perhaps the most paradigmatic example of the Baltics’ constitutional securitisation post-

soviet links and all political and economic initiatives led by Moscow was the constitutional ban imposed by Vilnius on Lithuania's accession to post-soviet organizations on the Constitutional Act "On the Non-Alignment of the Republic of Lithuania to Post-Soviet Eastern Unions" of 8 June 1992 (Seimas 1996; Miniotaite 1999).

The Baltic political elites have widely perceived the Western community, embodied in NATO and in the EU as the main source of stability and security, in opposition to Russia and the post-Soviet Space (Kesa 2011, 84). The former Estonian President Lennart Meri (1992-2001), claimed that "becoming a member of NATO means first and foremost reuniting with Europe, instability replaced by stability, inseparable union with countries that respect values" (Meri, quoted in Praks 2015, 190). As the former Estonian president claimed, referring to the soviet period, the Estonians "had forty years to ponder the values of Europe, just as the thirsty wanderer in the desert ponders the oasis" (Meri 1992). The adherence to European values is here used to distance Tallinn from Moscow and as means of othering the latter through its representation as a state that does not "respect values" and is therefore inferior.

The perception of Russia as the most significant "other" and a potential threat to the Baltic states clearly attest that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been above all united "by a construction of a common danger from the East", which was one the major rationales for the Baltics' pursuit of NATO and EU membership (Miniotaite 2003, 213 and 220). As aptly noted by Mälksoo (2006, 277), the Baltic republics' quest for NATO and EU membership, premised on the perceived danger posed by the "historically aggressive and unstable neighbouring Russia", has constituted "the politics of survival par excellence". Whereas Europe is associated with positive connotations, Russia is subjected to processes consistent with the third strategy of othering proposed by Diez (2005): Moscow is articulated as "aggressive", "unpredictable" and, implicitly, as "inferior".

The articulation of Russia as an ostensible threat to the independence of the Baltic states was evident throughout the 1990's. In 1993, former Estonian president Meri emphasised that "the democratic rearrangements of our neighbour state are retreating before a new, aggressive conception of foreign policy, oriented to neo-colonialism" (Meri 1993). The Kremlin was depicted as "politically and economically unpredictable, a country which has weak democratic roots but very powerful traditions of totalitarianism and imperialism" (Gobins 2002). According to the Lithuanian Law on Basics of National Security (1996), the main threats to the state stemmed from the "the specific geopolitical environment, hardly predictable due to existing militarized

territories and states of unstable democracy" (Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence 1996). Vytautas Landsbergis (1998) claimed that, by not granting Lithuania NATO membership, the Atlantic Alliance was leaving Vilnius in a "post-occupation zone of uncertainty and risk". According to the former MEP (2004-2014), Chairman of the Supreme Council (1990-1992) and Speaker of the Seimas 1996-2000), "failure to mention any one of them among the most likely applicants for NATO membership, would amount to a negative sign implying acceptance of the implementation of the Russian expansionist idea regarding its zone of special interests". Landsbergis further claimed that if the Atlantic Alliance fails to offer Lithuania some clear realistic prospects of NATO membership in the foreseeable future and leaves the country in a security grey zone, Vilnius "may be attacked and torn to pieces by a creature intent on fashioning for itself some gnawed-off satellite". Here, the securitising agent (Landsbergis) uses an "heuristic artefact" (a metaphor) with the aim of building a "coherent network of implications" (Balzacq 2005, 182) to stress the vulnerability of Lithuania in the face of the threat posed by Russia: Moscow is depicted as a dangerous, aggressive animal capable of predatory behaviour against its neighbours.

The Kremlin's securitisation of the Russian minorities living in Estonia and Latvia, the reluctance to withdraw the last remaining Russian troops from the Baltic republics (and make their withdrawal contingent upon changes in the Baltics' citizenship policies) and the refusal to sign and ratify border treaties with these two countries[23] were widely perceived as part of a broader attempt to hamper the prospects of the Baltics accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures (Bildt 1994; Vikotorova 2007, 49; Peters 1994, 4). As noted by Bugajski (2015, 163), "the initial purpose was to disqualify these countries from NATO and EU membership" and, subsequently, "disputes over treaties and over the history of Russian occupation became a useful of exerting diplomatic pressure" over the Baltic states.

The Kremlin's conduct has exacerbated the Baltic republics' perception that Moscow was not willing to allow them to leave Russia's sphere of influence, illustrating Russia's intention to continue interfering in the domestic politics of the Baltic republics (Peters 1994). The recurrent claims of the need to "protect" the Russian-speaking minority have fuelled the Baltic states (in this case, Latvia and Estonia) fears and strengthened the essentialist notion of embedding political loyalty in ethnicity, leading to the depiction of the Russian-speaking minority as a

23 Lithuania was the only country whose border treaty with Russia was signed (1997) and ratified (2003) by Moscow before the Baltics' accession to the EU and NATO (Mereckis and Markvenas 1998; Vucheva (2005).

potential “fifth column” (Jaeger 2000, 25). One of the most contentious issues in the Baltic-Russian relations during the 90’s was the Kremlin’s stiff opposition to the Baltic republics’ NATO membership. In order to counter their Euro-Atlantic aspirations, the Russian Federation offered unilateral security guarantees to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1997, with the aim of dissuading those countries to join the Atlantic Alliance and force them to remain non-aligned (Mereckis and Morkvenas 1998). However, according to Morozov (2001, 221), the Kremlin’s intention to assume the role of guarantor of security in the South-Eastern Baltic region was perceived in the Baltic republics as a mere pretext for Russia’s interference in those countries domestic affairs. Therefore, Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius refused Russia’s security guarantees and signed the Baltic Charter with the United States in 1998, thereby unequivocally confirming their pro-western orientation (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1998).

Granting NATO membership to any former Soviet republic would be perceived by the Kremlin as a confrontational decision, “just as Washington regarded the 1962 deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba” (Volkov 1997, 66). Prior to NATO’s summit of 1997, President Boris Yeltsin claimed that the Alliance would “fully undermine” its relations with Moscow if it decided to grant the Baltic republics membership (Yeltsin 1997, quoted in Reeves 1997). As noted by Karaganov (1999, quoted in Morozov 2005), “in the present post-Yugoslavian conditions, NATO enlargement would be interpreted not simply as a non-friendly act, but even as a preparation for aggression”. While the Baltics’ accession to the Alliance was constructed as an existential quest in Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius, the Kremlin perceived it as a hostile move and even as a threat, corroborating the mutually exclusive security concerns of Moscow and the Baltic states.

However, it must be noted that, in addition to what they perceived as Moscow’s aggressiveness and unpredictability, the Baltic states also securitised the reservations harboured by some European NATO member states to openly support their integration in the Atlantic Alliance. As noted by Asmus and Nurick (1996, 124), “what the Baltic states most lack is the active support of the strongest European powers in the Alliance - Germany, France and the United Kingdom” because their membership in the Atlantic Alliance was not perceived as fundamental to ensure Western Europe’s security. The two main arguments used against the Baltics’ membership were based on the alleged indefensibility of the Baltic states and especially on the belief that, by accepting Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into the alliance, NATO would jeopardise its relations with Russia (Praks 2015, 190).

In order to persuade the EU and NATO members into accepting them into the European Union and NATO, the Baltic states and the other CEE leaders often employed a “shaming strategy by invoking the West’s historical failures”, with the aim of creating “the moral pressure” to accept the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries’ Euro-Atlantic integration (Schimmelfennig 2003, 233; see also Mälksoo 2009a, 662). In order to attain that goal, the Baltic states and the other CEE’s political elites had recurrently used the Yalta and Munich metaphors, which epitomise Western Europe “abandonment” of the CEE countries after the end of WW2 in the face of soviet domination and the acquiescence to spheres of influence. President Meri’s (1997) words clearly demonstrate this rationale: ”the Cold War will only finally be over when the Baltic countries have assumed their place behind the NATO Council table” (Meri 1997). The Euro-Atlantic integration of these countries was fundamentally perceived and depicted as the ultimate test to the West’s credibility and guarantee that the Yalta and Munich mistakes would not be repeated. The three Baltic republics quest for integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures ended with their accession to the Atlantic Alliance, on 29 March 2004, and to the European Union on 1 May 2004 (European Union 2004; NATO 2004).

Chapter III – Baltic-Russian relations (2004-2014): moving towards (de)securitisation?

3.1 The Baltic States' post enlargement foreign policy

After accomplishing their two most important desiderata since they regained their independence in 1991 – accession to the European Union and to the Atlantic Alliance –, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania's foreign and security policy reached a situation of "zero gravity" and had to be completely redefined after 2004 (Jakniunaite 2009, 123; Miniotaite 2011, 111-2). As noted by Sandra Kalniete (2004), former Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs (2002-2004) and current member of the European Parliament (2009):

> "The goal of Latvia's foreign policy in the past decade was to *ensure permanence for Latvia's statehood*. This goal has been attained. Now, in the early years of the 21st century, Latvia finds itself in a fundamentally new and different situation. *For the first time in history Latvia is living without the shadow of a threat from abroad* and this opens up opportunities for accelerated development. (...) Looking back in our history, we can find only one period when conditions were so auspicious. It was the first decade of Latvia's independence, when rapid progress was made. (...) During this time (1991-2004), Latvia moved resolutely toward membership of the European Union and NATO, while everything else was subordinated to these goals." (Italic is ours).

According to Galbreath, Lasas and Lamoreaux (2008, 59), the Baltics' key challenge after ensuring their Euro-Atlantic integration has been to "overcome the post-soviet tendencies of restoration, redress and deterrence and move towards the post-existential policies of consolidation, stability and expansion". In other words, the three republics sought further integration into the Euro-Atlantic community, to increase regional stability in the Baltic sea and, above all, to foster their relations with the most Western-oriented post-Soviet countries, in particular with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

As regards "expansion", one major priority of the Baltics' post-enlargement foreign policy has precisely been the staunch support for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the former Soviet republics. In that context, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have strongly advocated for the establishment of closer relations between, on the one hand, the post-Soviet countries, and, on the other hand, NATO and the European Union (Kesa 2011, 82). With respect to the Atlantic Alliance, the Baltics' political elites have reaffirmed their commitment to the Open Door Policy

under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty[24] and spoken in favour of the Alliance further enlargement to the East, in particular to Georgia[25]. In 2006, during a visit to that Southern Caucasus state, the then Estonian president (2006-2016), Thomas Hendrik Ilves (2006), stated that:

> "In NATO too, Georgia has a strong and committed friend in Estonia. We support your membership in that great organization; I just met with the NATO secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and urged him to include the strongest possible language on Georgia in the NATO final communique we shall adopt next week at the Riga Summit. Tuesday I shall meet President Bush in Tallinn and will urge him in the same terms".

Furthermore, the Baltics have also adopted an encouraging stance toward the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and expressed their support towards the democratisation processes in the post-Soviet region (Lamoreaux and Galbreath 2008, 8). Promoted by Poland and Sweden, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) is part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (NEP) and was officially launched by the EU during the Prague Summit on 7 May 2009. This joint initiative[26] involves the EU, its member states and six eastern European partners: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In that context, the Baltic republics have been pursuing three main priorities: foster the democratisation of the EaP states, support the integration (and eventual membership) of Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova into the European Union and, concomitantly, the adoption of a "tailored approach" toward the states that are members of the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (Armenia and Belarus) and Azerbaijan[27]. As stated in the Annual Report of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015b, 10):

> "The increasing importance of the Eastern Partnership policy for the EU means that it would make sense to heighten the level of attention it is given in the overall EU agenda, and underline its strategic importance. This policy should continue to exist as a uniform platform underpinned by the principle of differentiation. A deeper integration should be pursued with

24 Article 10 of the Washington Treaty postulates that "(t)he Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty" (NATO 1949).

25 Georgia is the only official NATO candidate among the post-Soviet countries (NATO 2017a).

26 For an in-depth assessment of the EaP, see Fernandes (2010, 280-6).

27 In contrast to Minsk and Yerevan, Baku is not a member of the Eurasian Economic Union. According to the country's Foreign Minister Elmar Mamedyarov Azerbaijan has been conducting an independent foreign policy focused on bilateral relationships, and therefore, a potential membership in that Moscow-led organisation is not on the agenda (Mamedyarov 2014, quoted in TASS 2014).

> the partner countries which want to move closer to the EU. At the same time, an individual approach and cooperation tools should be sought for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus".

Owing to their commitment to the European integration of the EaP states, the Baltic states have voiced their support for the Colour Revolutions that occurred in Georgia and in Ukraine[28] in 2003 and 2004, respectively (Kesa 2011, 89). Alluding to both revolutions, the former Lithuanian Head of State, Valdas Adamkus, underlined that "the speed and the depth of democratic transitions that we have witnessed in Georgia and Ukraine requires even more determination and solidarity" (Adamkus 2006). The former Estonian President, Arnold Rüütel, echoed the same argument. Pointing to the 2003 Georgian Rose Revolution, the Estonian head of state stressed that Europe should fully support Tbilisi's democratisation, and as a result, "the triumphal progress of democracy should not get in jam just over budgetary dispute and short-term economic considerations" (Rüütel 2005b).

There have been three main rationales behind the Baltics' consistent emphasis on the eastern component of the European Neighbourhood Instrument. First of all, the support towards greater democratisation and the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the EaP states can be justified on security grounds. Owing to the Baltic republics' threat perceptions vis-à-vis the Kremlin, the Eastern Partnership is perceived by Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn as part of a containment strategy aimed at mitigating and challenging the Moscow's influence in the "shared neighbourhood" between the the EU and the Russian Federation (Made 2011; Kesa 2011, 87-88). As noted by Auers (2015, 210), by helping to strengthen the democratic institutions of those countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have sought to "create geopolitical security buffers in the same way the Nordic countries did for the Baltic states" during the 1990's. In other words, the "expansion" component in the Baltic republics' foreign policy has stemmed from the need to deter the expansion of Russia's influence in the "near abroad".

Whereas the threat perceptions regarding Moscow's intentions have indisputably played the major role in explaining the Baltic republics' conduct, it would be an oversimplification to state that the three Baltic republics merely aim to contain Russia's influence and counter what they perceive as its expansionist impulses in the EaP region (Jakniunaité 2009, 125 and 128). In that

28 The Revolution of Roses 2003, which was marked by the ouster of President Eduard Shevarnadze, refers to the peaceful protests sparked off by the controversial legislative elections that took place on 2 November in Georgia. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004-2005) was sparked off by the widespread perception that the run-off vote of the 2004 presidential elections was rigged by the Ukrainian authorities in favour of Viktor Yanukovych. For a detailed account, see Mitchell (2012).

context, the Baltics' active support towards Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is also closely related to their intention of increasing their participation in the EU's decision making process (Made 2011, 68; Lamoreaux and Galbreath 2008). One effective way of meeting that objective is through a strong focus on the eastern dimension of the ENP because the post-Soviet countries "are quite harmless policy areas demanding little domestic, including financial, input (...), but offering, at the same time, rather wide and risk-free opportunities to increase the image profile" within the EU (Made 2011, 74). Taking into consideration the limitations posed by their size and limited resources, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have identified the post-Soviet space as a niche area in which they can positively differentiate themselves and consolidate their position within the EU.

The third rationale is related to a normative component. Taking into consideration that the current challenges faced by the EaP countries are similar to the ones they faced throughout their membership negotiations, the Baltic states believe they have a moral responsibility to help them with their post-Soviet transitions (Rüütel 2005). Owing to the "accumulated significant experience with reforms, which provides substantial background knowledge for building relations with the EU's eastern neighbours" (Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016), the Baltic republics occupy a privileged position to understand and help the EaP countries' and have the responsibility to actively endorse their political and economic transitions (Rüütel 2006; Teikmanis 2009, quoted in The Baltic Times 2009; Kesa 2011, 87). Whereas it is true that the three Baltic republics "serve as an encouraging example to the other former Soviet republics", it is also acknowledged that the former's "historical, social and economic preconditions for democratisation were in many respects better than in the rest of the former Soviet Union" (Raik 2006, 31). In an address to the Georgian parliament, former Lithuanian President from 2005 to 2009, Adamkus (2005b) stressed Vilnius historical experiences and, implicitly, denied Russia's place within the Western normative framework:

> "Lithuania is eager to provide practical advice and support for your reforms. In fact, we have a lot to share, as we went through similar reforms just few years ago and now we know its "nuts and bolts". As I speak, our experts and NGOs are working with your professionals on how to harmonize Georgia's and EU's legislation. Georgia's military officers study in Vilnius at our Military Academy. (...) Europe has neither moral nor historical right to deny the nations in the Black Sea Region the possibility to share the same transatlantic institutions. On the contrary, *we have a responsibility to bring these nations back to Europe*" (Italic is ours).

While the three Baltic republics have all prioritised the Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy, there have occasionally been some nuances in terms of stated ambitions. In that respect, before the election of the current president, Dalia Grybauskaite, Lithuania engaged in a more assertive rhetoric, inter alia by stating the goal of becoming a regional leader (Jakniunaite 2009, 128-9; cf. Kesa 2011, 86). As noted by Arturas Paulauskas, the former speaker of the Lithuanian parliament (2000-2006) and acting president following the impeachment of Rolandas Paksas in April 2004[29]:

> "Today I propose a new and wider foreign policy doctrine. My vision of Lithuania is that of a country which through the quality of its membership of the European Union and NATO and good neighbour policy has become a leader of the region. I have a vision of Lithuania as a centre of the region, with Vilnius as a regional capital" (Paulauskas 2004).

Whereas "the strategy of regional leadership has elevated the level of ambition of Lithuanian security policy to a higher level", it is important to point out that Vilnius lacks the international influence and the resources needed to implement that strategy (Seselgyte 2013, 220).

In addition to prioritising the Eastern Partnership, the Baltic states have strived for a EU value-based foreign policy towards the Kremlin, rather than one where economic considerations play the major role. As stated in the "Annual Report" of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014), Riga strives for "a strong and united EU foreign policy that represents the common values and interests of the Member States in the international arena". Therefore, it is essential for the Baltic states to play an active role in shaping EU's Russia policy and to "be at the forefront of these processes in order to defend our national interests and to avoid a situation where we are made an item of trade or other states pursue their interests at our expense" (Paulauskas 2004). One reason for that is because "there is a strong perception among the Baltic States that Russia is particularly successful in dividing member states" (Fernandes 2010, 144).

Commercial projects like the Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines have aided the Baltics' perception that the largest EU members' are willing to accommodate the Kremlin's interests to the detriment of some Central and Eastern European member states', namely in the

29 Former president Rolandas Paksas, who was the President of Lithuania from February 2003 to April 2004, has been the only Head of State from a EU country to have been impeached from office. On 6 April 2004, the Seimas (Parliament) voted for his impeachment on three charges: interference in a privatisation deal, improperly restoring the Lithuanian citizenship and leaking classified information to Yuri Borisov, a Russian-Lithuanian businessman who had donated 400,000 dollars to Paksas' campaign and was accused of illegal arms sales to Sudan (Myers 2004).

energy sphere. The first project, agreed by the former German chancellor Gerhard Schroder and the Russian president Vladimir Putin in 2005, was strongly criticised by some CEE EU members, in particular Poland, whose former minister of Foreign Affairs compared the pipeline with the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact (Sikorski 2006, quoted in Beunderman 2006). The only notable exception was Latvia, as it will be analysed below.

In addition to the Nord Stream projects, the sale of four French Mistral-class amphibious assault ships to Russia[30] also sparked the protests of the Baltic leaders. The former Lithuanian Minister of National Defence (2008-2012), Rasa Jukneviciene (2011, quoted in Iskauskas 2011), stressed that the sale was an "obvious mistake" owing to Russia's normative inferiority: "when a NATO and EU member sells offensive weaponry to *a country whose democracy is not at a level that would make us feel calm*" it sets a dangerous precedent (italic is ours). According to an Estonian diplomat, the sale of those ships to Russia "would not add to the security of the region" and "the nations around the Baltic Sea in that case might have to see what they have to do to change their defense planning" (Tiido 2010, quoted in Lobjakas 2010). As stated in a Stratfor assessment (2009):

> "The purchase of a Mistral vessel ups the stakes in the Baltics because it would mean that Russia would be able to complement its overwhelming land-based superiority in the region with modern amphibious technology. The Baltics are already demanding an explanation of why France, a NATO ally, is considering such an important deal with Russia".

Owing to what they perceive as Russia's ability to divide the EU member states (Fernandes 2013b, 64), as well as the willingness of some EU countries, in particular Germany and France, to prioritise commercial interests over a value-driven foreign policy, the Baltic republics have been staunchly opposed to the dilution of NATO's role in Europe, and as noted by Mälksoo (2008, 39), they have been extremely cautious towards any attempt to prioritise the Common Security and Defence Policy[31] (CSDP) to the detriment of NATO. As pointed out by the Latvian National Armed Forces' Commander, Raimonds Graube, "every initiative concerning security in Europe should be adding to NATO's security capabilities", and therefore "duplicating the alliance's capacities would

30 Paris cancelled the Mistral deal with Russia in 2015. For more information, see Willsher (2015).

31 Previously known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), is framed by the Treaty on European Union. An integral part of the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the CSDP "sets the framework for EU political and military structures and military and civilian missions and operations abroad" (European Parliament 2017). For more information, see EEAS (2017).

be unacceptable" (Graube 2016, quoted in Kristovskis 2016a). In addition to that, the Estonian National Security Concept (2004) also states that:

> "The cooperation, which exists within the framework of the EU ESDP, and its further development, must take place in a manner that does not entail the duplicating of defence cooperation taking place within the NATO framework, and that supports transatlantic cooperation."

In that regard, the Baltics have pursued a "NATO first" defence policy and stressed the major importance of their bilateral relationship with Washington, widely perceived as the ultimate guarantee of their security and the only effective way of deterring Moscow (Rublovskis 2014, 175). In addition to Washington's role, the security guarantees enshrined in Article 5[32] of the Washington Treaty are widely perceived as more reliable than the mutual defence clause introduced in 2009 under Article 42 (7[33]) of the Treaty of the European Union.

Owing to their "NATO first" defence policy, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have sought to gain diplomatic and political capital with their allies, in particular the United States, by actively participating in all major Atlantic Alliance's "out-of-area" missions. This willingness to commit troops to international security missions can be justified on the grounds that the Baltic republics have actively sought to demonstrate that they are not merely "security consumers", but are also capable of performing an active and valuable role as "security providers" (Reinsalu 2013, quoted in Estonian Ministry of Defence 2013). NATO's former secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has applauded Tallinn's policy of providing troops to the former NATO-led

---

32 "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security" (NATO 1949).

33 "If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation" (Treaty of Lisbon 2016).

International Security Assistance Force[34] (ISAF) without caveats restricting their combat exposure (Rasmussen 2012, quoted in NATO 2012). In addition to serving in Afghanistan without caveats, a very rare occurrence among NATO allies, Estonian troops have been deployed to the Helmand province — "one of the most deadly areas in the country" – and suffered the second-highest number of deadly casualties per capita of all NATO members (Coffey 2013).

Whereas Tallinn has sought to specialise in the special operation forces in the most intense fighting areas of Southern Afghanistan, Latvia's has assumed the role of principal coordinator within the Northern Distribution Network[35] and, in addition to that, has decided to focus on the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) in the comparatively more stable provinces of Nurestan and Kunar in Eastern Afghanistan (Spruds and Potjomkina 2013; McNamara 2015, 161). However, despite its participation in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Riga has prioritised its presence in the US-led Multi-National Force in Iraq. While the former was not a NATO mission, it was perceived as a "tempting opportunity to enhance the security partnership with the United States" (McNamara 2015, 162).

Another case in point of the Baltics' strong commitment towards NATO's "out-of-area" missions was Lithuania's deployment of special forces alongside their American counterparts in Zabul and Kandahar, as well as and the decision to lead a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT[36]). Launched in the summer of 2005 as a civilian-military mission, part of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the leadership of the PRT in the Ghor province represented Vilnius "flagship contribution to the ISAF" (McNamara 2015, 165). According to Maskaliunaite (2014, 133), leading a PRT in Afghanistan coincided with the stated ambition of becoming a regional leader and was perceived by the Lithuanian political elite as a decision that would demonstrate Vilnius commitment to become a security provider and "to pay for its share of the NATO air policing of the Baltic states". Moreover, and taking into consideration that the

34 NATO took the lead of the ISAF in Afghanistan on 11 August 2003. "Mandated by the United Nations, ISAF's primary objective was to enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop new Afghan security forces" (NATO 2015). ISAF was followed by Operation Resolute Support in 2014.

35 Owing to Pakistan's volatility, the United States has sought to conclude a number of bilateral agreements in order to find alternative supply routes to transport military supplies indispensable to the War in Afghanistan. Established in 2008, the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) is comprised of several itineraries, the most important of which beginning in Riga. From the Latvia's capital, "the cargo goes by combinations of trains, trucks and ferries across Russian territory and the adjacent ex-Soviet "stans" to enter Afghanistan from the north" (Marmon 2010).

36 'Provincial Reconstruction Teams' were "small teams of military and civilian personnel working in Afghanistan's provinces to provide security for aid works and help humanitarian assistance or reconstruction tasks in areas with ongoing conflict or high levels of insecurity" from 2003 to 2011 (Maley 2007).

province of Ghor was a particularly dangerous location, the aforementioned mode of contribution was perceived as a potentially golden opportunity to increase the country's profile within the Atlantic Alliance (Racius 2011, 261).

3.2 "Memory wars" in the Baltic-Russian relations: a new form of existential politics?

The normalisation[37] of the Baltic-Russian relations' has been hindered by the tendency to frame historical narratives as security issues or, in other words, to secure certain historical remembrances through the complete rejection, delegitimisation or even criminalisation of alternative interpretations (Mälksoo 2015, 222). The existence of "conflicting historical narratives" have a profound impact on the relations between Moscow and the three Baltic republics, on the grounds that they "directly concern the foundational principles of each nation involved" (Fofanova and Morozov 2009, 15-6). As stressed by Ehin and Berg (2009, 9):

> "The national identity construction of the Baltic states and Russia, together with the historical narratives they are based on, are incompatible, and, indeed, antagonistic. The constituting narratives of self of the Baltic states and Russia include truth claims that are mutually exclusive. The differences are not in details but pertain to central elements of the respective narratives – the events of Second World War, the role of the Red Army, assessment of the Soviet regime and its collapse, the termination and restoration of Baltic independence".

3.2.1 The Baltic states' securitisation of memory

According to Mälksoo (2006, 275), "the shift from existential politics to normal politics by the Baltic states is far from being accomplished". In that regard, the notion of "existential politics" can have two main dimensions: the quest for "physical" survival, which led to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania's pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration, but also for "meaningful" survival, or alternatively stated, the quest to be recognised as a certain sort of being (2006, 278).

