Universidade do Minho
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Mediator or Third Party?
A Holistic Approach to Mediation in Cyprus

Outubro de 2011

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Tese de Mestrado
Relações Internacionais

Trabalho efectuado sob a orientação da
Professora Doutora Ana Paula Brandão

Outubro de 2011

Acknowledgements

Thank you to Professor Ana Paula Brandão for embarking with me on the journey of the making of this dissertation and for her motivational and inspirational guidance. Thank you to Professor Craig Webster for accepting to be interviewed and for his support. Thank you to Professor George Kentas and to Professor Ahmet Sözen for kindly accepting to be interviewed. Thank you to Christina McRoy at the *Cyprus Review*. Thank you to Alexandre for his patient companionship and to my brothers and my friends for their caring support.

To my parents

Mediador ou Terceira Parte?

Uma Abordagem Holística à Mediação no Chipre

Resumo Analítico

A multiplicação dos conflitos intra-estaduais tem vindo a ser acompanhada pelo crescente recurso à mediação mas, a sua eficácia e adequabilidade como instrumento de gestão de conflitos intra-estaduais vem a ser contestada por conceptualizações de mediação restritas e centradas na obtenção de acordos de paz. Para realizar todo o seu potencial e ser reconhecida como um instrumento crucial do *peacemaking* e, em geral, de gestão de conflitos intra-estaduais, a mediação tem de ser praticada e conceptualizada sob uma perspectiva abrangente e holística. O conflito intra-estadual veio substituir as guerras interestaduais como principal ameaça à paz e à segurança no pós-Guerra Fria e, como tal, requerido o alargamento da agenda de segurança, centrada no Estado, para abarcar a ameaça maior que a emergência deste fenómeno, disseminado e violento, representa para a vida e o desenvolvimento humanos. No contexto intratável e *protracted* em que ocorrem os conflitos intra-estaduais, criar condições de segurança, por si só, não é suficiente na prevenção da re-ocorrência da violência, pelo que, ao mesmo tempo que a paz se assume como o objectivo alargado e duradouro dos processos de gestão e resolução de conflitos, os instrumentos de *peacemaking* tornam-se fundamentais. A internacionalização de conflitos de cariz étnico gerada pelo uso da mediação em contextos de conflito intra-estadual tem prejudicado a chegada a acordo e a sua resolução permanente. No entanto, a mediação possui um efeito pacificador ao evitar que as partes recaiam no confronto militar, o que permite que tarefas de *peacekeeping e peacebuilding* possam ser eficazmente realizadas. *Conflito,* definido como estado de guerra aberta, não ocorre no Chipre desde 1974, no entanto subsiste no seu estado psicológico e sociológico, tendo vindo a constituir-se um importante *problema* para o qual a comunidade internacional procura solução. Iniciativas de mediação levadas, sobretudo, a cabo pelas Nações Unidas, mas também, pelos Estados Unidos, têm evitado a re-escalada do conflito mas, enquanto a UNFICYP se torna numa das mais longas missões de paz de sempre, uma solução permanente continua por acordar entre as comunidades Cipriota Grega e Cipriota Turca.

Mediator or Third Party?

A Holistic Approach to Mediation in Cyprus

Abstract

The multiplication of intrastate conflicts has been accompanied by an increasing resort to mediation, but its effectiveness and adequacy as an intrastate conflict management instrument has been contested by narrow and outcome-centred concepts of mediation practice. In order to accomplish its full potential and be recognized as a crucial *peacemaking* and, overall, intrastate conflict management instrument, mediation has to be practiced and conceptualized in a broader holistic perspective. Interstate wars have been substituted by intrastate conflict as a priority threat to international peace and security in the post-Cold War world and demanded the widening of its state-centric agenda to account for the greatest threat posed by this violent and pervasive phenomenon to human lives and human development. In the intractable and protracted context of intrastate conflict security becomes insufficient to prevent violence re-occurrence and, as peace becomes a more comprehensive and enduring objective of conflict management and resolution, *peacemaking* instruments become crucial. The internationalization of ethnic-based conflict provided by the use of mediation in intrastate conflict contexts has been detrimental to the production of settlement and the resolute ending of these conflicts. However, mediation has the de-escalatory and pacifying potential of preventing the parties from relapsing into militarized conflict, which allows for *peacekeeping* and *peacebuilding* tasks to be effectively performed. *Conflict,* defined as open fighting or war has not reoccurred in Cyprus since 1974, but in a psychological and sociological sense it has prevailed and become a growing *problem* for the international community to solve. Mainly, United Nations and also United States mediation initiatives have avoided re-escalation but, while UNFICYP becomes one of the longest *peacekeeping* missions of all times, a permanent settlement has, to this day, not been agreed between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities.

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Introduction

The multiplication of intrastate conflicts has been paralleled by the increasing resort to mediation, however, the use of mediation between ethnic-divided groups and the unavoidable internationalization process it confers to intrastate conflict have been related arguments used to consider mediation an ineffective and inadequate instrument of intrastate conflict management and resolution. Notwithstanding, understood as encompassing a broad variety of actors, styles, strategies and tactics, mediation exercise has the capacity to de-escalate conflict and prevent its re-escalation by offering disputants an alternative way of settling their differences to militarized conflict. A holistic perspective on mediation becomes important in order to understand mediation's various outcomes and impact in intrastate conflict contexts and for its adequacy as an instrument of intrastate conflict management to be fully captured and recognized. In the internationalized intrastate conflict in Cyprus the two Cypriot communities, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, with separate historical and cultural heritage, distanced through their perception of having differing identities and antagonized by the struggle for political power, became conflict rivals in 1963. From 1964 to our days, the mediation initiatives undertaken, mainly, by the United Nations (UN) but also by the United States (US) have not been able to devise a settlement and to solve the Cyprus Conflict to the present day, however, the conflict remains "pacified" since 1974. What has conditioned the Cyprus mediation process and determined its successes and failures, its impact in the conflict's context and, in turn, the context changes' impact in the mediation process itself, and which the type of mediator/s and mediation style/s had the greatest effectiveness capacity, or potential, can allow an understanding of the adequacy of mediation as an intrastate conflict management instrument and on how it can positively and fully contribute to intrastate conflict management and peace establishment processes.

With the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the end of the bipolar confrontation, the international system opened up to the edification of a more peaceful and secure international world order. Freed from the superpowers' hegemonic power dispute, the UN would now be able to realize its full potential as a peace promoter and guarantor in the new international order (Stephenson 1994, 14) but, paradoxically, the post-Cold War period has been one of the most violent periods in human history and one of great cost in human lives. The collapse of the bipolar world order and the recession of American and Soviet spheres of influence has uncovered the

smaller, but more violent and victimizing, intrastate conflicts. The presence of hegemonic powers had contained direct confrontation between post-colonial antagonized local factions but, the end of the *detent* and the withdrawal of the American or Soviet ally allowed for latent identity-based clashes to be uncovered giving rise to a global phenomenon that renders intrastate conflict one of the main sources of international insecurity today (Fisher 2001, 308).

The emergence of the intrastate conflict phenomenon as an important world security threat has defied the international communities' capacity to respond to the new threats posed by a new world order and rendered previous understandings of security obsolete. In a world where non-military *soft* security threats, from corruption, to human trafficking or financial crises have the greatest impact on people's daily lives and pose the greatest menace to states' integrity, traditional state-centric perspectives of security have become limited (Aldis and Herd 2004, 171). Once the threat of interstate war has receded, more than the security of a states' territory and of its national interests, the meaning of security has to encompass, today, those threats that pose a greater menace to international security (UN 1994, 22) to which the states' constituent population, rather than the state itself, are the greatest insecurity victims (Dark 1996, 2). As the object of security shifts from the state to the human being, *human security* has come to the fore in the new world security agenda and security begins to signify not only the survival of each individual human being but also the protection of its rights and well-being, the conditions that are mostly threatened by the new kind of security threats (UN 1994). Consequently, the concept of *security* has become too limited to fully encompass the scope of the new security agenda and the concept of *peace* more broad and accurate in conceptualizing the new threats, object and objectives of this broadened agenda. The existence of *peace* presupposes not only the absence of a threat of war or violence, but also the presence of those conditions that allow for human individuals self-realization (Jeong 200, 14-22). In the new widened peace and security agenda, peace must be achieved comprehensively, through collective security and deterrence strategies, able to eliminate violence in its *direct* and *structural* forms that render *peacekeeping* an insufficient instrument and that highlight *peacemaking* and *peacebuilding* as crucial tools for peace establishment (Alger 1989, 118-119).

Whether *civil* or *intercommunal*, intrastate conflicts are usually asymmetrically fought between groups with unequal access to the states' military, economic or political resources, to social status or wealth, who coexisted in a society embedded in cultural marginalization (Jeong 2000,31). These are multicultural societies where the state *apparatus* has become dominated by

one community and unresponsive to the other communities' needs, in which, in each community, victimization becomes collectively recognized and the mobilization motif that sparks violent conflict. Large casualties and physical and economic degradation coupled with deeply negative images held between disputants serve to perpetuate, solidify and, hence, give intrastate conflict its protracted character (Azar 1990, 7-16). Ideology, ethnicity and race fuel animosity and the nationalistic antagonisms between these local factions and exacerbate the violent and destructive character of intrastate conflict, causing massive humanitarian repercussions that spill-over the state's borders and threaten the very foundations of modern existence (Kaldor 2000, 3).

To acknowledge and understand the specific characteristics of interstate conflict, its origins, process and consequences, is fundamental to the development of instruments and strategies able, not only to alleviate its symptoms by providing humanitarian assistance to its victims but also, and more importantly, to target and mitigate the context in which it develops, degrades and prolongs. The emergence of this new typology of conflict has renewed the pertinence and importance of conflict management and resolution methods that had been neglected in the past (Stephenson 1994, 20). To achieve peace it becomes necessary not only to prevent fighting or war, but also to generate or re-establish the social structures that allow for quality of life and, thus, for insecurity to fade and a peaceful enduring order to be established and sustainable (Alger 1989, 118-119). In intrastate conflict, often fuelled by ethnic differentiations and demonization, where peace does not exist in order to be *kept*, *peacekeeping* has been proven to be an insufficient peace establishment tool, whereas the *making* and establishment of peace though the negotiations of a peace settlement has rendered *peacemaking* a crucial instrument to curb the threat and occurrence of violence (Clark 2001, 60).

The past century has witnessed the multiplication and institutionalization of peace and conflict management initiatives and processes. Simultaneously, mediation processes have multiplied and diversified and mediation has become an ever-more sophisticated and increasingly important instrument of *peacemaking* (Stephenson 1994, 25). Mediation has the potential to serve a peace process in two dimensions. It offers disputants an alternative path to resolve their differences other than conflict, thus, contributing to the establishment of *negative* peace, as well as, it aims and contributes to the emergence of a more just and equalitarian social reality that allows for human development in both disputants' communities, providing for a *positive* peace to be achieved and for peace to endure in a comprehensive sense.

Mediation has recently and increasingly come under the attention of academic research and, like any other area of scientific knowledge at its early development stages, is not yet fully developed or structured. The scope, the limits and the conceptual definition of mediation are sources of discussion and debate between mediation researchers. However, the produced theoretical findings have led to an excessive compartmentalization of mediation theory which, in turn, has had the tendency to limit the scope of what is considered to be a mediation activity and of a mediator's capacity, as well as, of theoretically limiting the concept of mediation itself (Bercovicth and Gartner 2009, 5 and Kleiboer 1996, 376).

Mediation processes in intrastate conflicts, however, have often extended themselves throughout long periods of time, having not always been able to produce an agreed settlement between disputants, or have not always been able to resolve the conflict and to prevent violence re-occurrence (Carment et al. 2009, 233). The internationalization effect has been considered an impairing factor to mediation's use in intrastate conflict contexts, being that the parties in conflict find incentives to continue their conflict through the diplomatic route in the possibility of finding support and allies to their cause in the international arena (Richmond b1998, 37-39, 43-47). On the other hand, mediation provides disputants in conflict an alternative to continued fighting and, by being involved in a mediation process, the parties refrain from relapsing into violent conflict. Consequently, mediation has a pacifying effect in intrastate conflict contexts and contributes to *peacekeeping* effectiveness and allows for *peacebuilding* and reconstruction tasks to be performed (Regan 2009, 136, 144).

Despite the fact that mediation has been increasingly utilized as a conflict management tool, only a third of all intrastate conflicts that emerged since the end o World War II have been mediated, which suggests that some conflicts are more susceptible to mediation practice than others (Terris and Maoz 2005 563). When a mediator enters a conflict context, the existing dual static conflicting relationship between *disputants* is transformed into a dynamic cooperative triad between mediated *parties* and mediator (Terris and Maoz 2005, 567) but, although the mediator's perception of the possibility of this game transformation may explain why some mediators offer or accept to mediate a given conflict, it does not serve as an explanation to why protracted intrastate conflicts, in which the parties are deeply antagonized and their relationship is hard to transform, are mediated. Therefore, the possibility of game transformation may serve as a measure of a conflict's amenability to mediation but, to take into account that mediators

choose to mediate intractable conflict, the threat to peace and security a conflict poses must also be considered as a determinant of mediation practice (Bercovicth and Gartner 2009, 25, 31).

By intervening, the mediator changes the conflict's context by introducing new information or by providing incentives or sanctions that convince the parties that mediation is a preferable alternative to continued fighting and, thus, that cooperation is possible. In principle, the greater change needed for this game transformation to occur the more resourced a mediator will need to be (Terris and Maoz 2005, 571). However, whether a mediator can use incentives or punishments to generate cooperation between parties in a mediation process is not consensual in mediation literature. Whereas supporters of *pure* mediation consider that a mediator only assists the parties in conflict in finding an agreement (Fisher and Keashley 1991,3), supporters of *muscled* or *power* mediation call attention to the fact that a mediator's capacity to leverage the parties can be crucial to mediation effectiveness (Bercovitch and Lee 2001). At the centre of this debate lays the question of whether a given actor must or not be impartial to perform mediation and whether or not the "cooperative triad", or the "triangular relationship", in a mediation process is broken when a mediator uses "carrots and sticks" to pressure the parties to cooperate or to accept a given settlement (Zartman and Touval 1996, 454). Advocates of mediation as a less intrusive exercise consider that when mediators apply intrusive strategies to leverage the parties, they become partial and lose their neutrality, ceasing to be a mediator and becoming a third party to the conflict (Zartman and Touval 1996, 454). On the other hand, power mediation advocates argue that impartiality is unimportant to parties who wish to be mediated and, therefore not a necessary precondition for mediation exercise (Bercovitch and Lee 2001). They also consider that mediators are always interested actors because propelled to mediate to serve an interest and follow their conflict outcome preference, even if the interest is in generating peace, therefore neutrality is never fully practiced or felt by mediators (Richmond a 1998, 717).

Related to the debate on whether a mediator should be neutral or if it can by biased and, therefore, on whether a mediator should use less intrusive mediation strategies or if it is preferable that he makes use of more intrusive ones, is the debate on whether a state actor or an International Organization (IO) is a preferable or more effective mediator. Wyle IOs are perceived as more neutral actors, interested in the promotion of peace and security, and, therefore, are more effective in fostering trust between parties and in transforming their adversarial relationship (Frazier and Dixon 2009, 59; Svensson 2009, 116-117), powerful states, who are driven by power politics to protect their own interests and that, therefore, are often biased actors who tend

to favor one party over the other, have the resources to leverage the parties into making commitments and to render a mediation process more effective in bringing the parties to a settlement (Zartman and Touval 1996, 447-448; Smith 1994, 447 and Bercovitch and Lee 2001). However, the intrusive directive strategies performed by states are not capable of addressing the parties' more fundamental relationship-related problems and often generate short-term solutions that lead to the conflicts' re-escalation once the mediator exits the conflict's environment (Haxia 2007, 593). On the other hand, the less intrusive non-directive strategies performed by IOs have the capacity to reduce misconceptions and mistrust between the parties and to generate a more cooperative relationship in the long-run, but are less effective in inducing commitments and less capable of generating conflict settlement (Quinn et al. 2009, 194). Since mediation is a dynamic and complex bargaining game and, because both types of mediators performing each mediation style have different short-term and long-term advantages, the *multiparty* combined use of the different mediators and mediation styles, at different given moments in a conflicts life-time, has come to researcher's attention as the potentially most effective and successful mediation strategy, especially for endurable and protracted conflicts (Croker et al. 1999, 40-41; Haxia 2007 593).

What has also come under mediation research attention is the need to consider the parties' perceptions' and expectations' impact on mediation processes (Richmond b1998, 37-39; Wall et al. 2001, 374). Parties' expectations towards the mediation outcome are not only determinant to disputants calling for or accepting mediation, as well as, they will condition the process of mediation itself. Once disputants in conflict assume their interaction to be a fixed zero-sum game, whereas their gains will match the other party's losses, any factor that can be perceived as beneficial to their preferred mediation outcome, or that can reduce the cost of being mediated, will motivate disputants to be mediated and, on the other hand, factors that increase the disputants' expectations of winning the conflict, or of reducing the cost of prolonging it, will have the reverse effect (Wall et al. 2001, 374). Perception, on the other hand, will condition the parties' behaviour during the mediation process and towards the mediator itself. It is suggested in the literature that disputants do not merely choose between continuing the conflict or being mediated and that mediation can be perceived by disputants as a third alternative, that of winning over their opponent through the mediation bargaining game and not through the costly conflict situation. When mediation is perceived by disputants as an alternative route to continue the conflict, they will focus on the realization of their interests and goals and not on achieving a

compromise solution with the other party, consequently, the mediator will be regarded as a facilitator of their interests' achievement (Richmond a 1998, 708-712).

Intrastate conflict disputants' relationship, especially when the disputing groups are divided on identity or ethnic lines, is deteriorated by discrimination, victimization and social hatred that distances the parties and exponentially reduces their ability, or their will, to make concessions toward the other (Fisher 2001, 321-323), therefore, mediated intrastate conflict is prone to having parties with deviated objectives regarding the mediator and the mediation process and not focused on cooperatively finding a solution through agreement (Richmond b1998, 43-47). When mediation is used to manage intrastate conflict the conflict becomes internationalized and, if disputants are focused on winning over their opponent through the diplomatic route, the mediator and the mediation is viewed as a vehicle for acquiring allies and support to their causes in the international arena. The conflict's internationalization caused by the entrance of the mediator in the conflict's context can potentially subvert the mediation process because the parties resist cooperating with the other and the mediator will find it hard to get the parties to negotiate beyond their initial bargaining positions, beyond those exclusive interests and goals that, if attained, will signify victory over their opponent (Fisher 2001, 308, 321-323). In this perspective, mediation is even considered to be counterproductive, once the search for compromises that mediation entails, between disputants with identity-based goals, has the detrimental effect of legitimizing and institutionalizing through power-sharing and consociational solutions the underlying principles of exclusion that divided and antagonized disputants in the first place (Kaldor 2000,7). Incapable of making concessions, these parties close the mediation process in a blame-game that instead of reconciling them, further drives them apart (Fisher 2001, 308, 321-323). With the internationalization process, the parties deviate from what is the purpose of the mediation process and more actors, with different interests, preferred strategies and outcome preferences, enter the conflict environment and the intrastate conflict is considered to become increasingly intractable and protracted (Masunungure and Bazda 2010, 229).

Ethnicity is, however, a socially-created, arbitrary, dividing line based on culturally-generated characteristics, as language, race or religion and, like any other man-made social construction, is not static or unchangeable (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004, 148-150). Furthermore, ethnicity is not the primary source of political conflict but an instrument used and explored between antagonized factions in the pursuit of political and economic goals (Faber

2000, 54-57). Issues in intrastate conflict are often framed and politicized along ethnic lines and contribute to processes of dehumanization and demonization of "the other", however, the ethnic antagonism is a consequence of an existing latent conflict over power and resources and not its cause (Bercovitch et al. 2000 53-55). Identity issues are intangible and non-negotiable but, as they are not the cause for conflict, they are not the ones addressed in a mediation process but those underlying tangible and negotiable needs and interests that caused the conflict in the first place (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004, 149-151). In a similar perspective, the conditions for intractability and protractedness are already laid in an intrastate conflict's context and are, therefore, pre-existent to any mediation activity. The internationalization of these conflicts provided by the entrance of the mediator may be detrimental to the mediation process itself and difficult the arrival at a settlement, however, it is not the mediation process itself that protracts intrastate conflict (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004, 151, 166).

