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Portugal: An Instrumental Approach to Peace Support Operations

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ABSTRACT *Until recently, in per capita terms, Portugal was one of the most significant European contributors to international United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations around the world. In the last few years, European Union and NATO missions and operations have topped deployment to UN operations. One can thus state that participation in peace support operations (PSO) has become a lodestar of Portuguese defence and foreign policies. The range of forces deployed, as well as the geographical diversity of deployment attest to the ambition and effort made by the Portuguese governments in becoming relevant in international affairs through PSO in the last 30 years. Given the limitations of a small power as Portugal, specialisation in the field of PSO is an asset for its positioning on the international scene, endowing it with a more active voice in matters of collective security and access to leadership positions.*

KEY WORDS: peace support operations, Portugal, peacekeeping, armed forces, United Nations, NATO, European Union

Since the 1990s, Portuguese armed and security forces have been increasingly required to take part in peace support operations (PSO),[1] a commitment which the country has taken to heart. According to the priorities established during the last legislatures under the José Sócrates' governments, Portugal was able to participate in all major international military operations and crisis management missions of the United Nations (UN), NATO and the European Union (EU) (Teixeira 2009a, 21).[2]

In early 2012, Portugal still ranked high in the list of 115 countries contributing to UN PSO, becoming the seventh largest European contributor to UN peacekeeping operations (PKO). This is an important demonstration of the effort of a small country[3] with limited resources, especially since the onset of the financial crisis which has deeply affected the country. Since the mid-1990s, Portugal has engaged over 30,000 soldiers in peacekeeping missions in over 30 settings in all continents (DGPDN 2012, 9–11; COC/EMGFA 2012; Moreira 2010). The multiplicity of forces used, as well as the diversity of deployment locations reflects the ambition and effort made by the Portuguese governments in the last three decades.

In the late 1990s, Portugal ranked amongst the top 15 contributing countries at the UN. The peaks of national participation in peace support missions were registered with the

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involvement in NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996, and with the deployment within the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in 2001. For the sake of rigour, it is important to clarify that the size of the military forces involved nowadays is notably smaller than a decade ago. Compared to the 1990s, and especially after 2009, there has been a marked decrease in the country's participation, particularly in UN missions. In addition, Portugal has given priority to participation which complies with its obligations towards NATO and EU missions, rather than deploying to UN operations. This state of affairs is mainly explained by the context of acute financial crisis that has forced Portugal to reduce its military contingents abroad and carefully decide on its contributions (Notícias).

This paper examines the set of circumstances that from the 1990s led Portugal to make a strategic choice to participate in PSO as an essential part of its foreign policy and international commitments to political and defence organisations. The key argument advanced here is that engagement in peace missions reflects Portugal's changed appraisal of the post-War security environment and of how to reposition itself within it in order to maximise its influence in decision-making processes at the main international *fora*. The section *Increased International Intervention* outlines the post-Cold War setting and the increase of UN PSO. The section *Why Do States Participate in PSO?* examines the contributions of International Relations (IR) theories that offer explanations for PSO deployment. In essence, the debate revolves around the different views of officials and academics on the real reasons why countries contribute to PSO: those who believe they are genuinely concerned about promoting international peace and security, and alleviating human suffering; and those, primarily from the realist realm, who argue that they are purely interested in promoting their security and enforcing their national interests. Still, a third approach is advanced here - rational choice theory – which emphasises the actors' instrumentality in their PSO policy. Then, the section *A New Vision of Security to Face a New Security Environment* explains the new vision of security and strategic environment construed by Portuguese political and military elites. The section *The Legitimising Framework* describes the legitimising framework for Portuguese deployment in PSO. The section *Factors that Shape the Decision to Deploy* expounds the factors that account for the decision to deploy. Section *PSO as Influence - The Armed Forces as an Instrument of Foreign Policy* elucidates how national defence goals became intertwined and linked to foreign policy, rendering the armed forces, as Portuguese policy makers argue, a more relevant 'arm' of foreign policy. It also engages with the issue on how PSO engagement bolstered the visibility of the country and the benefits accruing from deployments abroad.

Increased International Intervention

Throughout the 20th century, Portugal tried to steer away from major international conflicts. That posture was related to Lisbon's stance in the First World War, when it adopted a policy of neutrality and non-interventionism in the European arena (apart from the contingent participation of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps in Flanders due to the perceived need to secure its integrity and independence as well as its colonial empire; Telo n.d., 16). During the Cold War period, the Portuguese participation in UN peacekeeping was deemed inappropriate, because the country was closely bound to the Western, U.S.-led sphere, being one of the founding members of NATO. It was also admitted to the UN in the framework of the so-called 'package agreement' between the U.S. and Soviet blocs.[4]

This fact might have impeded the required neutrality and impartiality demanded from UN troop-contributing states. This accounted for Portugal not being invited to join the list of contributing countries to UN missions until 1989 (Sousa n.d., 4).

Another major reason for precluding external military involvements was because, after 1961, the Portuguese armed forces were engaged in three war fronts in Africa, which depleted the energies of the country for 14 years (1961–1974). More importantly, Portugal became increasingly isolated on the world stage as other European nations holding African colonies gradually granted them independence.

In the post-Revolution period, a transformation in the attitude of the Portuguese military was in force. Once the consolidation of the new Portuguese democratic regime was achieved and political–military relations were normalised, the military corps found a new rationale: participation in the post-Cold War peace missions (Vitorino 2009, 66).

Thus, Portugal only started to actively participate in peace support missions in the early 1990s. With the end of the Cold War and subsequent changes in the international situation, Portugal revised its strategic options as it realised the importance of having stronger means to intervene in international decision-making *fora*. Portugal, which had not been involved in a major conflict in Europe since the First World War, was forced by the circumstances to change its traditional African and Atlantic-centred defence paradigm (Cordeiro 2005, 4; Silva 2008; Vasconcelos 1999). This paradigm was replaced by a new model based on a global intervention policy (Silva 2008), legitimised by a set of values, such as peacekeeping, respect for human and minority rights, democracy, rule of Law, post-conflict reconstruction and development of states (Teixeira 2008, 5).