In that context, after becoming EU and NATO members, the three Baltic republics have sought not only Western Europe's acknowledgment of their historical subjectivity, but also to "enlarge the mnemonic vision of the united Europe" by seeking to incorporate their wartime

37 Normalisation of the Baltic-Russian relations is "understood here as the expected, yet incomplete, desecuritisation of the self-conceptualizations of the Baltic states after their inclusion within the EU and NATO" (Mälksoo 2006, 278).

experiences into a common European historical consciousness[38] (Mälksoo 2009b, 84). The premise of the Baltic historical narrative regarding World War II is that there is no fundamental distinction between the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany and the ones perpetrated by the Soviet Union. By drawing a comparison between both regimes' crimes, the Baltic historical narrative "clearly challenges the paradigm of the singularity of the Holocaust against which Europe has been defined so far" (Onken 2009, 38).

The Soviet Union's "imposed collective amnesia" (Judt 2002, 162) precluded an open discussion about the WW2 events in the Baltic states and was a political tool aimed at solidifying Moscow's control over the subjugated Eastern European peoples. As noted by Wydra (2007, 228),

> "First, the destruction of memory aimed to invalidate any uncontrolled references to historical time before the advent of Soviet communism. Second, totalitarian language came along with a "culture of lies" preventing groups with alternative visions about their identity from emerging. Organised forgetting was based on a tissue of lies, inventions, and fantasies that was unconsciously sustained by dissimulation and had a disastrous effect on group identity and historical consciousness. Finally, the public space was characterised by "communicative silencing," by a death of open historical debate, of critical discussion, and of exchange of memories to which the public acquiesced for fear of losing social opportunities and social mobility".

After the accession to the EU and NATO, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia awoke from their "mnemonical hibernation" (Kwasniewski 2002, quoted in Mälksoo 2009b) and sought to secure their historical narratives. More precisely, the Baltic republics' conduct has ranged "from mere discursive securitisation[39] to the proposal and adoption of pertinent legislation on the meaning of WW2 and the communist experience at domestic" and "pan-European" levels (Mälksoo 2015, 221). While their efforts at the former level have converged, there have been some differences at the latter, with Latvia and Lithuania's securitisation efforts proving to be more successful. In fact, the Latvian parliament, the *Saeima*, not only approved in 2009 a ban on the public display of both Soviet and Nazi symbols, such as swastikas and the hammer and sickle, but also outlawed

---

38 There can be distinguished "at least four major mnemonic communities in the European memory landscape in relation to World War II: Atlantic-Western European, German, East-Central European and Russian. Their remembrances of the war focus respectively on D-Day of 1944 and the Allied victory in Europe on 8 May 1945; manifold experiences resulting from the experience of bombing raids and total defeat; the trials of undergoing Soviet and Nazi occupations in succession; and the comfort drawn from the costly victory in The Great Patriotic War" (Mälksoo 2009a, 654).

39 The expression "securitisation move" is more consistent with the framework adopted here.

the singing and promotion of fascist and communist anthems and ideologies (The Moscow Times 2013). Prior to Riga's decision, Vilnius had already banned the display of Soviet symbols in 2008. Furthermore, the government approved a bill to amend the Lithuanian Criminal Code. More concretely, the Article 170 of the Criminal Code equates Stalinism with Nazism and stipulates that, inter alia, denying or endorsing "the aggression of USSR or Nazi Germany against Lithuania" and the genocide or "other crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by USSR or Nazi Germany" is now punishable (Zilinskas 2012, 321). Unlike Latvia and Lithuania's, Estonia's securitisation moves have been less successful. After narrowly passing in parliament, the Law on Forbidden Structures, which would have outlawed the public display of monuments glorifying the Soviet Union, was vetoed by then president Toomas Ilves in February 2007, on the grounds that it was unconstitutional (Torsti 2008, 20).

At the pan-European level, the attempts at institutionalising the equivalence between Stalinism and Nazism took place in both the European Union and in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). As regards the first, it must be stressed that the European Parliament proclaimed the "European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism" on 23 September 2008. The Declaration, which proposed "that 23 August be proclaimed European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism" indicates that both Stalinist and Nazi's acts of aggression "fall into the category of war crimes and crimes against humanity" (European Parliament 2008). The following year, on 2 April 2009, the European Parliament adopted a resolution "on European conscience and totalitarianism" equating Nazism with communism. Accordingly, "Nazism, Stalinism and fascist and Communist regimes" should be recognised as "a common legacy and brings about an honest and thorough debate on their crimes in the past century" (European Parliament 2009).

In 2009, the then President of the European Parliament, Hans-Gert Pöettering, stressed that the Estonia, Latvian and Lithuanian governments were among the most committed supporters of the 2 April 2009 Resolution, and thanked them for raising awareness "about the totalitarianism of the Soviet Union" (Pöettering 2009, quoted in Baltic News Service 2009). In addition to endorsing the above-mentioned resolutions, MEP's from the Baltic republics have been active in promoting the Baltic historical viewpoint. By way of example, Sandra Kalniete, former Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2002-2004) and member of the European Parliament since 2009, chairs the "Reconciliation of European Histories Group", an informal all-party group in the

European Parliament whose aim is to raise awareness about the crimes under Communist regimes (Reconciliation of European Histories 2016).

The Baltics' attempts at institutionalising their historical narrative have not been confined to the European Union. In fact, on 3 July 2009, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) Parliamentary Assembly adopted the Vilnius Declaration, which also endorses the establishment of 23 August as the international Remembrance Day for victims of totalitarianism and encouraged all its member states to raise awareness about totalitarian crimes (OSCE 2009). More concretely, the resolution on "Divided Europe reunited: promoting human rights and civil liberties in the OSCE region in the 21st century", proposed by Lithuania and drafted by Vilija Aleknaite-Abramikiene, a member of the Lithuanian parliament since 1992, draws a comparison between the Nazi and Soviet regimes by noting that "European countries experienced two major totalitarian regimes, Nazi and Stalinist, which brought about genocide, violations of human rights and freedoms, war crimes and crimes against humanity" (OSCE 2009).

However, it must be underlined that attempts at criminalising the negation of the crimes committed by the Soviet Union at the pan-European level have been fruitless so far. In a letter sent in December 2010, Audronius Azubalis, the then Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs (2010-2012), along with his counterparts from Latvia (but not from Estonia), Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania, urged the then EU's justice commissioner, Viviane Reding, to criminalise the "approval, denial or belittling of communist crimes" (BBC 2010). However, the Commission rejected the call, on the grounds that crimes based on politics are a national-level matter, and therefore, they do not fall within the scope of the EU (BBC 2010).

3.2.2 Russia's securitisation of memory: the opposite view

The Baltic's perception of their security narratives as security issues has been exacerbated by Russia's actions. Despite the huge asymmetries in the Baltic-Russian relations, the three Baltic republics have been perceived in Russia as the most hostile states to Moscow. By way of example, according to a poll conducted by Russia's independent Levada Center in May 2013, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia respectively occupied the 3rd, 4th and 5th place in a ranking that measured the perceived hostility towards Russia (Warren 2013). In addition to the lack of

citizenship of the Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia and Estonia, the Baltics' quest for pan-European recognition of their historical subjectivity has been perceived as a threat by the Kremlin, on the grounds that the historical narrative of the Baltic states directly calls Russia's into question. Whereas World War II represents the loss of independence for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Russia's historical narrative is premised on the huge sacrifices that were indispensable for the Soviet victory over Nazism in World War II (Auers 2015, 221; Prus 2015). In that context, the heroism of the "Great Patriotic War" – in Moscow's parlance – and the "liberation" of Central Eastern Europe occupy a central role in the current Russian national self-perception (Oken 2009, 44). As stressed by Brüggermann and Kasekamp (2008, 61), when it comes to the Baltic part in Soviet history, portraying the Red Army as "occupiers" and emphasising the Soviet occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania pose a threat to the Russian "truth" and amounts to sacrilege. After former Latvian president Andris Berzins (2011-2015) remarked that "there were no winners in World War II" and it (the conflict) was the "biggest crime against humanity ever", Russian Foreign Ministry's spokesman Aleksandr Lukashevich accused the former Latvian head of state of "blasphemy" against those who "liberated the world from fascism" (RT 2012).

In the Kremlin's official narrative, the use of the expression "Great Patriotic War" is used to accentuate that Moscow's conduct in the conflict was merely defensive and a response to the Operation Barbarossa, launched by Nazi Germany on 22 June 1941[40] (Davies 2006, 95-8). Therefore, any references to the events that took place between 1939 and 1941, including not only the Nazi-Soviet Pact (1939) and its secret protocols, but also the subsequent Soviet invasions of Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Romania (Bessarabia and Bukovina), are expunged from Russia's official narrative, as they "do not fit with the idealised image of the Great Patriotic War" (Fofanova and Morozov 2009, 27). According to Mälksoo (2009, 667), Russia's recognition of the Nazi-Soviet collusion in 1939-1941 is made even more problematic owing to the fact that the Soviet era is associated with unprecedented international power. Moreover, "victory over Nazism is the grand narration of how Russia's Europeaness has been defined", and therefore contesting Moscow's victory equates to calling into question the country's very position in Europe (Lehti, Jutila and Jokisipilä 2008, 404). The Soviet victory has therefore" become a cornerstone of Russia's national identity", (...) and has been actively exploited to mobilise support for the current political regime in Russia (Polegkyi 2016).

40 For more information on the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, see Davies (2006, 95-8).

Moscow has sought to securitise its own historical narrative by delegitimising versions that contradict its own, both domestically and at international level, in order to "retaliate against symbolic initiatives to establish an official equivalence between Stalinism and Nazism" (Mälksoo 2015, 227). At the first level, one case in point was the decision to create a "Commission to Counteract Attempts to Harm Russia's Interests by Falsifying History"[41] (President of Russia 2010). While the Commission itself was disbanded in 2012 and did not lead to any significant actions, its creation demonstrated the direction of the Kremlin's official historical policy "as a means of institutional counteraction of 'improper' interpretations, and a method of anchoring in society and among historians the idea of a need to fight 'falsification to the detriment' of the state" (Prus 2005, 2).

More recently, in 2014, the Russian State Duma passed a bill outlawing the denial of the facts set out in the Nuremberg Trial, the "rehabilitation of Nazism" and the distribution of "false information about the actions of Russia and its allies during WWII" (RT 2014). The OSCE's Representative on Freedom of the Media, Dunja Mijatovic, criticised the bill, pointing out that "a narrow application of such a law might lead to its abuse and suppress political and critical speech on issues of history and eventually affect freedom of the media" (Mijatović 2013, quoted in OSCE 2013). In July 2016, a Russian blogger was convicted under the above-mentioned law and accused of "rehabilitating Nazism" for stating that both the USSR and Nazi Germany invaded Poland in September 1939 (Peck 2016).

At the international level, Russia has sought to counter the institutionalisation of the Baltics' narrative regarding World War II. One major example of the Kremlin's conduct was the response to the above-mentioned OSCE 2009 resolution. After failing to have the resolution withdrawn, the Kremlin boycotted the vote on the final day of a week-long session of the OSCE's Parliamentary Assembly (Deutsche Welle 2009). The Russian ministry of Foreign Affairs has sharply criticised the resolution:

41 The main tasks of the commission were to "(a) to summarise and analyse information about the falsification of historical facts and events aimed at diminishing the international prestige of the Russian Federation and to report such incidents to the president of the Russian Federation; (b) to develop a strategy for counteracting attempts to falsify historical facts and events aimed at harming Russia's interests; (c) to prepare proposals for the president of the Russian Federation regarding measures aimed at counteracting attempts to falsify historical facts and events that are harming Russia's interests; (d) to examine proposals from and coordinate the work of federal agencies, government agencies in regions of the Russian Federation, and organizations to counteract attempts to falsify historical facts and events that harm Russia's interests; and (e) to recommend means of reacting adequately to attempts to falsify historical facts and events that harm Russia's interests and to neutralise their possible negative consequences" (President of Russia 2010).

> "We consider unacceptable the fact that in the OSCE's parliamentary assembly resolution there is an attempt to distort history with political goals. (...) This does not contribute to creating an atmosphere of trust and cooperation between the member states of this body" (Nesterenko 2009, quoted in Deutsche Welle 2009).

More than seeking to securitise its official narrative at the international level, Moscow has sought to discredit the Baltic states at the international fora, namely at the United Nations' General Assembly, through processes of othering. Alluding to the former members of the Latvian and Estonian SS Legion's marches[42], the Kremlin has accused Riga and Tallinn for violating the memory of "the countless victims of crimes against humanity committed in the Second World War" and glorifying "the Nazi past, the Nazi movement and neo-Nazism" (United Nations 2008 and 2009).

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has criticised in particular Estonia for "rewriting history" and for engaging in an "illegal" and "antihuman" conduct (Kamynin 2007, quoted in Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007). In other words, Russia has depicted Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as being responsible of violating universal principles and engaging in a conduct that is not consistent with "with the obligations of States Members of the United Nations under its Charter and are incompatible with the goals and principles of the Organization" (United Nations 2008 and 2009). In other words, the Kremlin has pursued a strategy of normative othering vis-à-vis the Baltic states, depicting Lithuania and, above all, Latvia and Estonia, as "uncivilised" countries whose conducts violate universal values.

The Kremlin's use of processes of normative othering was particularly intense vis-à-vis Estonia throughout the so-called "Bronze Soldier" crisis, which will be explained in Estonian-Russian relations sub-chapter. Throughout the dispute, Moscow portrayed Tallinn as a country that harboured neo-fascist attitudes and whose conduct collided with European core values and civilisation. In a statement at the United Nations General Assembly, the spokesperson of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated, alluding to the relocation of the Soviet memorial, that "(w)e condemn the emerging trend in many countries to glorify the cronies of Nazis and to destroy statues that have been erected to honour the memory of those who fought during the war in the anti-Hitler coalition" (Zakharova, quoted in Pelnens 2009, 51). The Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs, Konstantin Kosachev, was even blunter in his criticism,

---

42 Both the former SS members' marches in Latvia and the Bronze Soldier crisis will be analysed in the Latvian-Russian and Estonian-Russian sub-chapters, respectively.

noting that “the actions of the Estonian leadership stimulate neo-Nazi and revanchist attitudes. As a result, Estonia is in opposition to modern European civilisation, to the entire civilized world” (Kosachev, quoted in Pelnens 2009, 60). Tallinn’s actions were perceived as unacceptable and sacrilegious, and therefore the Estonian proposal concerning a joint participation in the reburial, with highest honours to the war dead, was refused by the Kremlin (Liik 2007, 73). The Kremlin has sought to expose the Baltic states (and also Poland) as an embodiment of “false Europe”, depicting them as being unworthy to be part of the West on normative grounds (Viktorova 2007; 49; Fofanova and Morozov). As indicated by Morozov (2005, 224):

> “By proclaiming their adherence to European values such as human rights and the anti-fascist legacy, Russian political actors attempted to single out the Baltics as the black sheep of the European family, thereby increasing their own legacy by assuming the right to speak on behalf of the true Europe”.

In addition to the attempts of securitising its official historical narrative, Moscow has been increasingly downplaying the significance of the Nazi-Soviet Pact[43]. In 2009, Vladimir Putin, then prime minister of Russia, wrote a piece in a Polish newspaper in which he acknowledged that "it is possible to condemn - and with good reason - the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact concluded in August 1939", as that form of agreement is "unacceptable from the moral point of view and had no chance of being realised" (Putin 2009, quoted in BBC 2009). However, in the same piece, he also noted that “a year earlier France and England signed a well-known agreement with Hitler in Munich, destroying all hope for the creation of a joint front for the fight against fascism” (Putin 2009, quoted in BBC 2009). In 2014, president Putin played down the accusations that the USSR contributed to the division of Poland and accused Warsaw of hypocrisy, alluding to the Polish annexation of two minor border areas in northern Slovakia, in the regions Spis and Orava, and also the Czech town of Cesky Tesin (and surrounding area) in 1938 (Jesensky 2014). In addition to that, the Russian president noted that the USSR signed a pact with Third Reich because it did not want to fight, and therefore there was nothing wrong with Moscow’s decision (Putin 2014, quoted in Radio Poland 2014).

43 In 1989 the Soviet authorities officially denounced the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of August 1939 as illegal and void and for the first time admitted the existence of a secret protocol providing for a division on territorial spheres of influence (Benn 2011).

3.3 Bilateral relations between the Baltic republics and Russia (2004-2014)

3.3.1 Lithuanian-Russian relations (2004-2014)

Prior to 2004, "Lithuanian-Russian relations have (...) displayed lesser degrees of behaviour manifesting territory and sovereign-related conflicts than Estonian-Russian or Latvian-Russian relations" (Aalto 2005, 265). In fact, already on July 21 1991, even before the Soviet recognised the Baltics' independence, Vilnius and Moscow signed a Treaty on the Basis of Interstate Relations (United Nations 1999, 21-6). Furthermore, it is also pertinent to note that the last Russian soldiers left Lithuania in August 1993 – Russian troops withdrawal from Latvia and Estonia would only be completed in 1994 –, and that the military transit issues with Kaliningrad –a Russian exclave pinched between Poland and Lithuania – were solved in 1995 by following a pragmatic approach based on the political and economic benefits of good relations rather than on frictions (Vitkus 1996).

There are two key factors that explain the cooperative relations between Lithuania and Russia between 1991 and 2004. First of all, Lithuania had a relatively small Russian minority (Annex 7), and partly because of that, Vilnius had decided to adopt a non-exclusionary citizenship law that granted "full citizenship to all those Russians, Poles and other ethnic minorities permanently living in Lithuania" (Onken 2007, 40). Furthermore, and unlike the other two Baltic republics, there were no territorial disputes between Moscow and Vilnius, and a border agreement was signed and ratified in 1997 and 2003, respectively.

However, after the accession to the European Union and to the Atlantic Alliance, Lithuanian-Russian relations have been marred by tensions. According to Leonard and Popescu (2007, 2), Lithuania, together with Poland, are considered the 'New Cold Warriors' among EU member states, clearly standing out from them owing to their "overtly hostile relationship with Moscow" and their intention "to shape a more critical EU line towards Russia" (2007, 48). Lithuania's principled and adversarial stance vis-à-vis the Kremlin has been illustrated by the former's decision to use its veto to block the launching of negotiations regarding a new the EU-Russia

Partnership and Cooperation Agreement[44] (PCA) in 2007 and by the refusal to attend Victory Day celebrations in Moscow in 2005 and 2010.

At a Committee of Permanent Representatives[45] (COREPER) meeting which took place a couple of weeks prior to the EU-Russia Samara summit in 17-18 May 2007, the Lithuanian government has decided to use its veto power and block EU talks with Russia on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Poland had already stressed said it would block EU talks with Moscow, owing to the Kremlin's refusal to lift a ban on Polish agricultural imports (Fernandes 2013b, 157-60). However, after the new Donald Tusk government officially withdrawn its opposition after Polish meat issues were addressed, Lithuania became the only dissenter, as neither Tallinn nor Riga endorsed Vilnius position (Molis 2008, 29). In that context, in April 2008, the then ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania insisted that any mandate for PCA talks must be based upon four conditions:

> "(1) assurances that Brussels will pressure Moscow to lift its oil blockade of Mazeikiu Nafta; (2) a reminder of Russia's obligation to adhere to the principles of the Energy Charter Treaty; (3) promises to seek greater Russian cooperation on a number of criminal cases important to Lithuania; and (4) a commitment up front to assess Russian progress in solving "frozen conflicts" in Georgia and Moldova during negotiations on the PCA" (Miller 2008).

In spite of the four demands listed above, the bilateral dispute between Vilnius and Moscow was mainly informed by the first demand. In that regard, it is pertinent to note that the Russian pipeline operator (Transneft) decided to close the pipeline supplying oil to the Butinge export terminal and to the Mazeikiu Nafta refinery, located in north-western Lithuania and the only oil refinery in the three Baltic republics, citing a "pipeline leak" (Vitkus 2009, 31). Despite the justification invoked, Russia's actions were perceived as:

44 As described by Fernandes (2009, 1), "the 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement is the legal basis for EU–Russian relations. A new framework of cooperation was established at the St. Petersburg summit in 2003. Since then, Brussels and Moscow have cooperated in four areas (the so-called 'common spaces'): a common economic space; a common space of freedom, security and justice; a common space of cooperation in the field of external security; and a common space on research, education and culture".

45 "The Permanent Representatives Committee or Coreper (Article 240 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - TFEU) is responsible for preparing the work of the Council of the European Union. It consists of representatives from the EU countries with the rank of ambassador to the European Union and is chaired by the EU country which holds the Council Presidency" (Eur-lex 2016b).

> “The blatant use of strong-arm tactics in economic disputes. Basically, Russia believes that the Baltic states are not (or at least not yet) in the same category as its established large customers in Western Europe, and so it feels free to respond more brutally when it sees its interests infringed. This does indeed constitute a case of using energy as a weapon, but in the form of a border skirmish rather than full-scale war” (Trenin 2010, 23).

In fact, the closure of the pipeline occurred immediately after the Lithuanian government signed an agreement in June 2006 acquiescing to the sale of the refinery to a Polish company, PKN Orlen, for much more than Lukoil[46] had offered. According to Janeliunas (2006 quoted in Kramer 2006), Transneft’s actions were aimed at forcing Vilnius to reconsider its decision because the Russian government “wanted a Russian company to buy the refinery, but for cheaper than a market price." Lithuania’s decision to use its EU leverage in order to solve the issue and its willingness to block PCA negotiations “stand out as one of the most aggressive moves by Vilnius towards Moscow” (Grigas 2013, 55).

Lithuania’s adoption of an adversarial posture vis-à-vis Moscow was also encapsulated by Vilnius’ response to the Kremlin’s invitations for the Lithuanian heads of state to attend the 2005 and 2010 Victory Day Celebrations in Moscow, which marked the 60th and 65th anniversaries of the end of World War II, respectively. As noted by Onken (2009, 24), the Kremlin’s invitation put the leaders of the Baltic republics “into a difficult situation as this day for the Baltic peoples marks the continuation of foreign occupation of their countries. Vilnius conduct has “stood out in comparison to Estonian and Latvian policies in its adversarial and principled, even dogmatic outlook” (Grigas 2013, 136). In 2005, the then Lithuanian president, Valdas Adamkus, declined the Kremlin’s invitation and justified his decision with historical factors:

> “The Second World War inflicted very deep wounds on Lithuania. Occupation, deportation and imprisonment, the terrible tragedy of the Holocaust, concentration camps, forced emigration – this was a most devastating blow by the totalitarian regimes to the Lithuanian nation. Over 350,000 people, one tenth of Lithuania’s population, were imprisoned, deported to the Gulags or massacred in Lithuania. The perpetration of such crimes continued in our country when the cruellest war in the history of mankind was officially over. The name of Lithuania disappeared from the map of Europe for five decades (…).Thus, aware of the

[46] Despite being known for its relative independence in foreign engagements throughout the 90’s, Lukoil now presents itself as a completely loyal Russian company and “flagship of the Russian state in foreign economic affairs” (Perovic 2006, 104).

painful historic experience of our nation and drawing on the discussions among the public, I have decided to stay on May 9th in Lithuania, with my people" (Adamkus 2005a).

In another occasion, the then Lithuanian head of state also noted that "on that day (9 May 1945) we traded Hitler for Stalin, and we should not celebrate it" (Adamkus 2005, quoted in Holbrooke 2005). The Lithuanian president was urged not to attend on several occasions by the former Speaker of *Seimas* (the Lithuanian Parliament) and President, Arturas Paulauskas (The Baltic Times 2005), and also by the then leader of the opposition, Andrius Kubilius, who claimed that May 9th is not a day of victory for Lithuania but of "catastrophic defeat", and therefore, "if the president goes to Moscow (...) he will participate in the celebrations of Lithuania's defeat (Kubilius 2005, quoted in Grigas 2013).

In 2010, unlike the Latvian and Estonian presidents, the Lithuanian head of state, Dalia Grybauskaite, did not receive an official invitation to attend the Victory Day ceremonies in Moscow[47]. After meeting with her two Baltic counterparts in Vilnius and agreeing with to coordinate their policies as regards attendance in Moscow, the Lithuanian president eventually has opted for not going after unsuccessfully attempting at ensuring a visit by president Medvedev as a trade-off for her presence in Moscow (Grigas 2013, 143).

3.3.2 Latvian-Russian relations (2004-2014)

The relations between Riga and Moscow did not remain as strained as the relations between the former's two Baltic neighbours and the Kremlin (Mezhevich and Sazanovich 2013). In fact, despite the accusations of "glorification of Nazism"[48] (Lavrov 2017, quoted in Sputnik 2017; Yakovenko 2008, quoted in Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008) and the recurrent criticism about Riga's citizenship policies and the alleged violations of the human rights of Latvia's

47 Rather than an official invitation, the Lithuanian president, Dalia Grybauskaite, received a greeting on 11 March 2010 (Lithuania's independence from the USSR) from Russian President Medvedev and an invitation to fix a date for a meeting to discuss the relations between the two countries (Grigas 2013, 137).

48 A case in point has been the former members of the Latvian SS Legion's marches, held every year in Riga on March 16. In that context, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, has accused Riga of "state support for regular neo-Nazi rallies" (Lavrov 2017, quoted in Sputnik 2017). It is important to note that Latvia commemorates its fallen soldiers on 11 November (the Lacplesis Day), and therefore March 16 is not an official state holiday. Moreover, according to Harry Rosenfield, the then UN Refugee Relief Association commissioner, "the Waffen-SS units of the Baltic States (the Baltic Legions) are to be seen as units that stood apart and were different from the German SS in terms of goals, ideologies, operations and constitution, and the Commission does not, therefore, consider them to be a movement that is hostile to the government of the United States" (Rosenfield 1950, quoted in Rislakki 2008, 132-3).

Russian-speaking minorities (Yakovenko 2006, quoted in Sputnik 2006), the Kremlin depicted Latvia in a less negative light than the two other Baltic republics of Estonia and Lithuania (Spruds 2009, 101-2). The Kremlin's policy of cultivating good relations with at least one of the three Baltic republics at any given period (Leonard and Popescu 2007, 46; Fernandes 2010, 144) "serves the purpose of marginalisation" and it is designed to weaken inter-Baltic solidarity" and to "disrupt a united" Baltic foreign policy (Bugajski 2007, 165).