Settlement, on the other hand, may be a limited measure of mediation effectiveness and adequacy for intrastate conflict management (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993,347). The arrival at a settlement may mean that security conditions have been established but that is not *sine-qua-non* to peace having been as well (Galtung 2007, 14-25). However, in the absence of the finite short-term settlement achievement, long-term successes cannot be ignored (Grieg 2001, 3). Mediation brings the parties into the negotiations table and away from the battlefield and, through stimulating communication and interaction, it has the potential of transforming the disputant's adversarial relationship (Galtung 2007, 14-25). The presence of the mediator and the occurrence of a mediation process allows for conflict de-escalation and for disputants to share a more peaceful coexistence and, by *pacifying* conflict, mediation contributes to *peacekeeping* effectiveness and allows for *peacebuilding* tasks to be performed (Regan 2009, 136, 144).

Research Questions and Hypothesis

Given that intrastate conflict is intractable and protracted, fought by ethnically distanced and antagonized disputants and, being that mediation may not be effective in generating peace settlements because the internationalization process generated by mediation provides incentives for them to continue their conflict through the mediation's bargaining game, is mediation an adequate instrument to manage or resolve this type of conflicts? How does the process of internationalization that mediation's use in intrastate conflict peace processes impair mediation

effectiveness as an intrastate conflict management tool? And, what type of mediator or an International Organization is the most suited to mediate intrastate conflict?

To answer the investigation-guiding questions above, three hypotheses are set forward to be confirmed or refuted. First, even if the internationalization process of intrastate conflicts between highly antagonized disputants renders a mediation process an extension of the disputants' rivalry and a time-consuming blame-game in which an agreed settlement is difficult to achieve, mediation shifts the rules of the war game into a cooperative one, altering the parties previous solely conflicting relationship, having, therefore the capacity to contain aggression and violence and to pacify intrastate conflict. Secondly, even if intrastate conflict disputants' interest in being mediated is caused by expectations of gaining support and finding allies in the international arena and, even if this internationalization process offers disputants incentives to try to achieve victory over their opponent through the diplomatic route instead of to cooperatively finding agreement with them, internationalization has the positive effect of making conflict management through mediation more attractive than continued fighting, therefore, even if the perspective of acquiring internationalization gains closes the parties in their initial and mutually exclusive positions and that be detrimental to mediation's effectiveness in bringing a permanent settlement to conflict, the interest in the use of mediation generated by the internationalization process induces disputants into initiating a peace process. Thirdly, although an IO does not have the same capacity to leverage the parties into agreeing to settlement as the powerful state does, the IO's less intrusive mediation is more capable of transforming the parties' adversarial relationship and will be more beneficial to the peace process in the long-run. Therefore the most suitable mediation between intrastate conflict disputants, because potentially more effective in getting enduring results, is the combination of the two types of mediators and their cooperative performance of their less and more intrusive mediation styles.

The Case-Study

The Cyprus conflict is one of the longest and most intractable and protracted intrastate conflict of all times, which has defied traditional approaches to conflict management adequacy and challenged the international communities' efforts for peace establishment. Largely transcending its intrastate dimension, the Cyprus conflict has been internationalized since its early stages and mediation initiates have been taking place for almost half a century without a

peace settlement being ever implemented or even fully agreed (Michael 2007, 588). Because Cypriot nationalisms did not aim at independence but at union with Greece and Turkey, the power-sharing consociational arrangement that gave the Republic of Cyprus its independence further entrenched the ethnic element into the political structure. Post-colonial Cyprus became a state but not a nation. War institutionalized a mistrustful adversarial relationship that spilled over into the *peacemaking* process with the communities disputing support for their causes in the international sphere (Castleberry 1964, 124).

Conflict in Cyprus has developed through an intricate net of local, regional and international dynamics. At the local level, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities are culturally distinct, each speaking their own language, each with its own educational systems, each practicing different religions and each having inherited the historic mistrust and hostility of Greco-Turkish relations (Yilmaz 2005, 31-32). The Zurich-London agreements of 1959/1960 that created the Republic of Cyprus were a product of international agreements between Britain, the Cyprus colonizer, Greece, Turkey and the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and provided for constitutional articles the Cypriot communities were not allowed to amend. Consequently, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots felt the new state and government had been imposed on them and questioned its legitimacy for different reasons and interests (Fisher 2001, 309-310). At the regional level, Greek and Turkish interests and historical adversarial relationship influences and fuels antagonism between the Cypriot communities, with the two countries disputing their clashing foreign policy interests at the Cyprus conflict's context (Michael 2007, 588). Finally, at the international level the Soviet Union's (during the Cold War period) and American strategic interests, with the United State's main interest resting on the stability and unity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to which both Greece and Turkey are member-states, as well as, the conflict management and peace and security interests of the UN, are played (Coufoudakis 1976, 458-459).

Five decades have passed since the outbreak of conflict in Cyprus. Although violence is no longer a concern, how and why the reunification *problem* remains unsolved is still an object of debate and so are the prospects for resolution. Mediation in Cyprus occurs in conflict context characterized by power, state resources access and demographic asymmetry between a majority of Greek Cypriots and a Turkish Cypriot minority. Both disputants view conflict and the mediation game as zero-sum and both search and count on external sympathies and allies to achieve their antithetical interests and aims. To both parties' interests the involvement of an external actor who

can support and strengthen their positions *vis-à-vis* their opponent's is seen as vital, what renders the Cyprus conflict a notable example of how mediation can be used as a vehicle for intrastate conflict internationalization (Richmond a 1998, 710-711).

Throughout its many evolution stages, improvements and setbacks, the Cyprus conflict has become one of special importance and priority to the UN, as the successes and failures of its conflict management strategies have impacted its credibility internationally. However, Cyprus' strategic positioning in the world map at the crossroads between Europe and the Middle East, its history, the presence of two ethnically differentiated and antagonized communities, the involvement of Greece and Turkey, American security concerns and, more recently, the accession processes to the European Union (EU) have affected the Cyprus conflict's evolution and, alongside, conditioned the UN's response to it (Coufoudakis 1976, 457). The UN enters the Cyprus conflict when Security Council resolution 186 stipulates the positioning of the *United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus* (UNFICYP) in 1964. At the same time as it determines the beginning of UN *peacekeeping* efforts, the same resolution marks also the initiation of UN's *peacemaking* tasks by setting the appointment of a mediator, acceptable to all the parties involved, Cypriot communities and the "motherlands" alike, for the promotion of a peaceful solution and a peace settlement (Coufoudakis 1976, 463-467). However, UN's involvement is taken by the Cypriot communities as an opportunity to achieve acceptance, recognition and legitimization for their causes internationally and UN mediation disregarded as a path to finding a solution cooperatively. Being a neutral mediator with a low coercion capacity and a great interest in a solution, the UN has been considered in the literature to be an inadequate mediator to the Cyprus conflict because incapable of preventing the Cypriot self-interested parties from controlling the mediation process and of getting them to genuinely cooperate in finding a solution to their conflict (Richmond a1998, 712, 716.721).

The US has also performed mediation in the Cyprus conflict, actually, even before the UN was involved in the Cyprus conflict, in an effort to prevent the conflict's all-out internationalization with UN involvement (Savvides 1998, 40). Since then, the US has *power* mediated the Cyprus dispute intermittently, using its privileged relationships with Greece and Turkey to prevent a re-escalation of the Cyprus conflict that could spill-over to an interstate Greco-Turkish war. Unlike the UN, the US has the resources to offer benefits or threat punishments to pressure the Cypriot parties into collaborating with the mediation process. However, as a state mediator, the US exercises mediation as an instrument of foreign policy, pursuing its own interests and outcome

preferences in the conflict and in its solution. As a stakeholder in the conflict, the US is seen as a *biased* and untrustworthy mediator by the Cyprus parties and its mediation tactics considered to have made the Cypriot parties reluctant to agreement and detrimental to the success of the mediation process (Michael 2007, 594). Concomitantly, the UN has been seen as more capable of addressing the parties differences and in improving their relationship and, thus the most suitable mediator in the Cyprus conflict context (Yilmaz 2005, 35).

The communities that founded the 1960 Republic of Cyprus live today in geographically separate territories. South of the "Green Line", the Republic of Cyprus has been under Greek Cypriot administration since 1963, whereas Turkish Cypriots administer a self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) since 1983. UN's and US' mediation initiatives have avoided conflict re-escalation but, while UNFICYP becomes one of the longest peacekeeping missions, a permanent settlement is yet to be agreed. Has mediation been an adequate conflict management instrument in the intractable and protracted Cyprus conflict? Did the internationalization of the conflict through the entrance of the US and UN mediators in the conflict's context impair their mediation initiatives? And, what mediator, the US or the UN has been more successful in mediating the Cyprus conflict? It is hypothesized that although the internationalization of the Cyprus conflict has led the mediation process into a time-consuming blame-game between the parties and an agreed settlement has not been achieved, violent conflict has not re-occurred since 1974, therefore, mediation has had the capacity to pacify the Cyprus conflict. Secondly, even if the Cyprus conflict disputants' interest in being mediated was a product of their expectations of gaining support and finding allies in the international arena and did offer them incentives to try to achieve victory over their opponent through the diplomatic route instead of cooperatively finding agreement, the internationalization perspective made conflict management through mediation more attractive than continued fighting, therefore, even if the perspective of acquiring internationalization gains closed the Cypriot parties in their initial and mutually exclusive positions and has prevented mediation from arriving at a settlement, the interest in the use of mediation generated by the internationalization process induced the Cypriot disputants into initiating the peace process. Thirdly, although the UN does not have the same capacity to leverage the parties into agreeing to settlement as the US does, the UN's less intrusive mediation was more capable of transforming the parties' adversarial relationship and was, and will, be more beneficial to the peace process in the long-run. Therefore the potentially most effective in generating effective and enduring peace settlements form of mediation in the Cyprus conflict is,

or could have been, the combination of US and UN cooperative performance of their more and less intrusive mediation styles.

Methodology

To confirm or refute the hypothesis above, a qualitative investigation will be made through the qualitative analysis of primary and secondary bibliographical sources. The work by Johan Galtung within the Peace Studies theoretical framework, Jacob Bercovitch's central contribution to mediation theory and Oliver Richmond's work on the internationalization of intrastate conflict through mediation and, specifically, on the Cyprus case, will be essential to the present investigation. The investigation made hereby will also benefit from the information acquired through semi-structured, qualitative exploratory interviews made to academics, based on an open pre-prepared script, performed on the first exploratory phase of the investigation process and at the case-study's location for the purpose of gaining insight to different perspectives on the Cyprus conflict. A holistic analysis will be made of the Cyprus mediators, incorporating the analysis of UN and US mediation performances in a paralleled and complementary perspective and not limiting itself to addressing each mediator's performance isolatedly. The impact on the conflict and the progress of the mediation process becomes more accurate when all the mediation initiatives are addressed as a whole. A broadened perspective of the mediation process in Cyprus calls for a simultaneous analysis of both actors' initiatives because they do not happen isolatedly and, on the contrary, each initiative originates and is set by previous ones, as well as, each one impacts on the ones that follow. Because the Cyprus mediation has been a more than five decade-long process and varied in terms of the type of mediators involved and the mediation styles and strategies performed by them, although the Cyprus case study is but one case, it allows for a holistic approach of mediation performance. An analysis of all mediators' actions together allows a better understanding of what are the mediation failures and successes in Cyprus and, ultimately, for an appreciation of how the mediation initiatives' trail can better be coordinated and concerted in order for mediation to be more effective in managing intrastate conflict.

In the case-study analysis, a two-fold historical exposition and analysis will be made of the overall period between the rise of the conflict in the early 1960's until the refusal of the Annan Plan peace settlement in 2004. Within this time-frame, first, a historical exposure of the

origins and evolution of the Cyprus conflict will be made first and will then follow to an historical analysis of the mediation process beginning at the US' first mediation initiatives in 1963 until the demise of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's mediation efforts. The Cyprus mediation process' variety allows for a broad panoply of variables conditioning a mediation process to be considered and analyzed, for the impact of the internationalization in the mediation process to be addressed and evaluated, as it has been critical to the conduct and evolution of the Cyprus mediation efforts, for a parallel analysis of two different types of mediators' performance, a state and an IO within the same contextual reality, and for an ascertainment of, not only, their isolated, but also, their mixed mediation styles' effectiveness.

Once intrastate conflict constitutes one of the greatest threats to peace in our days, to evaluate the adequacy of mediation as an instrument of conflict management, an understanding of its importance to intrastate peace processes and a contribution to its acknowledgement as an indispensable resource for the creation of a sustainable peaceful world order becomes pertinent and necessary. Adopting the solution-finding Peace Studies approach in ascertaining the Cypriot parties' interest in the internationalization of their conflict through the mediation process and its impact on the mediation's successes and failures, the Cyprus case-study analysis will allow for hypothesis to be confirmed or refuted and for the overall objectives of the present investigation to be achieved. Through the study of the Cyprus case it will possible to ascertain mediation relevance as a peace establishment instrument in the Cyprus conflict, to discuss its potential and its limits as a conflict management tool and, by ascertaining the successes and failures of US and UN mediation initiatives, to determine which type of mediator/s and mediation style/s have the greatest effectiveness and success potential.

Structural Presentation

The product of the investigation outlined above will be exposed in the present dissertation in two nuclear parts, whereas Part A, entitled "Intrastate Conflict and Mediation Theory", will provide the theoretical and conceptual framework that guides the investigation process and supports its findings and "Part B", entitled "The Cyprus Case-Study", will dedicate itself to the Cyprus' case conflict and mediation analysis. In Part A, a revision of the existing theoretical and conceptual findings will insert the present investigation in a Peace Studies framework of analysis, in Conflict Studies and International Mediation dominiums. This ascertainment of the "state of

the art" will provide for the theoretical framework adopted and the delimitation of the concepts that will be articulated. This nuclear first part will be divided into two chapters. In the first chapter, entitled "Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Management", an historical outlook on the nature and evolution of the intrastate conflict phenomenon will be made and its implications situated in the contemporary conceptions of international peace and security and the characteristics of intrastate conflict, relevant to the present debate in mediation literature of mediation adequacy as an intrastate conflict management instrument, will be ascertained. The following "Mediation as an Instrument of Conflict Management" chapter will solely dedicate itself to mediation theory. In this second chapter, the context, process and outcome determinants of mediation will be ascertained, the internationalization impact addressed and the compartmentalization existent in the present mediation overall theory exposed to offer a holistic perspective of the variety of its performance and potential, able to more accurately portray mediation practice in reality. To understand how the concept of mediation has been limited, it becomes necessary to demonstrate how broad it can be and, therefore, the various debates on the practice and conceptualization of mediation will need to be addressed. However, the focus of the present work, and the guidelines in which the theoretical framework exposition will be made, will be in demonstrating that mediation can, and should, be performed by various actors able to better capitalize on the potential on a broad variety of mediation styles and that it is this broad conceptualization and practice that allows for mediation's impact in intrastate conflict contexts and its capacity as an instrument of conflict management to fully be appreciated.

Part B will be divided into three chapters, whereas the first two chapters will mirror the conflict /mediation structure of Part A. Chapter 3, "The Cyprus Case: from Conflict to Problem", will identify and characterize the origins and the evolution of the Cyprus conflict, from its historical origins in the 1960's to its present pacified conflict *status quo.* Chapter 4, "US and UN Mediation in Cyprus" will identify, describe and analyze all the mediation initiatives, characterize the mediators and ascertain the success and failures of their mediation initiatives undertaken in the above set time-frame and, finally, chapter 5, "A holistic analysis of UN and US mediation in Cyprus" will provide a broad an paralleled analyses of the two mediators performance to ascertain their complementary potential and expose the findings on internationalization impact on the Cypriot mediation process.

The "Conclusion" will comprise a reflection exercise to provide answers for the theoretical questions posed by articulating the Cyprus case-study practical findings with the

existing and new theoretical conceptions. Implications to the Conflict and Peace Studies and, in particular, to mediation theory drawn from the conclusions taken will be ascertained, albeit recognizing the limits of the present investigation and suggesting areas where further investigation is needed.

PART A: Intrastate Conflict and Mediation Theory

1. Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Management

In the twentieth century, on the one hand, globalization has brought economic, technological and cultural changes that have undermined statehood and its borders while, on the other hand, interstate wars have been substituted by minor but violent fractures in state and societies (Shaw 1999, 67, 70, 72). With the collapse of the bipolar order, American and Soviet spheres of influence recede, uncovering the disintegration of local state forms of the prior colonial period. In result, intrastate conflict emerges all around the globe. The multiplication of violence between local factions rendered the intrastate war phenomenon a global dimension and an international security threat status that demands the international security agenda's enlargement and a global solution (Fisher 2001, 308).

In a new peace and world security agenda, human individual needs and sources of insecurity are prioritized as security threats and the mere absence of violence is no longer the *sine-qua-non* condition for security and peace to exist in the international system. Equalitarian access to political and economic resources, to educational opportunities and to all those societal conditions that allow for an individual to fully develop its capacities become as important sources and conditions for a peaceful and secure world order. Caused by the state's failure to respond and satisfy its citizens' security needs and characterized by a violent and intractable character with severe implications for human beings in conflict torn areas, intrastate conflict becomes an important threat to peace in its comprehensive sense. Where intrastate conflict is fought neither violence is absent nor do the conditions for human well-being and development exist, therefore, intrastate conflict becomes one of the most important sources of insecurity and a security priority to the international community in the contemporary world.

Prioritized as a threat to world peace and security by the international community, resources are channelled and strategies devised to manage and resolve the intrastate conflict phenomenon and mediation becomes increasingly utilized instrument of *peacemaking* in intrastate conflict management strategies (Terris and Maoz 2005, 563). However, mediation's effectiveness in intrastate conflict management is not a consensual issue. Intrastate conflicts are often based on identity-related, intangible, issues that fuel distance and antagonism between disputing parties and make this type of conflict particularly intractable and difficult to settle (Výryen 1999, 139-143). While mediation's capacity to devise a settlement and to resolve such

disputes has proved to be limited, its capacity to mitigate violence and to "pacify" intrastate conflict has not (2009, 136, 144). The question of whether the capacity to resolve a conflict is the measure of mediation validity as an intrastate conflict management instrument has stirred a debate in turn of whether intrastate conflict is amenable to mediation or not.

This chapter will start by situating the intrastate conflict phenomenon in the recent historical context in which theoretical conceptions of peace and security have fundamentally changed with the purpose of explaining how and why this phenomenon has been increasingly prioritized in the new international peace and security agenda. It will then follow to ascertain the origins and characteristics of intrastate conflict itself. It is important to note, however, that the objective here is not to make an exhaustive analysis of intrastate conflict's characteristics. The characteristics that will be of relevance are those necessary for conceptual definitions to be articulated, but also, and particularly, those that are considered relevant to the evaluation of intrastate conflict amenability to mediation. The conceptualization and characterization of the interstate conflict phenomenon will provide a better understanding of the arguments used for the discussion of the effectiveness and validity of mediation as an instrument of conflict management in intrastate conflict, which will be the final object of analysis of this chapter.

1.1 Intrastate Conflict in a Widened Peace and Security Agenda

The prevalence of military and nuclear threats in the Cold War narrowed the concept of security to the stabilization of interstate relations by restricting what was understood as a threat to security to the threat of the use of military or nuclear forces. In the post-Cold War world the concept of *security* understood as "security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests (...) or as global security the threat of a nuclear holocaust" (UN 1994, 22) has become too narrow because overly focussed on nation-states instead of people. "Unemployment, drugs, crime, pollution and humans rights violations" (UN 1994, 22) have become important security threats, while economy, society or environment become possible sources of international insecurity. To account for the emerging threats to the survival and well being of both states and human individuals alike, an expansion of the previously state-centric security agenda becomes necessary.

Traditional security strategies of deterrence and the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation remain in use in the post-Cold War era, however, the nature, the meaning and the means of ensuring security have fundamentally changed. Ensuring security meant to protect the state from external threats of military action and, through it, its citizens. Although states remain an important source and unit of analysis of international security, the new kind of threats that have emerged in the post-Cold War period are more menacing to the states' constituent population survival than that of the state itself (Dark 1996, 2). Non-military threats, such as corruption, organized crime, terrorism, weapons or human trafficking, poverty or environmental scarcity, are the *soft security* threats that increasingly have an impact on peoples' daily lives, but ones that have also menaced the integrity of states and, therefore, demand the widening of a security agenda traditionally focused on state-centric military threats (Aldis and Herd 2004, 171).