All this happened at a time when peacekeeping missions were also object of reconsideration at the *Agenda for Peace* by the then UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and a UN global doctrine for PKO and the role of the organisation in the prevention, containment, resolution and termination of conflicts were established. The *Agenda* was a key document in making peacekeeping a core theme of the UN. Published in 1992, the document initiated in the post-Cold War a profound debate on the importance of peacekeeping as an instrument in the process of conflict resolution (Boutros-Ghali 1992). In the *Agenda*, Boutros-Ghali defined the so-called instruments for peace and security: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding, sanctions and peace enforcement. Peacekeeping thus emerged as part of a range of instruments used to manage a crisis in its latent stage (pre-conflict) to its escalating stage (conflict) and, finally, to the post-conflict stage (peacebuilding). Accordingly, this implied using troops not only during a restricted period of the conflict, but also extending it to its previous and post-violence stages (preventive deployment and peacebuilding). The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) started to play a more active role in the regulation of the international order, passing resolutions that justified and legitimised its peacekeeping military interventions, and enhanced peace enforcement operations.

With this change, the military 'redesigned their doctrine, organisation and instruction in order to adapt to the use of military force in what some terminology has termed as "operations other than war"' (do Espírito Santo 2006). In 1995, in the *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, when analysing the failure of some post-Cold War missions (Angola, Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia), Boutros-Ghali affirmed the need for new forms of action with greater civil and military involvement, as well as new concerns with the security of the military and with the coordination between humanitarian and military missions (A/RES/51/242 1997).

In 1994, the amendment to the National Strategic Concept denoted a new concern with the Portuguese armed forces' adaptation to the technical and operational parameters of the other forces, which was essential to fulfil Portugal's commitments within those organisations. The challenge of participating in the international mission to the former Yugoslavia with a large-scale military contingent was then taken up: 'In the case of Bosnia, the fact that it chose to send a significant contingent and a combat unit, not a support unit, clearly demonstrated the will to call attention to its involvement in the Implementation Force (IFOR)' (Freire 2007, 89).

Why do States Participate in PSO?

At this point, it is relevant to ascertain concrete reasons for Portugal's participation in international missions (Pinto 2014, 398–401). Therefore, it is pertinent to delve into the debate on why states are driven to peacekeeping and PSO deployments in general. The literature on PSO largely disregards analyses of states' motivations for participating in PSO (Sorenson and Wood 2005, 4). In this respect, J. Jobe interrogates whether 'states contribute personnel out of a desire to support the institution of PKO's through the shared norms and values of the international community or are there other reasons for their participation, particularly self-interested behaviour?' (Jobe 2007, 16). In similar respect, K. Monnakgotla poses the following question:

> Why ... do countries participate in peacekeeping? Is it out of a commitment to bring about international peace, or are there other motivations? Why do some countries participate more than others? Is it because they are more concerned about international peace, or are there perhaps other less altruistic reasons? (Monnakgotla 1996)

Theoretically speaking, the vast majority of studies have focused their attention on several standardised types of explanations to understand the motivations for international military deployments. The authors who delve into this particular area of peacekeeping studies normally follow the realist/idealist divide of IR theory, although other theoretical accounts can provide further insights. In fact, the issue concerning participation in PSO and the motives behind it might be more complex that the simplistic dichotomy interests versus values may evince or that the determinism of this view suggests. States may have overlapping and more heterogeneous interests and priorities than it might be immediately perceptible. It is important to realise that '[o]ften state interest and humanitarian goals were intertwined with each other, so that motives [for participation] falling into one or the other category could not easily be distinguished from each other' (Marten 2004, 68).

Most of the literature which delves into the reasons that motivate countries into participating in UN PKO and PSO in general focuses on the politics, operational aspects, doctrine and strategy of PSO, as well as on broader topics as humanitarian intervention (Sorenson and Wood 2005, 4). First, it may be important to clarify that, at the domestic level, the decision to deploy PSO is made by the political decision makers, but its implementation depends on the military's willingness to cooperate. Political decision-makers and the military might have different stakes in PSO, at least in states which are not democracies and where the military is autonomous or has a different agenda. In his seminal study on the relationship between troop commitment for peace support, security

doctrines and civil–military integration, Velásquez concludes that countries with externally oriented doctrines and integrated defence and foreign affairs policies are more likely to contribute troops to UN operations (Vélazquez 2010, 174).

From the point of view of politicians and diplomats, the desire to participate in PSO may be driven by: the pursuit of a more active and visible foreign policy; the reinforcement of the country's standing on the international system; the access to particular areas of the world; increased regional influence, enforcing continued interest in certain areas of influence (such as ex-colonies), or reinforcing the claim for a permanent seat on the UNSC (such as Brazil). From the military viewpoint, joining PKO might constitute a significant factor in terms of motivation. The military may be attracted by first-hand military overseas experience for its troops, training in the absence of war opportunities, military intelligence gathering, the possibility of acquiring new equipment and resources, gaining additional professional skills, providing experience and sometimes satisfying promotion requirements for soldiers who have not experienced a real interstate war (Vélazquez 2010, 174).

One of the minor strands of PSO literature focuses on the reasons that motivate countries to participate in PSO. Some authors have proposed different theories that can explain, at least partially, why decision-makers decide to contribute to risky military operations framed as PSO. The most basic explanation for states to support PSO engagements derives from the classical debate between idealists and realists. The realist or instrumental approach posits that states undertaking PSO commitments are self-interested, driven by their national interests: maintaining the status quo or in assuring their presence in particular areas of the world. For realists, states are interested in strengthening their influence on the international scene: engaging in PSO allows states to pursue their own agendas. As Neack argues in her pointed study, some states at the UN dominate the PKO deployment process, so as to steer the UN decision-making process to their advantage: 'These states use their control over the UN to keep it out of regions considered to be their own spheres of influence and thus controllable' (Neack 1995, 189).