Central to the thaw in Latvian-Russian relations was Riga's willingness to accommodate Russia's interests by adopting a pragmatic and cooperative approach with respect to the existing historical disputes (Grigas 2013, 144). After 2004, in its process of further Euro-Atlantic integration, the "danger discourse" element in Latvia's official Russia's discourse "was complemented and partly replaced by an opportunity discourse" (Spruds 2009, 102). A case in point of Latvia's pragmatism was the decision to accept the Kremlin's invitation to attend the 2005 and 2010 Victory Day Celebrations in Moscow. The then Latvian president, Vike-Freiberga (1999-2007), justified her decision to take part in the ceremonies on the grounds that she intended to "extend a hand of friendship to Russia" (Vike-Freiberga 2005a). However, in a piece published in the Washington Post, the former president also noted that:

> "But Latvia's so-called liberation by Soviet troops in 1944-45 materialized in the form of another calamity, accompanied as it was by the customary rapes, lootings and wanton killings that the Red Army committed in a systematic manner throughout the territories it occupied, and that continued in Latvia well after the end of the war. These were followed by still more killings, repression and wave after wave of mass deportations, the last taking place in 1949" (Vike-Freiberga 2005b).

Whereas Riga has demonstrated pragmatism by being the only among the three Baltic republics to accept the Kremlin's invitation in 2005[49] (Miniotaite 2011, 112), the opportunity was seized to draw attention to the Baltic historical viewpoint and to the "renewed Soviet occupation of my country, and the immense human loss and suffering that ensued as a result; not only in Latvia, but throughout the former captive nations of Central and Eastern Europe" (Vike-Freiberga 2005a). Furthermore, President's Vike-Freiberga presence in Moscow cannot be dissociated from the expectation that, by attending the celebrations, Latvia would maximise the likelihood of signing a border agreement with the Russian Federation (Grigas 2013, 147).

49 In 2010, both Toomas Ilves and Valdis Zatlers, the then presidents of Estonia and Latvia, respectively, decided to attend (Joost 2010).

Whereas the Kremlin initially wanted Latvia to sign the agreement on 10 June 2005, immediately after the Victory Day's ceremonies, the circumstances were not perceived as opportune by Riga and, even more problematic, two weeks prior to the President's scheduled trip to Moscow, on 26 April 2005, "the Latvian government approved a unilateral declaration mentioning the 1920 peace treaty, the "illegal occupation of Latvia," and the "rights and claims" of Latvia and its citizens" (Muiznieks 2011, 29). The declaration was rejected by Moscow and the negotiations were suspended (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). At the EU-Russia Summit on 10 May 2005 Russian President Putin claimed that Moscow is "ready to sign the border agreements with Latvia", as long they are not "accompanied by foolish territorial demands" (Putin 2005, quoted in President of Russia 2005).

After the fruitless attempts in 1997 and 2005 (Rostoks 2006, 131-9; Levinsson 2006), the successful signing and ratification of the border agreement would take place in 2007 (Sheeher 2007), further corroborating the discernible improvements in the relationship between Riga and Moscow (Spruds 2009, 110). In January 2007, the then Latvian Prime Minister Aigars Kalvitis (2003-2007) informed his Russian counterpart that Riga was prepared to sign the border treaty and, even more significantly, that the Latvian government would acquiesce to the Kremlin's demands and not attach any declarations mentioning the 1920 Riga Peace Treaty (Mole 2012, 138). While it continues to view the 1920 Peace Treaty as the basis for the current Russian-Latvian relations, Riga has demonstrated the willingness to adopt a more flexible position in order to fulfil its key political objectives – in this case, the signing of the border treaty.

The thaw in Latvian-Russian relations can be further illustrated by the Latvian position with respect to Nord Stream project. In contrast to Tallinn and Vilnius position (Socor 2007), Riga has adopted a more cooperative stance, giving "subtle signs that it would cooperate with the project by making available its natural caves for gas storage to Nord Stream" (Grigas 2013, 43).

Riga's pragmatic approach towards Moscow was also evident in Riga's position in the disputes between the other two Baltic countries and the Kremlin. One major example was the response to the crisis between Tallinn and Moscow. Despite endorsing Estonia, Latvia took a more moderate position than Lithuania on the events regarding the Tallinn "Bronze Soldier" crisis in April 2007 (Miniotaite 2011, 115). "For instance, Latvia intended to adopt a text in Parliament to support Estonia in the Bronze Soldier case" but it refrained from doing so, fearing that such action would jeopardise the ratification of the border treaty (Fernandes 2010, 144). In addition to that, Riga pursued a less adversarial policy regarding the issue of compensations from the Soviet

occupation(s) than its southern Baltic neighbour. Rather than actually seeking compensation from the Kremlin, Latvia's policy was focused on assessing the damages stemming from the Soviet occupation (Grigas 2013, 165).

The first attempt to assess the repercussions of the Soviet occupation was the creation, in 1998, of a Commission of Historians to study the issue "Crimes against Humanity Committed in the Territory of Latvia under Two Occupations, 1940 - 1956" (Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000). In 2005, a parliamentary working group was established to determine the damages incurred by the Soviet occupation (Grigas 2013, 156). The following year, president Vike-Freiberga expressed the scepticism over the initiative by noting that demanding compensation for the effects of the Soviet occupations was not realistic (Vike-Freiberga 2006, quoted in Grigas 2013, 166). In 2009, following the outbreak of the international financial crisis, the criticism against the Commission increased and the public funding eventually ceased (Sputnik 2009).

The Latvian reaction to the August 2008 five-day Russo-Georgian war also demonstrated some nuances among the Baltic states. While it is true that Riga strongly condemned Moscow's invasion (Daudze 2008), the then Latvian president, Valdis Zatlers (2007-2011) underlined that, despite the Kremlin's recent conduct, "in the future we would like to develop good-neighbourly and pragmatic relations with Moscow" (Zatlers 2008, quoted in Georgia Times 2008).

3.3.3 Estonian-Russian relations (2004-2014)

Despite expectations to the contrary (Mikhelson 2003), Tallinn's integration into the European Union has not led to a discernible improvement in Estonian-Russian relations. In contrast to Latvia's approach, characterised by pragmatism and flexibility, Estonia has adopted a more principled stance regarding historical disputes and has been less willing to accommodate Russia's interests. Some pertinent examples were the protracted negotiations regarding the signing (and ratification) of a border treaty between the two countries, the reactions to the 2005 invitation to attend the Victory Day celebrations in Moscow, and above all, the so-called "Bronze Soldier" crisis in April 2007.

After fruitless negotiations during the previous decade, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov and his Estonian counterpart Urmas Paet signed a border agreement in the Russian capital on 18 May 2005 (Bigg 2005). However, on 27 June, the Kremlin announced that it had rescinded its signature, thereby "withdrawing from any obligations stipulated in the treaty"

and demanding "a renegotiation from scratch" (Levinsson 2006, 107). The Russian decision was justified on the grounds that the Estonian Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee attached a preamble to the treaty making reference to the legal continuity of the Estonian state, and accordingly, to the validity its legal cornerstone, the Tartu Peace Treaty, signed by the Soviet Union and the Republic of Estonia in 1920 (Socor 2005). The preamble further stated that, while the border treaty partly altered the 1920 treaty-fixed boundary, it did not impact the validity of the 1920 treaty, nor did it predetermine the handling of any bilateral issues not related to the treaty (Postimees 2013). Even though the preamble was merely a unilateral non-binding document devoid of reservations towards the border treaty's terms, and despite the fact that the Duma would be asked to ratify only the treaty – and not the preamble –, the Russian side accused Estonia of leaving a potential loophole for territorial claims[50] (Fofanova and Morozov 2009; Kosachev 2005, quoted in The Baltic Times 2005).

In 2014, Foreign Ministers Sergey Lavrov and Umas Paet signed a new State Border Treaty and the Maritime Border Treaty, concluding the negotiations that had been resumed in 2013 (Estonian Public Broadcasting 2014a), but the Russian parliament side has not ratified it so far[51]. In comparison to the 2005 text, there are two new main specifications[52] which indicate that Estonia has partly acquiesced to the Kremlin's demands. First of all, the new treaty declares that both countries are committed to "developing legal basis for solving issues related to Estonian-Russian border treaty and affirming, mutually, the lack of territorial claims" (Salu 2014). Secondly, both countries concur that, "by this treaty, without any exceptions, only issues related to state border line are being regulated" (Gromilova 2016, 53).

Estonia's firm position demonstrates that it was not only the territory that was at stake during the negotiations, but also - and particularly – the whole "historical narrative legitimising the inter-war legal continuity of the interwar republic" (Mole 2012, 130). Unlike Riga, which opted for accommodating the Kremlin's demands, Estonia has perceived them as a threat to the legal nature of its statehood. The lack of agreement regarding the ratification of the treaty directly

50 Estonia and Latvia have dropped all territorial claims vis-à-vis the Russian Federation in 1994 and 1997 (Aalto 2005, 260). As a former Estonian prime minister has emphasised, amending the current Estonian-Russian border and regain the trans-Narva territories and the Petseri region would not be in Tallinn's interest because it would further increase the ethnic imbalance in Estonia and represent an increase in the number of Russian speakers (Savisaar, quoted in Mole 2012, 129).

51 For more information on the current status of ratification, see Estonian Public Broadcasting (2017).

52 In addition to the two major specifications, "128.6 hectares of land will be exchanged – for comparison's sake, this is a bit more that the Tallinn Old Town – and 11.4 square kilometres" of the Lake Peipus area (Salu 2014).

stems from the "diametrically opposed foundational narratives of nationhood" because the Kremlin's insistence on 1991 as a "year zero" in the Estonian-Russian relations calls into question Tallinn's historical narrative, according to which the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 continues to represent the sole legitimate premise for relations (Smith 2008, 421).

As regards Moscow's invitations to attend the 2005 and 2010 Victory Day ceremonies, the Estonian positions have been "marked by both pragmatism and dogma, falling between the more pragmatic and cooperative Latvian policies and the more principled and confrontational Lithuanian policies" (Grigas 2013, 149). In 2005, the then Estonian head of state, Arnold Rüütel (2001-2006), under pressure from the Ansip government, declined the Kremlin's invitation, justifying his decision with "the duty and responsibility to uphold the confidence of the nation" by staying "together with the people of Estonia on this particular day" (Rüütel 2005A). Moreover, the former president noted that the end of World War II did not only bring "the victory over fascism", as it has also led to "the consolidation of the Soviet totalitarian regime in Estonia", and as a result, Estonians had no reasons to celebrate (Rüütel 2005A). However, the following president, Toomas Ilves (2006-2016), accepted the Kremlin's invitation for the 2010 Victory Day ceremonies. Alongside his Latvian counterpart, Ilves pushed for a common Baltic decision to attend the 2010 Victory day festivities, but their efforts collided with Lithuania's intransigence (Grigas 2013, 147-8).

The events that have decisively exacerbated the already sour relationship between the northernmost Baltic republic and the Kremlin took place in April 2007. The Estonian government's decision to relocate on the night of 26-27 April the so-called "Bronze Soldier" (previously called "Monument to the Liberators of Tallinn"[53]), a Soviet World War II war memorial, from the centre of Tallinn to the Estonian Defence Forces Cemetery sparked off violent riots among the Russian minority and marked a new low in the relations between the two countries. Following the relocation of the memorial, Tallinn's ambassador to Russia, Marina Kaljurand, was physically harassed, and a number of Estonian websites, including from banks, newspapers, the Estonian presidency, parliament and cabinet ministers were targeted by cyber-attacks stemming from computer networks and servers located in the Russian Federation (International Centre for Defence and Security 2007). In addition to that, the Russian state rail company also announced

53 The monument was unveiled in September 1947 and it was dedicated to the Red Army soldiers who had the Tallinn Offensive in 1944. Later, in 1964, an eternal flame was added. For more information on the memorial, see Lehti, Jutila and Jokisipilä (2008, 397) and Liik (2007, 73).

that repairs were "scheduled on its links entering Estonia, halting shipments of oil to the country's Baltic Sea ports", a decision deemed as being politically motivated (Myers 2007).

On April 30, a delegation from Russia's State Duma visited the Estonian capital to assess the events around the relocation of the Bronze Soldier memorial. The delegation, led by Nikolai Kovalyov, former director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and head of the Duma Veterans Affairs Committee, asked for the resignation of the Estonian government, further heightening the tensions between the two countries (Yasmann 2007). The Kremlin's conduct was harshly criticised in Estonia, and the April 2007 events were even compared with the failed 1924 communist coup[54], further corroborating how the erection, removal and relocation of memorials can be perceived as a matter of national survival in the "interpretation war" that has pitted the Baltic states against Russia (Mälksoo 2009b, 72; Lehti, Jutila and Jokisipilä 2008, 394; Kattago 2008, 434). While the monument came to be perceived by Russians as a symbol of the Soviet victory over Nazism and of the "liberation" of Europe from Nazi rule, for Estonians it represented the country's loss of independence and decades of occupation (Brüggeman and Kasekamp 2008). In Mälksoo's (2009, 109) words, "the Bronze Soldier is hence a seemingly polyreferential realm of memory that symbolises for the Estonians and Russians their different experiences of the war".

The Kremlin's pressure against Tallinn sparked off a response from the EU. At the May 2007 EU-Russia summit in Samara, the European Union affirmed the principle of solidarity among member states for the first time, therefore giving direct support, not only to Estonia, but also to Poland and Lithuania, two countries that were also involved in disputes with Moscow (Fernandes 2013b, 154). According to European Commission President Barroso, the UE emphasised to Russia that "a difficulty for a Member State is a difficulty for all of us at the European Union. We are a Union based on principles of solidarity. We are now 27 Member States. So, (...) an Estonian problem is a European problem as well" (Barroso 2007, quoted in UK Parliament 2007).

Following Russia's accusations about Estonia's alleged non-adherence to European values, Tallinn has responded using similar accusations, namely by framing Russia as "false Europe", in a strategy that corresponds to Diez's strategy of normative othering. In that context, the then

54 On 1 December, 1924, the Soviet Union attempted to overthrow the Estonian government and incorporate the country into the Soviet Union. More concretely, "assault groups organized by the Soviet intelligence officers, together with underground Estonian communists, attempted to seize power and to subsequently invite regular troops of the Red Army to enter Estonia" (Maigre 2015, 2). However, the plan was foiled, and the Soviet officers and local communists were not able to occupy "Tallinn's strategic locations, government institutions, military facilities, and communications networks" (2015, 2).

Estonian prime-minister, Andrus Ansip, accused Moscow of seeking, not only to undermine his country's sovereignty, but also to attack the European Union (Ansip 2007, quoted in Kaiser 2016, 529). The Estonian president urged Russia to "remain civilised", and noted that "it is customary in Europe that differences are solved by diplomats and politicians, not on the streets or by computer attacks. Those are ways of other countries, somewhere else, not in Europe" (Ilves 2007, quoted in McLaughin 2007). The Estonian head of state sought to both widen and deepen the discursive border between "civilised" Europe, to which Estonia belongs, and the "violent" and "barbaric" Russia, whose conduct and principles are not consistent with the European civilisation (Kaiser 2016, 529). In other words, the Estonian president sought to deny Russia's place within the western normative framework.

In addition to being the most potent symbol of the fundamental disagreements between Tallinn and Moscow about the Second World War (Fernandes 2010, 140), the "Bronze War" demonstrates that the shift from "existential politics" to "normal politics" had not been achieved. In fact, despite not being concerned with the "physical" survival of the state per se – as it was evident prior to the accession to NATO and the EU –, Estonia pursuit of its right to memory has likewise been "driven and ordered by the 'ethos of survival' because "the survival of a physical body is not sufficient without the survival of a combination of ideational features of a state, the intactness of which is equal to its physical endurance (Mälksoo 2015, 224).

Chapter IV – The impact of Russia's intervention in Ukraine on the Baltic states: (re)securitisation in discourse and practices?

4.1 Russia's actions in Ukraine and its impact on the Baltics: a brief contextualisation

On 27/28 February 2014, a full-scale Russian military invasion of the Crimean peninsula began, starting with the seizure of military bases, Sevastopol and Simferopol airports, Crimea's parliament building and Council of Ministers (Wilson 2014, 110). Even though the soldiers – without insignia, personal documents or mobile phones – were called "little green men" by local journalists, they were in fact from the "Black Sea Fleet, from the 'East' Chechen battalion, the 31st Guards brigade, the 22nd brigade of special GRU[55] troops, and other military units" (Vasiliev 2014). On March 6, the Crimean parliament and the municipal council of Sevastopol simultaneously set the date of March 16 for a referendum on the status of Crimea (2014). The results of the referendum, widely condemned as illegal and a breach of Ukrainian sovereignty (United Nations 2014; European Parliament 2014; NATO 2017b; OSCE 2014), indicated that 96,7% voted for union with Russia with a turnout of 83,1%. The annexation of Crimea would take place on 18 March 2014.

In addition to Crimea, Moscow has also been accused of playing a role in fuelling an armed insurgency in eastern Ukraine since 2014 – a claim that has been refuted by the Kremlin (Chance and Eshchenko 2015) –, namely by sending troops, supplying arms to separatist forces and shelling Ukrainian positions (Case and Anders 2015; Gregory 2015). On 11 May 2014, pro-Russian separatists organised a referendum in the territory under the control of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, and subsequently proclaimed their independence, a move that has not been recognised by any state. The conflict has already led to almost 10,000 deaths and provoked more than 1,4 million internally displaced people (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2016; The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2015). Even though "the conflict has settled into a low-intensity war of attrition" (Rojanski 2017) since the battle of Debaltseve in February 2015, the diplomatic efforts to put an end to the conflict, in particular the Minsk I and Minsk II Protocols, have largely failed.

---

55 The Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) is Russia's premier military intelligence organisation. For more information on Russia's intelligence community, see Galeotti (2016c).

Russia's military intervention in Ukraine has been simultaneously described as "the most egregious effort since World War II to forcibly alter the borders of a sovereign European state" and "the biggest test of Western resolve since the Cold War ended a quarter century ago" (Patrick 2014). Moscow has emerged "as a largely unpredictable player, which no longer gives prime importance to abiding (even in appearance) by international law" and shows "an across-the-board enmity for Western institutions in Europe and Western values in the world" (Heisbourg 2015, 34). As Trenin (2014, quoted in Koshkin 2014) has noted, "since spring 2014 we have been living in a new historic epoch if we talk about relations between Russia and the West".

Following the Kremlin's actions in Ukraine, analysts have expressed concerns about Moscow's use of "hybrid warfare" against the three Baltic republics, particularly against Estonia and Latvia, which have large Russian-speaking minorities[56] (Piotrowski and Ras 2017; Galeotti 2015; Stuttaford 2015). According to Galeotti (2016b, 282), Russia's "hybrid warfare[57]" tactics used to gain the upper hand in Ukraine "are distinctive in terms of the degree to which they are willing to give primacy to 'non-kinetic' means", such as "the scale of integration of non-state actors, and tight linkage between political and military command structures. However, this is all largely a question of degree rather than true qualitative novelty".

Taking into consideration "the gains in standard of living and increasing integration of many Russian speakers" and the "relative competence" of the Baltic republics' security forces, "the major vulnerability to hybrid warfare in the Baltics lies in Russian conventional forces that may "back up" or accompany nonviolent or covert Russian aggression" (Radin 2017). In fact, the Russian Armed Forces enjoy overwhelming conventional military superiority in the region (Rathke 2015) and the Alliance would be clearly "outnumbered, outranged, and outgunned" in a conventional conflict against Moscow (Shlapak and Johnson 2016). According to a RAND Corporation study, it would take 36-60 hours for the Russian military to reach the three Baltic capitals (Shlapak and Johnson 2016). The decisions taken at NATO's 2016 Warsaw Summit, namely the deployment of four multinational battalions to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, were largely symbolic and do not alter significantly the overall military balance in the region (Whitmore and Galeotti 2016).

56 See Annex 6 for the most recent figures.

57 Russia's "hybrid warfare" is here understood as "the use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign designed to achieve surprise, seize the initiative and gain psychological as well as physical advantages utilizing diplomatic means; sophisticated and rapid information, electronic and cyber operations; covert and occasionally overt military and intelligence action; and economic pressure" (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2015). For a detailed discussion about the expression, see Galeotti (2016b).

NATO's difficulties in defending the Baltic states in the face of a potential Russian incursion would be exacerbated by geographic factors. In that regard, in case Moscow is successful in seizing a 104 km piece of land connecting Poland and Lithuania – the Suwalki Gap –, the three Baltic states would be completely cut off from their NATO allies (Grigas 2016; Sytas 2017). As noted by the Commanding General of the United States Army Europe, "if (the gap) was closed, then you have three allies that are north that are potentially isolated from the rest of the alliance" (Hodges 2017, quoted in Sytas 2017). Therefore, "we have to practice, we have to demonstrate that we can support allies in keeping (the Gap) open, in maintaining that connection" (2017).

Russia's intervention in Ukraine, coupled with NATO's perceived vulnerability against "hybrid warfare" in its eastern flank, has led to a far-reaching change in how Russia is constructed in the Baltic states'. As pointed out by Jakniunaite (2016), from 2004 to 2014:

> "Russia's threat was perceived more as a constant feature (...) and constructed mostly in a geopolitically deterministic way. That is Russia was a constant, fixture with which you had to work, and find the ways around, but it was never securitised absolutely on the state level, as an existentialist threat. This situation has changed in 2014, and the main reason was the situation Ukraine".

4.2 Lithuania's security discourse and practices since 2014

While Moscow's intervention in Ukraine has been vehemently condemned by the three Baltic republics, the securitisation of Russia, both in terms of official discourse and relevant policy changes, has been particularly intense in Lithuania. As noted by Jakstaite and Cesnakas (2015):

> "Only after the occupation and annexation of Crimea did the focus on defence increase again in Lithuania. The aggression of Russia and its support for fighters in the regions of eastern Ukraine continued to raise concerns over possible Russian interventions in the Baltic States and prompted the need to strengthen defence capabilities".

When asked to evaluate the threat posed by the Kremlin, Linas Linkevicius, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister and former National Defence Minister (2000-2004), claimed that the tactics Russia has used in Ukraine, namely the deployment of soldiers without any identifying markings, "could be used on the territory of NATO countries" and, as a consequence, it is vital to "review our strategy" and to "take into account what is happening (...) on time, not too late" (Linkevicius

2015, quoted in Shapiro and Thoburn 2015). The perception of Russia as an imminent threat to be tackled with the utmost urgency has also been articulated by the head of state. In an interview to *The Washington Post*, the Lithuanian president, Dalia Grybauskaite, accused the Kremlin of being a "state with terrorist elements" and compared Moscow's actions in Ukraine with the "terrorism we have in Iraq and Syria" (Grybauskaite 2014, quoted in Weymouth 2014a). The Lithuanian head of state went on to claim that the Kremlin was an imminent threat to "all neighbouring countries" and Ukraine "is not the last territory where Putin is going to demonstrate his powers" (2014). In a speech at the United Nations, she asked, instilled with a sense of urgency, "how much time do we have" in the face of a country that "seeks to rewrite history and redraw the borders of post-war Europe" (Grybauskaite 2015a).

The securitisation of Russia has been clearly reflected in Lithuania's strategic documents. In that regard, the new Military Strategy, which replaced the document from 2012, emphasises that Moscow is "undermining the rule-based European security architecture", and therefore, "the security environment of Lithuania has worsened and become less predictable in the long-term" (Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence 2016a). The Military Strategy approved in 2016 differs significantly from its predecessors. In fact, even though the 2012 document states that there are "worrying trends in the Lithuanian security environment", owing to the "growing authoritarianism in the neighbouring Eastern nations, increasing military power of some neighbouring Eastern states, demonstration of this power and even using it against other states", Russia is not singled out as a threat to the country (Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence 2012). However, the 2016 Military Strategy postulates that "the likelihood of a conventional armed aggression against Lithuania and/or other NATO states in the region is no longer a theoretical one, and it may increase due to Russia's growing military power and intensions to use it" (Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence 2016a).

After decades of disinvestment, Lithuanian's defence budget has been markedly increased since 2013[58]. In that year, Vilnius defence expenditures stood at 0,8% of GDP and were the second smallest among NATO countries (Dudzinska 2014, 1; Hyndle-Hussein 2015, 3). In fact, between 1991 and 2013, Lithuania's defence expenditures was never been higher than 1,42% of GDP, a record attained in 2002 and 2003, and the average defence spending between 2004-2013 was only 1% of GDP (Jokubauskas 2015, 153). While the financial crisis certainly played a

58 For an evolution of the Baltic state's defence budget (2013-2018), see Annex 4.

significant role in precluding the adoption of more robust defence budgets, it must be noted that in 2010, even though the Lithuanian economy had already started growing again, the National Defence Ministry budget was further reduced (2015, 152).

In 2015 and 2016, the defence budget amounted to €425 million and €575, corresponding to 1.15 % of GDP and 1.48 % of GDP, respectively (Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence 2015A). In 2017, the sum was further raised by €150 million, reaching €725 million (corresponding to 1.77% of GDP). According to the report "Lithuanian Defence System: Facts and Trends", the defence expenditures will already meet the 2% NATO guideline next year and they will be further on steadily increased (Lithuanian Ministry of Defence 2017).

In addition to the exponential increase in defence expenditures, the securitisation of Russia has also been reflected in relevant policy decisions, particularly in the military sphere. As noted by Kojala and Kersanskas (2015, 183), "the crisis in Ukraine has come out as a catalyst to implement practical decisions to strengthen military capabilities". In that regard, one of the most significant measures was the reintroduction of conscription. The mandatory military service, which had been abolished in 2008, was firstly reinstated on a temporary basis (5 years) in 2015 because of "the current geopolitical situation, threats to national security and necessity to strengthen Lithuania's defence capabilities" (Seimas 2015a). The Chief of Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, Lieutenant General Vytautas Zukas, also stressed that the "geopolitical situation has changed" and "the lack of soldiers is critical and poses a real threat to national security" (Zukas 2015, quoted in The Guardian 2015a). The Lithuanian president, alluding to Russia's actions in Ukraine, echoed the same argument, highlighting that "the current geopolitical environment requires us to enhance and accelerate army recruitment" (Grybauskaite 2015, quoted in Deutsche Welle 2015c).

On March 14, 2016, Lithuania's State Defence Council unanimously approved permanent conscription (The Baltic Times 2016a) and, on 16 June 2016, the Parliament adopted "amendments to the Law on Military Conscription aimed at establishing conscription to initial mandatory military service on an annual basis" (Seimas 2016). The reintroduction of conscription was largely accepted, not only by the public, but also by the audience able to grant "formal" support to the measure – the Parliament (Seimas). According to government data, the reintroduction of conscription is endorsed by 68 % of the electorate (Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence 2017a). Russia's actions in Ukraine were "a key factor in shifting public opinion in favour of this increase in Lithuania's spending on defence" and "the presence of such a clearly

perceived threat made it easier for the government to reinstate conscription" (Jakstaite and Giedrius Cesnakas (2015). Furthermore, the new law on conscription was amply supported by the Lithuanian parliament: the required amendments to the law "passed by 112 votes in favour, with 3 votes against and 5 abstentions" (Seimas 2015a).