When new issues are added into the military political-agenda, security becomes a complex whole where security issues emerge from different levels of socio-political organization, from the international, to the national and the individual level, and, within them, issues are *securitized* [1] at different sectors of human interaction, not only from the military or the political, but also the economic, societal and environmental sectors. Issues of security are no longer clearly global or local, as local causes can have global effects or global causes have local effects (Buzan et al. 1998, 5-8, 17). Economic security, for example, has become of undeniable and particular interest in the contemporary world of pervasive and cyclical financial and economical crises that undermine a state's economy, degrade its citizens' quality of life, deteriorate the society and stress the states' capacity to cope. Environmental security has, as well, become an important security issue due to its global consequences when global warming, droughts and floods or rising sea levels require internationally concerted solutions (Buzan et al. 1998, 8). Societal security has also entered the security agenda as societal groupings have felt their identity endangered by immigration, integration, or cultural imperialism. With the break-up of colonial and communist large multi-ethnic states, within which societies have perceived their identity as being threatened and have become their own agents of security, societal insecurity's potentially destabilizing effects and pervasive consequences to communities and states alike have gained salience (Weaver 1995, 65-71)

[1] The Copenhagen School of security studies accounts for the context of power relations in which an issue becomes a security one when it is "securitized" by the political actors through their political discourse. When political discourse successfully mobilizes resources to address a certain issue, this issue becomes a security matter. For more on the *securitization* approach see Buzan 1991 and Buzan et al. 1998.

Kaldor (2000, 3-4) calls the post-Cold War wave of violent conflict the "new wars", a concept that aims to distinguish this menace to world security from the traditional intersate wars, which are central to state militaries and defence planners concerns. While the military and defence apparatus focus is on new security threats ranging from transnational crime to terrorism, intrastate wars are labelled as "low-intensity conflicts" and considered less important phenomena. However, despite its internal character, intrastate conflict is also a global threat to modern existence by the magnitude of its consequences, with massive casualties and people's displacement, human rights' violations and physical infrastructures destruction. The destructive potential of the "new wars" and their global character should not be ignored or relegated to a secondary position in the international security agenda. Instead, in Kaldor's perspective, they must be prioritized and approaches to their management should aim, not only at alleviating symptoms by providing humanitarian aid but also, and most importantly, at resolving the underlying causes of their initiation, degradation and prolongation (Kaldor 2000, 7).

The humanitarian impact, the human rights violations or the human cost conflict entails has become understood as a threat to world peace in the broadened peace and security agenda. With the rise of intrastate conflict as a pervasive security threat, the state's role as its citizen's security provider has become increasingly questioned. Particularly in intrastate conflict the legitimacy of the state is questioned by domestic communities with an unequal access to state power. In intrastate conflict also, the state can be incapable of restraining warlords and paramilitaries and political power can be ceased by these criminal groups. In such cases, the state becomes incapable, or unwilling, of providing security to its own citizens or even, the state itself can become a threat to its population's security. State failure demands a broadened understanding of the object of security, being that it must go beyond encompassing the security of the state to encompassing the security of the individual human beings in the state, since the security of the first is not necessarily conducive to the security of the second (Axworthy 2001, 19). Thomas and Tow (2002, 181-183), however, draw attention to the need to retain the state as a central security actor within the human security paradigm and not undermining its significance when focussing on the human individual as the object of security. An adaptation is required of policymaking elites in the prioritization process of the new human security problems and the increasingly complex international security environment in which they exist. A multilevel approach is needed that can deal with the impact of security problems on the

individual/humanitarian, on the state's affairs and, consequently, on the well being of the international community.

In an human security approach, because the understanding of what constitutes a threat is broadened to encompass societal, environmental, economical and other threats, security does not only signify assuring the human being's survival but also protecting his rights and his well-being, by assuring the conditions necessary for him to fully develop his capacities. Human security is not only *freedom from fear* of a threat, but also *freedom from want* and for human development (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007, 51-57). In turn, *security* becomes a limited concept to describe the full scope of the objectives of the new security agenda, while achieving *peace* becomes a more adequate concept to define its new goals.

In a broadened understanding, *peace* does not merely signify the absence of war, or of manifest violence, but also the existence of the opportunities for psychological and material opportunities for self-realization. For such conditions to exist, not only physical, visible and non-structural *direct* violence must be eliminated. Poverty, hunger, repression, oppression, social alienation, discrimination, absence of free speech or denial of educational opportunities are some of the indirect sources of *structural* violence that affect quality of life, erode human values and freedoms and shorten lifespans. When understanding violence as two-fold, direct and structural, war becomes but one peacelessness condition and peace only existent in the absence of both types of violence (Galtung 2007, 14-36). Peace itself becomes also two-fold when requiring the guarantee of positive human conditions. While *negative* peace signifies the absence of *direct* violence and, thus, the absence of manifest violence or war, *positive* peace is achieved through the removal of *structural* violence with the creation of equitable living conditions, equitable access to economic benefits and justice and the enjoyment of social, political and cultural development within societies. Peace, therefore, entails not only the repression of violence but also of injustices that curtail the existence of a social harmony, stability and order that allows for human beings, societies, states or the international community to develop (Galtung 2007, 14-36).

A comprehensive understanding of peace has been increasingly accepted internationally. A reflection of this is the incorporation of positive peace aimed strategies of economic and social cooperation, self-determination and human rights into the UN Charter, or the prioritization of human security in the UN Development Program in 1994. The fact that negative peace strategies of collective security and deterrence and its most valuable instrument, *peacekeeping*, have proved insufficient in achieving positive peace, *peacemaking* and *peacebuilding* have become

increasingly valuable tools and strategies. Similar to the need for simultaneous elimination of direct and structural violence, for the achievement of both negative and positive peace, the blending of *peacekeeping* and *peacemaking* and *peacebuilding* strategies has been increasingly recognised as necessary and its mastering *sine qua non* to a successful establishment of a comprehensive peace (Alger 1989, 118-119).

While *peacebuilding* can be said to encompass the creation of conditions for peace to exist in a society, *peacekeeping* prevents violence from been exercised (Stephenson 1994, 20-21). The concepts overlap however, since *peacemaking* can be considered to include those *peacebuilding* tasks, or even be more broadly understood as encompassing the *peacekeeping* process. For simplification and operationalization purposes, *peacemaking* will hereby refer to the diplomatic efforts aimed at helping bring parties in conflict arrive at a peaceful solution (Stephenson 1994, 21). In a human security approach, *peacekeeping* becomes too limited of a tool to counter the security threats that populations in conflict areas suffer. *Peacemaking* and *peacebuilding* aim at the transformation the conflict situation into a cooperative, reconstructive and reconciliative one, where violence gives away to economic and social development, while *peacekeeping* provides the opportunity for such transformation to occur. In a conflict situation, peace has to *made* and *built*, otherwise *peacekeeping* will contribute to the maintenance of the *status quo* and opportunities for resolution and the transformation of the conflict situation will be lost and peace will not be comprehensively achieved[2] (Rasmussen 1997 39-42).

The post-Cold War world has brought the need for a widened security agenda that allows for the prioritization of security threats that go beyond threatening the state's existence to threatening its citizens' lives. Human insecurity has, thus, become the most pervasive threat in the modern world. In a human, non-state centric, concept of security, the satisfaction of human needs, from physiological, to psychological, educational, economical or political, is the source of security and peace its ultimate goal. In an intrastate conflict context both the state's existence and its citizens' lives become threatened, human needs are left to be satisfied, insecurity becomes generalized and peace, either negative or positive, does not exist. Naturally, the intrastate conflict phenomenon becomes one of the most pervasive security and peace threats of the modern world, one of ancient origins and complex and intricate characteristics.

[2] For more on the enlargement of the peace operations agenda see UN. 1992. "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, *Peacemaking* and *Peacekeeping*" and UN. 2000. "Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations".

1.2 Intrastate Conflict Emergence and Characteristics

In the post-Cold War the prevalent form of conflict has changed. A drastic reduction of interstate conflicts has been replaced by a drastic rise of localized intrastate conflict. These "new wars" are wars between communal groups for political power and statehood (Holsti 1996 20-21). The modern nation-sate system is based upon the respect and protection of state boundaries set by a group of people that share a mutual sense of nationality, that enjoying their self-determination right legally and politically determine and govern the state's territory (Kellas 1998, 3-4). After the end of the Cold-War, however, local communities around the world found themselves living within colonial territorial borders that are not legitimized by the right of self-determination of its peoples and denied political independence (Fisher 2001, 308). Macro-historical conditions gave rise to political and psychological consequences that put socially constructed national identities at the epicenter of intrastate conflict around the world. Intrastate conflict is, thereby, often characterized by the existence of identity-based violence between disputing highly antagonized communities in a struggle for political power (Leventis 2007, 35-36). Because of its violent and intractable character, this type of conflict has recently been referred to as protracted in nature (Azar 1990, 7-16), as one that prolongs itself through time in cycles of violence escalation and de-escalation or that can become *freezed* for long periods of time (Fisher and Keashly 1991, 35). Also typical of intrastate conflict is its tendency to not remain confined to the state where it emerged and rather to become internationalized and to involve other states in the dispute or in conflict management initiatives (Raheem and Loganathan 2005, 2).

1.2.1 The Emergence of Intrastate Conflict

While the concepts of *nation* and of *state* would ideally overlap, in reality, the *nation* may not correspond to the geographical and political boundaries of the *state.* The two concepts differ in as much as the notion of *nation* embodies a sense of social community that the *state* does not necessarily encompass. A *nation* is a product of shared historical and cultural ties and common ancestry between a group of people that become aware of their common characteristics, may they be language, religion, common descent or even the shared existence in a determined

territory, and develop a sense of belonging and of common fate and deposit affection and loyalty to their mutual sense of nationality. *Nationalism,* in turn, is the ideology created by the people's awareness and sense of belonging to an existing nation, but also the behaviour, attitudes and the actions that are a product and that reflect the people's acquired national self-consciousness (Kellas 1998, 3-4).

While the principle of self-determination, that is, the right of a *people*, understood has a *nation,* to govern itself and to legally and politically determine the territory in which they live in, emerged in the end of the first World War for the respect and protection of state boundaries, a secessionist interpretation of it as the right of a people to establish their own state has, paradoxically, threatened the fragmentation of those same existing boundaries of nation-states in the international system. An alternative understanding of self-determination as the right of a people to participate in the state's governance that allows for multi-national coexistence within a state has become a preferred interpretation for the international community when faced with a multiplicity of intrastate conflict for statehood in the international system (Sözen 2007, 41).

Modern state sovereignty, based on the westphalian notions of territoriality and the non-interference of external actors in the state's internal affairs, and, thus, the rise of the nation-state as the unit of political independence applied to a post-colonial world, has triggered the emergence of conflict (Fisher 2001, 308). In the intrastate conflict of the late 20th century, ideology is framed around identity issues that can be traced back to 19th century colonial world. Societal differentiation processes which created the notions of race, ethnicity, religion, culture or language were an instrument of colonial rule used to affirm and justify the colonizers' superiority and control over the colonized (Kaldor 2000, 5). Equally, to govern the colonized, colonizers, often under-resourced to control large empires, tended to privilege certain groupings over the others to serve and contribute to the colonizers' governance, which further entrenched societal divisions among colonized peoples (Leventis 2007, 35-36). During the Cold War, the superpowers maintained their spheres of influence by supporting local groups and their presence which, while instigating differentiation and resentment between these local peoples, contained the latent post-colonial identity-based clash between them. With the end of the *détente* and the loss of the American or Soviet ally, intrastate conflict emerged (Fisher 2001, 308).

A sense of repression and the need for autonomy and identity lay at the root of intrastate conflicts, where antagonistic feelings and frustration deepen the adversarial enemy images that groups generate of each other and their will to force this "other" to behave accordingly to their

own wishes (Jeong 2000, 31). Identity is an inherent characteristic of intrastate conflict where groups' claims are based on their tribe, race, ethnicity, religion, culture or other socially constructed ideas and fundamental beliefs that become politicized in a struggle for political power (Kaldor 2000, 4-8). Consequently, these ideas provide the focus for the formation and unity of communities and the intangible value-related issues in turn of which the conflict is typically framed and fought (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004, 151).

1.2.2 Intrastate Conflict Characteristics

Conflict exists when incompatible goals are pursued by different groups whether through peaceful means or by the use of force. When one, or both groups, resort to the use of force, it can be targeted to inflicting casualties on each others' armed forces or, in the most violent cases, can also include direct physical violence against unarmed civilians identified as belonging to the opposing group (Ramsbotham et al., 2011 30-31). When *conflict* takes place between groups that co-exist within the internationally recognized territory of a state, they are referred to as *intrastate* conflicts as opposed to *interstate* conflicts, between two or more states in the international system. *Intrastate* conflict is, though, a broad category that encompasses different types of conflicts. Considering the disputants' status within the state, intrastate conflicts can be *civil wars,* when fought between a state's government and a non-state entity, or *intercommunal wars,* when fought between two or more non-state entities within the state (Sarkees et al. 2003, 59). Because intrastate conflict can emerge between groups that perceive themselves has possessing a distinct identity to that of their disputants, a wide range of these conflicts are referred to as *ethnic* conflicts*. Ethnic* conflict is, thus, said to involve two or more groups of peoples, nations, communities or minorities that perceive themselves, or are seen by others, as different (Bercovitch ans DeRouen 2004, 148). Even though ethnicity is an important feature of intrastate conflict, one that highly contributes to its complex and intractable character, defining a conflict as an *ethnic* one excessively highlights one of its many relevant characteristics. Focus on ethnicity diverts attention away from the underlying sources of these conflicts that are, actually, the propellers of the ethnic differentiation among groups who already held a latent conflict over political or economic resources (Faber 2000, 53-55).

In intrastate conflicts, power differentials are frequent and significant between the disputing groups. The different actors usually do not possess the same access to military,

economic or political resources, or even social status or wealth, holding an unbalanced relationship between them. Unequal access to political power and cultural marginalization generate a differential among existing groups considering the desirability of the maintenance of the status quo of the political system (Jeong 2000 31). Instead of being conflicts of interest between relatively similar parties, intrastate conflict is usually *asymmetric*, between dissimilar parties, as in between a majority and a minority or a government and a group of rebels (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 24). In typically asymmetric conflicts, there are no declarations of war, few decisive battles and more actions against civilians and terror tactics performed by groups of combatants loosely knit and organized, with little or no hierarchy or centralized authority, instead of national armies (Holsti 1996, 20-21). Guerrilla and counter-insurgency strategies in which civilians become the targets are used, while direct battle between the wearing factions is avoided. In the "new wars", leaders are the practitioners, while civilians are the main victims and political control over the territory is captured by expelling or forcing population displacement to establish homogenous and "pure" populations (Kaldor 2000, 4-8).

Due to its complex and intractable nature, intrastate conflicts are particularly difficult to settle and tend to prolong themselves through time, the reason for these conflicts being referred to as *protracted* conflicts. Azar (1990, 7-16) offers a comprehensive analysis and explanation of the protracted nature of intrastate conflicts. A Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) progressively develops along three key phases. At its "genesis", the conflict develops in multi-communal societies where the state *apparatus* usually becomes dominated by larger or privileged communities and becomes unresponsive to other groups' needs. The more the state is dominated by one identity group, which is resourced to maintain itself in power and resists minority groups' participation, the more these minorities will not recognise the regime as representing them and the more human needs will not be met. If the "genesis" preconditions exist, "process dynamics" determinants will be responsible for the conflicts' overt activation. When individual victimization becomes collectively recognized and groups organize and mobilize themselves to protest and this is responded by a coercive repression reaction from the weak state government, the latent conflict becomes a violent one. Regarding their outcomes, PSCs have negative-sum outputs, unclear end-points or winners. A large number of casualties and economic deterioration generate physical security deterioration while negative reciprocal images of the other group will further antagonise the belligerents, which together perpetuate and solidify conflict.

Intrastate conflict is often a protracted conflict, therefore one which exhibits a long life-cycle in which violence varies and periods of conflict escalation and de-escalation exist. Fisher and Keashly (1991, 35-36) offer a model of intrastate conflict escalation along four stages, *discussion, polarization, segregation* and *destruction*. Described in the reverse order, the same stages provide also a model for the occurrence of de-escalation. Escalation along the four stages occurs when significant changes in the *nature of communication,* in their *perceptions* and images of each other, in their *relationship,* in the main *issues* in conflict, the perceived possible *outcomes* and in the disputant's choice in *strategy* for dealing with the conflict occur.

Stage / ***Conflict Characteristic***	**Discussion**	**Polarization**	**Segregation**	**Destruction**
	de-escalation ←			→ escalation
Nature of communication	Misinterpretation	Threats	Absence of direct communication	Violent attacks
Perceptions of the other	Relatively accurate and positive	Rigid and negative stereotyping	Good versus evil	Dehumanization of the other
Relationship	Trust, respect and commitment	The other is important in its own right	Mistrust and disrespect	Hopelessness in a relationship improvement
Issues	Substantive interests and related positions	Concerns regarding the relationship	Fundamental needs and values	Ultimate survival
Outcomes	Win-win	Mutual compromise	Win-lose	Lose-lose
Strategy	Joint decision-making	Negotiation	Defensive competition	Destroy the other

Table 1. Fisher and Keashley's (1991, 35-36) *Four Stage Model* of Conflict Escalation.

Escalation along the four stages in the *nature of communication* occurs when the reliance on, what is often, a misinterpretation of the other's moves to the polarization stage with the occurrence of threats, to the segregation stage with the absence of direct communication and, to the destruction stage, with the performance of violent attacks on the other. Considering changes in *perceptions,* they change from being relatively accurate, or benign, to rigid and negative stereotypes, to casting the dispute as good versus evil and to, finally, a dehumanization of the other. The disputant's *relationship* escalates along the four stages when it moves from one of trust, respect and commitment, to the other solely being considered important in its own right, to one of mistrust and disrespect and to hopelessness on possible relationship improvements. The *issues* in conflict change from being framed in terms of substantive interests and related positions to being so in terms of concerns regarding the relationship, in the *segregation* stage in terms of fundamental needs and values, such as identity or security, and, finally, in the *destruction* stage, in terms of a question of ultimate survival. The perceived possible *outcomes* change from being win-win options to mutual compromise possibilities, to win-lose and, finally, to being perceived as only lose-lose alternatives wherein the disputants' objective is to suffer minimal losses while inflicting maximum costs on the other. As the perceived possible outcomes change, so do the *strategies* chosen by the disputants' to achieve them, beginning by choosing joint-decision making strategies, to preferring negotiation, to defensively competing with the other to, finally, outright attempting to destruct the other.

Another characteristic which can be exhibited by intrastate conflict is a certain degree of *internationalization.* Internationalization of an intrastate conflict is broadly understood to happen when other actors, beside the original disputants between whom the conflict was initiated, become involved in that given conflict. However, these actors can be those sates who are drawn in to lend their support, or even to fight, alongside either disputants, or the ones involved in the conflict's management and peace process. Two different internationalization processes can be said to exist, the one that is generated by the entrance of other disputants into the conflict, what can be referred to as the *internationalization through conflict,* and the one that is a product of the search for a solution by the international community, the *internationalization through the peace process* (Raheem and Loganathan 2005, 2). The internationalization process through the quest for a solution will, therefore, be understood as "the act of bringing something under international control" (Masunungure and Bazda 2010, 209), that is, when an issue is recognized and addressed as a problem that merits some form of intervention by the international community.

Through one process or the other, intrasate conflicts often do not remain circumscribed to a single state, but rather overlap state boundaries and become internationalized conflicts with consequences that affect the whole international system.