Realists tend to view peacekeeping theory as usually associated with regime theory or the liberal institutionalist school of thought (Dombroski 2006, 6, 10). They minimise the contributions of peacekeeping theorists because of the latter's favouring of institutions over states as the primary actors in IR. They question the ability of international institutions to have an independent effect on state behaviour and, in particular, on preventing war (Mearsheimer 1994–95, 342–364, 1995, 7).

Realists recognise, as Mearsheimer notes, that

> states sometimes operate through institutions. However, they believe that those rules reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on the international distribution of power. The most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it. (Mearsheimer 1994–95, 13)

If the balance of power is the independent variable that explains war, 'institutions are merely an intervening variable in the process' (Mearsheimer 1994–95, 13). In this view, institutions are essentially 'arenas for acting out power relationships' (Mearsheimer quoting Evans and Wilson, 1994–95, 13).

Rational choice theory declares that states act on the basis of their perceived interests (instrumentality). Rationality involves seeking the most cost-effective means to achieve a

specific goal without gauging the worthiness of that goal. Decisions are taken as a result of the actors' rational choice, which assumes 'some model of individual action, often one based on subjective-expected utility theory' (Hechter and Kanazawa 1997, 193 and 194).

Guided by this logic, states, similar to organisations, should be aware of their own capacities, as well as calculate the expected utility (costs and benefits) from interventions and the way that maximises their benefits (Nalbandov 2009, 24). Thus, as Zdeněk and Urbanovská argue,

> peacekeeping is viewed as a tool via which states endeavour to achieve their goals and maximise their profit as much as possible. When deliberating on the costs and profits of alternative behaviour, states estimate the likelihood that the chosen actions will lead to a desirable result. (Kříž and Urbanovská 2013, 373)

Instrumentality is a key factor in explaining why countries engage in PSO.

Conversely, the idealist or value-based approach (Urbanovská 2010, 491 and 492) stresses the altruistic motivations of states, namely that of maintaining peace and stability, the commitment to multilateralism or to sustaining or enhancing the authoritative status of the UN (Ishizuka 2004, 180). In looking at a number of missions under Chapter 7 undertaken in the 1990s, Jakobsen concluded that only in the case of North Kuwait (1991) did national interests play a major role. That is because the great Western powers, which had led humanitarian interventions, had changed their perception of their interests in face of the exploding conflicts (Jakobsen 1996, 112).

A New Vision of Security to Face a New Security Environment

A major argument advanced by Portuguese policy-makers since the 1990s is that defence matters and, above all, international security must be considered in an international framework and no longer as a strictly national issue. Since the mid-1990s, a 'comprehensive security concept' has become an emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities. Its proponents challenge the traditional notion of national security dominated by a state-centred security concept, focused primarily on external threats to national security posed by military factors. The end of the Cold War shifted the focus to multidimensional, often internal conflicts, and the result was a broad consensus on new security concepts. Concepts such as 'extended' (IISS 1997), 'comprehensive/global' (Commission on Global Governance 1995) or 'human' (UNDP 1994) were added to complement the traditional security concepts. In the early 1990s, on a scholarly level, works by Buzan (1991) and Waever (1993) opened up a convincing new approach to an altered concept of security. These studies widened the traditional state-centred security approach by enlarging it to embrace the complementary concept of societal security, in which issues such as economy, ecology, demography and stability risks, for instance debt issues, global ecological problems (such as climate change) and threats to political stability (for example, terrorism), are included (Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional 1994). One major reason for this shift is a development policy which has become progressively more sensitive to collective violence phenomena, and which increasingly involves discussions on concepts of 'global security' (UNDP 1994, 30).

The 1994 Portuguese National Strategic Concept of National Defence pleaded for a new view on security. One of the constitutive aspects of the Portuguese strategic community's

altered concept of security is the fact that the concept has been extended at two levels: in substantive and operational terms. At the substantive level, the concept now includes the manifold causes of conflict, and the notions of stability and interest have been both modified to take interdependencies into account and expanded in geographical terms. At the operational level, it is at the same time suggested that these new problems call for a scope expansion of potential military operations with the likelihood of a military crisis reaction becoming an integral element of a policy of crisis and conflict resolution. The 1994 change of the National Defence Strategic Concept revealed new concerns with the adaptation of the national armed forces to the technical and operational parameters of the other allied forces, an essential requirement to enable Portugal to comply with its commitments to those alliances. It established the need to 'collaborate in peacekeeping or peacebuilding missions, integrated in multinational forces at the international level', and 'ensure that the military can act beyond the scope of the specific and fundamental missions of the military defence of the Republic as an instrument of foreign policy of the State' (Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional 1994, paragraph 3). The same ideas are expressed in the revised 2003 Strategic Concept (Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional 2003, paragraph 7).

This promotion of peace missions as the new priority of the armed forces is reinforced by the new Strategic Concept approved in March 2013. Instead of ensuring the 'military defence of the country' and the 'achievement of the State's aims'—as was the case in the 2003 Concept—the new Concept stresses the objectives of defending the 'international position of Portugal' and the need to 'strengthen the foreign defence relations' (Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n.° 19/2013 2013; Lourenço 2013). The 2013 Concept organises the priorities of the armed forces according to a 'geopolitical scale of priorities', that is, participation in peacekeeping missions under the EU, NATO and the UN.