In addition to conscription, Vilnius has also taken decisive steps to increase the armed forces' combat readiness in order to prevent Moscow from achieving a *fait accompli*[59]. In that regard, Lithuania has decided to establish a rapid reaction force that, according to the president, would be able to counter "especially non-conventional threats" (Grybauskaite 2014, quoted in DELFI 2014). Lithuania's Chief of Defence has also stressed that the 2,500 strong formation, active since November 2014 and the first of its kind to be created in a NATO country in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea, is indispensable to respond to "hybrid warfare threats, including the instigation of ethnic minorities, provocations, attacks by non-state armed groups and organizations" (DELFI 2014). According to a Lithuanian general, speed is essential in countering hybrid warfare threats and, as a result, "we need to be able to deploy forces in hours, not weeks and months" (Tamosaitis 2014, quoted in Lyman 2014).

In May 2015, some 3,000 soldiers, including the newly-created rapid response force, participated in "Lightning Strike", a large-scale military exercise "simulating a response to armed groups seizing local government buildings, weapons stockpiles and airports to form a separatist government" (Scrutton and Sytas 2015). The Lithuanian head of state confirmed that the exercise's aim was to "try to learn from the Ukrainian and Crimean situation", while the spokesman for Lithuania Army's Joint Chiefs, Donatas Suchockis, acknowledged that the "exercise will involve dealing with what can be generally called the 'little green men', in an allusion to the Russian soldiers without insignia that were deployed to Crimea (Scrutton and Sytas 2015).

Vilnius' concerns about a potential Crimean-like scenario were also evident in the decision to open a modern urban warfare training facility close to the Lithuania-Belarussian border, in Pabrade (Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence 2017a). The fake town, the first one to be created in the Baltic states, allows the Lithuanian armed forces to "simulate a Russian attack in the country's territory" (Sharkov 2016). Another unconventional measure illustrating the profound

---

59 "Rather than the naked use of force or threat-making alone—situations whose logics are straightforward even if the best responses aren't—the *fait accompli* is a move that pursues an advantage by making it difficult for a competitor to retaliate or counter" (Jackson 2016). Russia's annexation of the Crimean peninsula is a classic example (Walker and Traynor 2014).

impact of Russia's recent actions was the Ministry of Defence's decision to distribute a manual which provides guidelines on "how to act in extreme situations or instances of war" (Kucina and Sindelar 2015). Defence Minister Juozas Olekas contended that a situation similar to the one that happened in Ukraine may also occur in Lithuania, while Marius Jatautas, director of the Mobilization and Civil Resistance Department, claimed that "security situation is very fragile" and, therefore, the country "should prepare for possible foreign aggression" (DELFI 2015).

Following the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Vilnius has also purchase modern military equipment in order to enhance the Lithuanian Armed Forces combat readiness. In that regard, it must be noted that the purchase of 88 Boxer Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV) armed with 30mm gun and Spike-LR anti-tank missiles for the sum of €386 million represents the largest ever defence investment of the Lithuanian Armed Forces (Malyasov 2016). To fully assess the dimension of the investment, it is essential to bear in mind that Vilnius' total defence budget stood at €575 million in 2016 (Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence 2015a). The other two main modernisation projects are the procurement of Norwegian–US advanced surface to air missile system NASAMS and German PzH 2000 155mm Self-Propelled Howitzer (Larrinaga 2016). With regard to the air-defence systems, the purchase worth of €100 million was justified with the fact that the "lack of air defence systems increases the likelihood of a successful snap attack with limited forces", similar to the one Russian conducted in Crimea (Stankovicius 2016, quoted in Samuels 2016).

In addition to modern military equipment, Vilnius has also adopted changes to the Army's structure. In that context, the Lithuanian parliament has ratified the establishment in the coastal city of Klaipeda of a new brigade which, together with the "Iron Wolf" Mechanized Infantry Brigade, now forms the basis Lithuania's Armed Forces. The creation of the Motorised Infantry Brigade Zemaitija, established in January 2016, will allow closer alignment of peacetime and wartime structures and, as a consequence, it will augment combat readiness (Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence 2017a). According to Lieutenant General Zukas, Chief of Defence, this alignment is essential because Vilnius is "conscious of the fact that we would simply have no time for forming new military units in the event of a potential threat" (Zukas 2015, quoted in Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence 2015). In addition to the Brigade Zemaitija, the Armed

Forces have recently formed a third brigade, the Light Infantry Brigade Aukstaitija[60]. As stated by the new Minister of National Defence Raimundas Karoblis, the creation of a third brigade is pertinent owing to the "developments and changes in geopolitical situation of the recent years" which "demonstrate that freedom and independence cannot be taken for granted any longer" (Karoblis 2017, quoted in Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence 2017b).

However, policy changes in the aftermath of Russia's actions in Ukraine have not been limited to the military and defence spheres. In response to what it has perceived as the information warfare waged by Moscow and by the Kremlin-controlled media, Lithuania's media watchdog has banned the broadcast of several Russian TV channels. To be more precise, in April 2015, the Lithuanian Radio and Television Commission decided to suspend RTR Planeta broadcast for three months for "inciting discord, warmongering, spreading biased information" (Deutsche Welle 2015b). More concretely, the channel was accused of "inciting hatred" and "showing contempt for Ukraine's territorial integrity" (Kropaite 2015). Previously, Lithuania had already imposed temporary bans on the broadcasts from Gazprom-owned NTV Mir, in March 2014, and from the First Baltic Channel (PBK), in October 2013 (Auers 2015, 226). The suspension of the channels listed above can be considered as a continuation of the trend of securitising historical narratives, as both channels were accused of "spreading lies about the events in Vilnius in January 1991[61]" (Reuters 2014b).

Vilnius' response to the perceived threat posed by Moscow's disinformation has also led to the approval of constitutional amendments. In order "to counter the misinformation and the propaganda of hostile forces" (Grybauskaite 2014), the Seimas adopted a number amendments to the Law on Provision of Information to the Public, initiated by Lithuania's head of state, Dalia Grybauskaite. The amendments, which came into effect on 1 October 2015 and passed with overwhelming support[62], stipulate:

> "(...)That a fine amounting to 3% of annual income is imposed on a broadcaster for broadcasting war propaganda or information that calls for violent change in the constitutional framework of the Republic of Lithuania or encroachment on the sovereignty, territorial

60 "In total, Aukstaitija will include roughly 4,500 professional service, continuous mandatory initial military service, and trained reserve soldiers" (Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence 2017b).

61 On 13 January 1991, 14 Lithuanians were killed and hundreds were wounded while preventing special Soviet military units to take over the control of Vilnius TV tower and the Radio and Television Committee building (Keller 1991).

62 The Law was passed by 79 votes, with 4 votes against and 27 abstentions (Seimas 2015b).

integrity and political independence of the country, as well as information that foments war or hatred" (Seimas 2015b).

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has also coincided with the adoption of concrete measures in the energy domain. In her 2015 State of Nation Address, the Lithuanian president claimed that Vilnius "had delayed to seek real energy independence" for more than twenty years. In that context, the liquefied gas terminal in Klaipeda – which started operating on 3 December 2014 – is perceived as a decisive measure to tackle the "existential threat" posed by the dependence on Russian gas and the Kremlin's use of "Gazprom as a tool of political and economic blackmail in Europe" (Grybauskaite 2015b). While Russia's actions in Ukraine may have added a renewed sense of urgency to the project, it must be emphasised that "energy security was least influenced by the geopolitical disruptions in 2014 because strategic trends to reduce vulnerabilities were adopted even before the crisis" (Kersanskas 2015, 189). In fact, the decision to build a LNG terminal in Klaipeda's port had already been announced by the Ministry of Energy in 2010 (Vaida 2010).

One last measure that could be potentially considered as exceptional is the construction of a fence in the border with the Russian Kaliningrad Oblast. The current Lithuanian Prime Minister, Saulius Skvernelis, has justified the construction with the need to "ensure credible control of our eastern border of the European Union" and "restrict smuggling and illegal migration", but he has also stressed that the fence would be able to stop tanks (Skvernelis 2017, quoted in Day 2017). Lithuania's Interior minister, Eimutis Misiunas, echoed the same arguments, noting that in addition to preventing alcohol and tobacco smuggling and illegal border crossings, there was (...) "a second reason, everybody knows (...). Estonia accused Russia of abducting an intelligence officer and we in Lithuania don't want this to happen with Lithuanian officers. It is like a red line for Russia" (Misiunas 2017, quoted in Boffey 2017).

4.3 Latvia's security discourse and practices since 2014

When asked to assess the impact of Moscow's actions in Europe, Raimonds Bergmanis, Latvia's Defence Minister since 2015, stressed that "Russia continues to pose a threat with its aggressive actions across our borders" (Bergmanis 2016, quoted in Tomkiw 2016). The Latvian minister further claimed that owing to "Russia's unpredictable nature, current relations (...) are based on mistrust and suspicion" and a thaw in Russian-West relations must only occur once the

Kremlin "obeys international law, stops threatening its neighbours with weapons and restores the status quo of Ukraine's territorial integrity" (2016). Bergmanis' predecessor and president of Latvia since July 2015, Raimonds Vejonis, contended that the Kremlin was using propaganda and military might in Ukraine to intimidate the Atlantic Alliance's smallest members, exhorting all allies to "stay united because if we don't, NATO will die" Vejonis (Vejonis 2015, quoted in Schmitt and Myers 2015). The former Latvian prime-minister (2014-2016), Laimdota Straujuma, also accused Moscow of attempting to undermine Riga's security through "(a)ggressive propaganda, economic sanctions, the demonstration of military power, and the unprecedented concentration of troops close to the Baltic borders" (Straujuma 2016, quoted in The Baltic Times 2016b). Russia's military build-up is perceived as a threat because "(w)e have already seen in Georgia and Ukraine how such exercises can turn into aggression, occupation, and annexation" (Vejonis 2016).

The repercussions of Moscow's actions in Ukraine have led to changes in Latvia's strategic thinking, namely the adoption of a new National Security Concept in 2015. The document indicates that Moscow's actions have challenged Europe's security and the global international order, thereby creating "long-term effects on the national security of the republic" (Latvian Ministry of Defence 2015). The document also states that the risks and threats affecting Riga's security have notably grown and, as a consequence, the "presence of allied forces is the most effective solution for the military security and defence" (2015).

The new National Security Concept marks a profound change in Riga's strategic discourse, as references to Russia were largely absent from the previous National Security Concepts. The 2005 National Security Concept (Latvian Ministry of Defence 2005), in which Russia is not mentioned at all, underlined that there were no potential military threats to Latvia or to the other two Baltic states. The following concepts (Latvian Ministry of Defence 2008 and Latvian Ministry of Defence 2011) depict Russia in a negative light, but they both fall short of articulating the Kremlin as an ostensible threat to Riga's security. More concretely, the first document mentioned above contends that, even though "the signing of the border treaty with Russia and its ratification by the Saeima is confirmation of a positive improvement of the national security environment of Latvia", "Russia's unilateral decision to terminate its performance under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces" has led to a decrease in "mutual trust and predictability" (Latvian Ministry of Defence 2008). The 2011 document notes that, "despite some events which have raised concerns on purposes of neighbouring states", such as the military conflict in Georgia and the

Russian-Belarusian military exercises Ladoga and Zapad 2009, the "security situation in the Baltic Sea region may be described as safe and stable" and "Latvia has no direct military threats" (2008).

Like in Lithuania, Russia's intervention in the Crimean peninsula has caused a major increase in defence expenditures. Prior to Russia's annexation of Crimea, the Latvian defence budget stood at 0,9% of GDP, being on the three smallest among NATO member states (Hyndle-Hussein 2015, 3), with only Lithuania (0,8%) and Luxembourg (0,8%) spending less. Expressing satisfaction over the parliament's support for his ministry's proposal to adopt a strict schedule for increasing the defence budget, Raimonds Vejonis, then minister of Defence, highlighted that the decision "demonstrates Latvia's readiness to switch from declarations and statements to real work in order to reinforce our country's defence in the long term and ensure its stability, prosperity and growth" (Vejonis 2014, quoted in Sargs.lv 2014a).

However, the report of the former Prime Minister Laimdota Straujuma on the 2016 national budget "is specified that the field of defence is a priority, therefore 2% of GDP will be used for defence financing in 2018 already" (Latvian Ministry of Defence 2016). The commitment made by the Latvian government and parliament has resulted in concrete actions: the defence expenditures have been growing steadily since 2014, with a defence budget of 1,4% and 1,7% of GDP in 2016 and in 2017, respectively (Marrone, France and Fattibene 2016, 13; Sargs.lv 2016).

Despite not investing as much as Lithuania in defence modernisation, Latvia has also sought to adapt its Armed Forces to the challenges posed by Moscow's actions in Ukraine. In that context, the most significant decision was the €48.1 million euros purchase of 123 surplus combat reconnaissance armoured vehicles from the United Kingdom, which will be equipped with Spike fourth-generation anti-tank missile systems (UK Government 2014). As a military analyst has put it:

> "A hundred 1970s-era vehicles might not sound significant (...) but in relative terms it is. Latvia's army is one of the smallest in Europe, numbering around 1,500, and has historically lacked any serious armoured capabilities. The government's build-up of an armoured vehicle fleet, albeit small, is a sign of shifting priorities in Eastern Europe" (Turnbull 2014).

Like Lithuania, Latvia has also sought to increase the combat readiness of its Army, particularly through the creation by 2018 of 18 rapid response units[63] in the Latvian National Guard[64] (Sargs.lv 2014b). In addition to that, the government is planning to provide the National Guard with the same weaponry systems that are used by Latvia's professional soldiers. In an interview to the Latvian Information Agency (LETA), the Defence Ministry State Secretary Janis Garisons stated that the guardsmen of those units "will be able to store their individual equipment at home, including weapons and night vision equipment" (Garisons 2016, quoted in Kristovskis 2016b).

Unlike its southern neighbour, Latvia has not decided to reinstate conscription. Some high-ranking politicians, in particular the Speaker of the Parliament, Inara Murniece, noted that it would be important to restart a discussion on reintroducing conscription in Latvia and to assess the potential costs of such move (Public Broadcasting of Latvia 2016e). However, the current Minister of National Defence, Raimonds Bergmanis, dismissed that possibility by noting that Riga lacked appropriate infrastructure, as well as both financial and human resources (Public Broadcasting of Latvia 2016f). In addition to that, the minister pointed out that, after analysing the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014, one of the main conclusions was that in both cases there was a swift and professional incursion that could be stopped only by an effective and well-trained force:

> "In the current situation, the return to compulsory military service in Latvia will greatly serve Russia's interests because the move would seriously weaken or even liquidate the professional army and the Home Guard both of which will lose financing and will have to cease ongoing development projects".

In addition to the military sphere, Latvia has also sought to bolster its defensive capabilities vis-a-vis Russia's "information warfare". One of the most relevant initiatives in that context was the establishment of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga, launched in 2014. After signing a Memory of Understanding with representatives from Estonia, Italy,

---

63 Fourteen units will be platoon-level with integrated air-defence, anti-tank, sniper and engineering capabilities. Four units will specialize in defense against weapons of mass destruction, air-defence, mortar fire support and engineering (Sargs.lv 2014b).

64 The "Latvian National Guard (HP) is a voluntary paramilitary self-defence militia company and a component of the national armed forces and regular forces in reserve, it is participating in a national protection system in the planning and execution of the tasks in accordance with the national defence plan (Latvian Government 2015).

Lithuania, Poland, the UK and Germany, Raimond Vejonis, then minister of defence, pointed out that:

> "The conflict between Russia and Ukraine clearly shows how important an information campaign can be in gaining the upper hand in a military conflict. Strategic communication is also becoming increasingly important in the context of NATO-led operations. For that reason, Latvia's initiative to create an international centre of excellence will help the alliance enhance its strategic communication capabilities" (Vejonis 2014, quoted in Atlantic Council 2014).

In addition to the launch of the Centre of Excellence, Riga has also securitised Russia's narrative about the conflict in Ukraine. In that regard, Latvia decided to shut down the local website of Russia's foreign news channel Sputnik in March 2016. As stated by a spokesman from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the decision was justified on the grounds that the government does not "regard Sputnik as a credible media source", but rather a "propaganda tool" (Jansons 2016, quoted in Euractiv 2016). The Network Information Center (NIC), which carried out the suspension, provided a second rationale by pointing out that "ensuring continuing operations of the sputniknews.lv website was at odds with the March 17, 2014 EU regulation[65] that stipulates sanctions against activities endangering the territorial integrity and independence of the Ukrainian state" (Public Broadcasting of Latvia 2016a). Shortly after the suspension of Sputnik, Latvia's broadcast watchdog, the National Electronic Mass Media Council (NEPLP), imposed a six-month ban on the Rossiya RTR Russian TV channel (Public Broadcast of Latvia 2016b). The Russian channel was accused of inciting hatred or calling for war, following contentious claims made by the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and Duma MP, Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

As regards the securitisation of information, it is also pertinent to mention that a domestic discussion regarding the establishment of a national TV channel in Russian language took place in Latvia. In the end, the government has opted for not creating a new channel, owing to the lack of political support. More concretely, the then nationalist party National Alliance – then part of the government – argued that the establishment of a Russian language channel would "send the wrong signal to Russian-speaking minorities" and "encourage them not to learn Latvian" (Rostoks and Vanaga 2016, 87).

Russia's military intervention in Ukraine has also led to the adoption of a number of constitutional amendments. The main aim of the bills submitted to the Latvian parliament by

65 Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (EUR-Lex 2016a).

president Vejonis, which included amendments to the National Security Law, to the National Armed Forces Law and to the Cabinet of Ministers' Rules of Proceeding, was to expedite both government and military decision-making in case of conflict (Public Broadcasting of Latvia 2015).

The amendments to the National Security Law give greater flexibility to local commanders, namely by stipulating that, should the country come under serious military threat, the Latvian Armed Forces are authorised to immediately launch self-defence measures without having to wait for an order from the Commander-in-Chief. Furthermore, in the event of a threat to the country's sovereignty, the Commander-in-Chief "may take full command of the Armed Forces if the Cabinet of Ministers is unable to perform its functions and there are urgent decisions to be taken concerning national defence" (President of Latvia 2016). Amendments also include a new and broader definition of "wartime", now described as a consequence of any attack, be it conventional (military) one or any other actions aimed against the country's independence, constitutional order or territorial integrity (Baltic News Network 2016).

As regards the National Armed Forces Law, the amendments promoted by the Latvian head of state intend to guarantee the swift and efficient cooperation and exchange of information between the Cabinet of Ministers and the National Armed Forces' command during wartime. In order to achieve that objective, the amendment indicates that the Armed Forces commander shall, in the event of a war, participate in the meetings of the cabinet of ministers as an advisor.

Finally, the amendment to the Law on the Structure of the Cabinet of Ministers - whose key goal is "to ensure decisive action in the event of a national threat" - will enable the Cabinet to make decisions in the event of a state of war or a state of exception if the Prime Minister and at least three other Members of the Cabinet attend the meeting (President of Latvia 2016).

The amendments mentioned above demonstrate the impact of Russia's intervention in Ukraine on Latvia's security perceptions, clearly revealing the perceived urgency to respond rapidly should Moscow use in Latvia any of the tactics it has displayed in Ukraine. This urgency is further demonstrated by the fact that the bills were justified on the grounds that it was urgent to preclude the repetition of the passiveness that characterised Riga's response to the first Soviet invasion and occupation (1940-1941). Alluding to those events, Janis Pleps, the president's adviser on constitutional matters, stressed that "no one will be able to say we didn't defend ourselves". Commenting on the ratification of his constitutional amendments by the *Saeima*, the Latvian head of state accentuated the importance of history:

> "Today we strengthen our position in order to prevent and deal with any threat to our country's independence, constitutional order and territorial integrity. (...)"I will stay in place, you stay in yours - these words spoken on the evening of 17 June 1940 will never again be possible" (Vejonis 2016, quoted in Public Broadcasting of Latvia 2016d).

The reference to the words of the former Latvian President Karlis Ulmanis, who exhorted Latvian citizens not to resist and avoid a bloodshed during the Soviet Union's first occupation in 1940, was used to draw a parallelism between contemporary Russia's actions in Ukraine and Moscow's conduct in World War II, attaching to the perceived threat a unambiguous sense of urgency. In addition to that, the allusion to the words of the former president also corroborates how the historical element has been a common feature in the articulation of Russia as a threat.

Also in 2016, the Latvian parliament passed amendments to the Criminal Law in order to tackle hybrid threats more efficiently. According to the Latvian Chairperson of the National Security Committee, "the security situation worldwide and especially in Europe has considerably changed lately, and Latvia has to be able to respond to new types of threats" (Aboltina 2016, quoted in Saeima 2016a). Accordingly, and taking into consideration that the provisions of the Criminal Law on the responsibility for crimes against independence, territorial integrity, constitutional order and the rule of law have remained unaltered since the law came into effect in 1999, the creation of a regulatory framework reflecting the changing geopolitical landscape and ensuring the adequate protection of Riga's security interests was deemed as essential by the Latvian political elite (Saeima 2016a).

The amendments ratified by the parliament criminalise any kind of activities deemed detrimental to the state's fundamental interests. Unlike the 1999 law, whose provisions rely on violent conduct as a primary factor for liability and, therefore, do not take into consideration that the government may also be overthrown without direct use of violence, the amendments stipulate that offenders are held criminally liable based on the objective of such activities (e.g. to undermine Latvia's territorial integrity) rather than the methods used. According to the new provisions, actions threatening the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the republic will carry a jail term of up to eight years and a probation period of up to three years. However, actions which include the use of violence or are conducted in an organized group are punished with a sentence of up to 15 years (Saeima 2016b).

In the energy field, it must be noted that Latvia's position regarding Nord Stream 2 has been consistent with that of the other CEE countries, and has differed from Riga's previous position

regarding Nord Stream. In 2016, the president of Lithuania and the prime-ministers of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia sent a letter to the president of the European Commission, Jean Claude Juncker, expressing disagreement with the project, owing to its "potentially destabilising geopolitical consequences" and its impact on "gas market development and gas transit patterns in the region, most notably the transit route via Ukraine" (Sytas 2016).

One further measure that could be deemed as "exceptional" is the decision to build a 90km fence along Latvia's 276km border with Russia. However, the justification provided by the Latvian authorities for the construction of a border fence has differed from Lithuania's and there was no reference to any perceived threat posed by Moscow. In fact, the main rationale behind the construction was the increase in the number of illegal crossings from the Russian Federation: while the number of people detained in 2014 was 144, the amount of unlawful crossings has risen to 476 in 2015 (Public Broadcasting of Latvia 2016c). In that context, the construction of the border fence was explained by the Latvian Ministry of Interior as a necessary step to fortify the European Union's outer borders taking into consideration the potential shifting of illegal migration routes from the Russian Federation to Norway and Finland, to the borders of the Baltic states (Public Broadcasting of Latvia 2016c).

4.4 Estonia's security discourse and practices since 2014

After the annexation of Crimea, Estonia's former president (2006-2016) and minister of Foreign Affairs (1996-1998 and 1999-2002), Toomas Ilves, was one of the first EU heads of state to draw an explicit comparison between Moscow's intervention in Ukraine and the crimes perpetrated by Nazi Germany. According to him, the Kremlin's "justification of a military invasion by a fabricated need to protect ethnic compatriots resuscitates the arguments used to annex Sudetenland in 1938" (Ilves 2014). In a letter exhorting his two Baltic counterparts to significantly raise defence spending, the former Estonian defence minister (2014-2016) stressed that "the unfolding crisis in Ukraine and the recent show of force near Baltic borders show that security must not be taken for granted", and also that "history teaches us that tectonic changes in the geopolitical landscape call for the utmost vigilance, unity and long-term perspectives" (Reinsalu 2014, quoted in Estonian Ministry of Defence 2014a).

However, even though Tallinn has strongly condemned Russia's actions in Ukraine, Estonia's securitisation of the Russian threat has been more balanced than Vilnius and Riga's. Rather than presenting itself as a vulnerable country vis-à-vis Moscow, the Estonian political elite has stressed the country's membership in the Atlantic Alliance and also the state's strong resilience, not only in the military and defence sectors, but also economically and socially. In that regard, the former prime-minister of Estonia (2014-2016), Taavi Roivas, observed that, although Russia's aggressive behaviour in Ukraine, "has made Russia a threat", he also emphasised that:

> "We have capable forces. We are ready to stand against any enemy. (...)[The Kremlin] would be completely crazy to pick a fight against NATO because NATO has made it very clear that every bit of its territory will be defended. And there will be a reaction against any attack" (Roivas 2016, quoted in Schmitt 2016).

The central focus on the country's resilience was further articulated by Hannes Hanso, former Minister of Defence (2015-2016):

> "I would not say Estonia is nervous about the current situation in our neighbourhood, but we are concerned. *Many things are working well for us, including the NATO Response Force and our response plans*. Our professional Army, together with our reserve forces and our volunteer-based Defence League, are all working well. Combined, this gives us a *substantial defence force*. So our own forces, along with the commitment of allies, provide a credible deterrent. Naturally, we have historically very painful memories of being occupied by the Soviet Union, and that makes independence and sovereignty even more valuable for us. The security situation could always be better, but *we are making the best of our situation*. Our *economy is growing, and Estonia is a safe and attractive place to invest in and conduct business*. Our tax system is very favourable, and corruption levels are very low" (Hanso 2016, quoted in Defence News 2016. Italic is ours).

When asked if he believed that Russia would invade the city of Narva in Eastern Estonia, former President Toomas Ilves completely dismissed that possibility, on the grounds that the income of the Russians living in Estonia were much higher than in neighbouring Russia, and therefore, they would not want to become part of Russia (Ilves 2014, quoted in Weymouth 2014b). In the same interview, the Estonian president also stressed how Tallinn's situation could not be compared to Ukraine's, by pointing out that "the big difference is that Ukraine is not in

NATO and we are" and "if it (Article 5) ever fails, then NATO no longer works" (Ilves 2014, quoted in Weymouth 2014b).

Estonia's less intense securitisation of Russia has also been evident in the new National Security Concept, which was adopted in 2017 and replaced the one from 2010. During the presentation of the new National Security to the parliament, current prime-minister Jüri Ratas acknowledged that "the Russian aggression in Eastern Ukraine" and "the annexation of Crimea" are a security concern for Tallinn (Ratas 2017, quoted in Estonian Government 2017a). Whereas "the likelihood of military pressure and the use of military means is assessed as being higher", Ratas also noted that "foreign intelligence and surveillance services" note "that the risk of direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO member countries in 2017 is low" (2017). In fact, while Latvia's new National Security Concept and particularly Lithuania's Military Strategy unambiguously single out Moscow as a threat, the Estonia's Security Concept is more balanced regarding Russia.