When there is outside interference in an intrastate conflict, the conflict can often become *freezed.* When *freezed*, the conflict remains in a precarious peace *status quo,* but one where the actual resort to violence is a distant possibility. In an analogy to the Cold War, Faber (2000, 54, 56-57, 62-63) considers that three consecutive stages can be identified in an intrastate conflict's political process from the moment it *freezes* to that when it is resolved. A conflict freezes when an event or an outside actor's action stops the use of violence by the disputants. At this *frozen* stage, disputants hold a confrontational relationship, are distanced and antagonized and pursue zero-sum strategies to obtain gains at the expense of the other, and also, because their political relations are unfriendly and intercommunal interaction is discouraged, there is a sense that violence is eminent. At the *thaw* stage disputants realize that the conflict is frozen and that zero-sum games are not advantageous, the conflict *status quo* is assumed to be an inevitable and static reality that is more profitable than its predecessor stage, therefore risky escalations are avoided by both disputants. The conflict can move to a *defreeze* final stage when it is solved, whether by politicians or the populations of the two opposing sides, suddenly or gradually withering away.

Intrastate conflict is a particularly violent and pervasive phenomenon that profoundly threatens not only people's lives and well being around the globe, but one which also menaces regional and international peace and security. Consequently, the multiplication of intrastate conflicts and the need for the mitigation of their consequences have drawn and channelled the international community's attention and resources. However, because of their intractable and protracted character, they are particularly difficult to manage and particularly difficult to solve. Mediation is frequently used by the international community to manage these conflicts, but its success is often limited. Consequently, a debate exists, in conflict management literature in general and in mediation literature in particular, about the amenability of intrastate conflict to mediation strategies, or if mediation is a valid and effective instrument to deal with or resolve this type of conflict.

1.3 Intrastate Conflict Management and Mediation: The Debate

Parallel to the multiplication of intrastate conflict and its prioritization in the international security agenda and consequent mobilization of resources to manage and counter its detrimental effects on international peace and security, mediation occurrence and its significance and importance as a conflict management instrument has grown (Terris and Maoz 2005, 563). However, the use of mediation for intrastate conflict management and resolution purposes is not consensual. The intractable and protracted character that intrastate conflict often assumes, the uncountable and basic goals of survival, wellness, freedom and identity that these disputes encompass and the consequent difficulty in solving them has generated criticism to conflict management approaches focussed on negotiations and third party involvement as the means to finding a resolute end to conflict. Motives for divergent views of mediation as an effective conflict management tool are mainly associated with two related aspects, the legitimization of the identity or ethnic character of these conflicts and the internationalization effect mediation has upon them with the entrance of an outside party into the conflict's environment

Conflict management approaches based on negotiations or mediation are criticized for premising themselves on the manageability of conflicts and for using instruments that address only one level of conflict by considering an individual acting within one group as the source of conflict resolution. Because they tend to focus on finite and divisible or rearrangable and finite interests and not on abstract and complex values and identity issues which characterize intrastate conflict, they are considered to be only able to fix and not solve deep-rooted grievances and disagreements between disputants with irreconcilable interests (Väyryen 1999, 139-143). For Kaldor (2000, 7) the use of mediation in conflicts where ethnicity marks the dividing line between disputants is counterproductive because the process of diplomatic negotiation that mediation entails legitimizes the identity principles of exclusion. The use of mediation is believed by Kaldor to assume that ethnicity is deeply rooted in society when, in fact, the disputants may not represent the whole society. By searching for compromises between these disputants, mediation will legitimize their mutually-exclusive identity based goals and further inculcate this divisive element into society. Furthermore, when the disputants' goals are legitimized, the only possible compromises between them are consociational solutions of power-sharing, which are

considered to function only for relatively homogeneous societies, while in ethnically heterogenic societies these solutions are unstable and short-termed.

Power-sharing arrangements are used as a solution for intrastate conflict because, in principle, they limit the ability of the larger social groups and electoral winners to cease state power and guarantees minority groups' access to it. The distribution of power in consociational democracies, which are the product of the power-sharing arrangements that conflict management efforts commonly pursue and arrive at, is designed to guaranty that any of the groups or communities in the state will suffer from policy decisions made by other community or communities. For this purpose, power-sharing arrangements generally feature veto provisions, constraints to mandate or prohibit certain forms of political representation and enforcement mechanisms that force the communities to abbey by it, such as setting a third party guarantor. However, democracy by consensus can be criticised in its democratic credentials when it devises an unequal access for majorities and minorities' to political power. Even though the intention is to create a more democratic society than that that is at the root of the conflict, inequality continues to exist, thus the power-sharing arrangement may be considered unfair and unacceptable to one or more communities. Although power-sharing has been proven to reduce the incidence of conflict, the power-sharing arrangement may encounter the moral hazard of accommodating demands from politicians that represent narrow group interests or that are too attached to their groups to deliver the compromises made and conflict may reoccur even before the power-sharing institutions have had a chance to work (Gates and Strom 2007, 1-9).

Similarly to Kaldor, Fisher (2001, 308, 321-323) contends that, unlike in resource-based conflicts, in identity-based conflicts the parties' goals are based on non-negotiable needs and interests, which cannot be suppressed or settled through mediation. The use of conventional negotiation strategies, such as mediation, is seen by the author has not only inappropriate to manage identity-based conflict, but also has potentially having the disastrous effect of further driving the conflicting parties apart, instead of bringing them together. In these non-tangible identity conflicts where power asymmetries, discrimination, victimization and social hatred exist, mediation is seen as an exercise in "frustration and futility" because the disputants are too antagonised to be able to make meaningful concessions towards a demonized "other". Consequently, when mediation occurs in such conflicts, the parties are not able to move beyond their initial bargaining positions and to transform their deep-rooted adversarial relationship into a

cooperation process, therefore, the negotiations become stuck in a blame-game that further polarizes the parties, adding to the conflict's intractability and escalation probability.

When the parties' relationship is highly polarized, the parties themselves may view it as a way of pursuing those initial and incompatible objectives without having to fight. In such case, mediation itself becomes protracted because the parties use the mediation process to pursue the "devious objective" (Richmond a1998) of finding supporters for their positions in the international arena and not with for the purpose of compromising with the other to resolve their dispute. On the other hand, the multiplication of the actors involved through the two internationalization processes in an intrastate conflict is thought to add to its intractability because the more actors and interests become involved, the harder it is to bridge the multiplied differences. The existence of multiple players multiplies the existing interests and positions and the strategies used in a given conflict's environment, which is further amplified by the entrance of third parties which add to the existence of competing interests and visions of how the conflict should be managed or solved. This phenomenon is thought by Masunungure and Bazda (2010, 229) to submerge mediated conflicts into an "internationalized trap" that has the collateral effect of having the conflict management process be responsible for the intractability and prolongation of conflict in time.

Opposing perspectives consider that criticism of mediation effectiveness is product of a focus on the security aspect, or goal, of conflict management, in securing definite and palpable resolutions for conflict. Galtung (2007, 14-25) suggests that a conflict must be transformed in order for peace, not security, to be established, a transformation which must be, in itself, peaceful, operated by peaceful means, and to which mediation is a relevant and important tool. Transforming adversarial relationships that emanate from opposing goals between disputants in conflict into a new reality, where they can live and develop together, is the key to a successful transformation process. Incompatible goals between disputants generate frustration and a progressive polarization. Polarization, in turn, creates a social or even physical distance that leads to a dehumanization process that removes aversion to the use of violence against the other. While conflict starts objectively, it takes on an attitudinal life in the disputants relations and finds an outer behavioural expression in violence. Conflict transformation, as opposed to approaches based on security, operates at the root and objective level of conflict by bridging the legitimate goals in a non-violent style through a combination of *peacekeeping* and mediation.

For Bercovitch and DeRouen (2004, 148-150), neither the identity element nor the internationalization process render mediation inappropriate for intrastate conflict management. Issues of identity are not sufficient to originate conflict, but are rather one of its many possible instigators. Similarly to what is expressed by Bercovitch and DeRouen, to Faber (2000, 53-55), ideology, religion or ethnicity are man-made social constructions that are not a product of natural existing conditions and, therefore, are not static or unchangeable. Politics can be ethnically defined in intrastate conflict, but ethnicity is not the primary source of conflict but, rather, a difference that is created and exploited by disputants to serve the real underlying causes of conflict that are usually related to political and economic issues. Identity issues are value-related, intangible, intractable and non-negotiable but they are not the underlying source of conflict. The issues to be addressed in solving a conflict are those political and economic, tangible and negotiable issues, susceptible to being mediated (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004, 149-151).

Internationalization of identity-based conflicts, its spill-over to other countries and the consequent multiplication of social groups and subgroups and alliances in the conflict's context, contributes to conflict intractability. An internationalized conflict is, indeed, one that endures through time, or has the tendency to continuously reoccur, and the most difficult to manage, but it is so due to its own intractable and protracted characteristics and not to the existence of a mediation process itself. To Bercovitch and DeRouen (2004, 151, 166) the causes for intrastate conflicts being difficult to manage and solve are pre-existent to the mediation event. Mediation is not only considered by the authors as an appropriate method of dealing with internationalized conflict but as the most appropriate one because seen as capable of deescalating intractable conflicts. To Regan et al. (2009, 136, 144), although mediation has not generally been effective in generating definite resolutions in intrastate conflict, the presence of third parties constitutes an external security guaranty to the parties in conflict because the existence of a mediation process contributes to the mitigation of violence and for the preservation of a peaceful coexistence between the parties. Even if mediation cannot effectively generate a settlement between parties, the presence of external actors and diplomacy makes an effective contribution to *peacebuilding* efforts and post-conflict stability, therefore, mediation becomes a crucial contributor for *peacekeeping* and *peacebuilding,* rendering it an undeniably important instrument of *peacemaking* in the overall process of intrastate conflict management.

Intrastate conflicts are often identity-based conflicts where ethnicity and other socially constructed ideas generate exclusion, victimization and antagonism between disputants, who

instrumentalize the identity issue in the pursuit for their political and economic goals. In this context, the use of mediation has the effect of legitimizing the disputants' goals and the discriminating principles that underlay them and of generalizing them as the needs and interests of, not only the disputants, but of the whole society. Mediated solutions based on consociational power-sharing arrangements, by dividing and not reuniting society, further inculcate discrimination and do not mitigate the identity element in the conflict. Intangible and non-negotiable identity issues tend to exist in intrastate conflict, but they are not its unique or primary cause. Consequently, these are not the issues mediation has to address but, instead, the political and economic issues that lay at the conflicts roots. The fact that in such conflicts the disputants' relation is deeply antagonized and polarized may pose many difficulties to the negotiations and concession-making process that mediation entails. The internationalization process generated by the mediator's entrance into the conflict environment, added to a possible pre-existing internationalization process in the conflict itself, may even complexify this process and detract the arrival at a resolute settlement, but the protractedness and intractability are already present in these conflicts and are not created by the mediation process. Even if in intrastate conflicts it is difficult for mediation to succeed in generating a resolute settlement, mediation can be a crucial instrument for de-escalation and violence mitigation, hence, for the conflicts' transformation. The existence of a mediation process avoids conflict re-escalation and reduces human insecurity, having "pacifying" effect that allows for successful *peacekeeping* and progress in *peacebuilding*, therefore. If mediation is a crucial *peacemaking* instrument in the peace processes of intrastate, identity-based, intractable and protracted conflict, even when the prospect of reaching a settlement is perceivably low, this suggests that its validity as an intrastate conflict management tool should not be altogether dismissed.

Final Remarks

In the contemporary globalized world where *soft* security threats are pervasive and menace the security of populations around the globe, global answers and solutions have to be found. In this context, security can no longer refer solely to state survival issues. Although the state remains an important security provider, in the contemporary world the object of security is

shifted to individual human beings, to the protection of their rights and freedoms and the guaranty of conditions for human development. When security is shifted to human security concerns, intrastate conflict becomes increasingly prioritised as a security threat due to its humanitarian impact, a prioritisation which is visible in the growing sophistication and multiplication of tools, policies and programs designed to prevent, manage and reconstruct and rehabilitate conflict areas (Adis and Herd 2004 172-173). The introduction of human security into the international security agenda has prioritized the management and resolution of conflict situations around the world, in which direct and structural violence exists and the conditions for peace are eroded. The urgency in countering its effects and finding definite solutions for conflict, able to establish comprehensive and enduring peace, make *peacemaking* approaches, methods and tools, crucial to the management of conflicts of violent character, numerous fatalities, of great social and economic impact, which threaten human security around the globe.

Although intrastate conflicts have emerged in the post-Cold War period as the most prevalent and pervasive war form, its origins can be traced back to the post-colonial world of the 19th century. The perceptions of separateness and the origins of identity discrimination that typify intrastate conflict where instigated by colonizers as an instrument of colonial governance and were later substituted and continued by the superpowers divisive influence. When the Cold War ends and the spheres receded, the long-existing submerged social turmoil exploded and conflict between local communities emerged around the world. The intangible, identity-based and socially constructed beliefs of race, ethnicity, religion or culture that historically determined communal formation become politicized in these groups' struggle for political independence and the fuel for intractable conflict. Deep identity-based antagonism coupled with extreme violence often gives intrastate conflict a protracted character and the tendency to prolong themselves through time in waves of escalation and de-escalation and such violent and protracted conflicts do not remain circumscribed to the state's border. When intrastate conflict is internationalized it can freeze in a *status quo* where the presence of the outsider deflects the use of direct violence between the disputants while the confrontational relationship is still held between them in a precarious peace situation. To *defreeze* and to *de-escalate* intrastate conflict becomes fundamental for an international community that is also affected by its spill-over effects. Its intractable, protracted and violent character renders intrastate conflict the most difficult type of conflict to manage and settle and one which has tested the international community's capacity and instruments of conflict management.

Critics of the use of mediation in intrastate conflict management point out that mediation is a negotiation process between polarized group leaders taken to represent the whole society's interests of abstract and complex values and identity issues that are not susceptible to be divided or rearranged between the parties. These identity-issues addressed through mediation are tacitly recognized as legitimate goals. Mediating incompatible and non-negotiable needs between highly antagonized disputants who will not be able to make concessions is a futile exercise that can further polarize the disputants and freeze the negotiations process in an unending blame-game and the conflict in an "internationalized trap". Agreement is reached when a consociational power-sharing but, although power-sharing is designed to assure an equalitarian access to political power, because the parties are not equal they often find the consociational democratic system to not fairly portray society and conflict often reoccurs. For the critics, mediation cannot offer a definite and long-lasting solution for intrastate conflict.

Supporters of the use of mediation in intrastate conflict management considerer mediation an important instrument in helping the parties transform their conflicting relationship into a peaceful reality. Because it has the capacity to transform disputants' relationships, mediation does not further polarize them, but the contrary. To achieve this transformation, mediation operates at the objective layer of conflict by bridging legitimate goals, while changing disputant's attitudes towards each other. Mediation, therefore, addresses the political and economic issues that originated the escalation of the identity-based dispute in the first place. Identity-issues are non-negotiable but they are not the primary source of conflict nor the issues to be addressed in a mediation process. The conflict's internationalization through the mediation process may complexify the arrival at a solution, but the reoccurrence of a certain conflict, or its prolongation, are not caused by the mediation process but by the existing intractability and protractedness in the conflict. Supporters of the use of mediation in intrastate conflict recognize it as not being effective in generating conflict settlements but draw attention to the valuable stabilizing and "pacifying" effect the existence of a mediation process has on intrastate conflict that allows for other conflict management instruments to be used effectively. Mediation can, therefore be an effective generator of both negative and positive peace by being able to transform the potentially violent intrastate conflict situations into non-violent processes of social and political change and, hence, a crucial peace instrument to counter the threats to human security that have become primordial in the new peace and security agenda of the post-Cold War order.

2. Mediation as an Instrument of Intrastate Conflict Management

Mediation is as old as conflict itself, but although it has existed for centuries, it has only recently come under scholars' and investigators' attention. With the end of the Cold War and the proliferation of intrastate conflict, mediation has become an increasingly utilized tool of peaceful third party intervention and, thus, the most important one in managing and resolving conflict (Bercovitch 2011, 1). Mediation has become one of the most significant peaceful conflict management instruments in contemporary international relations, which has been accompanied by a growing interest by researchers and scholars throughout the world in defining, distinguishing and evaluating the scope of this, ever increasingly valuable instrument.

Mediation theory in conflict management is currently at an immatured state, vibrant but not yet fully developed or structured. How to define, frame or distinguish mediation from other forms of third party intervention is an elementary but ongoing discussion in the literature (Bercovitch and Gartner 2009, 5). The debate around mediation's many variables, strategies, techniques, results, scope, capacity or usefulness is an ongoing exercise in the literature. Although this exercise is essential towards the achievement of scientific truth in social science, the process of analysing and debating the various pieces of the mediation "puzzle" individually has often the devious effect of distracting the investigator from the overall "picture". To dismantle an object, for example, a music box, is an adequate process of understanding and learning how this object works, how each piece exists and performs a certain task that allows the unity to exist in that form, that the pieces assembled in a certain form allow the box to play a tune. However, the task of reassembling the pieces is often not as straightforward as one imagined when decomposing the object at first and, sometimes, one ends up with "left-over" pieces and a music box that no longer plays music. It is this dismantling and decomposing process, which is essential to understanding and learning about phenomena to create scientific theory, that can lead investigators to leave "pieces" out. When an investigator isolates a certain element of an integrated whole the study and evaluation of this sole element can lead the investigator to concentrate too much on its specificity and on its differentiated characteristics to an extent that the piece of the "puzzle" or of the "music box", no longer fits in the overall theory.

Mediation theory is, at present, under this "compartmentalization" (Bercovitch and Gartner 2009, 19) process that has led to "conceptual confusion" (Kleiboer 1996, 376) and the

overdetermination of the mediation phenomenon. There is a present tendency towards excluding certain "pieces" of the complex mediation process because overdetermination exaggerates all characteristics of the unified reality and make it seem that the "piece" no longer fits the "puzzle", what has the tendency to limit the scope of mediation theory. Paradoxically, this is also product of "the absence of more explicitly articulated theories" (Kleiboer 1996, 376) to guide the compartmentalized investigation of mediations' many aspects and characteristics.

To provide a holistic perspective of mediation as an instrument of conflict management, theoretic understandings authors set forward will be ascertained and assorted considering three dimensions, which are simultaneously three temporal steps of any mediation initiative, its initiation, process and outcome. To understand why mediation exists, it is necessary to ascertain why and when conflicts are mediated, why mediators decide to mediate them and why the conflict's disputants desire to have their conflict mediated. Considering the mediation process, the emphasis is on how it is performed and who it is performed by, specifically on the mediators' characteristics and how these affect the conflict and disputants' interests. Regarding a mediation's result, it will be ascertained what outcomes can a mediation achieve and what parameters are used to determine its success or failure.

The present chapter is divided into five parts. The first four parts will each be dedicated to ascertaining the context, process and outcome determinants of a mediation event, whereas a fifth, and last part, will debate the existing concept of mediation and its limits. In the first part, dedicated to mediation context, the theoretical debate on mediation *initiation*, on how mediation is initiated and in which conflicts will be the focus of attention and analysis, therefore, the conflicts' characteristics, the mediator's and the parties' perspectives, underlying expectations and objectives will be addressed. A second part will focus on the variables which condition a mediation process, namely the actions and the underlying interests which condition both the mediator's and the parties' behaviour in it. When ascertaining what strategies a mediator can choose and employ, it will become necessary to address the relevance of impartiality and neutrality as compulsory mediator characteristics and the impact of mediator *bias* in a mediation process. This debate will then follow to ascertaining what actors perform mediation and how and to evaluating whether a mix of strategies and, necessarily, of actors can be an effective *multiparty* mediation process. The third part regards the parties' behaviour, their perspectives and expectations when being mediated, their impact in the mediation process and, unavoidably, the internationalization phenomenon of intrastate conflict through mediation will be addressed. In the

fourth part of this chapter a broad definition for mediation success, which considers all positive outcomes a meditation process can provide a conflict situation, will be searched for in the literature. Finally, in the fifth part a suggestion is made on a broad understanding of the concept of mediation in a holistic theoretic perspective considered to better mirror mediation in practice.

2.1. Conflict as Mediation Context

Bercovitch et al. (1991, 8) define mediation as:

> "a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law".

Mediation in international relations is, therefore, an instrument of conflict management that implies the entrance of an outside party into the conflict's environment with the objective of aiding the disputants in its peaceful resolution. Since a conflict typically develops among two opposing actors, this outside party, whether the conflict has developed among two or more actors, is commonly referred to as the "third" party. To Bercovitch et al. (1991,8), the third party is an outsider to the conflict that becomes involved in it to perform a conflict managing task and who, therefore, is not directly a disputant. Mediation is seen as lacking coerciveness and as an entirely voluntary act whose existence and performance is dependent on all involved parties' cooperation, therefore certain pre-conditions need to exist in order for mediation to take place.