In terms of political rationale, the decision made in the early 1990s to participate in missions in Africa and, above all, in the Balkans makes sense in terms of the 'extended security' approach adopted by the Portuguese political elites. The security interests thus extended well beyond the national ones, often materialised beyond territorial borders. Today, this concept has a flexible and extended meaning (Rodrigues 2009, 15), which requires states to have a new type of understanding within the international community. In the words of former Defence Minister Severiano Teixeira,

> The guarantee of national security is increasingly promoted far from our traditional borders, of the traditional geographical boundaries of states. Therefore, the definition of our intervention doctrine can no longer be predominantly determined only by historical factors or geographical proximity. It must include regional and international security criteria, promoting the values of democracy and the rule of law. (Teixeira n.d., 12)

Second, security and defence are ensured in the so-called 'security border' (Leandro 1992, 6; Garcia 2005b) within the framework of collective security systems. State integration in the EU, and membership in NATO and in the UN has attested the importance of collective thinking where states share common interests in variable proportions. Portuguese officials have frequently spoken in terms of 'the border of Portuguese security is the border of European security' (Teixeira 2009b, 105); 'defending national interests often means defending the projects in which Portugal is involved'

(Fundação Mário Soares 2006, 651). However, this does not mean that national concerns terminate at the borders of the organisations to which it belongs, and exclusively in the missions in which it participates (Rodrigues 2009, 15).

Third, it must be noted that behind this global intervention policy (Viana 2002, 324), there is an enlargement of the actual concept of national interest, defined not only in its traditional form—the defence of territorial integrity and of the nation—but as a promoter of security, international peace and stability, conflict resolution and human rights. This concept of national interest has guided the definition of Portugal's priorities with regard to foreign policy, defence and security, and has led it to intervene in particular conflict scenarios.

As far as the risks, threats and transnational conflicts are concerned, policy-makers state that the response will have to rely mainly on international cooperation: it is thus a framework of cooperative security, 'because it is based on cooperation between states as the sole response to risks and threats to international security' (Lopes 2009, 53; Teixeira 2008, 3; Programa do XVIII 2009, 119). Portuguese statesmen have stated that Portugal must 'assume its responsibilities of international stabilisation, not only in the framework of NATO and the European Union, and in contiguous geographical regions, but also well beyond the area defined as traditional' (Teixeira 2008, 6).

In the early 1990s, in spite of the debate about the national interest of intervening in the Balkans, Portuguese officials began to recognise that, on account of Portugal's membership in the EU and NATO, its security border no longer coincided with its geographical border. Portugal's strategic interests—while still embracing the Atlantic—henceforth also included Europe and its southern fringe, thus making the Balkans an area of interest for Portugal (Vasconcelos 2000, 22; Teixeira 1999; Vitorino quoted in Viana 2002, 325).

Portuguese participation in PSO is, as we have seen before, the result of the changing security environment with the end of the Cold War, especially the proliferation of a new set of risks and threats. Portuguese national defence policy largely reflects the constraints of the international environment.

At the transnational level, several new issues of concern arose, such as the phenomena of organised crime, terrorism, Islamist fundamentalism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental risks, humanitarian disasters and pandemics. At the sub-state level, Portuguese officials have pointed to the emergence of failed states, violent conflicts and civil wars, such as the ones that occurred in the Balkans in the 1990s and those that fester in Africa, which have become current and represent, directly and indirectly, a threat to European security and stability (Programa do XVIII 2009).

This new environment has shaped the emergence of a new security narrative. As Portuguese authorities commonly state, the security concept must be flexible, requiring from states a new kind of understanding of their role in the international community. Portuguese politicians have acknowledged that the concept of security, particularly in the post-Cold War, has assumed a broader meaning that goes far beyond the protection of the national borders against military threats, as was evidenced in the revision of NATO's Strategic Concept 1991, 1999 and 2010) and the EU Security Strategy (2003 and 2005).

In the 1990s, Portugal remained attentive to the set of changes occurring internationally, which had implications at home and fostered the redefinition of foreign and national defence policies. To that effect, the armed forces began to fulfil the international

commitments assumed by Portugal within the organisations it belongs to. The military component thus became a major instrument to bolster Portugal's position through its foreign policy.

Due to the globalisation process, the permeability of borders has increased. Countries have become vulnerable to phenomena which take place beyond their borders and often not of their direct concern. Terrorism, in particular, has put in evidence the correlation between external events and internal security. This is what some authors have referred to as growing interdependence between internal and external aspects of security or, in other words, the external dimensions of internal security (Bigo 2006; Eriksson and Rhinard 2009). That understanding presupposes that risks and dangers are considered to have no borders nowadays. Thus, the limits to the security measures of states need to be redefined and adjusted to the new freedom and security requirements of citizens (Guedes and Elias 2010). The emerging debate in Portugal about the need to assign the armed forces a more active role in terms of national security translates an underlying awareness of a new geo-strategic context of threats and risks. Today, states need to win their internal security in remote areas, as illustrated by the example of Afghanistan and Pakistan, countries which have become 'incubators' of terrorism and extremism that are spreading into Europe (Noivo 2009).

In the new security narrative, two important consequences follow from this. First, the new concept of security goes beyond the traditional concern for state security and the use of force. Second, it requires an adaptation of the traditional instruments to respond to new risks and threats. As a former defence minister has asserted, particularly in the security and defence realms,

> [I]t is a notion of security sustained in the projection of stability onto the regional borders, in support of nation-building of economically and politically sustainable states, based on the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights; it is sustainable security in promoting sustainable development and improving the living conditions of the populations, that is, human security. (Teixeira 2008, 3)

The successive government programmes and other defining foreign and defence policy documents state that in the current international security context, a broader conception of security and a more integrated defence policy are required (Teixeira 2008, 3; Política de Defesa Nacional n.d.). They also affirm that national defence policy implies a redefinition of the strategic guidelines which act as a structuring element of national security and defence, and should simultaneously be able to concur with promoting Portugal's assertive role in the international community.