As regards the defence and military sector, it must be noted that, even though Estonia's defence expenditures did increase after the annexation of Crimea, they have not increased as significantly as Latvia and Lithuania's. However, it must be underlined that Estonia was, even prior the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, one of the few NATO countries whose government had already decided to spend 2% of GDP in defence (Auers 2015, 203). Unlike the other two Baltic republics, whose defence budget was less than 1% in 2014, the Estonian political parties had already reached a consensus in 2012 to spend at least 2% of national income on defence (Estonian Ministry of Defence 2016). In spite of already meeting NATO's benchmark, Tallinn's defence budget have been steadily growing in the last two years, increasing from 2,07% in 2016 to 2,2% of GDP in 2017 (Business Insider 2016).

In terms of concrete measures, it must be noted that Tallinn has decided to invest about 40 million euros from the government's reserve fund to develop the infrastructure needed for hosting NATO troops in the course of 4 years (Mikser 2015, quoted in Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015. Furthermore, in July 2016, the Roivas' government allocated an additional €13m to cover costs connected to hosting allied forces, including extending existing barracks (Estonian Public Broadcasting 2016).

The Estonian government has also sought to bolster the capabilities of the Estonian Defence Forces. In that respect, it is pertinent to mention the purchase of 80 third generation systems Javelins with the aim of reinforcing the army's anti-tank capabilities, in a deal worth 40 million

euros (Palowski 2016). Sven Mikser, former Minister of Defence (20154-2015) and Minister of Foreign Affairs since November 2016, stressed the procurement's urgency by noting that "due to the changed security circumstances, we decided to proceed with the procurement as soon as possible" (Mikser 2014, quoted in Estonian Public Broadcasting 2014b). In addition to that, the then Estonian Defence Minister, Sven Mikser, signed on 9 December of 2014 the biggest arms deal in Estonia's history (Estonian Ministry of Defence 2014b). According to the deal, signed with Estonian's minister Dutch counterpart, Jeanine Antoinette Hennis-Plasschaert, "Estonia will buy 44 modern CV 9035NL infantry fighting vehicles and support vehicles based on Leopard 1 tanks, for 113 million euros" (2014b).

In spite of the very significant investments, it is important to bear in mind that the equipment listed above had already been established as a key goal in the 2013-2022 National Defence Development Plan (Estonian Defence Forces 2013). As outlined in the document, "with regard to land operations, the main focus during the development plan's planning period is on establishing rapid-response infantry brigades, developing armoured manoeuvre capability and strengthening anti-tank defences" (2013). In other words, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has added a renewed sense of urgency to the upgrade of the Defence Forces' equipment, but the intention to do so had already been explicitly stressed prior to the conflict in Ukraine.

As regards the territorial defence forces in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, there is an overwhelming consensus that the country should not alter the nature of the Defence League[66] as a traditional volunteer battalion (Hyndle-Hussein 2015, 3). In a purely symbolic move after the annexation of Crimea, the Ministry of Defence decided to allocate 1 million euros for the construction of a Defence League building in the eastern border city of Narva (Estonian Public Broadcasting 2014c). More significantly, the Estonian government has decided to recruit hundreds civilian computer experts for the Defence League Cyber Unit, in order to bolster the country's resilience against Russian cyberwarfare (Blair 2015).

Estonia's response to Moscow's disinformation campaigns has also clearly differed from Lithuania and Latvia's. Like the other two Baltic republics, Tallinn also considers that Moscow's controlled media has been orchestrating disinformation campaigns aimed at destabilising the country and attacking its international reputation. However, rather than securitising the Kremlin's

66 "The Estonian Defence League is a part of the Defence Forces, a voluntary militarily organised national defence organisation operating in the area of government of the Ministry of Defence. The Estonian Defence League possesses arms, engages in military exercises and fulfils the tasks prescribed by the National Defence League Act" (Estonian Defence League 2016).

official narrative about the conflict in Ukraine and suspending Russian-language channels, Estonia was the only Baltic republic to create a new channel in Russian language (Rostoks and Vanaga 2016, 86). In that context, the Estonian Public Broadcasting Company has decided to launch for the very first time since 1991 a Russian language television channel (ETV+) on September 25 2015 (Nielsen 2015). The channel, which "focuses on telling local stories about life and opportunities in the country", is almost entirely financed by Estonia's state budget, and its annual running costs stand at roughly 4 million euros (Krutaine 2015).

The former Estonian president has emphasised that freedom of speech is one of Tallinn's core values and, therefore, banning TV channels should not be an option to be considered (Ilves 2014, quoted in Milne 2014). A Reform Party member of the Estonian parliament, Kristen Michal, echoed the same argument, and emphasised that imposing a ban on Russian channels would only intensify "Russian propaganda" (Michal 2014, quoted in Estonian Public Broadcasting 2014). Whereas the creation of a Russian-language channel has been deemed as a commendable step, the most effective way to mitigate the repercussions of the disinformation promoted by the Kremlin-controlled media is to increase media literacy among the Estonian society (Pääbo 2016).

Like Latvia and Lithuania, Estonia has declared its intention to build a fence along a 90 km section of the altogether 135 km land border with the Russian Federation. The justification provided by Estonia differs from the ones given by Lithuania, but were quite similar to Latvia's. In the words of the former of Estonian Minister of Interior Hanno Pevkur (2014-2016):

> "Estonia needs a modern state border, which is worthy of serving as the external border for Europe and the NATO. I believe that both the Government, as well as the Riigikogu will support the necessary allocations from the next years' State budget, so that Estonia could present in her centennial year the most modern border infrastructure in the world" (Pevkur 2016, quoted in Estonian Ministry of Interior 2016).

Toomas Viks, a spokesman from the Estonian Ministry of Interior, further explained that the planned "around-the-clock technical surveillance" will "create ideal conditions for border guarding and to ensure the security of Estonia and the Schengen area" and "the information gathered would be used to investigate illegal border crossing, smuggling and human trafficking" (Viiks 2015, quoted in BBC 2015). Rather than focusing on a threat posed by Russia or even citing the

kidnapping of an Estonian security official[67] in September 2014, Tallinn has stressed that the fence's purpose is to combat illicit activities.

67 On 4 September 2014, Eston Kohver, an officer from the Estonian Internal Security Service, was abducted from Estonian territory in the close vicinity of the Estonian-Russian border line when he was investigating cross border crime and smuggling (Estonian Ministry of Interior 2015). Whereas the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) has acknowledged the abduction, it refuted the claim that the action took place inside Estonia's territory (2015b). Kohver was accused of spying and sentenced to 15 years in prison by a Pskov regional court, but he would be exchanged for Aleksei Dressen, a former Estonian security official serving a 16-year sentence for spying for Moscow, in September 2015 (The Guardian 2015b).

Conclusion

Applying the securitisation framework and the strategies of othering proposed by Diez (2005) to map the evolution of the representation of Russia in the Baltic states from 1991 to the present, it is possible to discern three interconnected elements: security, history and normative considerations. As demonstrated in Chapter I, the first strategy enunciated by Diez (2005) – that is, securitisation or the construction of Russia as an existential threat –, was prevalent in the three Baltic republics from around the mid 1990's until their accession to the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance in 2004. First of all, the securitisation of Russia in the Baltics has manifested itself in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia's adherence to the principle of legal continuity, according to which the three countries were never legitimately part of the Soviet Union. As noted in Chapter II, the Baltics' practice of anchoring the principle of historical continuity in their constitutions corresponds to a form of securitisation because "the entire state project is precarious if not firmly connected to the historic one" (Jaeger 2000). In other words, non-recognition of their legal continuity is considered in the Baltic capitals as a threat to their very independence and statehood legitimacy.

The key corollaries of the principle mentioned above are the citizenship policies of Estonia and Latvia. While Vilnius has also proclaimed the legal continuity of the Lithuanian interwar republic, the decades under Soviet control did not lead to a loss of territory or to significant changes in the country's ethnic composition. However, both Latvia and Estonia, where the number of the titular ethnic groups had markedly decreased – the percentage of Latvians and Estonians were merely 52% and 62% of the total population in 1989 –, adopted exclusionary citizenship policies based upon *jus sanguinis*, thereby granting automatic citizenship only to the citizens of the interwar republics and their descendants. Through that decision, Riga and Tallinn sought to ensure that the state's titular group would reverse decades of marginalisation and that the first post-occupation elections had "overwhelmingly ethnic Estonian and Latvian electorates" (Auers 2015, 81). The Russian-speaking minorities were perceived as "colonial" minorities and a potential "fifth column" that could be used by Moscow to sabotage Latvia and Estonia's independence from within.

The securitisation of Russian was also translated into the Baltic states' foreign policy discourse and strategic orientation. Following their re(independence), Lithuania, Latvia and

Estonia sought to irreversibly dissociate themselves from the Russian Federation through a dual strategy. First of all, the Baltics staunchly avoided any links with Russian-led post-Soviet initiatives. In that context, the most paradigmatic example of securitisation was Lithuania's constitutional ban on the accession to post-soviet organisations.

Concomitant with the refusal to join post-Soviet initiatives, the Baltic states started to openly pursue their integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures in the mid 90's. In order to make their case for membership in the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn stressed their adherence to European values and their civilisation affinity with the Euro-Atlantic structures, while denying Russia's and implicitly articulating Moscow as inferior, owing to its perceived lack of democratic values. In addition to that, they sought to demonstrate their acute vulnerability vis-à-vis the Russian Federation, whose government, besides "undemocratic", was also constructed as "aggressive", "unstable", and therefore, as a threat. In that regard, the Baltics' foreign policy establishments contextually mobilised heuristic artifacts in order to build a coherent network of implications (Balzacq 2005, 182) about Moscow. In a striking metaphor, the Kremlin was represented as a predatory "creature" capable of "attacking" and "tearing into pieces" their weaker neighbours (Landsbergis 1998).

From their integration into the Euro-Atlantic political and security structures in 2004 and until the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia was not constructed as an existential threat to the Baltic states independence. Instead of portraying Moscow as an ostensible threat, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia sought the pan-European recognition of their historical subjectivity. However, the shift from "existential politics" to "normal politics" – here understood as the "desecuritisation of the self-conceptualizations of the Baltic states after their inclusion within the EU and NATO" (Mälksoo 2006, 278) – was not achieved. In fact, while they were less concerned with the state "physical" survival, which was ensured through the integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures, they strived for their "meaningful survival". In other words, they sought to be full members of the Western mnemonic community, in a quest that had existential overtones.

At the international level, they sought to draw attention, particularly at the European Union and at the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, for the repercussions of their *de facto* loss of independence in 1940 and their forced incorporation into the Soviet Union, a claim that Moscow refutes. Even more significantly, the Baltic republics have sought to persuade their Western partners of the moral equivalence between Nazism and Stalinism, therefore questioning the uniqueness of the former's crimes. However, even though Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have

sought to "incorporate their wartime experiences into a common European historical consciousness" (Mälksoo 2009a, 84), there have been some nuances. In that context, it is pertinent to stress that the securitisation of the Baltics' historical narrative was less intense in Estonia, both domestically and at the international level. At the domestic level, Lithuania and Latvia securitised their narratives namely by amending the Criminal code and criminalising the denial of Soviet occupation and by banning Soviet (and Nazi) symbols and ideologies. In one paradigmatic example of their different approach, Estonia (unlike Latvia) did not take in Lithuania's 2010 government initiative to ask the EU Justice Commissioner for the criminalisation of the "approval, denial or belittling of communist crimes" (BBC 2010).

From 2004 to 2014, the Baltic states have predominantly articulated Moscow through processes of normative othering, which correspond to Diez's strategy of constructing the other as violating universal values. The most paradigmatic example occurred during the Bronze Soldier crisis in 2007. During the dispute, the Estonian president urged the Kremlin to remain "civilised" and pointed out "it is customary in Europe that differences are solved by diplomats and politicians, not on the streets or by computer attacks" (Ilves 2007, quoted in McLaughin 2007). In other words, Tallinn sought to expand the discursive border between "civilised" and "true" Europe, to which Estonia belongs, and the "violent" and "barbaric" Russia, whose conduct and principles place it firmly outside the Western normative framework (Kaiser 2016, 529).

Processes of normative othering vis-à-vis Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were also evident in Moscow's discourse and practices. In fact, the Kremlin has accused the three Baltic republics of harbouring neo-Nazi sympathies and, in reference to Estonia and Latvia's citizenship policies, of discriminating against and violating the rights of their Russian-speaking minorities. In light of that, the Kremlin contends that the Baltics' conduct was not consistent with "with the obligations of States Members of the United Nations under its Charter and are incompatible with the goals and principles of the Organization." The Kremlin has sought to expose the Baltic states as an embodiment of "false Europe" and denied Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia's place within the Western normative framework. By way of example, during the "Bronze Soldier crisis", Estonia's conduct was criticised as being counter "to modern European civilisation, to the entire civilized world" (Kosachev, quoted in Pelnens 2009, 60).

The annexation of Crimea on March 18 2014 represented a watershed moment in the European security landscape. Russia's military intervention has led to a resurgence of processes of geopolitical othering, similar to the ones that were prevalent in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia

prior to their accession to the EU and NATO in 2004. In other words, Moscow has been resecuritised and articulated as a threat, particularly (albeit not exclusively), in the military sphere. However, there have been differences among the three Baltic states in terms of discourse and policy change.

The resecuritisation of Russia was particularly intense in Lithuania. In fact, Vilnius' securitising agents articulated Moscow as a threat and adopted a comprehensive set of policy change(s) justified with reference to the declared threat, not only in the defence and military sphere, but also in other sectors. As regards the defence sphere, it is pertinent to stress that Lithuania has been markedly increasing its defence spending. While Vilnius' defence expenditures only stood at 0,8% of state budget prior to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict – the smallest defence budget among NATO countries–, the expenses have significantly increased since 2014. More specifically, the defence budget has increased from 1.15 % of GDP (2015) to 1,77% (2017), and it will be further raised to 2% (2018).

One of the most significant measures in the military sphere was the reintroduction of conscription, which had been abolished in 2008. The decision was justified, by both the head of state and the military establishment, with regard to Russia's actions in Ukraine. In addition to that, Lithuania has also sought to increase the country's armed forces readiness by altering its structure and investing in modern military equipment. For example, the purchase of 88 Infantry Fighting Vehicles was Vilnius' largest defence investment ever. The changes have been explained on the grounds that it was essential for the Armed Forces to able to respond swiftly in the event of a Russian attack and prevent a *fait accompli*, in another allusion to Russia's annexation of Crimea.

In addition to the defence and military spheres, Vilnius has also securitised information, namely by suspending Russian TV channels. The ban imposed on Russian channels was justified on the grounds that Moscow was spreading war propaganda and distorting the truth about Lithuania's history, which corroborates the continuation of the trend to securitise historical narratives. Vilnius securitisation of information was also illustrated by the approval of constitutional amendments aimed at imposing fines to broadcasters accused of spreading propaganda against the country sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the country.

Latvia's securitisation of Russia has also been particularly intense, both in terms of discourse and comprehensive policy changes. As regards the military sphere, Riga's defence expenditures

have grown dramatically since 2014: the country, which had one of the smaller defence budgets of all NATO members in 2013, will achieve the Alliance 2% benchmark already in 2018, two years earlier than initially projected. Despite the considerable investment in the defence and military sectors, the policy changes implemented by Riga have not been as far-reaching as Lithuania's. The issue of conscription was a case in point: there was no significant political support to reinstate the mandatory military service. In fact, the Latvian Defence Minister dismissed the possibility by pointing out to the of lack financial and human resources. One further difference between Lithuania and Latvia's response to Russia's actions in Ukraine was Riga's stronger emphasis on constitutional securitisation. Rather than changes in the Armed Forces structure, Riga has sought to increase the country's defence readiness by approving constitutional amendments that expedite both government and military decision-making in case of conflict.

In comparison to the other two Baltic republics, Estonia's re(securitisation) of Russia has been significantly more balanced. While it has largely shared Riga and Vilnius' discourse regarding Moscow's actions in Ukraine, Estonian political leaders have decided to stress the country's strengths rather than its vulnerabilities. In that regard, whereas Russia's actions in Ukraine were framed as a threat, Tallinn has focused on the country's resilience and ability to sustain Moscow's pressure, not only militarily. One paradigmatic example was Estonia's response to the perceived disinformation campaigns waged by the Kremlin against the Baltic republics. While Latvia and Lithuania decided to securitise information and suspend Russian channels, Estonia has instead created, for the very first time since 1991, a Russian-speaking channel targeting the Russophone minorities.

In addition to adopting a discourse stressing resilience rather than vulnerabilities, the policy changes implemented by Tallinn have been less comprehensive and drastic. In that context, it is fundamental to bear in mind that Estonia did not abolish conscription and its investment in the defence and security was already significantly higher than in Latvia and Lithuania. By way of example, the level of military expenditures of Estonia was already markedly higher that Latvia and Lithuania: while the latter spent 1% or less in defence prior to 2014, the former was already of the few NATO countries meeting the Alliance's 2% benchmark. However, even though Tallinn did not have room to significantly increase defence spending – like Latvia and Lithuania –, the expenditures have been steadily increasing since 2014. In addition to that, it is important to stress that Estonia has also recently signed its biggest arms deal ever. Even though some of the

most significant procurements had already been planned prior to 2014, the conflict in Ukraine added further urgency to the military equipment modernisation.

This work could serve as a starting point for further academic enquiry. Possible avenues for research could address the undertheorised and under-explored conceptualisation of audiences in the Copenhagen's School securitisation framework. As we have noted in chapter I, there are two kinds of audiences: the general public, which provides "moral" support to the claim articulated by the securitiser, and the policy-makers – inter alia national parliaments – whose "formal" support is indispensable for the securitising agent to adopt exceptional measures. In this dissertation, we focused on the latter audience, leaving the former unaddressed. Therefore, we believe it would be pertinent to explore the linkages between the two audiences in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. More concretely, it would be important to (1) assess the impact of each of the two audiences in the Baltic countries overall decision-making processes and to (2) identify whether there are nuances in the arguments employed by the securitising agent to persuade each audience. Not only would an answer to both those questions help to further evaluate the securitisation of Russia in the Baltic states, but it would also represent a valuable contribution to improve the Copenhagen School securitisation's framework.

Annexes

Annex 1 – Map of the Baltic states

(Kasekamp 2010, 176)

Annex 2 – Territorial changes of the Baltic states after 1940

(Kasekamp 2010, 121)

Annex 3 – Key projects of military cooperation of the Baltic republics

Project	Aim	Capabilities	Remarks
BALTBAT HQ in Latvia Operational during 1994-2003	• Peacekeeping unit for UN Chapter VI operations • Promotion of the cooperation among the Baltic States and between Baltic States and Western world	• Multinational staff • Multinational HQ, logistic company • Three rifle companies (one from each of the BS)	• 1998-2000 1/3 of the battalion was 3 times deployed to B&H as part of the Danish Battalion • Never deployed to a mission as a battalion
BALTRON HQ in Estonia Operational since 1997	• Minimize mine hazards • Enhance security of territorial waters • Help to remediate environmental damage • Participate in standing NATO forces (SNMCMG1)	• Mine hunters and sweepers: LV contributes with 1 LINDAU and 2 CONDOR class vessels, EE with 2 FRAUENLOB and 2 LINDAU class ships, LT with 1 LINDAU class vessel • Each nation provides a staff ship for operations and exercises	
BALTNET CRC in Lithuania Operational since 1998	• Execute the common air surveillance • Implement the common acquisition projects • Organize common training activities	• Baltic Air Surveillance Network and Control System • Combined Control and Reporting Centre (CRC) • Nodes (NN) in each of the Baltic State • Assigned to	• BALTNET is an integral part of NATO air Defense system, connected to NATINADS

		BALTNET in 3 BS	
BALTDEFCOL Based in Estonia Created in 1999	• Staff training at the operational level for OF3 level students • Higher command studies to prepare OF 4-5 officers and equivalent civil servants • Defense background training and studies for civil servants • Regular development seminars and study periods	• Directing Staff – 40 positions • Support Staff – 25 positions	• Military instructors and academics from more than 10 countries are employed by the Baltic Defence College • BALTDEFCOL educates officers from the Baltic and Nordic States, Western and Eastern Europe, Balkans, South Caucasus and other countries

(Molis 2009, 32-3)

Annex 4 – Military spending of the Baltic states as % of GDP (2013-2018)



Graphic created from data compiled from Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence (2016b, 2017), Sargs.lv (2016); Latvian Ministry of Defence (2016), SIPRI 2017 and Government of Estonia (2017b).

Annex 5 – Baltic states' population by ethnicity (2017)

Country	Titular ethnic groups	Russians
Lithuania	86,9%	4,6%
Latvia	62%	25,4%
Estonia	68,8%	25,1%

Table compiled from data in Statistics Estonia (2017a), Statistics Lithuania (2017a) and Statistics Latvia (2017a).

Annex 6 – Titular ethnic groups as percentage of the population (1945-1989)

Country	1945	1959	1970	1989
Lithuania	78%	79%	79%	80%
Latvia	80%	62%	57%	52%
Estonia	94%	75%	68%	62%

(Kasekamp 2010, 155)

Appendices

Appendix 1 –NATO Summer School "NATO Beyond the Warsaw Summit: Adapting to the New Realities" (Czechia, 10-15 July, 2016)

The Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI) is a Czech-based think tank established in 2002, whose main mission "is to build an ever-growing number of informed and security-minded policy practitioners dedicated to the development and protection of democratic values and institutions", particularly in Czechia and in other post-communist European states. To achieve its mission, the PSSI conducts a broad range of activities under its Security Scholars Program, Space Security Program, Economic & Financial Threat Program and Energy Security Program. In addition to the core programmes listed above, the PSSI has recently launched a number of projects aimed at assessing Russia's influence in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries.

Since 2005, the PSSI, in cooperation with NATO's Public Diplomacy Division and the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have offered an intensive course for 25 students in International Relations and Political Science from NATO member states and partner countries concerning future challenges for the Atlantic Alliance and other critical issues on the global security agenda. The one-week course, which takes place at Měřín, encompasses presentations, lectures, group simulations and discussions led by Czech and foreign security experts. The Summer School's 2016 edition, titled "NATO Beyond the Warsaw Summit: Adapting to the New Realities", focused on the Alliance 2016 Warsaw Summit's outcomes, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and its impact on CEE countries, NATO-Russian relations, and cyber warfare.

The lectures were particularly important for the construction last chapter of this dissertation, as one of the topics covered in the Summer School was the CEE countries – including the Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia's – response to Russia's actions in Ukraine. Furthermore, I had the privilege of exchanging ideas with my fellow participants – including some from the Baltic republics –, as well as the honour of meeting Professor Mark Galeotti, one of the leading international experts on Russia.

Appendix 2 – University of Tartu's Summer School "Transition stories from the USSR to the EU: reasons and consequences" (1-14 August, 2016)

The Summer School "Transition Stories from the USSR to the EU: Reasons and Consequences" took place in Tallinn and Tartu, and it was organised by the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies of the University of Tartu, in conjunction with the College of Charleston. The interdisciplinary two-week programme included lectures, practical workshops and seminars conducted by Estonian and foreign experts. The main topics were Estonia's foreign and security policies, the Estonian Citizenship Law and the legal status of the country's minorities, e-governance practices, among other topics. In addition to the activities listed above, the programme encompassed meetings with the then Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs (2015-2016) and former presidential candidate (2016), Marina Kaljurand, the former President Arnold Rüütel (2001-2006), and the current American Ambassador in Estonia, James Melville.

The participation in the Summer School has enriched this dissertation, and it was one of the most enriching experiences I have had as a student. In fact, I had the privilege of receiving additional bibliography suggestions and exchanging ideas with Estonian experts from various academic backgrounds, and what is more, I had the honour of listening to two high-ranking Estonian politicians who helped to shape the country's foreign policy.

Appendix 3 – Internship at the Embassy of Portugal in Helsinki, Finland (5 December, 2016 – 1 June, 2017)

From 5 December 2016 to 1 June 2017, I undertook an Erasmus Plus Internship Programme at the Embassy of Portugal in Helsinki, Finland, under the supervision of the Head of Mission, H.E. Ambassador António Costa Moura. Since 2011, the Portuguese Diplomatic Mission to Finland has also covered Estonia. During my internship, I was responsible for drafting diplomatic correspondence, participating in meetings with Finnish and Estonian authorities, and elaborating reports about Estonia and Finland's domestic and foreign policies, with a particular focus on EU-related matters. Furthermore, I attended briefing sessions organised by representatives from Finland's Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Agriculture and Forestry, and Finance. In Tallinn, I attended briefings on Estonia's upcoming presidency of the Council of the European Union (July 2017 – December 2017). My tasks also included writing reports about lectures delivered by foreign experts and members of foreign governments at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and at the Aleksanteri Institute of the University of Helsinki, a centre of research, study and expertise pertaining to Russia and Eastern Europe.

References

Primary Sources

Adamkus, Valdas. 2005a. "Statement by the President of the Republic of Lithuania." March 7. http://archyvas.lrp.lt/en/news.full/5545.

___. 2005b. "Address of the President of the Republic of Lithuania to the Members of Georgia's Parliament." November 9. http://archyvas.lrp.lt/en/news.full/6167.

___. 2006. "Welcoming Remarks by H.E. President of the Republic of Lithuania for the Intellectuals Forum at the "Vilnius Conference '06: Common Vision for Common Neighborhood." May 3. http://archyvas.lrp.lt/en/news.full/6615.

Associated Press. 2016. "Lavrov: Baltics Show no Gratitude for Moscow Letting Them Go." April 26. https://apnews.com/bc2b5efb10fe4337b42e72f32fa08163/lavrov-baltics-show-no-gratitude-moscow-letting-them-go.

Atlantic Council. 2014. "Seven Allies Establish NATO's Strategic Communications Center of Excellence in Latvia." July 7. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/seven-allies-establish-nato-s-strategic-communications-center-of-excellence-in-latvia.

Baltic News Service. 2009. "Baltic States Opened Western Europe's Eyes on Soviet Union Totalitarianism – EP Chairman in Vilnius". Aprill 28. http://www.webcitation.org/5yf88YFCY.

___. 2016. "Latvian Government Concludes Work on Amendments to Increase National Security." February 26. http://bnn-news.com/latvian-government-concludes-work-on-amendments-to-increase-national-security-138668.

BBC. 2009. "Putin Condemns Nazi-Soviet Pact." August 31. http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8230387.stm.