Wall et al. (2001, 371-372) group in two factors, norms and expected benefits, the conditions under which disputants and would-be mediators become involved in mediation. For the disputants, culturally embedded norms and domestic and international laws motivate them to seek or allow third parties to handle their disagreements and so do the benefits they expect to yield through this assistance when comparing the expected outcome of the mediation to that of the alternative option of continuing the conflict. In Maoz's and Terris' view (2009, 70), disputants will call for, or accept, a mediator's offer when the expected utility of an agreement exceeds that

of the continued conflict. Notwithstanding, mediation does not come without cost to disputants. With a mediator's involvement disputants lose some control over the peace process and may even suffer a loss of public face for being incapable of resolving their own dispute, as well as, during the course of mediation, concessions will have to be made, political or economic ties with the mediator may be lost and, also, the whole process may even result in a less-than-hoped-for outcome (Bercovitch and Gartner 2009, 21).

For mediation to be effective, mediators will have to be able to manage the costs of mediation for disputants, but they will also have to manage their own. It is not only the disputants who perform a cost/benefit evaluation of the mediation process. For mediators, domestic and international norms and laws create a societal obligation to mediate a dispute, but the mediator may also be motivated to mediate because it expects to yield benefits for itself or its constituents through the mediation's exercise (Wall et al. 2001, 372-373). Mediators will be willing to mediate a dispute when the expected gains from the prospect of successful conflict resolution outweigh the costs mediating entails (Terris and Maoz 2005, 563). Domestic and international political costs, media criticism, reputation losses or censure from the parties are some of the risks a mediator incurs in performing mediation (Bercovitch and Gartner 2009, 21).

For Terris and Maoz (2005, 564-569), the fact that mediators perform this cost/benefit assessment explains why certain conflicts will be more amenable to mediation since this "mediation dilemma" suggests that conflicts that exhibit a greater possibility of resolution and of a successful mediation will be more positively weight by would-be mediators and, therefore, will be more susceptible to being mediated. Conflict *versatility* is suggested by the authors as the measure for conflict amenability to mediation. *Versatile* conflicts are those which can more easily be transformed by the mediator from a static adversarial dual game into a dynamic cooperative triad, the ones in which the mediator believes to be capable of moving the parties from an adversarial to a cooperative game by altering the disputants' evaluation of the cost/benefit relation between prolonging conflict and searching an agreement.

Although the cost/benefit evaluation made by the would-be mediators in versatility theory recognizes that a mediator has vested interests in the conflict's management and that, therefore, performs a cost assessment according to the expected conflict game's susceptibility to transformation, this may not be the case for all kinds of would-be mediators, since international and regional organizations become mediators for *peacemaking* purposes. How is a cost/benefit evaluation made when the benefit is peace? What cost can surpass peace for these organizations

to refrain from mediating? When the mediators' vested interest in the conflict's management is to yield the benefits of peace, it will offer to mediate whatever the cost.

Bercovitch and Gartner's (2009, 21, 25, 31) findings also contradict *versatility theory*. The authors find that the mediators' and disputants' reasoning that determines if a conflict is mediated leads to the tendency for mediation to be performed in more intractable conflicts. As it has been described, mediation is costly and risky, both for mediators and for disputants. A mediator's involvement signals that a conflict has become too difficult that the disputants cannot end it alone and too costly for them to maintain it, therefore, high-intensity and complex conflicts, where an agreement or a resolution is unlikely to be found between the disputants on their own, are the ones that are often mediated. Because mediation is costly, mediators will more likely channel their resources into managing the most intense conflicts that generate international attention and insecurity.

Bercovitch (1986, 156) notes that mediators, whether they have become mediators through finding themselves involved in a conflict due to a geographical, historical, political or strategic connection with the disputants, through their own initiative or in response to one or both disputants call for mediation, enter the conflict when it exhibits certain characteristics. The author observes that mediation usually occurs: when the conflict has complexified and "drained out" to an extent that the disputants wish to avoid the conflict's escalation into violent conflict; when disputants can no longer sustain the ongoing war effort or it is foreseeable that this effort cannot bring victory to either side; when they are prepared to be cooperative to break the conflict's stalemate through communication; or when they have reached a negotiation impasse in their own conflict management efforts.

This propitious moment for mediation to occur in a conflict's life cycle is defined by Zartman (2001 8-9, 14) as the *ripe* moment and identified as the only one when a mediation process can be successful. A *ripe* moment is that when a *mutually hurting stalemate* exists, one when both disputants feel they have locked themselves in a conflict that neither is in a position to win. Because victory is seen as not achievable, disputants find themselves in the painful deadlock of having to continue a conflict that they cannot win and which's continued escalation may have catastrophic consequences for both. At this given moment, disputants start looking for a way out and the *ripe* timing exists in the conflict for mediation to occur. However, *ripeness* is not sufficient for mediation to occur, it must be identified and seized, either by the parties or through a mediator's persuasion. The perception of *ripeness* will also be important during the mediation

process and must be maintained in order for the parties not to drop out on the negotiations and pursue the alternative conflict re-escalation. On the other hand, the inexistence of *ripeness,* the author considers, cannot mean a mediators' inaction and, in such cases, it must be produced.

For Kleiboer (1994 115) it is an important mediator role to try to convince the parties that having their conflict managed by mediation is desirable and possible. Disputants' *willingness* to finding agreement is the essence of *ripeness* and not stalemate. A mutually hurting stalemate may not suffice to make the parties willing to be mediated and neither can mediation be dependent on the existence of a mutually hurting stalemate that provides a *ripe* moment. Especially in conflicts where disputants are *enduring rivals* involved in intractable conflicts, Grieg (2001, 693) argues the mediator's capacity to improve the relationship between disputants is essential. Because the adversarial relationship becomes deeply rooted in long-term rivalries, the *timing* of the mediation attempts along the conflict's life cycle becomes crucial. To the author *ripeness* is not *sine-qua-non* to mediation success but only one that can improve its likelihood.

Mediation is a non-coercive conflict management process in which both disputants and mediators voluntarily accept to take part in. Because mediation entails costs for all actors involved, certain conflicts will have more willing disputants to accept mediation offers and more willing mediators to make a mediation offer than others. Versatile conflicts, in which the conflict adversarial relationship between disputants is more susceptible to being transformed into a cooperative one, would, therefore, be the ones more prone to be mediated. However, intractable conflicts that pose a great threat to international security are the ones especially targeted by mediation initiatives of, peace-promoting, international and regional organizations. Intractable or not, mediation typically occurs at a given moment in a conflict's life cycle, when the disputants are searching for a way out of a mutually hurting stalemate of continuous fighting and are also willing to be mediated. However, It is not only up to the disputants but, more importantly, to the mediator to cease or even to generate these ripe moments for mediation in a given conflict. Especially in the case of conflict between long-term rivals, the mediator's capacity to perceive the best timing for mediation attempts along the conflict's life cycle and to continuously induce disputants to cooperate becomes crucial.

2.2. Mediator Strategies and Mediator Style

Who mediates conflict in international relations? A mediator is an actor who has the resources, the standing or the interest, either one or the combination of two or all these conditions, to manage a certain conflict. In the anarchic international system, where there is no centralized form of authority, mediators and mediation activities emerge from a variety of actors and are performed in a variety of forms. To best serve its conflict management interests, a mediator plans his intervention by performing a choice on how to handle the mediation process. Considering the specific context and characteristics of the dispute to be mediated, the mediator chooses the strategy to be employed that it finds can best alter the dispute or/and the parties' interactions to transform the existing adversarial dual relationship into a bargaining cooperative triad (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004, 153). The mediator's interests, perceptions, positions, motivations, resources and power to leverage determine its capacity to fulfil different mediator roles and its choice in strategy (Bercovitch and Houston 2000, 180). As it has been described above, mediation is a "strategic engagement" (Bercovitch and Gartner 2009, 20) that is affected by the conflict's, the parties' and the mediators' characteristics, therefore, the particular form under which it takes place will be a product of a variety of factors.

A mediation strategy is "a goal or a means to the overall objective of managing a conflict constructively and effectively" (Bercovitch and Houston 2000, 183). Mediator strategies differ in terms of a more passive or active role of the mediator in the mediation process and, consequently, on the amount of resources they demand of the mediator. They are not mutually exclusive or isolated units, but rather typologies that emerge from authors' observance of patterns of mediator behaviour. The different kinds of strategies can be used isolatedly or in a mix by one or more mediators, which can also be of different types, although some are more typically used by sates and others by international organizations, in the same conflict.

In mediation literature there are two main proposals on a typology of strategies utilized by mediators in conflict management. Zartman and Touval (1996, 454-455) consider a mediator uses three types of strategies in a particular order, which also encompasses a progressive increase in mediator involvement in the mediation process: as a bridge between the parties as a *communicator,* as a pressuring *formulator* and, finally, as an active *manipulator* that calls into question mediation's "triangular relationship". As *communicators*, mediators are purely passive

vehicles for contact and message transmitters between the parties who, due to their conflict, had not have direct contact for a period of time and wish to do so without appearing weak or losing face. In a second stage, the mediator is a *formulator* that affects the substance of the negotiations by helping the parties to conceive ways out of their dispute, making suggestions on solutions to their conflict and persuading the parties to accept them. A *formulator* is, or must be, more powerful than a communicator and an imaginative creator of ways to unblock the parties' constraints to accepting a solution. With the maximum degree of involvement, the powerful *manipulator* "pushes and pulls" the parties into resolution by either, making his proposed solution more attractive, by adding benefits as a way to overcome imbalances that prevent one or both parties to accept it, or by supporting or condemning one of the parties in order to increase the perceived cost of continuing conflict for the party who refused to come around.

Bercovitch and Houston (2000, 175) modified Zartman and Touval's taxonomy by identifying three categories of mediator behaviour along a continuum ranging from lower to higher intervention strategies: *communication-facilitation*, *procedural* and *directive* strategies. *Communication-facilitation* strategies are the least intrusive of Bercovitch and Houston's taxonomy in which a passive mediator has little control over the mediation process or substance, acting as an information channel and facilitating cooperation between the parties, making use of such tactics as establishing contact with the parties and stimulating their interaction and communication, identifying their interests and issues at conflict and stimulating their discussion (Bercovitch and Su-Mi Lee 2001). In *procedural* [3] strategies the mediator exerts control over the mediation's environment by deciding on aspects of its formal process, determining where, when, how often or on what agenda meetings take place, their pace, formality, protocols and procedures (Bercovitch and Su-Mi Lee 2001). By controlling the mediation environment the mediator is also able to exert control over outside influences emanating from constituencies and the media and also over the distribution of information to the parties and to the outside (Bercovitch and Houston 2000, 175). *Procedural* strategies allow the mediator to structure the agenda and decide what issues should be discussed first, to highlight common interests and generate understandings, to reduce tensions, to keep the parties at the table and to help them save-face and, overall, are designed to promote a favourable environment for conflict management where and when it does not exist to sustain the mediation process (Bercovitch and Su Mi-Lee 2001). At the end of Bercovitch and Houston's (2000, 175) continuum, *directive*

[3] In his most recent work, Bercovitch has referred to this type of strategies as *procedural-formulative* strategies (Bercovitch and Su Mi-Lee 2001).

strategies are the most intrusive and powerful form of mediation by which the mediator affects the content and substance of the mediation process. A *directive* mediator aims at changing the parties' behaviour and motivation by providing incentives or issuing ultimatums that alter the way in which they frame conflicting issues with the underlying objective of inciting the parities to cooperate. To affect the parties' perspectives on the mediation process, their expectations or their issue-framing, a *directive* mediator must possess power and resources to successfully perform certain tactics such as increasing non-agreement costs, taking responsibility for concessions, rewarding party concessions, promising resources or threatening their withdrawal, or offering to observe agreement compliance (Bercovitch and Su Mi-Lee).

Beardsley et al. (2006, 62-66) propose a new taxonomy based on the two existing taxonomies in mediation literature. The authors suggest a continuum of mediator styles in which mediation can be *facilitative*, *formulative* or *manipulative*. For the authors, Bercovitch and Houston's *facilitation* concept is preferable to that of *communication* suggested by Zartman and Touval to describe mediation performance at the lower level of the intervention spectrum because it better encapsulates the range of activities that are performed by the mediator. *Facilitative mediation* is defined as "a set of techniques that help actors correctly identify agreements within the overlapping range of possible nonviolent outcomes", whereas the mediator serves, not only, as communication channel, but also as an information provider who clarifies misconceptions the parties have over their opponent. Moving towards the middle of the spectrum, Beardlsey et al. prefer Zartman and Touval 's *formulator* concept to that of *procedural* proposed by Bercovitch and Houston, conceiving *formulative* mediators as proposition creators and makers and not merely as "environment controllers". *Formulative* mediators are "coordinators" who structure the negotiations, create temporal constraints, redefine issues and create focal points and/or propose alternatives, especially when an impasse is reached at the negotiations' table. Regarding the most intrusive strategies, Beardlsey et al. also prefer Zartman and Touval's *manipulation* concept, defining *manipulative mediation* as one in which the mediator uses its leverage to influence the negotiations process by, either increasing the immediate cost of continuing conflict, and/or the future cost of not finding agreement. To increase the former cost, the *manipulative* mediator offers "carrots" increasing the benefits for one or both parties by offering a direct compensation and economic or diplomatic benefits for accepting the proposed agreement, whereas to increase future costs the *manipulator* employs "sticks", a penalty for non-agreement, such as economic or diplomatic sanctions or direct

military intervention. However, to promise benefits and issue threats the *manipulative* mediator will have to have brought the parties together through *facilitative mediation* and to have had proposed an agreement, which the parties are pressured to accept, through a *formulative* strategy.



Fig.1. Bradsley et al. (2006, 62-66) Mediation Style Continuum

The difference, however, between Bercovitch and Houston's and Zartman an Touval's conception of the higher intrusive mediation strategy is that the latter consider that when a mediator uses its power over the parties, to leverage them into agreement, it ceases to be a mediator. Because the mediator is considered to lose its neutrality, the "triangular relationship" of mediation is considered to be broken and that the mediator has become a third party in the conflict (1996, 454), while in Bercovitch and Houston's *directive* strategies the mediator does not become a third party in the conflict. To understand what concept, that of *manipulative* or of *directive,* can better suit strategies used at the highest level of the intrusiveness spectrum it is necessary to ascertain if neutrality is a necessary condition for mediation performance.

2.2.1 Impartiality, Neutrality and Bias

The question of whether a mediator must or not be neutral is, has it has been set forth, related to the question of whether or not a mediator ceases to be one when using a highly intrusive strategy to pressure the parties into making concessions or accepting an agreement. Impartiality and neutrality are, therefore, associated with the more fundamental question of what should or not be considered mediation. In mediation literature a division exists between supporters of *pure* mediation, to which a mediator must be impartial and neutral and, thus is always a passive mediator, and those who argue that the use of active *muscled* strategies is an

important mediator asset and, because it is so, neutrality and impartiality cannot define the limits of what is or what is not to be considered mediation. Should the use of a partial strategy in a mediation process be considered mediation? Should the highest intrusive strategies be considered mediation? Can mediation be partial?

Fisher and Keashley (1991, 33) make a distinction between *pure mediation*, in which a mediator assists the parties in conflict in finding an agreement by using reasoning, persuasion and suggesting alternatives, from *mediation with muscle* or *power mediation*, which includes the use of leverage and coercion by the mediator through offers of reward or threats of punishment to move the parties towards settlement and, thus becoming "a member of the negotiating triad". While for *pure mediation* supporters impartiality and the perception of a mediator's neutrality is key to gaining the parties trust and acceptance and, therefore, *power mediation* cannot be considered mediation (Skjelsbaek 1991, 100), for impartiality critics a mediator has to be capable of exerting influence over the parties to bring the negotiation process into the desired outcome, emphasising the importance of a mediators' resources and capacity to *leverage* (Smith 1994, 445-446).

Leverage is the word for *power* in meditation literature and to Zartman and Touval (1996, 455) refers to the "ability to move a party in an intended direction", one that is essential for a mediator to possess since the parties, whose interest is in winning the negotiations, welcome the mediator only if they perceive it as capable of leveraging the other party to cede. In the parties' acceptance of a mediator there is the underlying expectance that a mediator will bring about an attractive outcome, which means that a mediator is perceived to have a certain outcome preference and, therefore, is partial. For Zartman and Touval, the cost-benefit assessment made by the parties when accepting a mediator renders impartiality unimportant and unnecessary. Equally, for Bercovitch (1986, 163-164) "effective mediation in international relations is a matter of resources, not impartiality", it depends on the mediator's knowledge and skill but also on his prestige, authority and access to resources that either one or both parties value, especially because highly intrusive strategies are much more effective in conflict management than lower ones (Bercovitch and Su-Mi Lee, 2001).

Wall (1981, 162, 166) draws attention to the fact that partiality, or *bias*, can be present even in lower involvement strategies when a mediator adopts "proactive tactics", such as biasing communicated information or claiming authorship of a party's proposal, if he finds these to better serve the mediation process and outcome. But are "proactive tactics" beneficial to the mediation

process and outcome? A mediator is not required to be impartial, but is neutrality a necessary precondition?

For Svensson (2009,450), a *biased* mediator is one who engages in mediation, at least partly, to ensure that its interests, or those of its protégé, are taken into account in the conflict settlement, while a *neutral* mediator is propelled to engage in mediation due to an humanitarian impulse and altruistic motivations for ending the conflict. Notwithstanding, Svensson also argues that while a neutral mediator may not support any of the sides directly, it has interests that result from concerns over its reputation and image. What this assumption suggests is that a mediator can be more *biased* or more *neutral*, in other words, that a mediator will rarely be purely neutral and will most frequently deposit a certain interest in the conflict and the mediation outcome. While impartiality refers to the mediator's lack of preference in favor of one or more parties in conflict, neutrality presupposes an unbiased relationship between the mediator and the disputants (Kleiboer 1996, 369).

Richmond (1998 (1), 717) argues that a disputant accepts or invites a certain mediator expecting that he will be able to convince his adversary of the rightfulness of his demands, therefore disputants do not desire the mediator to be neutral. Neutrality is, therefore, neither fully felt nor exercised by a mediator, nor do disputants truly desire the mediator to be neutral. For Terris and Maoz (2009, 69-70, 83) the crucial mediator characteristic, or requirement, that has impact on the occurrence, process and mediation outcome is neither impartiality nor neutrality but *credibility*. The measure of a mediator's credibility is one made by the parties considering the mediator's past experience, capabilities, and the relationship they hold with it. A mediator's credibility relies both on the extent to which the parties find its offer to mediate believable, which means that the parties believe the mediator to have the desire and the interest to mediate, and that the mediator is capable of delivering its offer, that is, of being capable of acting as a mediator in their conflict. For Svensson (2009, 116-11) *reputation* is the essential mediator characteristic because it is the essential determinant of its credibility, or what makes them credible peace guarantors for the conflicting parties. Parties perceive mediators who are concerned about reputational costs will be less inclined to deceit them and will be more able to deliver any promised security guarantees, therefore, the author considers the parties will be more able to maintain a cooperative behaviour and to make credible commitments. The essential element behind credibility and reputation is that of *trust*, that the parties trust the mediator to be capable of delievering a mediation offer.

As the effectiveness of high involvement mediation strategies has been demonstrated in mediation literature and the impact of the parties' perceptions of the mediator and the mediation process have been highlighted, impartiality and neutrality have been shown not be crucial conditions for mediation initiation, process and outcome. Mediator reputation and credibility have, thus, become more pragmatic concepts of required mediator characteristics for effective mediation processes and successful outcomes. Since a mediator needs not be impartial nor neutral the "triangular relationship" is not broken when high involvement strategies are used as suggested by Zartman and Touval. A third party can perform mediation if it is biased. Leverage can be a crucial asset for a mediator to bring the parties into agreement and leveraging tactics will often be partial because they tend to reward or punish one side or the other. A directive mediator may have vested interests in the conflict and side with one of the parties to influence an outcome and still be a mediator because the underlying objective of his directive performance is the conflict's management. A mediator does not need to be impartial since, as it has been argued, a mediator will never be a completely disinterested intervener, even when performing the most passive of roles. That is not to say that a mediator is always biased. A mediator may never be *purely* neutral but he can still be so, to an extent, when the focus of his involvement is in safeguarding no other interest than that of peace, as opposed to a *biased* mediator who will be involved in the conflict to protect self-interests but, that are not contrary to that of making peace.