As the last government's programme (October 2009–March 2011) underlines, in the new international environment, the concept of security has undergone three fundamental changes. First, the notion of security is now 'wide security' (Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998, 21–47): security changed its value and meaning, moving from security of protection of vital interests threatened by an enemy, that is, predictable threats, to security directed to various risks, more diffuse in shape, space and actors' origins, whereby unpredictability increases the conditions for the outbreak of conflicts.

Second, security is no longer exclusive to states: what it is now at stake is also the security of people. The Portuguese government has adopted the framework of 'human security' as the bedrock of its security and policy concerns.

The participation in PSO has followed the broad concept of security and flexible boundaries outlined above. In the 20th century, Portugal underwent several dramatic border changes: decolonisation of the African colonies, the transfer of Macao to China and EU integration. They naturally changed the traditional concept of sovereignty. In an increasingly globalised world where the country's integration takes place at various layers, 'the problem of the new dimensions of the concept of border' is an issue of paramount importance, as the definition of the 'several areas of insertion' where Portugal wishes to have a say (Garcia 2005a). This question arises nation wise, but it is also of fundamental importance within organisations, such as the EU or NATO, the area of intervention which has globally expanded. According to Portuguese experts and academics, the Portuguese security border coincides with that defined by NATO; its economic and political border coincides with that of the EU and the cultural border corresponds to the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Peoples—CPLP (Moreira 1996). To those, one could also add the vulnerability border, in the words of Gen. G. Leandro (Leandro 1992; Garcia 2005a).

Portuguese defence has thus been called upon to provide the conceptual framework and the operational means to shoulder this broad concept of security and of flexible borders (Garcia 2005a) through a mix of components. Thus, Portuguese decision-makers, politicians and military alike, have frequently stated that national interest and independence are not solely called into question when the integrity of the territory is threatened: in the current international framework, the country must be responsive to the interests of its partners, alliances and international organisations of which it is a member.

The answer to the new challenges and the new security rationale was the definition of a new legitimacy for international intervention. That legitimacy derived from the re-elaboration, in the wake of the Cold War's end, of national and international mechanisms capable of ensuring peace and international stability, providing actors that hold responsibilities in international society with a guide for action. The concern with the establishment of regulatory mechanisms to be activated in situations of instability, so as to reduce or minimise conflict and its consequences, has led to several reforms. The UN played the primary role and, following *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) and the *Brahmi Report* (A/55/305-S/2000/809 2000), advocated a more activist approach in terms of UN peacekeeping. With those documents, the UN assumed the incapacity to ensure the monopoly of PSO, including enforcement, paving the way for an intervention by regional security organisations and states acting under 'coalitions of the willing' (Bellamy et al. 2004; Bellamy and Williams 2009).

The Legitimising Framework

The Portuguese military doctrine reflects the country's 'internationalist' orientation, focusing on international peace missions. The Portuguese military, with its externally oriented doctrine, share the political understanding that PSO engagements are favourable to the pursuit of the national interest. Thus, it is important to analyse the Portuguese military doctrine, as it reflects the developments mentioned previously. The doctrine outlines the general conditions for the development of the armed forces, by offering a shared way of thinking about military problems and by determining which resources will be employed, and how and where they will be used (Vélazquez 2010, 29).

National legislation recognises that the armed forces are one of the instruments for the assertion of national foreign policy, and it validates the rationale to endow them with the

military capabilities needed to carry out the new tasks. A former Minister of Defence stated: 'National Defence and the Armed Forces are not only one of the fundamental pillars of state sovereignty, but have increasingly become an irreplaceable instrument of our external policy as the international presence of the State' (Teixeira 2008, 2, 14).

The fourth amendment to the 1975 Constitution, introduced in 1997, highlights the armed forces' pledge towards 'meeting the international commitments of the Portuguese state in the military field and participating in humanitarian and peace operations conducted by international organisations of which Portugal is a member' (art 275.°, CRP 1997). This constitutional amendment was designed as a tool to legitimise military intervention in a variety of missions and in diverse regions of the globe with varying aims and means.

This provision has been reinforced in subsequent versions of the Law of National Defence and Armed Forces. The recent Law of National Defence (2009) articulates that amongst its range of attributions, the foremost is 'to participate in international military missions to ensure the state's international commitments in the military realm, including humanitarian and peace missions conducted by international organisations of which Portugal is a party' (Teixeira 2008; Lei n° 31-A/2009, 7 July, art. 24). The 2003 Strategic Concept of National Defence reflected the growing importance of Portugal's participation in the context of multinational operations, considering them

> a consolidated option that honours our country. Its continuation is a desideratum which should take into account the need to defend humanitarian principles, the proximity of our interests, the satisfaction of international commitments and the realistic picture of our possibilities.

It explains that 'the Portuguese state, a member of the United Nations attaches the greatest importance to international security, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and strengthening the reputation and performance of the UN.' It goes on stating that Portugal should have 'the capacity to participate in peace and humanitarian missions, namely in the framework of the United Nations, the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union' (Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional 2003, paragraphs 4.3, 7.1 and 8.2).

Simultaneously, it opened up prospects for alliances outside the traditional organisational framework, paving the way for bilateral and multilateral action in the area of defence, military and military–technical cooperation. Other references to the use of the armed forces in support of diplomatic activities can be found in the Military Strategic Concept, which is classified in governmental programmes as the '*Grandes Opções do Plano*' or Ministerial Directives. This variety of documents provides a sense of the renewed role of the military in the foreign policy of the state and in the projection of power on the international scene (Sousa n.d., 4).

Those documents also affirm that, in order to have the means so that it can contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management, Portugal needs trained and equipped forces with adequate levels of readiness and with sufficient resources to meet the full range of contingencies. In fact, the emerging debate in Portugal on the need for the armed forces to have a more active role provided the underlying framework, regarding not only the awareness of the new geo-strategic context of threats and risks and their form of manifestation, but also the search for a new role for the military, taking into account several legal changes (such as the demise of compulsory military service, political pressure for personnel downsizing and the changes in the employment of military forces).