___. 2010. "EU Won't legislate on Communist Crimes." December 22. www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-12059475.

___. 2015. "Estonia 'Plans Russia Border Fence' amid Ukraine Tensions." August 28. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34085926.

Beunderman, Mark. 2006. "Poland Compares German-Russian Pipeline to Nazi-Soviet Pact", *Euobserver*, May 2. https://euobserver.com/foreign/21486.

Bigg, Claire. 2005. “Russia/Estonia: Milestone Border Treaty Signed.” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, May 18. https://www.rferl.org/a/1058924.html.

Blair, David. 2015. "Estonia Recruits Volunteer Army of 'Cyber Warriors'." *The Telegraph*, April 26. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/estonia/11564163/Estonia-recruits-volunteer-army-of-cyber-warriors.html.

Boffey, Daniel. 2017. "'We Know How to Live Next to Russia': Lithuania Builds Border Fence with Kaliningrad." *The Guardian*, August 24. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/24/russia-lithuania-border-fence-kaliningrad-estonia-eston-kohver.

Brazauskas, Algirdas. 1997. "Annual report of H.E. Algirdas Brazauskas, President of the Republic of Lithuania, made at the Session of the Seimas Concerning the Internal and Foreign Policy of the Republic of Lithuania in 1996." http://www.lrs.lt/prezident/mp97/mp97a.htm.

Cameron, Rob. 2006. “Latvia Prepares for NATO Summit.” *Deutsche Welle*, 26 November. http://www.dw.com/en/latvia-prepares-for-nato-summit/a-2247758.

Cerpa, Elina. 2001. "'Baltic Gene' Discovered." *The Baltic Times*, January 18. https://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/4166/.

Chance, Matthew, and Alla Eshchenko. 2015. "Claims that Russian Forces Entered Ukraine 'Complete Rubbish,' Russia Says." *CNN*, January 20. http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/20/ world/ukraine-russia/index.html.

Coleman, Nick. 2001. “Baltics Mark Soviet Deportations.” *The Baltic Times*, June 14. https:// www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/5065/.

Day, Matt. 2017. " Lithuania to Build Fence Along its Border with Russia to Protect Itself from 'Provocations'." *The Telegraph*, January 17. http://www.telegraph.co.uk /news/2017/01/17/lithuania-build-fence-along-border-russia-protect-provocations/.

Defense News. 2016. “Interview: Estonia's Defence Minister Hannes Hanso.” February 3. https://www.defensenews.com/interviews/2016/02/03/interview-estonia-s-defence-minister-hannes-hanso/.

DELFI. 2014. “President Grybauskaite: Rapid Response Force will Step up Lithuania's Defence.” October 14. https://en.delfi.lt/lithuania/defence/president-grybauskaite-rapid-response-force-will-step-up-lithuanias-defence.d?id=66111826

____. 2015. “Manual on What to do in Case of War Distributed to Lithuanian Schools.” January 28. https://en.delfi.lt/lithuania/defence/manual-on-what-to-do-in-case-of-war-distributed-to-lithuanian-schools.d?id=67025106.

Deutsche Welle. 2009. “OSCE Resolution Equating Stalinism with Nazism Enrages Russia.” July 9. http://www.dw.com/en/osce-resolution-equating-stalinism-with-nazism-enrages-russia/a-4468156.

____. 2015a. "Eyeing Russia, Lithuania Could Reintroduce Conscription." February 24. http://www.dw.com/en/eyeing-russia-lithuania-could-reintroduce-conscription/a-18276709.

____. 2015b. “Lithuania to Ban Russian TV Channel for Warmongering.” April 8. http://www.dw.com/en/lithuania-to-ban-russian-tv-channel-for-warmongering/a-18370852.

____. 2015c. "Baltic Countries to Ask NATO for Thousands of Permanent Troops." May 15. http://www.dw.com/en/baltic-countries-to-ask-nato-for-thousands-of-permanent-troops/a-18450863.

Dolgov, Anna. 2014. "Russia's Igor Strelkov: I Am Responsible for War in Eastern Ukraine." *The Moscow Times*, November 21. https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russias-igor-strelkov-i-am-responsible-for-war-in-eastern-ukraine-41598.

Estonia.eu. 2016. "Citizenship". May 9. http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/society/citizenship.htm.

Estonian Defence Forces. 2013. "National Defence Development Plan 2013 – 2022." http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/riigikaitse2022/riigikaitse-arengukava/index-en.html.

Estonian Defence League. 2016. "Estonian Defence League." http://www.kaitseliit.ee/en/edl.

Estonian Government. 2017a. "Prime Minister Ratas's Speech at the Presentation of the National Security Concept to the Riigikogu". May 2. https://www.valitsus.ee/en/news/prime-minister-ratass-speech-presentation-national-security-concept-riigikogu.

____. 2017b. “Ratas: State budget for 2018 is the budget of a more equitable Estonia.” September 28. https://www.valitsus.ee/en/news/ratas-state-budget-2018-budget-more-equitable-estonia.

Estonian Ministry of Defence. 2004. “The National Security Concept of Estonia 2004”. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156841/Estonia-2004.pdf.

____. 2013. “Reinsalu: Next 12 Months in Afghanistan are Critical.” http://www.kmin.ee/en/news/reinsalu-next-12-months-afghanistan-are-critical.

____. 2014a. “Reinsalu Calls on Baltic Colleagues to Increase Defence Spending.” http://www.kmin.ee/en/news/reinsalu-calls-baltic-colleagues-increase-defence-spending.

____. 2014b. "Defence Minister Mikser signs Estonia’s Biggest Arms Deal." http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/en/news/defence-minister-mikser-signs-estonias-biggest-arms-deal.

____. 2016. "Defence Budget." http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/en/objectives-activities/defence-budget.

Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1998. “U.S. Baltic Charter: a Charter of Partnership among the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, and Republic of Lithuania". http://vm.ee/en/us-baltic-charter.

____. 2015. "Defence Minister Mikser: Estonia’s Model of National Defence works." http://vm.ee/en/newsletter/defence-minister-mikser-estonias-model-national-defence-works.

Estonian Ministry of Interior. 2015. "About Eston Kohver." https://www.siseministeerium.ee/en/eston-kohver.

____. 2016. "The Government Approved the Border Strip Elements of the Land Border." https://www.siseministeerium.ee/en/news/government-approved-border-strip-elements-land-border.

Estonian National Electoral Committee. 2016. "Elections in Estonia: 1992-2005." Tallinn: Tallinna Raamatutrükikoda.

Estonian Public Broadcasting. 2014a. “Estonia, Russia Sign Border Treaty.” February 18. http://news.err.ee/111702/estonia-russia-sign-border-treaty

____. 2014b. “Estonia Buys Javelin Anti-tank Missile System from the US for €40 million.” November 18. http://news.err.ee/114312/estonia-buys-javelin-anti-tank-missile-system-from-the-us-for-40-million

____. 2014c. “Ministry to Fast-Track Narva Home Guard Building.” March 25. http://news.err.ee/112048/ministry-to-fast-track-narva-home-guard-building

____. 2015. “Mikser: Estonia Better Protected than Ever Before.” July 24. http://news.err.ee/116381/mikser-estonia-better-protected-than-ever-before

____. 2016. "Government Allocates €13m more for Hosting Allied troops." July 1. http://news.err.ee/118450/government-allocates-13m-more-for-hosting-allied-troops.

___. 2017. "Moscow May Return to Ratification of Estonian-Russian Border Treaty." January 17. http://news.err.ee/120382/moscow-may-return-to-ratification-of-estonian-russian-border-treaty.

EUR-Lex. 2016a. "Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 Concerning Restrictive Measures in Respect of Actions Undermining or Threatening the Territorial Integrity, Sovereignty and Independence of Ukraine." http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R0269.

___. 2016b. "Coreper." http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/coreper.html.

Euractiv. 2016. "Latvia Shuts Down Russian 'Propaganda' Website Sputnik." March 3. https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/latvia-shuts-down-russias-propaganda-website-sputnik/.

European External Action Service (EEAS). 2017. "The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)." https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/431/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en.

European Parliament. 2008. "Declaration of the European Parliament on the Proclamation of 23 August as European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism". http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-0439+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.

___. 2009. "European Parliament Resolution of 2 April 2009 on European Conscience and Totalitarianism". http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-0213+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.

___. 2014. "European Parliament Resolution of 13 March 2014 on the Invasion of Ukraine by Russia."http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2014-0248.

___. 2017. "Common Security and Defence Policy." http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.1.2.html#_ftn1.

European Union. 2004. "The History of the European Union." https://europa.eu/europe an-union/about-eu/history/2000-2009/2004_en.

German History in Documents and Images. 2016. "The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty (August 23, 1939)." http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1545.

Grybauskaite, Dalia. 2014. " State of the Nation Address by H.E. Dalia Grybauskaitė, President of the Republic of Lithuania." March 27. https://www.lrp.lt/en/press-centre/press-releases/state-of-the-nation-address-by-h.e.-dalia-grybauskaite-president-of-the-republic-of-lithuania/19004.

___. 2015a. “Speech by President Dalia Grybauskaitė at the United Nations General Assembly. The United Nations at 70: the Road Ahead for Peace, Security and Human Rights.” September 29. https://www.lrp.lt/en/activities/speeches/speech-by-president-dalia-grybauskaite-at-the-united-nations-general-assembly-the-united-nations-at-70-the-road-ahead-for-peace-security-and-human-rights/23796.

___. 2015b. “State of the Nation Address by H.E. Dalia Grybauskaitė, President of the Republic of Lithuania.” https://www.lrp.lt/en/press-centre/press-releases/state-of-the-nation-address-by-h.e.-dalia-grybauskaite-president-of-the-republic-of-lithuania/22896.

Harri, Tiido. 2003. “Video Interview with Ambassador Harri Tiido, Head of the Mission of the Republic of Estonia to NATO.” *NATO*, 27 October. http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s031027b.htm.

Holbrooke, Richard. 2005. "The End of the Romance." *The Washington Post*, February 16. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A27622-2005Feb15.html.

Ilves, Toomas. 1999. "Estonia As a Nordic Country. Speech by Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Swedish Institute for International Affairs, 14 December 1999." http://www.americanrhetoric.com/ speeches/toomasilvesestonianordiccountry.htm.

___. 2006. “President of the Republic at the Georgian Parliament, 23 November 2006.” https://vp2006-2016.president.ee/en/official-duties/speeches/2569-president-of-the-republic-at-the-georgian-parliament-on-23-november-2006/layout-visit.html.

___. 2014. “The United States and Europe Need a New Rulebook for Russia.” *The Washington Times*, September 14. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/toomas-hendrik-ilves-the-united-states-and-europe-need-a-new-rulebook-for-russia/2014/03/27/e15dad62-b5bb-11e3-8020-b2d790b3c9e1_story.html.

Investment and Development Agency of Latvia. 2017. “Foreign Trade Statistics.” http://www.liaa.gov.lv/en/trade/foreign-trade-statistics.

Iskauskas, Ceslovas. 2011. “Political price of the Mistral deal.” *Geopolitika*, February 14. http://www.geopolitika.lt/?artc=4498.

Joost, Kai. 2010. “Ilves, Zatlers in Moscow for May 9 Anniversary.” *Baltic Reports*, May 10. http://balticreports.com/2010/05/10/ilves-zatlers-in-moscow-for-may-9-anniversary/.

Kalniete, Sandra. 2004. "Latvia's Foreign Policy at the Crossroads of Changes." *Latvian Ministry of Forein Affairs*. January 27. http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/news/latest-news/speeches-and interviews/4068-speech-by-latvia.

Keller, Bill. 1991. “Soviet Tanks Roll in Lithuania; 11 Dead.” *The New York Times*, January 13. http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/13/world/soviet-tanks-roll-in-lithuania-11-dead.html?pagewanted=all.

Kristovskis, Gatis. 2016a. “NATO – Russia Confrontation Could Escalate, says Latvian State Secretary.” http://defencematters.org/news/nato-russia-confrontation-could-escalate-says-latvian-state-secretary/707/.

___. 2016b. “Initiatives Concerning Security in Europe Must Not Duplicate NATO Functions – Graube”.http://www.leta.lv/eng/defence_matters_eng/defence_matters_eng/news/FCFE3CD5-0FF0-4E9C-B231-7B4424283F18/.

Kropaite, Zivile. 2015. “Lithuania Bans Russian TV Station.” *Euobserver*, April 9. https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/128267.

Langsbergis, Vytautas. 1998. “Lithuania Before an Open Door.” *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*. http://lfpr.lt/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/LFPR-2-Landsbergis.pdf.

Larrinaga, Nicholas. 2016. "Lithuania and Norway agree NASAMS deal." *IHS Jane's Defence Weekly*, October 25. http://www.janes.com/article/64881/lithuania-and-norway-agree-nasams-deal.

Latvian Government. 2015. "The National Guard of the Republic of Latvia Law." http://www.vvc.gov.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/Citi/The_National_Guard_of_the_Republic_of_Latvia_Law.pdf.

Latvian Information Agency (LETA). 2016. “Saeima Passes Controversial Amendments to Criminal Law in Final Reading 2016.” leta.lv/eng/home/important/1339FA51-D181-0A2B-05AD-7618856E2B4E/.

Latvian Ministry of Defence. 2005. “The National Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia (2005).”http://www.mod.gov.lv/~/media/AM/Par_aizsardzibas_nozari/Plani,%20koncepcijas/2005_nd_en.ashx.

___. 2008. “The National Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia (2008).” http://www.mod.gov.lv/~/media/AM/Par_aizsardzibas_nozari/Plani,%20koncepcijas/2008_nd_en.ashx.

___. 2011. “The National Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia (2011).” http://www.mod.gov.lv/~/media/AM/Par_aizsardzibas_nozari/Plani,%20koncepcijas/2011_EN_ND.ashx.

___. 2015. “The National Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia (2015).” http://www.mod.gov.lv/~/media/AM/Par_aizsardzibas_nozari/Plani,%20koncepcijas/NDK/NDK_ENG_final.ashx.

___. 2016. "Policy Planning Defence Policy Priorities." http://www.mod.gov.lv/en/Par_aizsardzibas_nozari/Politikas_planosana.aspx.

Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2000. “Latvia's History: Education, Remembrance, Research.” June 2. http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/news/latest-news/newsletters/latvia-s-history-education-remembrance-research/lh-no-2-june-2000.

___. 2015a. “Basic Facts about Citizenship and Language Policy of Latvia and Some Sensitive History-related Issues.” November 11. http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/society-integration/citizenship-in-latvia/citizenship-policy-in-latvia/basic-facts-about-citizenship-and-language-policy-of-latvia-and-some-sensitive-history-related-issues.

___. 2015b. “Annual Report by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on Accomplishments and Activities Planned with Respect to National Foreign Policy and the European Union” http://www.mfa.gov.lv/images/zinojums_FINAL_FINAL_ENG.pdf.

___. 2016. “The Eastern Partnership”. http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/eastern-partnership.

Latvian Supreme Court. 2016. “Restoration of the Independence.” http://at.gov.lv/en/the-history/joining-the-european-judiciary/restoration-of-the-independence/.

Linkevicius, Linas. 1998. “NATO and Lithuania: What is Blocking Entry Through an Open Door?” *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*. http://lfpr.lt/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/LFPR-1-Linkevicius.pdf.

Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2014. “Lithuania's Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).” May 2. https://www.urm.lt/default/en/foreign-policy/lithuania-in-the-region-and-the-world/lithuanias-security-policy/lithuanian-membership-in-the-north-atlantic-treaty-organization-nato.

Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence. 2012. "The Military Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania 2012." https://kam.lt/en/defence_policy_1053/important_documents/strategical_documents.html.

___. 2015. "A New Brigade Named Zemaitija is Established within the Lithuanian Armed Forces in Western Lithuania." http://kam.lt/en/news_1098/current_issues/a_new_brigade_named_zemaitija_is_established_within_the_lithuanian_armed_forces_in_western_lithuania.html

___. 2016a. "The Military Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania 2016." http://kam.lt/download/51934/lt%20military%20strategy%202016.

___. 2016b. "Budget Statement." October 25. https://kam.lt/en/budget_1065.html.

___. 2017a. "Lithuanian Defence System: Facts and Trends". http://urm.lt/uploads/nato/documents/nato.pdf.

___. 2017b. "Lithuania Needs Capable Armed Forces, Karoblis says." March 23. http://kam.lt/en/news_1098/current_issues/lithuania_needs _a_capable_armed_forces_r._karoblis_says.html.

Malyasov, Dylan. 2016. "Lithuania Signed a Contract to Purchase German Boxer Infantry Fighting Vehicles." *Defence Blog*, August 22. http://defence-blog.com/army/lithuania-signed-a-contract-to-purchase-german-boxer-infantry-fighting-vehicles.html.

McLaughlin, Daniel. 2007. "Estonia Closes Moscow Embassy as President Berates Russia." *The Irish Times*, May 3. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/estonia-closes-moscow-embassy-as-president-berates-russia-1.1204026.

Meri, Lennart. 1992. "Statement By H.E. Lennart Meri President Of The Republic Of Estonia To The NATO Council Brussels 25 November 1992." https://vp1992-2001.president.ee/eng/k6ned/K6ne.asp?ID=9515.

___. 1993. "Estonian President Lennart Meri At The Inaugural Conference Of The Baltic Institute For Strategic And International Studies December 16, 1993, Tallinn." https://vp1992-2001.president.ee/eng/k6ned/K6ne.asp?ID=9483.

___. 1994. "President of the Republic of Estonia H.E. Lennart Meri at a Conference in Frankfurt 23 September." https://vp1992-2001.president.ee/eng/k6ned/K6ne.asp?ID=9428.

___. 1995. "Estonia - Touch Stone of Future Europe." https://vp1992-2001.president.ee/eng/k6ned/K6ne.asp?ID=9353.

____. 1997. “Remarks by the President of the Republic at the Meeting of NATO and Partner Country Heads of State or Government in Madrid.” https://vp1992-2001.president.ee/eng/k6ned/K6ne.asp?ID=4374

____. 1998. “Remarks of the President of the Republic at the Jagellonia University of Krakow.” https://vp1992-2001.president.ee/eng/k6ned/K6ne.asp?ID=4351.

Myers, Steven. 2004. “Lithuanian Parliament Removes Country's President After Casting Votes on Three Charges.” *The New York Times*, April 7. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/07/world/lithuanian-parliament-removes-country-s-president-after-casting-votes-three.html?mcubz=3.

NATO. 1949. “The North Atlantic Treaty (1949)”. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf.

____. 2004. "Seven new members join NATO". http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/03-march/e0329a.htm.

____. 2012. “NATO's Baltic Allies: Punching Above Their Weight. Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in Tallinn, Estonia on 19 January 2012”. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_83482.htm.

____. 2014. "NATO Releases Satellite Imagery Showing Russian Combat Troops Inside Ukraine." 26 November. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112193.htm.

____. 2015. “ISAF's mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014).” September 1. https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_69366.htm.

____. 2017a. “Relations with Georgia”. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_38988.htm.

____. 2017b. "Relations with Ukraine." http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm..

Oliphant, Roland. 2016. "Russia Simulated a Nuclear Strike Against Sweden, Nato Admits". *The Daily Telegraph*, February 4. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/12139943/Russia-simulated-a-nuclear-strike-against-Sweden-Nato-admits.html.

OSCE. 2009. “Vilnius Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Resolutions Adopted at the Eighteenth Annual Session Vilnius, 29 June to 3 July 2009.” https://www.oscepa.org/documents/all-documents/annual-sessions/2009-vilnius/declaration-6/261-2009-vilnius-declaration-eng/file.

___. 2013. “Media Freedom Representative Calls Recent Legislative Initiatives in Russia Potentially Harmful to Freedom of Expression and Freedom of the Media.” June 26. http://www.osce.org/fom/103121.

___. 2014. "OSCE Chair Says Crimean Referendum in its Current Form is Illegal and Calls for Alternative Ways to Address the Crimean Issue." March 11. http://www.osce.org/cio/116313.

Pääbo, Heiko. "Dividing Clash of Values in Contemporary Estonia: Liberal vs Traditional Values." Lecture at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu, August 4, 2016.

Parliament of Estonia. 2016. “Restoration of the Independence of Estonia, 1991.” https://www.riigikogu.ee/en/press-releases/restoration-of-the-independence/.

Paulauskas, Arturas. 2004. “Speech by H. E. Mr. Arturas Paulauskas, Acting President of the Republic of Lithuania, at Vilnius University, Lithuania's New Foreign Policy.” http://paulauskas.president.lt/en/one.phtml?id=4995.

Palowski, Jakub. 2016. “Estonia Receives Javelin Anti-Tank Missiles From The United States.” *Defence 24*, March 22. http://www.defence24.com/330206,estonia-receives-javelin-anti-tank-missiles-from-the-united-states#.

Parks, Michael. 1990. "Draft Dodgers Give Red Army Special Alarm." *Los Angeles Times*, April 3. http://articles.latimes.com/1990-04-03/news/mn-695_1_red-army.

President of Latvia. 2016. “Legislative Initiatives from the President of Latvia.” http://www.president.lv/pk/content/?cat_id=9413&lng=en.

President of Russia. 2005. “Press Statement and Responses to Questions Following the Russia-European Union Summit.” http://en.special.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22967.

President of Russia. 2010. “The Commission to Counteract Attempts to Harm Russia's Interests by Falsifying History.” *Russian Politics & Law* 48(4). doi:10.2753/RUP1061-1940480407.

Public Broadcasting of Latvia. 2015. "Saeima Moves Fast on President's Speedy Security Laws." http://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/politics/saeima-moves-fast-on-presidents-speedy-security-laws.a154824/.

___. 2016a. “Latvia Shuts Down Sputnik Propaganda Website.” March 29. http://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/society/latvia-shuts-down-sputnik-propaganda-website.a175627/.

___. 2016b. “Latvia Suspends Rossiya RTR Channel.” April 7. http://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/society/latvia-suspends-rossiya-rtr-channel.a177088/.

___. 2016c. “Why is Latvia Building a Fence?” March 22. http://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/society/why-is-latvia-building-a-fence.a174585/

___. 2016d. “Revised Security Laws Mark a Break with History.” February 25. http://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/president/revised-security-laws-mark-a-break-with-history.a170811/.

___. 2016e. "Saeima Speaker Wants to Renew Conscription Debate." April 6. http://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/society/saeima-speaker-wants-to-renew-conscription-debate.a176850/.

___. 2016f. "Conscription Would Make Little Sense, says Defense Ministry." January 4. http://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/defense/conscription-would-make-little-sense-says-defense-ministry.a217588/.

Radio Poland. 2014. “Putin – What Was Wrong with Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact?”. November 7. http://thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/186605,Putin-%E2%80%93-what-was-wrong-with-the-MolotovRibbentrop-Pact.

Reconciliation of European Histories. 2016. “‘Reconciliation of European Histories’: an Informal Group of Members of the European Parliament.” https://eureconciliation.eu/about/.

Reeves, Phil. 1997. “Russia Balks Over Baltic States.” *The Independent*, 27 May. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/russia-balks-over-baltic-states-1263842.html.

Reuters. 2014a "Baltic Military Chiefs to Call for Permanent NATO Presence." May 14. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-baltic-russia/baltic-military-chiefs-to-call-for-permanent-nato-presence-idUSKBN0NZ0T220150514.

___. 2014b. "Lithuania Bans Russian TV Station Over 'Lies'." March 21. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-lithuania/lithuania-bans-russian-tv-station-over-lies-idUSBREA2K1HP20140321.

RT. 2012. “Russia Blasts Latvia for Blasphemy Over WWII Statements.” July 24. https://www.rt.com/politics/latvia-ww2-nazi-veterans-946/.

___. 2014. “Duma Passes Bill Criminalizing Rehabilitation of Nazism.” April 23. https://www.rt.com/politics/154332-russia-nazi-rehabilitation-ban/.

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2007. “Spokesman Mikhail Kamynin Commentary Regarding the EU Council Conclusions on the Implementation of the EU Policy on Human Rights and

Democratization in Third Countries, of December 10, 2007", http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/354118.

___. 2008. "Remarks by Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Yakovenko at Press Conference at Interfax News Agency, Moscow, September 19, 2008." http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/general_assembly/-/asset_publisher/lrzZMhfoyRUj/content/id/324458.

Rüütel, Arnold. 2005a. "The Statement of the President of the Republic, March 7, 2005." https://vp2001-2006.president.ee/en/duties/statements.php?gid=59933.

___. 2005b. "The President of the Republic At the Forum of Presidents dedicated to the 2nd Anniversary of the Revolution of Roses in Georgia Tbilisi, November 23, 2005." https://vp2001-2006.president.ee/en/duties/speeches.php?gid=70348.

___. 2006. "The President of the Republic At Estonian-Georgian Business Forum Tbilisi, May 10, 2006." https://vp2001-2006.president.ee/en/duties/speeches.php?gid=76879.

Saeima of the Republic of Latvia. 2016a. "Saeima Preliminarily Supports Amendments to the Criminal Law Aimed at Addressing Threats of Hybrid Warfare." http://www.saeima.lv/en/news/saeima-news/24508-saeima-preliminarily-supports-amendments-to-the-criminal-law-aimed-at-addressing-threats-of-hybrid-w

___. 2016b. "Saeima Adopts New Regulations on Criminal Liability for Crimes Against the State." http://www.saeima.lv/en/news/saeima-news/24680-saeima-adopts-new-regulations-on-criminal-liability-for-crimes-against-the-state.

Salu, Mikk. 2014. "Estonian-Russian Border Treaty to be Signed, in Moscow." *Postimees*, February 17. http://news.postimees.ee/2699996/estonian-russian-border-treaty-to-be-signed-in-moscow.

Sargs. 2014a. "Latvian Parliament Passes Law about Increasing Defense Budget to 2% of GDP by 2020." July 3. http://www.sargs.lv/Zinas/Military_News/2014/07/03-01.aspx#lastcomment.

Sargs. 2014b. "18 Rapid Response Units to be Created in National Guard." July 30. http://www.sargs.lv//lv/Zinas/Military_News/2014/07/30-01.aspx#CommentBlockPart.

Sargs.lv. 2016. "Latvian Defence Budget Expenditure in 2016." February 26. http://www.sargs.lv/Zinas/Military_News/2016/02/16-01.aspx#lastcomment.

Schmitt, Caroline. 2016. "Estonian PM: 'Putin's Aggressive Behavior Made Russia a Threat'." *Deutsche Welle*, July 6. http://www.dw.com/en/estonian-pm-putins-aggressive-behavior-made-russia-a-threat/a-19382378.

Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania. 1996. "The Basics of National Security of Lithuania. 1996." https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/TAIS.39790?jfwid=9tq147ume.