In sum, a mediator does not have to be impartial and mediation does not have to be *pure.* A powerful mediator can and will use the resources available to him to pressure the parties into making concessions and finding agreement. The capacity to *leverage* is an important mediator asset but one that is often possessed by actors who have vested interests in the conflict and that can have a special relationship with one or both parties. Notwithstanding, a mediator is always an *interested* actor, one that becomes involved in a given conflict because he is interested in the benefits he can achieve from the conflicts' management, even if this is "only" peace. A mediator is never purely neutral because he is always an *interested* actor, which does not mean that he is always biased. A mediator will be considered *neutral* if his only vested interest in the conflict's management is that of generating peace, while a mediator will be *biased* when he holds other interests that he expects to realize with the conflict's management or resolution. Both neutral and biased actors can be credible mediators and can hold the necessary reputation to make valued mediation offers and have the capacity to deliver them. If neither neutrality nor impartiality should be considered necessary preconditions for mediation existence, the triangular

relationship between mediator and mediated is not broken when mediators make use higher intrusive strategies and, therefore, these are better addressed as *directive* rather than *manipulative* strategies.

2.2.2 Mediator Type and Multiparty Mediation

The lack of consensus in mediation theory on whether a mediator is a neutral intervener in conflict management or if it can be a biased actor is, as it has been described, related to the debate on the type of strategies a mediator can employ and, more specifically, on whether intrusive strategies are preferable and more successful to less intrusive strategies. Since certain strategies are more typically performed by certain actors, the debate naturally spills over to which actor, a state or an international organization is the preferable mediator. While a state mediator is often perceived as a *biased* mediator, one who is resourced and powerful and that will be able to use *leverage* to pressure the parties into brokering agreements, an international organization, perceived as a *neutral* mediator, who is solely interested in the conflict's resolution and the promotion of peace and security, will be more susceptible to the parties' attempts to control the mediation process and less able to produce signed agreements. What, then, is the preferable and most effective type of mediator?

The actor offering mediation in conflict management can be either, an individual, a state, a regional organization or an international institution. Bercovitch and Gartner (2009, 23) define individual mediation as the one offered and performed by an isolated individual and identify it as the less frequent type of actor in mediation in this sense. That is not to say that the individual level is not relevant in international conflict mediation, on the contrary, the individual mediator's skill, experience and prestige (Bercovitch 1986, 163) are conditioning factors of the process of mediation but, due to the bulk of costs and risks involved, individuals usually become involved in international conflict mediation as representatives of one of the two other categories of actors and rarely at their own initiative and expense. When mediation is performed by a state or an international or regional institution or organization, national figures such as top decision-makers, current or former leaders, are selected as diplomatic representatives of the state or the international or regional institution or organization as the conflict's mediator (Bercovitch and Gartner 2009, 24), therefore mediation is most commonly exercised by these two types of actors.

Due to intrastate complex and often protracted character, mediation offers to manage this kind of conflict come from resourceful international actors such as states and international organizations.

Historically, states have been the primary mediators, since the rise of the nation-state rendered it the only legitimate actor in the international system. Until the emergence of non-state actors with the end of World War II, powerful states and coalitions guided by the *realpolitik* of interstate relations dominated the third party intervention scene (Frazier and Dixon 2009, 46). Although states are no longer the only legitimate actor to undertake third party intervention and perform mediation in the international system, a realist perspective is still valuable when considering a state's behaviour as mediator. Although a state's intervention as mediator is legitimized by a proclaimed conflict containment objective, underlying the desire for peace a state's motivation for becoming involved in the conflict stems from self-interest and power politics (Zartman and Touval 1996, 446). Savun (2009, 99) argues that the states that are most likely to mediate conflict are those who possess a strong intelligence gathering apparatus, diplomatic representation in the territory of a state involved in the conflict, or alliance ties with it. What this implies is that, typically, there is a pre-existing strategic, diplomatic or historical connection between the mediation-offering state and the disputants, therefore, that a state becomes involved in mediation when the conflict's management is relevant to its interests. State mediators will defensively become involved when a continuing conflict threatens its interests or offensively, when involvement provides it with an opportunity to expand its international influence (Zartman and Touval 1996, 446-447).

While powerful states are typically most likely to be involved in mediation due to resource availability, smaller states can also be effective mediators because they possess other resources, not related to the capacity to offer incentives or threaten punishment to incite disputants to cooperate, but those that stem from the diplomatic and historical connection they may hold with the disputants. Reputation and the absence of the threat of punishment are the resource and the advantage "weak" states offer that make them suitable and acceptable mediators to disputing parties (Frazier and Dixon 2009, 48). Nonetheless, small or medium sized states are also motivated by their interest in avoiding the conflict's spill-over to its territory, in avoiding taking sides, in promoting its own security or in enhancing its influence (Zartman and Touval 1996, 448-447).

International organizations (IOs) have developed in the XX century as crucial peaceful interaction framework providers between the diversified typology of actors that have emerged in

the modern, globalized, international system. Being forums for debate and providing norms for interaction, international organizations are information disseminators and liability establishers. Because international organizations are a product of a centralized cooperation among states, they are seen as legitimate information collectors that reduce uncertainty in the international system and, thus, continue to facilitate and foster cooperation among actors (Savun 2009, 100-101). As product of cooperation, they are perceived as legitimate and neutral actors, what allows for states, through them, to be able to manage conflicts at a lower cost (Frazier and Dixon 2009, 51).

IOs have become active participants in peacemaking and conflict management activities, particularly the UN, now freed from the bipolar constraints of the Cold war period. The emergence of intrastate conflictuality in the post-Cold War era has emphasised the UN's role as the centre for initiating and concerting efforts and legitimizing their use in managing conflict worldwide (Bercovitch and Gartner 2009, 24). Although the UN has been criticized for being an inefficient and ineffectual bureaucracy, it possesses exclusive resources as a mediator, such as specialized and skilled personnel and the capacity to mobilize international consensus around its mediation initiatives (Bercovitch and Gartner 2009, 25). UN mediation is also advantageous for the parties in conflict since its involvement, as dictated by the UN Charter, holds no other interest than maintaining peace and security and, also, because the parties can *save-face* once concessions can be made on behalf the international community and not as a loss and weakness *vis-à-vis* the adversary (Richmond b1998, 26). On the other hand, the involvement of the UN in conflict management has the effect of internationalizing the dispute through making available a forum in which the disputants can search for support and legitimization to their claims and positions from other states (Richmond b1998, 25). When the UN mediates a conflict, the disputants tend to have a greater control over the process than when mediation is performed by a state because its coercive capacity is lower. The initiation of mediation is much more dependent on the disputants' interest in being mediated by the UN (Richmond b1998, 10), which can stem from the interest in internationalizing their dispute and not on finding a solution for it.

The UN is not dispossessed of leverage, but its capacity to leverage stems, not from its military capacity and its relative power position in the international system, as it does for states, but from its international status and reputation. Notwithstanding, its coercive potential is lower than that of the former and, unlike states, which are drawn into mediation by national interest in the conflicts' management, international organizations, the UN in particular, mediate with the

only purpose of managing the conflict, and therefore, deposit a greater interest than states in the conflicts' solution (Richmond b1998, 10). States have a higher capacity to use leverage because their resources allow them to use "carrots and sticks" to coerce the parties into brokering agreement, while international organizations have a lower capacity to leverage the parties but are more committed than states to solving the conflict.

States have more capacity to leverage but are seen as less neutral or biased mediators, while IOs have a lower capacity to leverage but are seen as more neutral. Because of their different resource capabilities, it is expected that higher involvement mediation strategies will more typically be performed by states, while IOs will be more inclined to pursue less intrusive strategies that do not require the capacity to leverage the parties and that do not damage their most valuable resource, their perceived neutrality, which also is the source of its legitimacy as mediator. However, having less coercive resources, IOs will be limited to the use of less intrusive mediation styles and the success of its mediation will rely much more on the parties will to maintain a cooperative behaviour, while states, understood as more resourced and powerful mediators, will exert more control over the parties due to their interest in the mediators' resources (Smith 1994, 447). Which mediator, a state characterized as powerful, resourced and holding a special relationship with the either the parties and, therefore, biased, or an IO, characterized by a higher commitment to the conflict's solution, reputation as peace guarantor and neutrality, will be more effective in mediation initiation, process and outcome?

For Bercovitch and Su-Mi Lee (2001) trust is an essential ingredient for mediation success, but for mediators and parties to share a degree of trust in each other they must share common interests and belong to the same regime or alliance. While this could hold true considering the case of a pre-existing alliance between the state mediator and one or both parties, it also holds true in the case of an international organization as mediator of which one or both parties are part of. For Kydd (2003), biased mediators are preferable to neutral mediators because they are attributed a greater credibility from the conflicting parties. The author argues that, in order to be effective, a mediator has to be seen as credible by the conflicting parties, that is, that they must trust the mediator is being truthful in the information and counselling he is giving. The argument rests in the assumption that, because a neutral or *unbiased* mediator posits its greater interest in minimizing the possibility of war, he will have an incentive to make statements to avoid war even if they are not true and, therefore, will not be trusted by the parties. Only a mediator who is trusted not to use "cheap talk" and who is believed to be on one parties'

side will be effective inducing the parties into agreement. For the authors above, directive strategies are the most effective and successful of the mediation type spectrum, which are not typically performed by an IO but by a state mediator.

Frazier and Dixon (2009, 59) argue that IOs are better in fostering trust because their intervention in conflict carries an internationally granted legitimacy. The authors sustain that while less trusted, states are more successful in reaching settlements due to their capacity to offer carrots and sticks to generate cooperation but, because a state is biased and/or a party may have been pressured by the state mediator to accept an agreement, either one, the parties may perceive it as unfair and the agreement may not endure. IOs are considered more effective mediators because they are more successful in securing an agreement between the parties than a state. Analysing the UN's credibility *vis-à-vis* that of a state, Svensson (2009, 116-117) argues that, while the UN is comparatively weak, it has a reputational incentive to be honest and to deliver its promises and, therefore, will be more credible and more capable of resolving the parties' commitment problems with an agreement. The author calls attention to the fact that arriving at an agreement is not sinequanon to its implementation since the parties can be reluctant to settle the conflict if they perceive the possibility of exploiting the other party when the agreement is reached.

Criticizing support in the literature for considering directive mediation as the most effective of styles, Haxia (2007, 593), calls attention to the necessity of considering the long-term and the short-term effects of the different mediation strategies. The author argues that the literature has failed to assess the long-term impact on the conflict of the use of directive strategies and that only its immediate impact in suppressing the conflict has been considered and the fact that, once the directive mediator ceases mediating, the conflict recurs. Similarly, performing a comparative assessment of the effectiveness of different mediation styles in conflict management, Beardsley et al. (2006, 68-69, 83) come to the conclusion that low intervention strategies are more successful in resolving the parties' commitment problems and in reducing conflict tensions in the long-run because formulation and facilitation are more effective in helping the disputants recognize and better understand the other's arguments and in reducing mistrust and misconception, while high intervention strategies are the most successful in preventing bargaining failures, that is in effectively securing a formal agreement. Quinn et al. (2009, 194) finds that even though facilitative and formulative mediation will not be able to induce compromise between the parties as effectively as directive mediation, because the mediators

performing the former styles will not be able to employ the same degree of leverage that directive mediators do and that this renders them more effective in achieving agreements, the former styles are more successful in reducing tensions in the long and in generating commitment to what was agreed.

Comparative analysis on the short/long-term effects of mediation strategies has led to support in the literature to the most effective form of mediation being the one which allows for a capitalization of the advantages offered by the different mediation styles (Vukovic 2011, 117-118). While directive mediators can be useful interveners when conflict tension escalates and a threat or a display of the use of force exists that render the parties unwilling to negotiate by using leverage to prevent escalation and to pressure the parties into returning to the negotiating table, facilitative and formulative mediators can work with the parties in the improvement of their relationship and the development of trust (Frazier and Dixon 2009, 58-59). However, directive strategies are unlikely to work when the conflicts' intensity is low because they damage the de-escalated environment if parties find the mediator to be conducive and self-interested, suspect of the mediators' intentions or the fairness of an agreement and refuse to negotiate or agree (Bercovitch and Gartner 2009, 28).

The potential for complementarity between the existing variety of mediating activities has become increasingly recognized in mediation literature as "the key" (Beardsley et al., 2006 81 and Bercovitch and Gartner 2009, 39) to effective mediation and conflict management, which suggests that a coordinated and sequenced action (Carment et al. 2009, 233) between neutral and biased mediators, or states and international organizations, would achieve the most effective mediation processes and successful outcomes. *Multiparty mediation* is defined by Croker et al. (1999, 30-33, 41-42) as "attempts by many third parties to assist peace negotiations in any given conflict", which may occur sequentially, one mediator at a time over the life of the conflict, or simultaneously, many different mediators at the same time. When conflict is at its lowest level of tension, the authors support that non-state actors, such as international organizations, are the most effective in bringing the parties into the negotiations table and in widening their perspectives on the conflicts' solution possibilities. IOs are also considered effective for post-crisis moments in helping tension de-escalation by exerting procedural control over the negotiations and to monitor or facilitate agreement implementation. When conflict tensions are escalating or violence occurs, leverage is needed to generate incentives for the parties to cease fighting and come to the negotiating table, therefore, a state actor will be the most effective. The advantage of *multiparty*

mediation resides in the possibility of these different mediators intervening at different points in the conflict's cycle when their mediation style is potentially more effective, however, having more than one mediator involved, coherence, coordination and the sequencing of the various mediators' initiatives become essential. The right mix of skills and resources for each specific moment in the conflict's cycle is the comparative advantage of *multiparty mediation*, however, as the number of interveners increases conflicting interests and positions may exist between the mediators themselves, therefore, the development and sustenance of a coordinated intervention strategy is essential to capitalize on the different kinds of mediation styles advantages and effectiveness (Croker et al. 1999 40-41).

While states are motivated to mediate in order to protect their own interests and stakes in the conflict, international organizations, hold no other interest than promoting peace and security. A product of centralized cooperation, international organizations are perceived as legitimate and neutral actors and possess unique mediator resources, such as access to information and skilled personnel or the holding international support for its mediation initiatives. Neutrality is crucial, not only for international organizations' acceptance as mediator, but to the parties concession-making in the negotiations process. However, neutrality may allow the parties to have a greater control over the mediation process, especially when they use it to find allies and supporters for their causes in the international arena and undermine the cooperation and solution-finding process mediation should be. Because of neutrality also, parties in conflict may devalue the international organization advices and appeals if they feel it is merely trying to avoid war and not properly considering their interests.

Due to their international status and reputation, international organizations are better at fostering trust between the parties than states are. However, because they do not have the same capacity as states to offer "carrots and sticks" to pressure the parties, they are less successful in reaching settlements. On the other hand, while a state employing a directive strategy will be able to pressure the parties into signing an agreement, in the long-run, conflict may reoccur because the parties where not prepared to commit or because they perceive the agreement as being unfair. Low intrusive strategies that affect the parties' relationship, their perspectives of each other and their interests are the most effective in generating commitments but can be ineffective in bringing the parties into signing an agreement. This suggests that low and high intrusive strategies and complementary and, therefore, that states' and international organizations' mediation initiatives can also be so. Multiparty mediation initiatives, therefore, hold a substantial

effectiveness potential in conflict management when allowing for different actors to act on different moments in the conflict when their strategies can most be successful.

2.3 The Parties' Perspective and Internationalization

Similarly to mediators, disputants call out, or accept, a mediator's involvement after the expected cost/benefit assessment is made of having their dispute mediated, that is to say that, although mediation exists for the purpose of conflict management or resolution, the interest a disputant has in being mediated is not necessarily correspondent to having the dispute managed or resolved. To ascertain the spectrum of motives disputants in conflict develop to seek and accept to become parties under mediation it is necessary to understand what costs and benefits are weighed by disputants and, to perform this task, to consider their perceptions and expectations regarding the mediation process.

The actors between whom a conflict emerges and is fought are referred to as *disputants.* When a mediation process is initiated between them the actors involved in the mediated conflict become *parties* in a negotiation process. The change in terminology suggests an attitudinal change in the *disputants,* from being concentrated on achieving victory over their opponent to that of *parties* in a collective effort to resolve their dispute and end the conflict, but how does this attitudinal change occur? Why do disputants in conflict choose to become parties in a mediation process?

Mediation is voluntary, which means its existence depends on the disputants' will to allow their conflict to be mediated. The choice of having their conflict mediated is determined not solely by the undesirability of continued conflict but also the parties' positive cost-benefit assessment of having their conflict mediated. There are other alternatives to having their conflict mediated, such as brokering negotiations themselves, but the choice for mediation signifies that disputants expect greater benefits from mediation than from the use of other conflict management instruments (Bercovitch 1986, 156). Do disputants resort to mediation with the intention of resolving their conflict, or can they also be driven by the possibility of winning over their opponent through the diplomatic route?

Entering direct negotiations with an opponent signifies great political costs for parties. Showing willingness to negotiate carries: a risk that the move will be seen as a sign of weakness, the fear that the opponent may not agree to talk, and the consequences in case the negotiations fail. Mediation offers a face-saving device for disputants who do not which to continue the conflict but do not desire to sustain the costs of brokering direct negotiations with the adversary. Mediation can be suggested, or even instigated, by third parties and allow disputants to save-face by seeming to accept mediation as a result of this pressure. On the other hand, while direct negotiations imply direct contact between parties, some forms of mediation do not and, therefore, allow disputants to not appear weak, or to be conceding, when accepting to talk in an indirect format with the opponent. Mediation allows the disputants to justify the change from conflict to diplomacy, however, it also makes it easier for them to walk away from the negotiations table at a lower cost because the risk that the other party will resort to arms when already involved in a mediation process is lower. Similarly, because disputants may be pressured to accept mediation, this acceptance may not mean that they are sincerely committed to solving their dispute through diplomatic means (Greig and Diehl 2009, 172).

For disputants to be willing to abandon the conflict-generated antagonistic and adversarial position towards cooperation and agree to negotiate under mediation, a transformation process needs to occur. It is this process through which the disputants become receptive to conflict management tools as a means of achieving their goals in detriment of militarized means that Grieg and Diehl (2009, 160-162) call *softening up*. This concept differs from the idea of conflict versatility in as much as it does not imply a change in goals and policy preferences in the disputants, towards each other, but only an attitudinal transformation on how to achieve those same goals, a change in perspective on how they could manage their rivalry to acquire a better outcome for themselves, purely strategic in nature, about their beliefs about how their relationship with the adversary should be continued. If versatility focuses on the mediators' willingness to explain why conflicts are mediated, softening up provides insight on why the disputants become willing to be mediated. The voluntary character of mediation renders it necessary for "willingness" to exist simultaneously on the part of the mediator and on the disputants' part.

Disputants' expectations regarding the mediation outcome become a decisive factor in the choice for mediation since the disputants will compare the expected outcome from mediation to those of the current conflicted interaction with their opponent. The disputants' choice is a

product of an "individual" or isolated process that does not consider the joint outcomes of the mediation process, but rather the disputant's expected outcomes (Wall et al. 2001, 374). Disputant's expectations are sourced in their individual projections of the mediation process, projections which are constructed by the way they view the mediation process and, unavoidably, on the perception they have of the mediator himself.

Richmond (1998 (2), 37-39) draws attention to mediation literature's concentration on the mediators' perspective of the mediation process, which bypasses the reciprocal relationship between the mediator and the mediated that a mediation process entails. When the perspective is turned to the disputants' point of view, resolving the conflict may not be the guiding objective as it is always in a mediator's perspective. Instead, disputants may be guided by other objectives other than compromising with the other party, while still being aware of the need to remain cooperative in order to avoid having to recede to the use of violence. While cooperation is still desired by the disputants, it is of an elusive kind, since the parties will not have the will to compromise during the mediation process. In Richmond's (1998 (2), 39) terminology, parties may view mediation as a tool to realizing their "devious objectives" and an alternative choice emerges to the two-sided option between continuing the conflict and compromising with an agreement, that of continuing their struggle at a low level, with minimal costs and concessions. In pursuing the alternative, mediation is viewed by the parties as an instrument and a vehicle to winning over their opponent or at least avoiding defeat. Consequently, the assets and resources a mediator (the ally it can become or the access to other allies it can represent) can bring into the conflict to aid the disputants in realizing their objectives will be more valued than an agreement and, therefore, the determinant factor of disputants' acceptance of mediation.