They are deployed, not so much in the context of classical warfare, but more in PKO or in armed conflict, along phenomena of asymmetric insurgencies that combine terrorist actions and guerrilla tactics (Guedes and Elias 2010, Chapter V).

Factors That Shape the Decision to Deploy

The decision to participate in international missions to promote, maintain or restore peace is conditioned by several factors which vary according to the specific geographical, military, political and financial responsibilities of the mission and the degree of risk they entail. However, it is possible to identify the main factors that generally have encouraged Portuguese participation in such missions:

(1) *International commitments*: the Portuguese involvement in PSO is often the consequence of treaties and agreements entered into by Portugal with the various regional and global collective security organisations. Portugal is keen on proving to be able to act on behalf of common commitments and aims, and participating in the collective effort to maintain peace and security. The constitutional reform of 1997, which broadened the scope of action of the armed forces to include the so-called 'new missions', enshrined the principle of upgrading the international commitments of Portugal in the military field, participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations and missions of public interest and military–technical cooperation.
(2) *National strategic interest*: a major consideration is the relevance in maintaining or restoring peace and security in areas of strategic interest for Portugal, such as the former colonies.
(3) *Defence of the national interest*: it can also be read as the defence of projects in which Portugal is involved. Involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina under NATO, especially in the early stages, was a shining example of defence of interests carried out within the European project, which consequently became a part of the Portuguese national interests.
(4) *International solidarity*: the motivation to help and to relieve the suffering of populations is a driving factor to protect interests which are not, strictly speaking, national. As an international actor and a responsible member of the community of nations, Portugal embraces and promotes values, such as safeguarding peace and security, promoting respect for human rights and democracy.
(5) *International prestige*: policy-makers believe that PSO participation has enhanced Portuguese status and influence in the world (Fundação Mário Soares 2006, 648; Vitorino 2000, 32; Freire 2007, 84 and 85; do Amaral 2005, 24 and 25). Government officials interviewed within this research emphasised that PSO commitment increased Portugal's bargaining power, endowed Lisbon with increased 'clout', an influential voice, and gave it a say in the important matters within international organisations.[5] Through peacekeeping, Portugal also aims at strengthening its position within the decision-making structures of international organisations, namely by: obtaining a larger national representation in the organisational structure, such as in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); acquiring greater legitimacy, enabling the country to

request the involvement of the international community and, in particular, the UN in operational theatres which are important to Portugal (such as East Timor and the Portuguese-speaking states). In the words of diplomat Duarte: 'Portugal has been a *demandeur* of the United Nations' intervention in regard to PKO, conflict mediation, political stabilisation, and economic and institutional reconstruction (see the cases of Angola, Mozambique, East Timor and Guinea-Bissau) (Duarte 2008, 135), encouraging applications to managerial positions in high-level international institutions.

(6) *Economic interest*: although this is not a primary driver of national involvement in peace missions, the reality is that participation in such missions, especially within the UN, has been an important catalyst for restructuring and modernising the national armed forces.

(7) *Access to information*: participation in PSO enables the contributing states to access inside information. It is essential for policy-makers to be in possession of detailed information on the conditions that shape a crisis situation, in order to decide on whether or not to deploy forces, and if so, what type and number of forces and logistical support are the most appropriate. The process of decision-making is greatly facilitated if the decision-maker has the maximum available information (Santos 2010, 501 and 502). As exemplified by Gomes,

> the Portuguese diplomatic presence in Sarajevo... allowed the Portuguese diplomatic machinery to get first-hand information on the course of events and participate on the 'spot' in the process of elaboration of common positions of the Heads of Mission of the European Union on a particular subject. (Gomes 2000, 58)

Another factor that generally has encouraged Portuguese participation in such missions is the fact that it also provides opportunities for military action in real conflict situations and international contacts (Santos 2010, 650–653).

More recently, the former Defence Minister S. Teixeira sharpened the criteria for deciding on participating in PSO as:

- respect for international law;
- balanced participation in NATO, EU and UN missions;
- the concentration of efforts in the theatres in which Portugal can both improve its strategic status and ensure access to positions of command in international missions;
- military criteria of risk, cost and international visibility (Teixeira 2009a, 21).

In the new international security framework, the missions of the Portuguese armed forces have changed in order to fit this framework and respond to new priorities.

PSO as Influence: The Armed Forces as an Instrument of Foreign Policy

It is important to note how the Portuguese government became aware of the importance of combining diplomatic activity with the military instrument to ensure the best results, a vision translated into the several revisions of the National Defence Strategic Concept in 1994 and in 2003, in the fourth constitutional revision in 1997, and in the National Defence and Armed Forces Laws. These documents acknowledge the military component as an

instrument for affirmation in the field of foreign policy. Accordingly, the armed forces, through international cooperation, are depicted as one more 'vector', 'arm' (MDN 2001, 19 and 20) and 'instrument of foreign policy' (Branco 2009, 112). The framing of political and military discourse validates the view that

> [T]he Armed Forces have thus become a core instrument of the country's foreign policy—a fact clearly assumed by the political power, and which has significantly contributed to the country not becoming an irrelevant entity in terms of international relations in the post-Cold War. (Branco 2009, 112)

The conflicts where the Portuguese armed forces were more significantly engaged were Angola, Mozambique, the former Yugoslavia and East Timor. The Portuguese armed forces now enjoy a prestigious international experience and have given a contribution to international security in settings as those referred above, as well as Afghanistan, Lebanon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, Somalia, Mali and Guinea-Bissau, amongst many others (see Appendices in online). Thus, Portugal presents itself as a 'producer' and no longer as a mere 'consumer' of international security (Freire 2007, 90; MDN 2001, 19 and 20; Pereira, Farinha, and Mendes 2009; Duque 1998, 46 and 47; Teixeira 2009a, 20): 'Portugal internationally affirms itself as a security producer, capable of using its ancestral cosmopolitanism in the dissemination of global peace and security ... ' (EMGFA, n.d., 5).