____. 2015a. "The Seimas Reintroduces Mandatory Initial Military Service for a Five-year-period." March 19. http://www.lrs.lt/sip/portal.show?p_r=16385&p_k=2&p_t=154427.

____. 2015b. "Seimas Adopted Amendments to the Law on Provision of Information to the Public." May 21. http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w5_show?p_r=4028&p_d=158019&p_k=2.

____. 2016. "Seimas Introduced Permanent Conscription." June 16. http://www.lrs.lt/sip/portal.show?p_r=16386&p_k=2&p_t=164916.

Shapiro, Jeremy and Hannah Thoburn. 2015. "The Russian Threat to Lithuania: An Interview with Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius." *Brookings*, February 25. https://www.brookings.edu /blog/order-from-chaos/2015/02/25/the-russian-threat-to-lithuania-an-interview-with-foreign-minister-linas-linkevicius/.

Sharkov, Damien. 2016. "Lithuania Builds Fake Town to Simulate Russian Attack." *Newsweek*, September 1. http://www.newsweek.com/lithuania-builds-fake-town-simulate-russian-attack-494989.

Sputnik. 2009. "Latvia Puts Damage from 'Soviet Occupation' at $200 bln – media." April 28. https://sputniknews.com/world/20090428150010678/.

____. 2017. "Turning Blind Eye to Neo-Nazi Marches in Latvia 'Shame for EU, NATO'". March 17. https://sputniknews.com/europe/201703171051684482-neo-nazi-latvia-marches-russia/.

Statistics Estonia 2017a. "Population by ethnic nationality, 1 January, years." June 6. http://www.stat.ee/34278.

____. 2017b. "Foreign Trade by Country, Month, Year and Indicator." http://pub.stat.ee/px-web.2001/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=FT09&ti=EXPORTS+AND+IMPORTS+BY+COUNTRY+(MONTHS)&path=../I_Databas/Economy/11Foreign_trade/03Foreign_trade_since_2004/&lang=1.

Statistics Latvia. 2017a. "Demography 2017." http://www.csb.gov.lv/sites/default/files/nr_11_demografija_2017_17_00_lv_en.pdf.

____. 2017b. "Exports and imports by countries and territories (thsd EUR)." http://data.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/en/atirdz/atirdz__ikgad__atirdz/?tablelist=true&rxid=cdcb978c-22b0-416a-aacc-aa650d3e2ce0.

Statistics Lithuania. 2017a. "Proportion of the Population by Ethnicity, Compared to the Total Resident Population." https://osp.stat.gov.lt/statistiniu-rodikliu-analize?hash=e7339206-858d-43de-ad93-f12ca772590c#/.

____. 2017b. "Foreign Trade." https://osp.stat.gov.lt/en/uzsienio-prekyba1.

Sytas, Andrius. 2016. "EU Leaders Sign Letter Objecting to Nord Stream-2 Gas Link." *Reuters*, March 16. http://www.reuters.com/article/eu-energy-nordstream/eu-leaders-sign-letter-objecting-to-nord-stream-2-gas-link-idUSL5N16O4AW.

TASS. 2014. "Azerbaijan's Access to Eurasian Economic Union not on Agenda — Foreign Minister." December 25. http://tass.com/economy/769271.

The Baltic Course. 2013. "In 2013, Exports and Imports Grew in Lithuania." February 10. http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/good_for_business/?doc=87470.

The Baltic Times. 1998. "Lithuania, Estonia Continue Meat War." November 26. https://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/3715/.

____. 2015. "Estonian-Russian Border Agreement sent to Russian Duma for Ratification." March 20. http://www.baltictimes.com/estonian-russian_border_agreement_sent_to_russian_duma_for_ratification/.

____. 2016a. "Lithuania to Reintroduce Permanent Conscription." March 15. https://www.baltictimes.com/lithuania_to_reintroduce_permanent_conscription/.

____. 2016b. "Straujuma: Russia's Attempts to Undermine Latvia's National Security Ongoing." January 22. https://www.baltictimes.com/straujuma__russia_s_attempts_to_undermine_latvia_s_national_security__ongoing_/.

The Business Insider. 2016. "Estonia Passes 2017 Record Level Budget Spending to Bolster Defense." December 19. http://www.businessinsider.com/r-estonia-passes-2017-record-level-budget-spending-to-bolster-defense-2016-12.

The Guardian. 2015a. "Lithuania to Reinstate Compulsory Military Service amid Ukraine Tensions." February 24. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/24/lithuania-reinstate-compulsory-military-service.

____. 2015b. "Russia Frees Estonian Officer in Cold War-style Spy Swap." September 27. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/27/russia-frees-estonian-officer-spy-swap.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. 2015. "Ukraine IDP Figures Analysis." http://www.internal-displacement.org/europe-the-caucasus-and-central-asia/ukraine/figures-analysis.

The Moscow Times. 2013. "Latvia Bans Soviet Symbols." June 23. https://themoscowtimes.com/news/latvia-bans-soviet-symbols-25182.

The New York Times. 1988. "Text of '39 Pact: Baltic Nations Enter Soviet Orbit." August 25, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/25/world/text-of-39-pact-baltic-nations-enter-soviet-orbit.html.

___. 2005. "Baltic States Rebuffed by Putin." May 7. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/07/world/europe/baltic-states-rebuffed-by-putin.html.

The Swedish Wire. 2011. "Sweden apologises to Baltics over Soviet era." August 15. http://www.swedishwire.com/politics/10940-sweden-apologises-to-baltics-over-soviet-era.

Tomkiw, Lydia. 2016. "Russia a Threat To NATO? Ahead Of Warsaw Summit 2016 And Amid Russian Aggression, Latvia's Defense Minister Speaks Out." *International Business Time*, July 7. http://www.ibtimes.com/russia-threat-nato-ahead-warsaw-summit-2016-amid-russian-aggression-latvias-defense-2389600.

Treaty of Lisbon. 2016. "Article 42." http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-european-union-and-comments/title-5-general-provisions-on-the-unions-external-action-and-specific-provisions/chapter-2-specific-provisions-on-the-common-foreign-and-security-policy/section-2-provisions-on-the-common-security-and-defence-policy/129-article-42.html.

UK Government. 2014. "Latvian Army Purchases UK Armoured Combat Vehicles." https://www.gov.uk/government/news/latvian-army-purchases-uk-armoured-combat-vehicles.

UK Parliament. 2007. "Deteriorating EU-Russia relations". https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmfaff/51/5109.htm.

United Nations. 1999. "Treaty Between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic on the Basis for Relations Between States." In *Treaties and International Agreements Registered or Filed and Recorded with the Secretariat of the United Nations*, 21-6. New York: United Nations.

___. 2008. "Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 2007." http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/62/142.

___. 2009. “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 2008.” http://dag.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/172294/A_RES_63_162-EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

___. 2014. "Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 27 March 2014." http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/262.

Vaida, Petras. 2010. “Svedas: Lithuania Plans to Build LNG Terminal by 2014.” *The Baltic Course*, November 4. http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/energy/?doc=33539.

Vejonis, Raimonds. 2016. “The President of Latvia: the values of NATO must be fostered to confront modern threats.” http://www.president.lv/pk/content/?art_id=24233.

Vike-Freiberga, Vaira. 2005a. “Declaration by H.E. Dr. Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of the Republic of Latvia regarding 9 May 2005.” http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/information-on-the-history-of-latvia/5505-declaration-by-h-e-dr-vaira-vike-freiberga-president-of-the-republic-of-latvia-regarding-9-may-2005-riga-12-january-2005.

___. 2005b. “Rights and Remembrance.” *The Washington Post*, May 7. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/06/AR2005050601217.html.

Weymouth, Lally. 2014a. "Lithuania’s President: ‘Russia is Terrorizing its Neighbors and Using Terrorist Methods’.” *The Washington Post*, September 24. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/lithuanias-president-russia-is-terrorizing-its-neighbors-and-using-terrorist-methods/2014/09/24/eb32b9fc-4410-11e4-b47c-f5889e061e5f_story.html.

Weymouth, Lally. 2014b. “Estonia’s President: Russia is Threatening ‘the Entire Post- World War II Order”, *The Washington Post*, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/estonias-president-russia-is-threateningthe-entire-post-world-war-ii-order/2014/09/29/035ef686-45cd-11e4-b47c-f5889e061e5f_story.html.

Willsher, Kim. 2015. "France Looking for Warship Buyers After Cancelling Mistral Deal with Russia." *The Guardian*, August 6. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/06/france-russia-mistral-warships-deal-cancelled.

Secondary Sources

Aalto, Pami. 2005. "Post-Soviet Geo-politics in the North of Europe." In *Post-Cold War Identity Politics: Northern and Baltic Experiences*, edited by Marko Lehti and David Smith, 251-73. Taylor & Francis e-Library.

Abizadeh, Arash. 2005. "Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global Solidarity." *American Political Science Review* 99(1): 45–60. doi:10.1017/S0003055405051488.

Altau, Karl. 2015. "Remembering the Deadly Baltic Deportations". *Victims of Communism Foundation's Blog*, June 23. http://blog.victimsofcommunism.org/remembering-the-deadly-baltic-deportations/

Annus, Epp. 2012 "The Problem of Soviet Colonialism in the Baltics." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 43(1): 21-45. doi:10.1080/01629778.2011.628551.

Aradau, Claudia. 2004. "Security and the Democratic scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation." *Journal of International Relations and Development* 7(4): 388–413. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800030.

Aras, Bulent, and Rabia Polat. 2008. "From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey's Relations with Syria and Iran." *Security Dialogue* 39(5): 495–515. doi: 10.1177/0967010608096150.

Asmus, Ronald, and Robert Nurick. 1996. "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States." *Survival* 38(2): 121-42. doi:10.1080/00396339608442849

Auers, Daunis. 2015. *Comparative Politics and Government of the Baltic States Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the 21st Century*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bajarnas, Eitvydas. 1995. "Lithuania's Security Dilemma." In *The Baltic States: Security and Defence after Independence*, edited by Peter Ham. https://www.iss.europa eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/cp019e.pdf.

Balzacq, Thierry. 2005. "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context." *European Journal of International Relations* 11(2): 171–201. doi: 10.1177/1354066105052960.

____. 2011. "A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants." In *Securitzation Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, edited by Thierry Balzacq, 1-30. New York: Routledge.

Benn, David. 2011. “Russian Historians Defend the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.” International Affairs 87 (3): 709-15. www.chathamhouse.org/publications/ia/archive/view/164427.

Berenskoetter, Felix. 2007. “Friends, There Are No Friends? An Intimate Reframing of the International.” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 35(3): 647-76. doi:10.1177/03058298070350031501.

Berg, Eiki, and Piret Ehin (ed). 2009. *Identity and Foreign Policy: Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration*. Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate.

Berman, Daniel. 2014. "Will Narva Be Russia’s Next Crimea?" The Diplomat, April 8. http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/will-narva-be-russias-next-crimea/.

Bideleux, Robert, and Ian Jeffries. 1998. *A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change*. London: Routledge.

Bildt, Carl. 1994. “The Baltic Litmus Test: Revealing Russia's True Colors.” *Foreign Affairs* 73(5): 72-85. doi:10.2307/20046832.

Booth, Ken. 2005. Critical Security Studies and World Politics. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Bousfield, Jonathan. 2004. *The Rough Guide to The Baltic States*. New York: Rough Guides.

Brandão, Ana. 2015. “A UE e o Terrorismo Transnacional: Securitizing Move e Ator Normativo, uma Contradição nos Termos?” In *Segurança, Liberdade e Política: Pensar a Escola de Copenhaga em Português*, edited by André Barrinha and Maria Freire, 45-78. Lisboa: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais.

Brüggeman, Karsten, and Andres Kasekamp. 2008. “The Politics of History and the ‘War of Monuments’.” *Nationalities Papers* 36(3): 425-448. doi:10.1080/00905990802080646.

Bugajski, Janusz. 2007. “Isolation and marginalization: Russia’s offensive in the Baltic region.” *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review* 19: 162-166.

Buzan, Barry. 2015. "The English School: a neglected approach to International Security Studies." *Security Dialogue*, 46 (2): 126-143. doi:10.1177/0967010614555944.

Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever. 1997. "Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Copenhagen School Replies." *Review of International Studies* 23(2): 241-250.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Buzan, Barry, and Ole Waever. 2003. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brüggemann, Karsten. 2003. "Defending National Sovereignty against Two Russias: Estonia in the Russian Civil War, 1918-1920." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 34(1): 22-51. doi:10.1080/01629770200000241.

Case, Sean, and Klement Anders. 2016. "Putin's Undeclared War. Summer 2014. Russian Artillery Strikes against Ukraine." *Bellingcat*, December 21. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2016/12/21/russian-artillery-strikes-against-ukraine/.

Collins, Alan. 2003. "Securitization, Frankenstein's Monster and Malasyian Education." *Pacific Review* 18(4): 565-86. doi: 10.1080/09512740500339034.

___. 2013. "Introduction: What is Security Studies?" In *Contemporary Security Studies*, edited by Alan Collins, 1-13. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Coffey, Luke. 2013. "The Baltic States: Why the United States Must Strengthen Security Cooperation." *The Heritage Foundation*. http://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/the-baltic-states-why-the-united-states-must-strengthen-security-cooperation.

Davies, Norman. 2006. *Europe at War 1939–1945: No Simple Victory*. London: MacMillan.

Demirjian, Karoun. 2015. "Putin Denies Russian Troops are in Ukraine, Decrees Certain Deaths Secret." *The Washington Post*, May 28. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-denies-russian-troops-are-in-ukraine-decrees-certain-deaths-secret/2015/05/28/9bb15092-0543-11e5-93f4-f24d4af7f97d_story.html?utm_term=.b2fa38327f88.

Diez, Thomas. 2004. "Europe's Others and the Return of Geopolitics." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17(2): 319-35, doi:10.1080/0955757042000245924

___. 2005. "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering Normative Power Europe." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33(3): 613-36. doi:10.1177/030582 98050330031701.

Dudzinska, Kinga. 2014. "The Security Policy of the Baltic States vis-à-vis Russia." *The Polish Institute of Foreign Affairs*, 83 (678). http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=17608.

Ehin, Piret, and Eiki Berg. 2009. "Incompatible Identities? Baltic-Russian Relations and the EU as an Arena for Identity Conflict." In *Identity and Foreign Policy: Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration*, edited by Jakniunaite and Piret Ehin, 1-15. Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate.

Elsuwege, Peter. 2004. "Russian-speaking Minorities in Estonia and Latvia: Problems of Integration at the Threshold of the European Union." *European Center for Minority Issues*, Working Paper. http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/6314.

___. 2015. “Russia and the Baltic States: Time to Get the Legal Facts Right”, *The Baltic Times*, July 6. https://www.baltictimes.com/russia_and_the_baltic_states__time_to_get_the_legal_facts_right/.

Emmers, Ralph. 2013. ”Securitization.” In *Contemporary Security Studies*, edited by Alan Collins, 131-46. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Encyclopædia Britannica. 2016. “Memel Dispute.” https://www.britannica.com/event/Memel-dispute.

Fernandes, Sandra. 2009. “Time to reassess the European security architecture? The NATO–EU–Russia Security Triangle”. EPIN Working Paper 22. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/98664/WP%20022.pdf.

___. 2011. “European Security through EU-Russian Relations: Towards a New Multilateral Order?” *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 7(2):195-215. http://www.jcer.net/ojs/index.php/jcer/article/view/346/275.

___. 2013a. "A Política Externa da Nova Rússia: Velhos Dilemas e Novas Asserções." In *O fim da URSS: A Nova Rússia e a Crise das Esquerdas*, edited by Pedro Oliveira, 125-43. Lisboa: Edições Colibri.

___. 2013b. "The EU Institutional Balance: Assessment of its Impact on the Relationship with Russia". In *The European Union Neighbourhood: Ten Years into the New Millennium*, edited by Teresa Cierco, 143-172. Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate.

___. 2015. "Rússia." In *BRICS e a Nova Ordem Internacional*, edited by Jorge Tavares da Silva. Aveiro: Mare Liberum.

Filatova, Irina. 2009. “Medvedev's New Russian orthodoxy.” *The Guardian*, May 21. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/may/21/russia-medvedev-history.

Fink, Andrew. 2015. “The Welles Declaration: 75th Anniversary of the U.S. Standing Up for Democracy in the Baltic States.” *The Daily Signal*, July 24. http://dailysignal.com/2015/07/24/the-welles-declaration-75th-anniversary-of-the-u-s-standing-up-for-democracy-in-the-baltic-states/.

Fofanova, Elena and Viatcheslav Morozov. 2009. “Imperial Legacy and the Russian-Baltic Relations: From Conflicting Historical Narratives to a Foreign Policy Confrontation?” In *Identity and Foreign Policy: Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration*, edited by Eiki Berg and Piret Ehin, 15-33. Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate.

Floyd, Rita. 2010. *Security and the Environment: Securitisation Theory and US Environmental Security Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

___. 2011. "Can Securitization Theory be Used in Normative Analysis? Towards a Just Securitization Theory." *Security Dialogue* 42(4-5): 427–39. doi:10.1177/0967010611418712.

Freire, Raquel. 2013. "O Fim da URSS e a Nova Rússia: Alinhamento de Política Externa e a sua Vizinhança Próxima." In *O Fim da URSS: A Nova Rússia e a Crise das Esquerdas*, edited by Pedro Oliveira, 101-25. Lisboa: Edições Colibri.

Friedman, Uri. 2016. "What If Russia Invaded the Baltics—and Donald Trump Was President?". *The Atlantic*, July 27. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/russia-nato-trump-shirreff/492938/.

Galbreath, David, Ainius Lasas and Jeremy Lamoreaux. 2008. *Continuity and Change in the Baltic Sea Region: Comparing Foreign Policies*. Leiden: Brill.

Galeotti, Mark. 2014. "Estonian Kidnap Is Russia's Latest Provocation." *The Moscow Times*, September 11. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/estonian-kidnap-is-russia-s-latest-provocation/506874.html.

___. 2015. "Time to Think About 'Hybrid Defense'." *War on the Rocks*, July 30. https://warontherocks.com/2015/07/time-to-think-about-hybrid-defense/.

___. 2016a. "Heavy Metal diplomacy: Russia's Political Use of its Military in Europe since 2014." *European Council on Foreign Relations*, December 19. http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/Heavy_Metal_Diplomacy_Final_2.pdf.

___. 2016b. "Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-linear? How New is Russia's 'New Way of War'?" *Small Wars & Insurgencies*. 27(2): 281-301. doi:10.1080/09592318.2015.1129170.

___. 2016c. "Putin's Hydra: Inside Russia's Intelligence Services." *European Council on Foreign Relations*, May 11. http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR_169_-_INSIDE_RUSSIAS_INTELLIGENCE_SERVICES_(WEB_AND_PRINT)_2.pdf.

Geistlinger, Michael, and Aksel Kirch. 1995. *Estonia: A New Framework for the Estonian Majority and the Russian Minority*. Vienna: Wilhelm Braumuller.

Georgia Times. 2008. "Latvia Answers Difficult Questions". December 24. http://www.georgiatim es.info/en/analysis/5176.html.

Gobins, Marcis. 2002. "Why does Latvia Need NATO?" *Providus*, February 26. http://providus.lv/en/article/why-does-latvia-need-nato.

Grayson, Kyle. 2003. “Securitization and the Boomerang Debate: A Rejoinder to Liotta and Smith-Windsor.” *Security Dialogue* 34(3): 337–43. doi:10.1177/09670106030343009.

Gregory, Paul. 2015. "If Russian Soldiers Aren't Dying In Ukraine, Why Did Putin Make Casualty Stats A State Secret?" *Forbes*, September 02. https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2015/09/02/if-russian-soldiers-arent-dying-in-ukraine-why-did-putin-make-casualty-stats-a-state-secret/#3704b9744e30.

Grigas, Agnia. 2013. *The Politics of Energy and Memory between the Baltic States and Russia*. Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate.

___. 2015. "How Russia Sees Baltic Sovereignty." *The Moscow Times*, July 14 http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/how-russia-sees-baltic-sovereignty/525643.html.

___. 2016. “NATO’s Vulnerable Link in Europe: Poland’s Suwalki Gap.” *Atlantic Council*. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/nato-s-vulnerable-link-in-europe-poland-s-suwalki-gap.

Gromilova, Anna. 2016. “Resolving the Russo-Estonian Dispute in the Wake of the Ukranian Crisis”. http://cis01.central.ucv.ro/revistadestiintepolitice/files/numarul51_2016/5.pdf

Hansen, Lene. 2006. *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*. London: Routledge.

Heisbourg, François. 2015. "Preserving Post-Cold War Europe." *Survival* 57(1): 31-48. doi:10.1080/00396338.2015.1008293.

Herd, Graeme, and Johan Löfgren. 2001. “Societal Security, the Baltic States and EU Integration.” *Cooperation and Conflict* 36(3): 273-96. doi:10.1177/00108360121962425.

Hough, Peter. 2008. *Understanding Global Security*. New York: Routledge.

Huntington, Samuel. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. London: Simon & Schuster.

Huysmans, Jef. 1998. “Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the Creative Development of Security Studies Agenda in Europe.” *European Journal of International Relations* 4(4): 479-504. doi:10.1177/1354066198004004004.

Hyndle-Hussein, Joanna. 2015. “The Baltic States on the Conflict in Ukraine.” *Centre for Eastern Studies*, January 23. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-01-23/baltic-states-conflict-ukraine.

International Centre for Defence and Security. 2007. “Russia’s Involvement in the Tallinn Disturbances.” May 11. https://www.icds.ee/publications/article/russias-involvement-in-the-tallinn-disturbances/.

Korosteleva, Elena. 2012. *The European Union and its Eastern Neighbours. Towards a More Ambitious Partnership?* New York: Routledge.

Jackson, Van. 2016. "Grappling with the Fait Accompli: a Classical Tactic in the Modern Strategic Landscape." *War on the Rocks*, May 31. https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/grappling-with-the-fait-accompli-a-classical-tactic-in-the-modern-strategic-landscape/.

Jaeger, Oyvind. 2000. “Securitizing Russia: Discursive Practices of the Baltic states.” *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 7(2). http://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol7/iss2/2.

Jakniunaite, Dovile. 2009. “Neighbourhood Politics of Baltic States: Between the EU and Russia.” In *Identity and Foreign Policy: Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration*, edited by Eiki Berg and Piret Ehin, 117–31. Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate.

___. 2016. "Baltic perceptions after Ukraine." *Journal on Baltic Security* 2(2): 6-34. http://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/JOBS/JOBS.02.2.pdf.

Jakstaite, Gerda and Giedrius Cesnakas. 2015. "Lithuania’s reintroduction of conscription is a clear response to the threat posed by Russia in the Baltics." *EUROPP - European Politics and Policy at LSE*, March 9. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/03/09/lithuanias-reintroduction-of-conscription-is-a-clear-response-to-the-threat-posed-by-russia-in-the-baltics/.

Jesensky, Marcel. 2014. *The Slovak–Polish Border, 1918-1947*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Jokubauskas, Vytautas. 2015. “The Financing and Personnel of the Lithuanian Army.” *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review*, 13(1): 147-70. doi:10.1515/lasr-2015-0008.

Jonson, Lena. 1998. "Russia and the 'Near Abroad': Concepts and Trends." In *The Baltic States in World Politics*, edited by Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin, 112–132. Richmond, CA: Curzon.

Judt, Tony. 2005. *Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945*. New York: Penguin Press.

Kaiser, Robert. 2016. “Performativity and the Eventfulness of Bordering Practices.” In *A Companion to Border Studies*, edited by Thomas Wilson and Hastings Donnan, 522-37. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.

Karabeshkin, Leonid and Dina Spechler. 2007. "EU and NATO Enlargement: Russia's Expectations, Responses and Options for the Future." *European Security* 16(3-4): 307-328. doi:10.1080/09662830701776056.

Kasekamp, Andres. 2010. *A History of the Baltic States*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kattago, Siobhan. 2008. "Commemorating Liberation and Occupation: War Memorials along the Road to Narva." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 39(4): 431-449. doi:10.1080/016297708 02461225.

Kearns, Jordan and Emmet Tuohy. 2015. “Trends in Estonian Oil Shale Utilization.” *International Security for Defence and Security*. October 8. https://www.icds.ee/publications /article/trends-in-estonian-oil-shale-utilization/.

Kesa, Katerina. 2011. “Latvian and Lithuanian Policy in the Eastern Neighbourhood: Between Solidarity and Self Promotion” *Perspectives Review of International Affairs* 19(2): 81-100.

Kojala, Linas, and Vytautas Kersanskas. 2015. ”The Impact of the Conflict in Ukraine on Lithuanian Security Development.” *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review* 13(1) 171-89. doi:10.1515/lasr-2015-0009.

Koshkin, Pavel. 2014. "Trenin: Russia-West Rivalry Over Ukraine is Higher Priority than Security." *Russia Direct*, September 15. http://www.russia-direct.org/qa/trenin-russia-west-rivalry-over-ukraine-higher-priority-security.

Kramer, Andrew. 2006. "Lithuanians Are Given a Taste of How Russia Plays the Oil Game." *The New York Times*, October 28. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/28/business/world business/28embargo.html.

Krutaine, Aija. 2015. "The Baltic Media after the Crisis. The Parallel Universes." *Re:Baltica*, November 23. https://en.rebaltica.lv/2015/11/the-parallel-universes/.

Laar, Mart. 2007. *The Unforgotten War. Armed Resistance Movement in Estonia in 1944*. Tallinn: Grenader.

Lamoreaux, Jeremy, and David Galbreath. 2008. “The Baltic States as ‘Small States’: Negotiating The ‘East’ By Engaging The ‘West’.” *Journal of Baltic Studies* 39(1): 1-14. doi:10.1080/01629770801908697.

Laustsen, Bagge, and Ole Waever. 2000. "In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29(3): 703-29. doi:10.1177/03058298000290031601.

Lehti, Marko. 2005. “Possessing a Baltic Europe: Retold National Narratives in the European North.” In *Post-Cold War Identity Politics: Northern and Baltic Experiences*, edited by Marko Lehti and David Smith, 11-49. Taylor & Francis e-Library.

Lehti, Marko, Matti Jutila and Markku Jokisipilä. 2008. ”Never-Ending Second World War: Public Performances of National Dignity and the Drama of the Bronze Soldier.” *Journal of Baltic Studies* 39:4, 393-418. doi:10.1080/01629770802461175.

Leonard, Mark, and Nicu Popescu. 2007. “A Power Audit of EU-Russia relations.” *European Council on Foreign Relations*. http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/a_power_audit_of_eu_russia_relations.

Léonard, Sarah, and Christian Kaunert. 2011. “Reconceptualizing the audience in securitization theory.” In *Securitzation Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, edited by Thierry Balzacq, 57-76. New York: Routledge.