Intrastate conflicts are referred by Richmond (1998 (2), 43-47) as especially prone to disputants holding devious objectives during the mediation process because the parties are alienated and the issues in conflict are related to self-preservation, which makes it difficult for them to see the conflict, or the mediation process, other than a win-lose situation where alliances with external actors become crucial. In the case of an intrastate dispute, the entrance of a mediator implicates the conflict's internationalization, particularly when the mediator is an international or regional organization or institution, and hence the vehicle for the parties to search for external allies and support. In this context, internationalization is a vital interest for the parties, the mediation process is viewed as a vehicle to its achievement and the mediator as an agent of empowerment or a third party that can strengthen their position *vis-à-vis* their opponent's.

The choice for mediation by disputants is a result of a cost/benefit assessment that unavoidably takes into account the objectives they expect to realize when enrolling in a mediation process. Because mediation allows disputants to save-face it becomes susceptible to being instrumentalized by disputants to continue their dispute at a lower level and with lower cost through the diplomatic route. Versatility theory and *softening up* are not opposing concepts, in fact, they are complementary. Although they offer different perspectives on conflict amenability to mediation, *softening up* allows for an understanding on why a conflict may be amenable to mediation but, because of the parties' views and expectations on the mediation process, the will to be mediated may not mean that the will to resolve the conflict exists. When disputants in conflict become parties in a mediation process, they may do so, not with the interest of resolving their dispute but with that of capitalizing on mediation's characteristics to use it as a "third" option between resolving or continuing the conflict. In such cases, the mediator's impact on the power equilibrium between the disputants is a determinant factor for disputants to accept to be mediated. Especially in intrastate conflicts where the adversarial relationship between the disputants is seen as more permanent than transformable factor, the interest in accepting a mediators' entrance is particularly prone to result from an interest in the conflicts internationalization that will allow disputants to search for external allies to strengthen their positions.

2.4 Defining Success in Mediation Outcome

If the debate in turn of what mediation style is the most effective in conflict management suggests the arrival at an agreement between the parties does not necessarily indicate that a conflict has ended, compromising themselves on a written agreement may not be an objective or, in fact, be undesirable, to parties in a mediation process. For Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis (1993, 347), the idea that a conflict is resolved once an agreement is signed between the parties is a misconception of mediation success that has a outcome-oriented and static view of the conflict itself and which disregards the mediation process and conflict's complex dynamics. Similarly, even if agreement is produced, the parties may not perceive it as a definitive solution because they may find it unfair or continue to nurture the prospect of gaining advantage over

their opponent (Carment et al. 2009, 233). Even if a settlement has been produced but the conflict as not ended and violence re-occurs, can the mediation process be considered successful? On the other end, can a mediation process that has not been able to bring the parties into agreement, but that has been able to prevent the conflict from escalating, be considered unsuccessful? What can be defined as a successful mediation outcome?

Mediation has been increasingly taking place in intractable and protracted conflicts where the arrival at agreement or resolution is time-consuming and often unlikely, hence the need to take into account other achievements rather than a full, resolute agreement to characterize successful and effective mediation. In an intractable conflict a limited achievement can be more arduous and more significant than achieving a full solution in a more tractable one (Bercovitch and Gartner 2009, 21). Mediation processes that elongate themselves through time cannot be evaluated in terms of short-term achievements but rather by its extended-term success (Grieg 2001, 3). Bercovitch and Su-Mi Lee (2001) define mediation outcome as an observable difference provoked by mediation in the conflict itself or in the parties' behaviours. Unsuccessful mediation processes are considered those which have not produced either of changes while successful mediation outcomes produce a cease-fire, a partial settlement or a full settlement. Savun (2009, 103) uses the same outcomes to measure mediation short-term success. He defines a successful mediation as an episode that either reduces the likelihood of the re-occurrence of conflict or that encourages the parties into making concessions but suggests that to consider the long-term success of mediation outcome, the durability of the peace established by the mediation process is the measure of its success. Offering a broader perspective on mediation outcomes and success, Beardsley et al. (2006, 66-67) suggest the measures for mediation success are determined by the mediation's objective as a conflict management instrument, that is, the achievement of the outcomes that are relevant to crises management. The author identifies three objectives or desired outcomes that are used as a measure of mediation success, which are the achievement of a formal agreement, tension reduction and crises abatement. While tension reduction refers to the diminution of tension after a crisis has occurred, crises abatement is broader and refers to the absence of the threat of violence regardless of whether any agreement has been reached.

A peace settlement may be difficult to be established in a mediation process, especially in intractable and protracted conflicts such as intrastate conflicts but, has it has been put forward, the arrival at an agreement does neither necessarily terminate conflict because there

may be still potential for a conflict to re-escalate and violence to reoccur. To determine a mediation process' success through the arrival at a settlement between the parties is, therefore, not an adequate measure of mediation success. Because mediation in intrastate conflicts, mirroring the conflict itself, may elongate itself through time, more limited achievements and extended-term successes must be considered in evaluating mediation, rather than focussing only on short-term and punctual signing of agreements. Cease-fires, partial settlements or full settlements are, no doubt, examples of mediation successes, but the long term successes that ultimately allow for a durable peace to be established must also be considered. Because mediation is a conflict management instrument, other conflict management objectives it is able to achieve must also be added to that of formal agreement achievement, namely, its capacity to reduce tensions when moments of crisis exist in a conflict and its capacity to abate crisis moments by eliminating the threat of violence.

2.5. A Holistic Perspective of *Mediation*

The complex and multifaceted character of mediation actors, strategies and techniques call for a holistic view of a mediator's tasks and available tools. If a mediator does not need to be neutral and can, in fact, be biased, the limits to the concept of mediation must be widened. In mediation literature there is a gap between conceptualization and practice, one that does not allow for theory to adequately mirror and address the practice of mediation. Consequently, a progressive compartmentalization of the theory has tended to shrink the limits of the concept of mediation Returning to the left-open issue over what is a more accurate understanding and typology of mediator strategies, it becomes necessary to readdress and reformulate the concept of mediation. In this perspective, how can mediation be defined?

For Bercovitch et al. (1991, 3) the form in which the conflict management task is performed by a third party can be divided into two categories, those that are binding, involving legalistic or normative procedures that force disputants to comply with the ruling or judgement determined by the third party as the solution to their conflict, as is the case in arbitration, and those whose procedures are designed to assist and facilitate the conflicting parties' path towards

reaching a solution and in which the parties' participation is entirely voluntary, as in conciliation, facilitation, consultation and mediation (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004, 153).



Fig 2. Bercovitch's et al.(1991,3; 2004,153) Perspective on Mediation as Third Party Intervention.

As figure 2 indicates, Bercovitch et al. distinguish between *mediation* and other forms of third party intervention that also do not have a coercive character and that are cooperative in nature, such as *conciliation*, *facilitation* or *good offices*, which is justified by the higher degree of involvement that its performance demands of the third party. Bercovitch et al. consider a *conciliator* as a third party who acts as a "**communication** link" (2004, 152) between the parties to reduce tensions and encourage the parties to change their negotiating positions. *Consultation* (or *problem-solving*) is defined as involving a third party "**facilitating** analysis of the conflict and development of alternatives through **communication**" (2004, 153). In performing *good offices*, a third party is considered to merely act as a "**message transmitter**" and a "go-between" (1986, 156) and is, therefore, considered as the most passive form of third party intervention (1991, 8). *Mediation* is considered by Bercovitch et al. (2004, 152-153) as "the most favoured form of third-party intervention", which may include "more informal forms of third party intervention such as the provision of good offices (...)" and that is distinguishable from *conciliation* or *consultation* because it "allows a mediator to take a more active role". However, in practice, when a third party voluntarily intervenes, under the disputants' voluntary acceptance of its involvement, mediators act as facilitators, conciliators or good offices providers, therefore, in

reality, it is not clear what specific characteristic/s of this involvement distinguish, for example, a facilitator, or conciliator, from a mediator.

The provision of good offices is not always limited to the "go-between" function in which Bercovitch et al. inscribes it and, on the contrary, has involved an array of tasks that are associated with the performance of facilitators or conciliators. Richmond (1998 (2), 4), while arguing that "good offices is not technically mediation", notes that "its underlying objective is the same" and that "any acceptable definition of mediation must cover a broad spectrum of third party activities". Frazier and Dixon (2009, 54, 63), who also refer to the need of a broad understanding of mediation and one that reflects the fact that it is "the dominant form of third party conflict management", like Richmond, found the need to treat good offices as a mediation activity in case-study analysis. Because good offices providers, particularly in the case of the UN, have utilized conciliation or facilitation in their practice, there is the need to consider good offices a mediation activity and, consequently, the one to include conciliation or facilitation in a broad definition of mediation.

Beardsley et al. (2006, 63) draws attention to the over-compartmentalization regarding less intrusive third party activities and mediation. The author sustains that the literature has wrongly treated facilitation as a distinct conflict management instrument and ignored that it is, actually, not distinct from mediation. He calls attention to the fact that there has been over-labelling of what he refers to as "low-level" mediation activities and that the concept of *facilitation* should encapsulate a broad range of these "low-level" activities ranging from consultation, conciliation to problem-solving. Notwithstanding, the author inscribes good offices in his concept of *facilitative* mediation when, in practice, good offices can be performed in a *formulative* style. Frazier and Dixon's (2009, 63) need to treat conciliation as mediation and Beardsley's (2006, 63) view of good offices a facilitator's role, are two examples in mediation literature that signal that these techniques are not so distant in reality, or not as clearly distinguishable, and that the theory is over-compartmentalized.

Regarding arbitration, Bercovitch et al. exclude it from the mediation spectrum altogether when, in reality, the practice of arbitration is also not so distant from that of mediation. In the practice of arbitration, an agreement, however binding, is **mediated** between the parties by a third party, therefore, arbitration should not fall altogether out of the mediation spectrum. Considering mediation an exclusively non-binding activity is justified by Bercovitch through the assumption that "most disputants would not accept mediation in the first place if mediation

bound them to an outcome" (Bercovitch and Su-Mi Lee 2001). This assumption, however, disregards the possibility that parties may wish to be bounded to an outcome and, in fact, if they never did, arbitration would not come into being. Equally, Zartman and Touval (1986, 446-447) consider that mediation differs from arbitration because it "employs judicial procedures and issues a verdict that the parties have committed themselves beforehand to accept" and that "[M]ediation is best thought of as a mode of negotiation in which a third party helps the parties find a solution which they cannot find by themselves". Despite the differentiation in terms of procedures, the two statements made by Zartman and Touval do not collide. In other words, the definition of mediation given in the second statement does not exclude arbitration and, in fact, can also be used to define an arbitration process. The authors restrict mediation to a non-binding third party activity, but this is, actually, the only characteristic mediation and arbitration do not share since arbitration is also a non-coercive and voluntary form of third party intervention for conflict management purposes, therefore arbitration should be considered as a type of mediation.

There tends to be a focus on mediation literature on what mediation *is not,* instead of what mediation *is* when defining the concept of mediation and its limits and emphasis is given to what characteristics may distinguish it from other forms of third party intervention. The result is a compartmentalization of all forms of third party intervention into distinctive activities in which the conceptualization of mediation becomes limited. A mediators' type, style, tasks, choice in strategies and tactics are broad and complex in practice, therefore it is necessary to consider them under a more holistic perspective and a broader understanding of the concept of mediation as third party intervention in conflict management.

In the effort to develop a holistic perspective on mediation strategies started by Beardsley et al., the continuum of mediation styles is presented as one of continued substantive involvement whereas the higher levels of involvement demand that the lower ones have been achieved, therefore, a *facilitative* mediation will always exist in a mediation process and will rarely be *manipulative* without *formulative mediation* having taken place. By introducing the concepts of *facilitative, formulative* and *manipulative* mediation Beardsley et al. offer a holistic perspective on mediation strategies by considering that the adoption of different strategies by a mediator generate different types or styles of mediation and not simply see the use of certain strategies as mediator "behaviour". The author's perspective on mediation is also holistic in considering "inclusiveness" of the three types of mediation along the level of involvement continuum,

reflecting the complexity of a mediator's choice and use of tools and tactics and task performance in a mediation process.

Facilitative mediation does better capture the amplitude of tasks a mediator performs at this lower level of the spectrum as both a communication link and an information provider to the parties. Similarly, *formulative mediation* is a concept that also better distinguishes the middle strategies of the intervention continuum because it better captures the increment in the mediators intrusiveness or activeness in the mediation process than the *procedural* concept by including the specific task of helping the parties produce a solution by finding an equilibrium between the parties positions and demands. Although Beardsley's et al. conception of *manipulative* mediation does not, on substance, differ from Bercovitch and Houston's conception of a *directive* mediator, the authors opted to adopt the *manipulative* term. However, given that a mediator does not forcefully need to be impartial or neutral and when it executes a highly intrusive strategy the triangular relationship between mediator and mediated is not broken and the mediator does not cease to be one, *directive* mediation is preferable in a holistic perspective:



Fig.3. Holistic Perspective of Mediation as Third Party Intervention.

In a holistic perspective, mediation becomes the non-coercive and voluntary form of third party intervention in conflict management per excellence. Outside parties who intervene in a conflict, whether coercively or non-coercively are third parties. When these parties' intervention does not purport any mediation activity, they are not to be considered mediators. A third party is an outside party who becomes involved in a conflict between other parties to offer support to one of the disputants, while mediators are third parties who become involved in a conflict to offer support to all disputants in their conflict management efforts. A mediator is a third party, but one that is voluntarily accepted by the parties in the conflict to non-coercively intervene with the specific task of mediating the dispute for conflict management purposes.

Arbitrage complies with the definition of mediation since it is a non-coercive and voluntary form of third party intervention, yet it is mediation in its binding form. To consider that mediation can be binding is not prejudicial or limitative of mediation's existence. It does not condition the acceptance of mediation by conflict disputants because the parties voluntarily and beforehand accept arbitrative mediation's binding result. Parties know the rules from the start, meaning that they know its result is binding when they accept arbitrage. In fact, it is precisely that binding character that parties who turn to arbitrage voluntarily search when they do so. Taking on Bercovitch's perspective, for Schrodt and Gerner (2004, 312) mediation is also "neither forceful nor biding" but the authors do consider it to be non-binding "unless negotiating parties choose to make it so". Therefore, and although this was not the authors' intent, mediation can be arbitrative if that is the parties' desire. Considering arbitrage a form of mediation does not prejudice its voluntary essence because it is entirely up to the parties to decide to convey to arbitrative mediation's binding character. Mediation can be binding or non-binding, therefore, mediation can be arbitrative in as much as parties voluntarily accept its binding character.

In a holistic perspective, mediation is *arbitrative* when its outcome is binding to the parties in conflict and can be *facilitative, formulative* or *directive,* in a continuum of increasing intervention of the mediator in the mediation process, depending on his choice in strategy, when its result is non-binding. In non-binding mediation the three typologies are not restrictive and can co-exist, whether performed by one or more mediators in the same conflict, although some are more typically used by certain types of actors according to the resources they possess, necessary to apply each of the strategies. Having a taxonomy of mediation types or styles allows not only mediation strategies to be characterized as those of a facilitative, formulative or directive mediation but also for other forms of mediation practice, which have been wrongly not

considered as such, to be included in the mediation spectrum. In a holistic perspective, conciliation and consultation are forms of facilitative mediation and good offices can be either facilitative, formulative or arbitrative, depending on the strategies employed by mediators. In this perspective the many forms mediation can take will be considered and promptly typified and characterized within mediation theory, which becomes the all-encompassing act of non-coercive third party intervention in the form of peace negotiations in conflict management.

Final Remarks

Mediation is affected by many variables, from the conflict's context, in which it takes place, to the parties' and the mediators' characteristics. These variables condition the mediators' behaviour, their choice in strategy and style, which in turn conditions the mediation process itself. The interplay of this various variables, in turn, determines mediation outcome and success. Mediation is a voluntary, dynamic and interactive process whose existence is determined by all its participants, by the mediators' and the disputants' attitudes and actions. According to versatility theory, a conflict is mediated when the adversarial relationship between disputants is perceived by the mediator as being more susceptible to be transformed into a cooperative one. The more a conflict is susceptible to this transformation process, the more versatile and amenable to mediation it will be considered. However, low-versatility intractable intrastate conflicts that pose a greater security threat are also often mediated, which suggests that the cost of mediation is not always determinant to the existence of a mediation offer. For peace-promoting international and regional organizations, for example, the societal obligation to mediate is more important than mediation cost and, again, intractable conflicts that pose a greater threat to peace will be the object of a mediation offer by this type of mediators.

Because mediation is a non-coercive conflict management process, in which both disputants and mediators voluntarily accept to take part in, a conflict is mediated when the offer of mediation exists and is desired by the disputants. Therefore, when a mediator offers mediation or accedes to a mediation plea he does so in accordance with its vested interests in the conflicts' management or resolution, which can be a product of a cost/benefit assessment of its involvement or the mere interest in generating peace. According to this assessment and the

specific characteristics exhibited by the conflict, the mediator chooses the mediation strategy he finds most likely to be successful in managing the conflict, which can vary from passive to more active roles in the mediation process. Defenders of *pure* mediation argue that neutrality is a necessary condition for mediation exercise because it is the key to the acceptance of mediation by parties in conflict and for them to deposit trust in the mediator and the mediation process, therefore, *muscled* strategies should not be considered mediation at all. However, a mediator's capacity to influence parties who are interested in winning over the other in the negotiations process into making concessions and finding agreement is an important mediator asset. Using his resources to *leverage* the parties, the mediator will be more able to bring the mediation process into a desirable outcome. Furthermore, a mediator perceived by the parties as having the capacity to bring about an attractive outcome can determine the parties' acceptance of a mediation offer. This implies that the parties perceive the mediator to have certain outcome preferences that may be advantageous for them and, therefore, that a mediator's impartiality may be irrelevant to the parties.

An active mediator is not necessarily biased, as much as a passive one is not necessarily neutral. Furthermore, a mediator will hardly be purely neutral as he holds the interests in managing and solving the conflict and his own perspective of how to do it, an interest that usually comes from reputational and image concerns. The parties themselves may accept a certain mediator because they believe him to be able to convince the adversary to the rightfulness of their demands. In sum, neutrality is neither fully held by a mediator neither do parties truly expect it of a mediator. A new articulation of the concepts of neutrality and partiality is needed that accounts for this reality, therefore, a *biased* mediator is one who engages in mediation to protect his own or his supported party's interests while a *neutral* mediator does so acting on an humanitarian and altruistic motivation to end a conflict.

Typically, highly intrusive strategies are performed by states, while less intrusive strategies are so by international organizations. States are often motivated to mediate a conflict which involves one or more disputants with whom it holds an historic, diplomatic or strategic connection and, thus, to protect its own interests and stakes in the conflict. International organizations, on the other hand, because they are a product of and inducers of cooperation, are perceived as legitimate and neutral actors, being that the UN, in the post-Cold War order, has become the most important one as a mediation offerer and performer. Although they can suffer for inefficiency and inefficacy problems, international organizations, such as the UN, possess

unique mediator resources, which differ from the power resources possessed by states, but which can be equally important and determinant to its performance as a mediator, such as access to information and skilled personnel or the holding international support for its mediation initiatives. Being neutral, international organizations differ from states in holding no other interest in the mediation of a given conflict than promoting peace and security. This aspect is crucial for the organizations' acceptance as mediator by the parties and beneficial to the parties' concession-making in the negotiations process, however, it allows the parties to have a greater control over the mediation process.