In January 2000, Portugal's engagement in a former colony propelled it to the status of European country that contributed with the largest number of personnel for PKO (Duque 2005).[6] The setting was East Timor, a territory taken over by Indonesia in 1975, where Portugal had engaged military personnel and police. From the early days of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in the mid-1970s until independence in 2002, Portugal skilfully used its diplomacy to find a pacific solution to the conflict, acting through the UN General Assembly and Security Council, the Human Rights Commission and the International Court of Justice, as well as negotiating directly with Indonesia.

UN-brokered talks between Indonesia and Portugal culminated in a May 1999 agreement which paved the way for a popular consultation on the status of the territory. The agreement foresaw the holding of a referendum that would allow the Timorese people to decide on whether to continue to be part of Indonesia or to be independent. The UN authorised the establishment of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to ensure the referendum. UN-supervised voter registration led to an August 1999 ballot in which 78% of East Timorese voted for independence, consequently leading to massive destruction perpetrated by pro-Indonesian militias.

The violence that followed the elections provoked outrage in Portugal. With Portugal united behind the East Timorese cause, President Jorge Sampaio, Prime Minister A. Guterres and Minister of Foreign Affairs Jaime Gama were instrumental in drumming up international support for a UN peacekeeping force. Not surprisingly, Portugal's most significant involvement in any UN peacekeeping mission occurred within UNTAET, the UN Mission in East Timor, the second largest contribution on the ground after Australia (Palma 2009, 196 and 197).

The Portuguese battalions acting under UNTAET and UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) deployed at its maximum strength 800 military (2000–2004), reducing the number as the mission winded down. To this figure, one must also add the military assigned to the Central Command Sector of East Timor. The mission was planned

as a peacekeeping force, but, considering the delicate situation in the territory, it was governed by stricter rules of engagement, some of which were drafted under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The actions of these battalions deserved recognition and praise from UN, and reinforced Portuguese prestige in peace missions (Palma 2009, 198 and 199).

Portuguese contingents in international peace missions are thus seen as an indispensable element in affirming Portugal's status in the Atlantic Alliance as an active agent in building a united and effective Europe, and as a member of the international community that actively contributes to the preservation of peace. In the multilateral context, Portugal intends to assert its presence and engagement in the international organisations and alliance systems to which it belongs. Accordingly, it must participate in developing the European Foreign and Security Policy and be at the forefront of the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy, including participation in military operations and civilian missions commanded by the EU, as well as involvement in the permanent structured cooperation in matters of defence established by the Treaty of Lisbon (Palma 2009). Regarding the UN, Portugal supports the organisation's role in maintaining the rule of Law, international order and peace, affirming the centrality of its role and the need to strengthen its instruments in peace support and post-conflict reconstruction processes, especially in failed states. Portuguese diplomacy stresses that Portugal has always been a staunch supporter of international law, effective multilateralism and of the primacy of the UN in international affairs (Gorjão 2010, 5; Cravinho 2010, 6).

Due to its relationship with the former colonies, Portugal should also strengthen its friendship and cooperation ties with Portuguese-speaking countries, particularly within the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries, promoting military and technical cooperation (Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n.° 19/2013 2013, 1982).

The budget for national forces deployed in international missions has nevertheless suffered from significant cuts since 2012.[7] There has been a clear reduction in Portugal's participation in UN-led operations to the benefit of operations under NATO command: Lisbon has preferred to participate in NATO and EU missions to the detriment of UN ones. NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept and the 2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration have underlined the importance of the contributions made by partner countries to NATO-led operations and missions. These contributions demonstrate the partners' commitment to promote international security and stability: 'The greatest part of these contributions is indirect and comes through participation in NATO-led operations and missions... Member countries incur the deployment costs involved whenever they volunteer forces to participate in NATO-led operations' (NATO 2014). Portugal is thus obliged to contribute to peace endeavours as NATO's operational partner.

Currently, the largest share of operations is allocated to national involvement in the NATO missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan (which Portugal has decided to fully maintain until 2014) and in the Mediterranean (Operation Active Endeavour). Cuts in the defence budget have adversely affected the participation of the Portuguese armed forces in PSO. These decisions are mainly explained by the context of economic and financial downturn that has forced Portugal to reduce its military spending and personnel, and decide on its contribution carefully. The logic in this context of crisis, as explained by former Defence Minister Severiano Teixeira, is to

> avoid geographical dispersion and excessive multiplication of settings where missions are carried out, and concentrate our efforts in theatres of operations where

> Portugal can enhance its effective value, and, finally, to have a balanced participation in EU and NATO missions, which are the two multilateral organisations in which Portugal has had the privilege to fulfil its international commitments. (Teixeira 2009c, 44)

In the context of the acute financial crisis it is experiencing, even deploying 1131 soldiers in 2013 represents a significant commitment for a deeply indebted Portuguese state.

Therefore, Portugal is pursuing a more rational path: without exhausting its participation in settings of greater wearing and risk, it has invested in niches that have enhanced its importance with relative economy of resources. There is no longer the need to increase size to affirm the participation or presence of Portugal; the prevailing tendency now is to choose what to do and how to do it to affirm the Portuguese presence in settings that policy-makers consider a priority, not neglecting the commitment to what is internationally required, and the capacity to meet those requests and, simultaneously, satisfy national interests.

Foreign Policy Gains

Portuguese politicians and diplomats have quite often mentioned the role played by the armed forces in PSO in increasing the visibility of the country internationally, amongst partners and allies, and in strengthening the bargaining power and the political weight of Portugal in international *fora* (Vitorino 1996, 87–96). The military vector is depicted in the official speech as a valuable instrument of foreign policy and in the promotion of national values and interests, and, linked to other vectors and dimensions (particularly diplomacy), has contributed to enhancing the position and the international visibility of the country—this is certainly the belief held by Portuguese government officials. In the words of a former minister, Portugal's participation in multinational missions has a 'multiplying effect on the position of Portugal in the world' (Vitorino 1998, 165).