Levinsson, Claes. 2006. "The Long Shadow of History: Post-Soviet Border Disputes - The Case of Estonia, Latvia, and Russia". *Connections: The Quarterly Journal.* http://connections-qj.org/system/files/05.2.04_levinsson.pdf.

Liik, Kadri. 2007. “The “Bronze Year” of Estonia-Russia relations.” *International Centre for Defence Studies*. https://www.icds.ee/fileadmin/media/icds.ee/failid/Kadri_Liik_Bronze_Year.pdf.

Loeber, Dietrich. 1999. “Consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact for Lithuania of Today International Law Aspects.” *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*. http://lfpr.lt/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/LFPR-4-Loeber.pdf

Lobjakas, Ahto. 2010. “French-Russian Warship Deal Making Waves Among NATO Allies.” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, February 9. https://www.rferl.org/a/FrenchRussian_Warship_Deal_Making_Waves_Among_NATO_Allies/1953455.html.

Lucas, Edward. 2015. "The Coming Storm: Baltic Sea Security Report." Center for European Policy Analysis. http://www.cepa.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report-%20%282%29.compressed.pdf.

Luksa, Juozas. 2010. *Forest Brothers: The Account of an Anti-Soviet Lithuanian Freedom Fighter, 1944-1948*. Budapest: Central European University Press.

Lyman, Rick. 2014. “Ukraine Crisis in Mind, Lithuania Establishes a Rapid Reaction Force.” *The New York Times*, December 20. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/20/world/europe/lithuania-assembles-a-force-as-it-readies-for-whatever-russia-may-bring.html?mcubz=3.

Made, Vahur. 2011. “Shining in Brussels? The Eastern Partnership in Estonia’s Foreign Policy”, *Perspectives Review of International Affairs* 19(2): 67-79. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23616145.

Maigre, Merle. 2015. "Nothing New in Hybrid Warfare: The Estonian Experience and Recommendations for NATO." *The German Marshall Fund of the United States*, Foreign Policy Program, February 2015. http://www.gmfus.org/publications/nothing-new-hybrid-warfare-estonian-experience-and-recommendations-nato.

Major, Claudia, and Alicia Voss. 2016. "Nordic-Baltic Security, Germany and NATO The Baltic Sea Region Is a Test Case for European Security." *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*. https://www.swpberlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2016C13_mjr_vos.pdf.

Mälksoo, Maria. 2006. “From Existential Politics Towards Normal Politics? The Baltic States in the Enlarged Europe.” *Security Dialogue* 37(3): 275–297, doi:10.1177/0967010606069180.

___. 2008. “Europe’s New Vanguard or the Old ‘Security Modernists’ in a Fancy Dress? The Baltic States against the Images of Eastern Europe in the EU.” In *The Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook*, edited by Andres Kasekamp, 31-60. Tallinn: Estonian Foreign Policy Institute.

___. 2009a. “The Memory Politics of Becoming European: The East European Subalterns and the Collective Memory of Europe.” *European Journal of International Relations* 15(4): 653–680. doi:10.1177/1354066109345049.

___. 2009b. "The Politics of Becoming European: A study of Polish and Baltic post-Cold War security imaginaries." Taylor & Francis e-Library.

___. 2015. “‘Memory must be Defended’: Beyond the Politics of Mnemonical Security.” *Security Dialogue*, 46(3) 221–237 doi:10.1177/0967010614552549.

Maness, Ryan, and Brandon Valeriano. 2015. *Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy. Energy, Cyber, and Maritime Policy as New Sources of Power*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Manners, Ian. 2006. “The European Union as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez.” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 35(1): 167-80. doi: 10.1177/03058298060350010201.

Marmon, Billl. 2010. “New Supply ‘Front’ for Afghan War Runs Across Russia, Georgia and the ‘Stans.” *The European Institute*. https://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/93-

european-affairs/february–march-2010/959-new-supply-front-for-afghan-war-runs-across-russia-georgia-and-the-stans.

Marrone, Alessandro, Olivier de France and Daniele Fattibene. 2016. "Defence Budgets and Cooperation in Europe: Developments, Trends and Drivers." *Istituto Affari Internazionali*. http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/pma_report.pdf.

Marten, Kimberly. 2014. "Crimean Punishment. Why Russia Won't Invade Ukraine." *Foreign Affairs*, February 27. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2014-02-27/crimean-punishment?cid=soc-twitter-in-snapshots-crimean_punishment-030114.

Maskaliunaite, Asta. 2014. "Sharing the Burden? Assessing the Lithuanian Decision to Establish a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan." *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review* 12(1): 223-243. doi:10.2478/lasr-2014-0010.

Mawhood, Will. 2015. "Estonia and Hungary: a Very Finno-Ugric Feud." *The Baltic Times*, February 14. https://www.baltictimes.com/estonia_and_hungary__a_very_finno-ugric_feud_108630569454df593963f89/.

Mazower, Mark. 1999. *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century*. London: Penguin.

McNamara, Eoin. 2015. "When Contributions Abroad Mean Security at Home? The Baltic States and NATO Burden-Sharing in Afghanistan." In *Newcomer no more? Contemporary NATO and the Future of the Enlargement from the Perspective of "Post-Cold War Members*, edited by Robert Czulda and Marek Madej, 153-69. Warsaw: NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

McSweeney, Bill, 1996. "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School." *Review of International Studies* 22(1): 81–94. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097432?seq=1# page_scan_tab_contents.

Mereckis, Darius, and Rimantas Morkvenas 1998. "The 1991 Treaty as a Basis for Lithuanian-Russian Relations." *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*. http://lfpr.lt/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/LFPR-1-Mereckis_Morkvenas.pdf.

Mertelsmann, Olaf. 2016. "The Objectives of the Different Waves of Stalinist Repression in the Baltic States." In *The Baltic States Under Stalinist Rule*, edited by Olaf Mertelsmann, 171-88. Cologne: Böhlau Verlag.

Mezhevich, Nikolai, and Lyudmila Sazanovich. 2013. "Current Problems in Russian-Latvian Relations". *Baltic Region* 3: 67-76. doi:10.5922/2079-8555-2013-3-7.

Mihkelson, Marko. 2003. "Baltic-Russian Relations in the Light of Expanding NATO and EU. Post-Imperial Clash of Different Mentalities." *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet*

Democratization 2(11): 270-280. https://www2.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya%20archive/11-2_Mihkelson.pdf.

Miles, Matthew, and Michael Huberman. 1994. *Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Miller, Ryan. 2008. "Lithuania's Lonely Gambit." *Centre for European Policy Analysis*, May 15. http://cepa.org/index/?id=d9b993256f4573d37b1cdc50ea3528d8. Milne, Richard. 2014. "Russian Threat Prompts Baltics to Try to Solve Squabbles", *Financial Times*, April 22. https://www.ft.com/content/2f627e7a-ca20-11e3-ac05-00144feabdc0 ?mhq5j=e2.

Moore, Kathleen. 2003. "Latvia: European Rights Official Stirs Debate With Citizenship, Voting Comments." *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, October 10. https://www.rferl.org /a/1104620.html.

Miniotaite, Grazina. 1999. "The Security Policy of Lithuania and the Integration Dilemma." *NATO*. http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/miniotaite.pdf.

____. 2003. "Convergent Geography and Divergent Identities: A Decade of Transformation in the Baltic States." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 16(2): 209-222. doi:10.1080/09557570302047

____. 2011. "Europeanization Tendencies of the Foreign Security and Security Policy of the Baltic states", *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review* 1(9): 101-19. doi:10.2478/v10243-012-0001-8.

Misiunas, Romuald and Rein Taagepera. 1990. *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 1940-1990*. London: Hurst.

Mitchell, Lincoln. 2012. *The Color Revolutions*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Mole, Richard. 2012. *The Baltic States from the Soviet Union to the European Union: Identity, Discourse and Power in the Post-Communist Transition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania*. New York: Routledge.

Molis, Arunas. 2009. "Baltic Military Cooperation: Past, Present and the Future". *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review* 22: 28-47. http://lfpr.lt/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/LFPR-22-Molis.pdf.

Morgan, Patrick. 2007. "Security in International Politics: Traditional Approaches." In *Contemporary Security Studies*, edited by Alan Collins, 12-33. Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Morozov, Viatcheslav 2005. “The Baltic States in Russian Foreign Policy Discourse: Can Russia Become a Baltic Country?” In *Post-Cold War Identity Politics: Northern and Baltic Experiences*, edited by Marko Lehti and David Smith, 217-51. Taylor & Francis e-Library.

Morozov, Viatcheslav and Bahar Rumelili. 2012. “The External Constitution of European Identity: Russia and Turkey as Europe-makers.” *Cooperation and Conflict* 47(1): 28–48. doi:10.1177/0010836711433124

Muiznieks, Nils. 2011. *Latvian-Russian Relations: Dynamics Since Latvia’s Accession to the EU and NATO*. Riga: University of Latvia Press.

Munster, Rens. 2012. “Securitization.” In *Oxford Bibliographies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/OBO/9780199743292-0091.

Myers, Steven. 2007. “Friction Between Estonia and Russia Ignites Protests in Moscow”, *The New York Times*, May 3. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/03/world/europe/03estonia.html?mcubz=3.

Naimark, Norman. 2010. *Stalin’s Genocides*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Maley, William. 2007. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan - how they arrived and where they are going.” *NATO Review*. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/Military_civilian_divide/Provincial_Reconstruction_Teams_Afghanistan/EN/index.htm

Nielsen, Rachel. 2015. “Estonia Launches New Channel to Win Over Its Russians.” *The Moscow Times*, September 27. https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/estonia-launches-new-channel-to-win-over-its-russians-49854.

Nünlistnd, Christian, and Oliver Thränert. 2015. "Putin’s Russia and European Security." CSS Analyses ETH Zürich in Security Policy 172. http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse172-EN.pdf.

Onken, Eva-Clarita. 2007. "The Baltic States and Moscow's 9 May Commemoration: Analysing Memory Politics in Europe." *Europe-Asia Studies* 59(1): 23-46. doi:10.1080/09668130601072589.

____. “Commemorating 9 May: The Baltic States and European Memory Politics.” In *Identity and Foreign Policy: Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration*, edited by Eiki Berg and Piret Ehin, 33-50. Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate.

Patrick, Stewart. 2014." NATO Membership Has Its Privileges (Unfortunately Ukraine Won't See Them)." *Council on Foreign Relations*, September 03. https://www.cfr.org/blog/nato-membership-has-its-privileges-unfortunately-ukraine-wont-see-them.

Pavlovaite, Inga. 2005. "Paradise Regained: The Conceptualization of Europe in the Lithuanian Debate." In *Post-Cold War Identity Politics: Northern and Baltic Experiences, edited by Marko Lehti and David Smith*, 197-216. Taylor & Francis e-Library.

Peck, Michael. 2016. "Russia Says It Never Invaded Poland in 1939." *The National Interest*, October 12. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russia-says-it-never-invaded-poland-1939-18017.

Pelnens, Gatis (editor). 2009. *The "Humanitarian Dimension" of Russian Foreign Policy toward Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and the Baltic States*. Translated by Rihards Kalnins. Riga: Centre for East European Policy Studies.

Perovic, Jeronim. 2006. "Russia Energy Companies in the Caspian and Central Eurasian Region: Expanding Southward." In *Russian Business Power: the Role of Russian Business in Foreign and Security Relations*, edited by Andreas Wenger, Jeronim Perovic and Robert Orrtung, 88-114. New York: Routledge.

Peters, Rita. 1994. "Russia Pressures the Baltic States." *Perspective* 4(3). https://open.bu.edu/bitstream/handle/2144/3503/perspective_4_3_peters.pdf?sequence=1.

Piotrowski, Marcin, and Kinga Ras. 2017. "Russian Hybrid Threats to the Baltic States." *The Polish Institute of International Affairs*, 13 July. https://www.pism.pl/Publications/PISM-Bulletin/Russian-Hybrid-Threats-to-the-Baltic-States

Pohl, Otto. 1999. *Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937-1949*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood.

Polegkyi, Oleksii. 2016. "Russia's New 'Religion'. The Cult of the 'Great Victory'." *New Eastern Europe*, May 25. http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/2004-russia-s-new-religion-the-cult-of-the-great-victory.

Ponsard, Lionel. 2006. *Russia, NATO and Cooperative Security. Bridging the Gap*. Taylor & Francis e-Library.

Postimees. 2013. "Estonia, Russia to Exchange 128.6 Hectares of Land Under Border Treaty". May 28. http://news.postimees.ee/1250918/estonia-russia-to-exchange-128-6-hectares-of-land-under-border-treaty.

Plakans, Andrejs. 2011. *A Concise History of the Baltic States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Praks, Henrik. 2015. "Estonia and NATO: Back to Basics After a Decade of Membership." In *Newcomer no more? Contemporary NATO and the Future of the Enlargement from the Perspective of Post-Cold War Members*, edited by Robert Czulda and Marek Madej, 189-207. Warsaw: NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

Prus, Justyna. 2015. "Russia's Use of History as a Political Weapon." *The Polish Institute for International Affairs*, Policy Paper 12 (114). https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=19763.

Purs, Aldis. 2012. *Baltic Facades. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since 1945*. London: Reaktion Books.

Racevskis, Karlis. 2007. "Toward a Postcolonial Perspective on the Baltic States." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 33(1): 37-56. doi:10.1080/01629770100000201.

Racius, Edgunas. 2011. "Trials and Tribulations of the Lithuanian Participation in the NATO ISAF Mission." In *Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Multinational Contributions to Reconstruction*, edited by Nyk Hydek and Péter Marton, 261-77. Routledge: New York.

Radin, Andrew. 2017. Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics Threats and Potential Responses. *RAND Corporation*. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1577.html.

Raik, Kristi. 2006. "Promoting Democracy through Civil Society: How to Step up the EU's Policy towards the Eastern Neighbourhood." *Centre for European Policy Studies* 237. https://www.ceps.eu/publications/promoting-democracy-through-civil-society-how-step-eus-policy-towards-eastern.

Rathke, Jeffrey. 2015. "Can NATO Deter Russia in View of the Conventional Military Imbalance in the East?" *Centre for Strategic and International Studies*. https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-nato-deter-russia-view-conventional-military-imbalance-east.

Raun, Toivo. 1994. "Baltic Independence, 1917-1920 and 1988-1994: Comparative Perspectives." *The National Council for Soviet and East European research*. https://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceeer/1994-808-12-Raun.pdf

Randall, Newnham. 2011. "Oil, Carrots, and Sticks: Russia's Energy Resources as a Foreign Policy Tool". *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 2(2): 134-43. doi:10.1016/j.euras.2011.03.004.

Rostoks, Tom. 2006. "The Border Issue" in *Latvian-Russian Relations: Domestic and International Dimensions*, edited by Nils Muiznieks, 131-9. Riga: University of Latvia.

Rostoks, Tom, and Nora Vanaga. 2016. "Latvia's Security Defence post-2014." *Journal on Baltic Security* 2(2): 71-109.

Roe, Paul. 2008. “Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK’s Decision to Invade Iraq.” *Security Dialogue* 39(6): 615–635. doi:10.1177/0967010608098212

____. 2012. “Is securitization a ‘negative’ concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics.” *Security Dialogue* 43(3): 249–66. doi:10.1177/0967010612443723.

Rislakki, Jukka. 2014. *The Case for Latvia: Disinformation Campaigns Against a Small Nation*. Leiden: Brill.

Rojansky, Matthew. 2017. "The Ukraine-Russia Conflict: A Way Forward." *The National Interest*, February 1. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-ukraine-russia-conflict-way-forward-19282.

Rublovskis, Raimonds. 2014. “Latvian Security and Defense Policy within the Twenty-First Century Security Environment”, *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review* 12(1): 173-88. doi:10.2478/lasr-2014-0008.

Rumelili, Bahar. 2004. “Constructing identity and relating to difference: understanding the EU 's mode of differentiation.” *Review of International Studies* 30(1): 27-47. doi:10.1017/S0260210504005819.

Said, Edward. 1979. Orientalism. New York: Random House.

Safire, William. 1994. "ON LANGUAGE; The Near Abroad". *The New York Times*, May 22. http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/22/magazine/on-language-the-near-abroad.html.

Salter, Mark. 2011. “When Securitization Fails: the Hard Case of Counter Terrorism programs.” *In Securitzation Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, edited by Thierry Balzacq, 116-31. New York: Routledge.

Samuels, Gabriel. 2016. "Lithuania to Invest Millions in Missile Defence Systems as Fears of Russian Attack Grow." *The Independent*, September 28. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-lithuania-defence-missile-system-investment-invasion-fears-a7335561.html.

Satkauskas, Rytas. 2001. “Legal Consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact for the Baltic States on the Obligation to `Overcome the Problems Inherited from the Past'.” In *Baltic Yearbook of International Law*, edited by Ineta Ziemele. Leiden: Brill.

Scerbinskis, Valters. 2005. “Looking for Neighbours: Origins and Developments of Latvian Rhetoric on Nordic Closeness.” In *Post-Cold War Identity Politics: Northern and Baltic Experiences*, edited by Marko Lehti and David Smith, 155-70. Taylor & Francis e-Library.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. 1998. "Nato Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation." *Security Studies* 8(2): 198-234. doi:10.1080/09636419808429378.

Schmitt, Eric, and Steven Myers. 2015. “NATO Refocuses on the Kremlin, Its Original Foe*.” The New York Times*, June 23. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/24/world/europe/nato-returns-its-attention-to-an-old-foe-russia.html?mcubz=3.

Scrutton, Alistair and Andrius Sytas. 2015. “Lithuania Stages 'Little Green Men' War Games, with Eye on Moscow.” *Reuters*, May 6. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-lithuania-wargames/lithuania-stages-little-green-man-war-games-with-eye-on-moscow-idUSKBN0NR1PG20150506.

Seselgyte, Margarita. 2013. “Lithuania.” In *Strategic Cultures in Europe. Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*, edited by Heiko Biehl, Bastian Giegerich and Jonas Alexandra, 217-228. Potsdam: Springer.

Sheehan, Michael. 2005. *International Security: an Analytical Survey*. Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner.

Sheeter, Laura. 2007. "Latvia, Russia sign border deal." *BBC*, March 27. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6498049.stm.

Sherr, James. 2013. *Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Shlapak, David and Michael Johnson. 2016. “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank. Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics.” *Rand Corporation*. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1253/RAND_RR1253.pdf.

SIPRI. 2017. “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.” https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.

Smith, David. 2008. "Woe from Stones: Commemoration, Identity Politics and Estonia's War of Monuments'." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 39(4): 419-30. doi:10.1080/01629770802461191.

Socor, Vladimir. 2007. "Baltic Seabed Gas Pipeline Project: Far from a Done Deal'.' *The Jamestown Foundation*, May 22. https://bafl.com/2007/05/22/baltic-seabed-gas-pipeline-project-far-from-a-done-deal/.

Solovjova, Jelena. 2016. "Is Russia Really a Threat to the Baltic States?" *Al Jazeera*, July 7. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/07/russia-threat-baltic-states-160707054916449.html.

Sperling, James. 2007. "Regional or global security co operation? The vertices of conflict and interstices of cooperation". In *Global Security Governance: Competing perceptions of security in the 21st century*, edited by Emil Kirchner and James Sperling, 263-85. New York: Routledge.

Spruds, Andris. 2009. "Entrapment in the Discourse of Danger? Latvian-Russian Interaction in the Context of European Integration." In *Identity and Foreign Policy: Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration*, edited by Eiki Berg and Piret Ehin, 101-16. Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate.

Spruds, Andris, and Diana Potjomkina. 2013. *Northern Distribution Network: Redefining Partnerships within NATO and Beyond*. Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs.

Sputnik. 2006. "Russia Voices Concern over Human Rights in Baltics." March 13. https://sputniknews.com/world/2006031344241387/.

Stratfor. 2009. "Russia, France: Panicking the Baltics." November 25. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russia-france-panicking-baltics

Strods, Heinrihs, and Matthew Kott. 2002. "The File on Operation "Priboi": A Re-assessment of the Mass Deportations of 1949." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 33(1):1-36. doi:10.1080/01629770100000191.

Stuttaford, Andrew. 2015. "A Hybrid Defence for the Baltic states." *The National Review*, July 30. http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/421840.

Sulovic, Vladimir. 2010. " Meaning of Security and Theory of Securitization." *Belgrade Centre for Security Policy*, October 05. http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/sulovic_(2010)_meaning_of_secu.pdf.

Sytas, Andrius. 2017. "NATO War Game Defends Baltic Weak Spot for First Time." *Reuters*, June 18. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-russia-suwalki-gap/nato-war-game-defends-baltic-weak-spot-for-first-time-idUSKBN1990L2.

Sutyagin, Igor, 2014. "Russian Forces in Ukraine." *Royal United Services Institute*, 9 March 2015. https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201503_bp_russian_forces_in_ukraine.pdf.

Taagepera, Rein. 1991. "Building Democracy in Estonia." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 24(3): 478-481. doi:10.2307/420093.

Terriff, Terry, Stuart Croft, Lucy James and Patrick Morgan. 1999. *Security Studies Today*. Cambridge: Polity.

The Baltic Times. 2009. "Support Grows for Georgia". March 4. https://www.baltictimes.com /news/articles/22446/.

The Jamestown Foundation. 1996. "Two Maritime Border Disputes Simmer in the Baltics". https://jamestown.org/program/two-maritime-border-disputes-simmer-in-the-baltics/.

Theiler, Tobias. 2003. "Societal Security and Social Psychology." *Review of International Studies* 29(2): 249–268. doi:10.1017/S0260210503000159.

Thieme, Donald. 2014. "Are the Baltics the Next Crimea?" *United States Naval Institute*, April 1. https://news.usni.org/2014/04/01/baltics-next-crimea.

Torsti, Pilvi. 2008. "Why do History Politics Matter? The Case of the Estonian Bronze Soldier." In *The Cold War and the Politics of History*, edited by Juhana Aunesluoma and Pauli Kettunen, 19-35. Edita: Helsinki.

Traynor, Ian. 2007. "Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia." *The Guardian*, May 17. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia.

Trenin, Dmitri. 2008. "Energy Geopolitics in Russia-EU Relations." In *Pipelines politics and Power. The future of the EU-Russia energy relations*, edited by Katinka Barysch, 15-25. London: Center for European Reform.

___. 2011. *Russian Policies Toward the Nordic-Baltic Region*. Washington: Atlantic Council.

___. 2014. "Why Russia Won't Interfere." February 23, *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/24/opinion/why-russia-wont-interfere.html?_r=1.

Turnbull, Grant. 2014. "Russian Aggression Spurs Eastern European Vehicle Modernisation", *Army Technology*, October 2. http://www.army-technology.com/features/featurerussian-aggression-spurs-eastern-european-vehicle-modernisation-4387406/.

Vasiliev, Andrei. 2014. "The Crimean 'Army'." *Open Democracy*, March 14. https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/andrei-vasiliev/crimean-%E2%80%98army%E2%80%99.

Vaughn, Jocelyn. 2009. "The Unlikely Securitizer: Humanitarian Organizations and the Securitization of Indistinctiveness." *Security Dialogue* 40(3): 263-85. doi:10.1177/0967010 609336194.

Viktorova, Jevgenia. 2007. “Conflict Transformation the Estonian Way: The Estonian-Russian Border Conflict, European Integration and Shifts in Discursive Representation of the Other.” *Perspectives* 27: 44-66.

Visek, Richard. 1997. “Creating the Ethnic Electorate through Legal Restorationism: Citizenship Rights in Estonia.” *Harvard International Law Journal* 38(2): 315-73.

Vitkus, Gediminas. 1996. "Lithuanian-Russian Relations in 1990- 1995. A Study of Lithuanian Foreign Policy." *Forschungsschwerpunkt Konflikt- und Kooperationsstrukturen in Osteuropa*, 12. http://fkks.uni-mannheim.de/publikationen/fkks12.pdf.

____. 2009. "Russian Pipeline Diplomacy: A Lithuanian Response." *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 26: 25-46.

Volkov, Vladimir. 1997. “Expanding NATO Eastward. View from Moscow.” *Problems of Post Communism* 44(3): 61-5. doi:10.1080/10758216.1997.11655733.

Vucheva, Elitsa. 2005. “Estonia and Russia Sign Border Deal.” *Euobserver*, May 19. https://euobserver.com/foreign/19100.

Waever, Ole, and Barry Buzan. 2013. "After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present, and Future of Security Studies." In *Contemporary Security Studies*, edited by Alan Collins, 393-410. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Walt, Stephen. 1991. "The Renaissance of Security Studies." *International Studies Quarterly* 35(2): 211-239. doi:10.2307/2600471.

Warren, Adrienne. 2013. "Levada Poll: The Top Friends and Enemies of Russia in the Neighbourhood and Beyond." *Eastbook.eu*, June 24. http://www.eastbook.eu/en/2013/06/24/92671/.

Wesslau, Fredrik, and Andrew Wilson. 2015. “Russia 2030: a Story of Great Power Dreams and Small Victorious Wars.” *European Council of Foreign Relations*. http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/russia_2030_a_story_of_great_power_dreams_and_small_victorious_wars

Whitmore, Brian and Mark Galeotti. 2016. “Countdown To Warsaw.” *The Power Vertical*, Podcast audio, July 1. https://www.rferl.org/a/27833014.html.

Williams, Michael. 2003. "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics." *International Studies Quarterly* 47: 511–531. doi:10.1046/j.0020-8833.2003.00277.x.

___. 2011a. “The Continuing Evolution of Securitization Theory.” In *Securitzation Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, edited by Thierry Balzacq, 212-22. New York: Routledge.

___. 2011b. “Securitization and the Liberalism of Fear.” *Security Dialogue* 42(4–5): 453–463. doi:10.1177/0967010611418717.

Wydra, Harald. 2007. *Communism and the Emergence of Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Yasmann, Victor. 2007. “Russia: Monument Dispute With Estonia Gets Dirty.” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*. https://www.rferl.org/a/1076297.html.

Yin, Robert. 1994. *Case Study Research: Designs and Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.*

Zagorski, Andrei. 2011. “Eastern Partnership from the Russian Perspective.” *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/ipg/2011-3/05_zagorski.pdf

Zalimas, Dainius. 1999. “Legal and political issues on the Continuity of the Republic of Lithuania.” *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*. http://lfpr.lt/wp-content/uploads /2015/07/LFPR-4-Zalimas.pdf.

Zilinskas, Justinas. 2012. “Introduction of 'Crime of Denial' in the Lithuanian Criminal Law and First Instances of its Application.” *Jurisprudence* 19(1): 315-29. https://www.mruni.eu /upload/iblock/205/017_zilinskas.pdf.