In this sense, the decision to participate in NATO's IFOR and Stabilisation Force (SFOR) operations in Bosnia in the 1990s and, after 9/11, in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan was seen as a means of strengthening Portugal's credibility within NATO. Portugal proved its political and operational capacity as it ensured the presence of its forces in the Balkans and in Africa—two operational theatres with totally different characteristics and geographically distant from each other and from the mainland. It should be recalled that during that same period, Portugal deployed around 1200 military personnel in Angola and Mozambique, where the Portuguese presence was larger in operational and political terms (Fundação Mário Soares 2006, 647).

Portugal has sought to take advantage of its efforts and did so by obtaining several diplomatic achievements: the election as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 1997–1998 and again in the 2011–2012 biennium; the appointment of Freitas do Amaral as President of the 50th United Nations General Assembly in 1995; the appointment to posts in the DPKO[8] or the nomination of António Guterres as UN High Commissioner in 2005 (Fundação Mário Soares 2006, 679 and 680; Sousa, n.d., 9).

Conclusion

Portugal remained attentive to the set of changes occurring in the international, post-Cold War environment, and, as it turned out, it had internal implications, leading to a redefinition of foreign policy and national defence. First, the Portuguese government became aware that it was essential to combine diplomatic activity with the military instrument to ensure the best results in the preservation and restoration of security. This vision translated into several revisions of the Strategic Concept of National Defence, recognising that the military component is an instrument of national assertion in the field of foreign policy, as well as the need to provide the armed forces with the skills and equipment needed for the performance of new tasks in the framework of the new PSO.

Similarly, Portugal prepared to respond to new strategic requirements, developing the tools necessary for the defence and affirmation of national interests in the external sphere, and by participating in the efforts of the international community to maintain peace and security in various regions of the world. Deployment to PSO corresponds, on the one hand, to a peculiar vision of defence of national interests and, on the other hand, to a discharge of its obligations as a member of international organisations, such as the UN, EU and NATO.

Portugal also strove to ensure that political gains would confer a greater role on the international scene. Given the limitations of a small power as Portugal, specialising in the field of PSO is an asset for Lisbon's positioning on the international scene, giving it a more active voice in matters of collective security. Smaller or less important states of the international system lay claim to international visibility and diplomatic leverage through activities, such as peacekeeping.

Portuguese policy-makers believe that being engaged in PSO raises the profile of Portuguese foreign policy and diplomacy. The country's involvement has been remarkable if measured against national resources. PSO deployment has become an instrument of foreign policy. By and large, the analysis of Portuguese PSO participation has shown that an instrumental approach has guided this option.

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Supplemental data

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Notes

1. The concept of Peace Support Operations will be used here, because it is a more comprehensive and flexible concept, instead of the traditional concept of UN peacekeeping. PSO engage in organised multinational efforts and involve mainly military personnel—but also a broad range of civilians and NGO personnel—to contain conflict, redress the peace and create an environment to support reconciliation, rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. That is because, strictly speaking, according to the UN Capstone Doctrine, peacekeeping is a 'technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers' (DPKO, 2008, 18). Peacekeeping has also been used as a generic term, as for example within the UN itself. In the DPKO, peacekeeping embraces a broad spectrum of activities to

maintain international peace and security. As Tardy explains: 'Strictly speaking, "peacekeeping" refers to "traditional peacekeeping", the deployment of neutral military forces between two armed factions to supervise a ceasefire in a non-coercive and consent-based way' (Tardy 2004, 2). In peacekeeping operations, while the nature of the force is essentially military, it operates under the peacekeeping regimes principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force developed especially during the launching of UNEF I (UN Emergency Force I). UN peacekeeping is based on the assumption that the management of violence, both in internal and international conflicts, can be achieved without resorting to the use of force or enforcement measures (Dombroski 2006, 23). In truth, peacekeeping no longer corresponds to that rather restrictive notion, since, as the same UN document reckons, it is no longer limited to the traditional functions of observing truces, ceasefires and separating warring parties, but it works, in a much broader sense, to 'lay the foundations for sustainable peace' (DPKO 2008, 18; see Findlay 2002). In this article, peacekeeping and PSO will be used interchangeably. The existing literature on Portugal's participation in international PSO is very limited and non-existent at international scholarly level. The exception is the most exhaustive study carried out so far under the direction of A. Moreira, *Portugal e as Operações de Paz*, 2010. See also Pinto (2014).

[2] To this date, Lisbon has deployed to 56 NATO missions, to 21 EU operations and missions and to 37 UN operations.

[3] Although the participation of small states in PSO is not the scope of this article, more recent works on this subject are Heng (2012), Krishnasamy (2003) and Bin Ahmad (2002). On the Nordic PK, see, for instance, the entire issue of *International Peacekeeping*, 14(4), August 2007; Jakobsen (1998, 2006) and Bergman (2004).

[4] It terminated a period of Cold War controversy over UN membership, allowing pro-U.S. countries to join along with several Soviet satellite countries.

[5] Interviews with Nuno Pinheiro Torres (Head) and Henrique Castanheira of the Ministry of National Defence (DGPDN) and Gen. M. Branco, Lisbon, 16 October 2013. See also testimony of Portuguese officials and statesmen in EMGFA (n.d.).

[6] The largest deployment of military forces abroad was during 2000/2001 with the simultaneous involvement of military units in three operations: SFOR/Bosnia, KFOR/Kosovo and UNTAET/East Timor.

[7] Email interview with N. Pinheiro Torres, Head of DGPDN, Ministry of National Defence, 28 July 2014.

[8] Amongst various officers, the most important was Major-Gen. Martins Branco's as Peacekeeping Affairs Officer in the period 2001–2002.

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