When disputants in conflict call for, or accept, a mediation offer and become mediated parties they may do so without having suffered an expected attitudinal transformation towards the other, from an opponent who wishes to defeat him to a party who wishes to find a solution with him for their conflict. Although the choice for being mediated suggests disputants find continued conflict undesirable it may be solely the case that they have *softened up* from finding continuing the conflict through military fighting undesirable but that they see mediation as an opportunity to continue it at a lower level and with lower costs. Winning over their opponent through the diplomatic route can still be the parties' objective in mediation and their main motivation for being mediated. Acceding to mediation allows disputants to justify their strategy change from conflict to diplomacy without appearing weak, to save-face and not take the blame in case negotiations fail and to more easily be able to leave the negotiations table, therefore mediation can be still be appealing to parties who are not sincerely committed to cooperatively resolve their dispute with the other but that are rather focused on the preferred outcomes they isolatedly expect to take out of the mediation process. The benefits they expect to hold from the interaction with the mediator and the access to its resources and assets are crucial for the disputants' pursuit of their "devious objective" of winning over the other party through the mediation process. In such cases, the parties engage in elusive cooperation to simulate a will to compromise with the other that they do not allow to materialize. This is prone to happen especially in intrastate conflict mediation because it involves deeply antagonized parties who may see the mediation process as a vehicle to making their case internationally and to finding allies and supporters for their causes, therefore, international organizations who can provide exposure to the parties positions will be more appealing mediators in such cases.

International organizations are better at fostering trust between the parties but are less successful in reaching settlements in their mediation initiatives because they do not hold the

state's capacity to offer carrots and sticks to pressure the parties into making commitments. However, a settlement is not necessarily conducive to a conflict's ending. While a state employing a directive strategy will be able to generate an agreement in the short-term, over the long-term the parties may perceive it as unfair and the conflict may reoccur, since underlying tensions were not suppressed, or even addressed, by the directive strategy. Although they can be ineffective in producing agreements, low intrusive strategies are essential in reducing the mistrusts and misconceptions that prevent the parties from making honest and durable commitments.

States and International Organizations have different mediating capacities, different resources and motivations to mediate and different characteristics that allow them to carry out certain strategies more effectively than others. Where facilitative and formulative mediation strategies fail to induce compromise, directive strategies can enter to secure an agreement and where directive mediation fails in improving the parties' relationship, facilitative and formulative strategies can work to do so. Once mediation strategies have a complementary potential so do the mediation initiatives by states and international organizations. A coordinated and sequenced action between neutral and biased mediators in a multiparty mediation process can, in fact, be the key to the effectiveness of mediation in intrastate conflict management because they can seize on their resources, capacities, characteristics and strategies by using them the best moment in the conflicts' life-cycle. Especially in conflicts between disputants who have been in conflict for a prolonged period of time and that hold a long-term rivalry relationship. In prolonged conflicts between enduring rivals the mediator's capacity to perceive the right timing to act along the conflicts life cycle and to generate and cease ripe moments becomes crucial.

Mediation, however, is a complex process that has increasingly been taking place in complex contexts where finding a definite resolution for conflict is an arduous and time-consuming path with constant setbacks and breakthroughs, where cease-fires and partial settlements are important steps. While definite resolution may not be achieved, the existence of a mediation process can have a pacifying effect in the conflict when tensions become reduced or the threat of violence fades. Because mediation has the important conflict management effect of reducing violence, the production of an agreement is not a broad enough measure of mediation success and does not fully reflect mediation's utility as a conflict management instrument. Mediation successful outcomes are not only those steps which drive the parties into agreement but also those that contribute to the necessary environment for negotiations to be able to achieve it. Mediation is not only useful and is not only successful in producing agreements but also in

preventing violence, in reducing tensions and abating crisis that allow for a certain degree of peace.

The complex and multifaceted character of mediation actors, strategies and techniques call for a holistic view of a mediator's tasks and available tools, one that can empower and bring legitimacy to its performance in conflict managing, the conditions for mediation success. It is agreed that mediation is a third party conflict managing instrument whose most outstanding characteristics are its non-coercive character and the fact that all parties involved, whether disputants or the third party itself, take part in on a purely voluntary basis.

In a holistic perspective mediation is a voluntary and non-coercive form of third party intervention, in which the third party intervenes to mediate peace negotiations between disputing parties. The mediation process can be performed in various forms, that is, it can be exercised in various styles, according to which it can assume a binding character or not. When a mediation process is binding, it is non-coercively and voluntarily exercised between the parties, but the solution devised by the mediator is pre-set and pre-accepted as a binding one, or one which must be accepted and acceded by the parties in conflict. In arbitrative mediation, the mediation's binding character is pre-determined and therefore, accepted and desired by the parties in conflict. When mediation is performed in a non-coercive, voluntary and non-binding form, it can be so in three forms or styles, *facilitative*, *formulative* or *directive.* These styles are not frequently used in isolation but rather tend to mix, because when a *formulative* form of mediation is exercised, a *facilitative* one is needed beforehand or, when *directive* mediation is used, a *formulative* mediation has existed. Therefore, this group of mediation styles is better presented in a continuum ranging from the lower mediator involvement to the higher one, whereas the higher levels suppose that lower styles of mediation involvement have happened in the mediation process.

How we conceive mediation, what it is, how it is performed or comes into being, when should it be performed on not, why and for what purpose and with what results, by whom or between whom, is not innocuous. On the contrary, theory impacts reality and influences the practice of mediation. For this reason, to correctly place the pieces of the theoretical "puzzle" together to form the unified "picture" theory is ever increasingly needed to guide, not only the investigation process and investigators themselves, but also the mediation processes in practice and mediators themselves.

PART B: The Cyprus Case-Study

3. The Cyprus Case: From Intrastate *Conflict* to Diplomatic *Problem*

Geography has been decisive in a Cypriot history of continuous occupations. Laying on the Mediterranean route between Europe and Asia, Cyprus has been for centuries a place of encounter and clash between European and Middle Eastern civilizations. Situated at the northeaster corner of the Mediterranean, the Sea's third largest island is a close neighbour of Egypt to the south, Syria to the west, Turkey to the north and also to Greece further to the northwest. Invaded, sold and transferred, the land's strategic importance has been of such greatness that political geography has greatly dictated the island's inhabitant's fortune. From the rule of the Republic of Venice, to three centuries of Turkish rule under the Ottoman Empire, to British colonization until 1960 and the current division between the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, a Cypriot nation-state that encompasses the whole island's territory and its peoples has never been fully realized, although that has been for long the desire of its peoples and of the international community.

Drawn from the north coast of Cyprus to the oriental coast south of Famagusta, the buffer-zone set by the UN in 1974, also known as the "Green Line", cuts across the capital of Nicosia where the remains of the warzone are object of a long anticipated reconstruction. In the southern flank of the dividing line, the Republic of Cyprus has been under full Greek Cypriot administration since 1963, whereas Turkish Cypriots have been living in a self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus since 1983. Tension between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots is still felt on the island and dealt with differently by each community.

Although the Cyprus conflict has lasted for decades, times of conflict in terms of aggression or war have been relatively scarce. There have been only two moments when violence erupted between the two communities, in 1963, when intercommunal violence led to the collapse of the of Constitutional rule set by the Zurich-London Agreements and, in 1974, with the coup d'état by Greek army officers stationed on the island and subsequent Turkish military intervention. A *conflict,* in a physical sense, defined as a state of open fighting or war has not reoccurred in Cyprus since 1974. Although in a psychological and sociological sense the *conflict* has prevailed, meaning the state of disharmony and opposition between the persons, ideas and interests that shape the communities' actions, the physical dimension has evaporated. With the absence of this dimension plus the continuous incapability of the parties to agree on a solution despite numerous international community attempts to reunite the Cypriots, the Cyprus conflict

has become increasingly referred to as a *problem*. The *conflict* is no longer staged on the ground but only at a diplomatic sphere, as a *question* or a situation to be considered, answered and solved, thus *problem* describes the current situation and the character of the dispute more accurately. Because aggression has been relatively infrequent and the numerous attempts at resolution have unavoidably ended in failure, the Cyprus "conflict" has become less of a *conflict* and increasingly a lengthy and protracted *problem* for the parties involved and for the international community to solve.

There are various interplaying dimensions in the Cypriot dispute, at the local, regional and international levels, that provide for its intricate character. At the local level, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, with different identities, cultures, languages and religions, have antagonised each other through their differing nationalisms, which consistently decreased their interaction and political socialization (Kizilyürek 2008, 97). At the regional level, Greece and Turkey's historically difficult relations and deep mistrust spill over to the local level. The "motherlands" are stakeholders in the Cyprus dispute, having vested strategic interests on the island, legitimised by their connection to the local communities. At the international level, two countries and an international organization are involved, these being the United Kingdom, one of the Guarantor powers of the Cypriot state, whose interest in the dispute revolves around the maintenance of two Sovereign Base Areas on the island; the US, who are mainly concerned in a avoiding a Greco-Turkish war that could undermine NATO and in maintaining a western influence in the region; and the UN, whose interest stems from the realization that the explosive potential of the Cypriot dispute is regionally and internationally dangerous.

In this chapter, an historical analysis of the evolution of the Cyprus conflict, between the years of 1960 and 1974, will be made to ascertain the various actors' interests in the conflict's context, the circumstances in which they developed, their impact on the string of events and, ultimately, the positions they held when mediation initiatives took place. The fifty year-long dispute is divided in four moments that provide an understanding on how the Cyprus dispute evolved from being a *conflict*, a period when violence between the parties was occurring, to becoming pacified and constituting no longer a conflict in its aggressive terms but a growing diplomatic international *problem*. On the first timeframe, the circumstances in which the conflict was generated will be analysed, cause and consequence of the demise of the Cypriot unitary state created in 1960. A second timeframe will analyse what is considered in this thesis as an embryonic stage of the conflict's internationalization process, characterized by US involvement in

the first attempts at conflict resolution. The involvement of the UN in 1964 will mark the beginning of the third timeframe, since the events from then on cannot be isolated from the internationalization process that was underway and from the international community's actions impact on the evolution of the conflict itself. In the final fourth part, 1974 is identified as the final year of pure conflict and the beginning of a new phase where war has ceased to exist. The understanding the *status quo* in which the peacemaking activities have been taking place ever since will be its main focus.

It is relevant to refer that literature on the Cyprus conflict is mainly partisan. Although the sources may be biased, there is an effort in the description of the conflict made here to be impartial, although not being afraid to hold actors accountable for certain events. Accountability becomes important when investigating the negotiation in the process of mediation as it brings knowledge about the parties involved in a dispute. The effort is at impartiality and accountability, as these are cornerstones in the analysis of any historical events in order to design better plans for the future.

3.1 The 1960 Republic of Cyprus and the Origins of Conflict

The United Kingdom had declared Cyprus a British Crown Colony after a newly-founded Republic of Turkey renounced sovereignty over Cyprus in 1923's Treaty of Lausanne (Constandinos 2009, 14). The Republic of Cyprus was founded on the 16th of August of 1960 when independence was granted to the island by its colonial ruler. At the time, 80% of the Cypriot population was of Greek origin and 18% of Turkish origin, whereas 2% of the population was comprised of smaller groups like the British, Armenian, Maronite or Latin communities (Plaza, 1965, 7). The Constitution of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus emerged from international treaties reached by the UK, the two "motherlands", Greece and Turkey, and the two Cypriot communities. The circumstances in which this Constitution was conceived and its consequent nature, can be traced back as the trigger of events that led to the first intercommunal fighting in 1963 that broke down the 3 year old young Republic.

Despite the eighty-three years of British administration, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots preserved their relationships with their "motherlands", Greece and Turkey respectively,

and kept physical, cultural and emotional ties. Although the two communities had been living together on the island for centuries, they remained mostly separate, each holding its own religion, customs, traditions, educational systems and laws. Before and during British rule, under the Ottoman System of Millet [4] (Tocci 2004, 43), the two communities had been living relatively autonomously but separate living and indifference prevented them from sharing a unique sense of fate and political belonging or for a nationalistic unified movement to rise in the transition to a Westphalian world. Instead, the religious groups of the Ottoman period transformed themselves into distinct national communities, whose nationalisms were intimate with the Greek and Turkish nationalist ideologies and, with it, the historical clash and mistrust of Greco-Turkish relations (Kizilyürek 2008, 96).

Geographically, this "separateness" was not as evident. Although in some concentrations one community could outnumber the other and in the main cities each community tended to live in separate quarters, the main pattern of population concentration was a mix between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Each community preserved its original language, Greek and Turkish, and although some spoke both and, due to British occupation, some spoke English, other indicators of communal integration, such as inter-ethnical marriages remained rare (Plaza 1965, 7-8).

Intercommunal violence had been growing since the beginning of the 1950's when it was known British rule was approaching its end (ICG 2009, 1). Unlike "traditional" nationalist movements' behavioural pattern of fighting for independence against colonial powers, in Cyprus the strongest political force against colonial power came from Greek Cypriot struggle for union with "motherland" Greece. Greek Cypriot opposition to occupation dates back to Ottoman rule when the Orthodox Church of Cyprus began to aspire union with Greece, or *enosis,* which had led to popular rising and a frustrated coup attempt in 1931 (The Republic of Cyprus 2000, 80).

As the British were signalling their departure, at the time of his election as the head of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus in 1950, Archbishop Makarios committed himself to the achievement of *enosis* after convening a plebiscite of Greek Cypriots where 92% expressed themselves in accordance with this aim (UN Security Council, 2010) and set about to organize a national movement. This national movement of clerical leadership gained support of a growing communist movement, with the Cypriot communist *Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú*

[4] The *millet system* of governance of the Ottoman Empire was based on communal separation of the territory's inhabitants. Each community held separate private, social and political lives directed by their different religious leaders. This system was maintained and further elaborated by the British with the introduction of communal voting in municipal elections (Tocci 2004, 43).

(AKEL), the Progessive Party for the Working People, also aligning with Hellenist propaganda (Anderson 2008, 2). Makarios then turned to George Grivas, a retired Greek army colonel of Cypriot origins who led a right-wing extremist organization during the Nazi occupation of Greece, to plan a guerrilla action for liberation of the island. Upon his return from Greece to the island in 1954, Grivas organizes and arms a Greek-Cypriot resistance group, *Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston* (EOKA), the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters. For EOKA, Turkish Cypriots were compatriots also experiencing an oppressing alien rule and, if they were not to joint in the efforts to end British occupation, they were only asked to not oppose to their struggle and to refrain from aligning with the British (Solsten 1991). Led by Grivas, EOKA endures a lethally effective, five-year guerrilla war for liberation against British troops. The chief of the British Imperial General Staff, John Harding is dispatched to Cyprus to repress the Greek Cypriot uprising, forbidding demonstrations, pursuing AKEL affiliates and EOKA suspects and sending Makarios to exile in Mahe Island, in the Seychelles, at a time when Cyprus' military bases were serving as air-deck for the British expedition to Egypt upon the Suez Chanel crisis (Anderson 2008, 4-6).

Fearing Greek Cypriot domination, Turkish Cypriots had began reacting to the growing *enosis* campaign with anti-union demonstrations that evolved to pursuing *taksim*, the Turkish word for "division" or "partition", expressing their desire for the island to be divided between Greece and Turkey (Yilmaz 2005, 30). During British administration the Turkish Cypriot community felt underprivileged and restricted in the running of their communal affairs in comparison to the Greek Cypriot community and started to organize themselves politically after the Greek Cypriot uprising of 1931. A mass meeting was held in 1949 in the Turkish Cypriot community, where it was agreed that Cyprus should be returned to its former owner, Turkey, if Britain decided to leave (TRNC 2011, 7-8). In response to EOKA activity, the Turkish Resistance Organization, the *Türk Mukavemet Teskilati* (TMT), was created by the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot political leadership. As Britain was closer to leaving the island, these militias fostered by Ankara became an obstacle for Greek Cypriot *enosis*.

However, the first signs of conflict between the two communities, which emerged during British occupation, were not only due to Greek Cypriot struggle for *enosis* causing the reactive *taksim* of the Turkish Cypriots but also to the fact that the British played the two communities against each other in order to contain Greek Cypriot increasingly growing resistance. British colonial policy, often referred by Greek Cypriots as one of "divide and rule" (Leventis and Tsokkalides 2007, 36), is also responsible for sharpening the division between the two

communities[5]. British policy had the unavoidable divisive effect of "organizing" violence and allowing for a process of victimization to occur collectively that further antagonized the two communities. Collectivization allowed for "the other" to be identified and labelled as an enemy, or a threat, and for the issues in contention to start to take on a political nature (Leventis and Tsokkalides 2007, 40-41).

In 1957, Anglo-American talks were taking place over the future of Cyprus while intercommunal violence was growing and the island was on the verge of civil war. The US was concerned about the impact the growing tension in Cyprus could have on the historically tense Greco-Turkish relationship and, consequently, on NATO's unity against a Soviet attack (Constandinos 2009, 14). In the Cold War context, Cyprus had become strategically vital for the United Kingdom and its allies. The growing dependence on Middle Eastern oil and the withdrawal of troops from Palestine and the Suez Chanel and the threat of Turkey aligning with the communist bloc signal the great UK and Western interests on maintaining influence over the island (Constandinos 2009, 15). Cyprus was a real opportunity for Russia's influence expansion over the Mediterranean once Communist ideology was strongly supported in the island with AKEL being the largest political party. US' policy goals toward Cyprus were for it to achieve political stability in a democratic, pro-Western, government under the joint protection of Britain, Greece and Turkey, thus taking the "fuel and the flame" that could undermine NATO, as well as to secure US access to the military facilities on the island by maintaining UK sovereignty over them (Adams 1972, 98).

Being the occupational power before British presence and, in fact, the one that transferred its administration to the British Empire, Turkey saw the Cyprus question as one that should be of Turkey's and Britain's sole concern. The island is also of strategic importance to Turkey at this time due to its position relatively to its southern ports of Anatolia, which meant that if Greece were to possess the island through *enosis,* Turkey's "encirclement" would be complete by losing access to the Eastern Mediterranean from the south (Yilmaz 2005, 34). The Cyprus *issue* has been successfully *securitized* by the political elite and the military in Turkey through the context of its many disagreements with Greece in an excessively geopoliticised discourse that will remain intact through the coming of the 21st century, which means that, for Turkey, Cyprus is not merely a question of protecting the Turkish community on the island, but one of national security against the Greek threat (Kaliber 2005).

[5] The formation of the "Auxiliary Police Force", composed of Turkish Cypriot policemen, used to restrain Greek Cypriot demonstrations and EOKA activities exemplifies one this type of British colonial policies (Leventis and Tsokkalides 2007, 36).

Greece has always been a central stakeholder in the Cyprus conflict due to the Greek Cypriot Hellenist feelings and had always maintained its desire to unite the island. At an attempt to raise international opinion to pressure Britain into bilateral negotiations on the future of Cyprus, Greece begins to attempt to internationalize the Cyprus question addressing the UN General Assembly in a search for a Greek Cypriot right of self-determination to be recognized. What can be understood as a Greek support for a Makarios designed strategy for achieving *enosis* by portraying it as a struggle for self-determination, failed to acknowledge that *taksim* also suited the international principle and that to try to apply it to a multi-ethnic country would probably backfire with the Turkish Cypriots claiming the same right (Reddaway 1986, 538). The Turkish Cypriots were the minority, the group that the right of self-determination seeks to protect. Finding the time inappropriate to adopt a resolution on the Cypriot question (UN General Assembly 1954), since the UK, Greece and Turkey were starting to negotiate the transfer of sovereignty, the General Assembly limited its response to the Greek plea to expressing confidence on the parties involved to reach a just solution (UN General Assembly 1958). The attempt at internationalization of the Cyprus question by the Greeks had failed. Nevertheless, the General Assembly, serving as a forum for the interested parties' debate on Cyprus, contributed to the institutionalization of the *question* and its insertion in the legal international framework that modified their ultimate goals and prompted Greece and Turkey to seek a solution together, outside the organization (Coufoudakis 1976, 461-462).

In 1959, Greece and Turkey are invited by the UK for talks in Zurich over a compromise agreement for the independence of Cyprus. Later that year, in London, the foundations of the Republic of Cyprus laid at Zurich were ratified by the three countries and the representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, Makarios and Küçük respectively. The accords reached at these negotiations became known as the Zurich-London Agreements and dictated the Republic of Cyprus was to be a state in which executive, legislative and juridical power was to be shared. Although power-sharing political regimes were no novelty in world politics at the time, the one established in Cyprus presented new and untried features in constitutional law and international politics that reflect, on the one hand, a scrupulous preoccupation with the safeguard of the rights and autonomy of the two ethnic groups, providing for the protection of minority rights to the Turkish Cypriots and avoid supremacy of the larger Greek Cypriot community and, on the other hand, the diverse foreign interests invested on the island.

The Cypriot Constitution created in the Zurich-London Agreements starts by providing a sole Cypriot nationality but also recognition of the two communities separate existence and their different origins, cultures, mother tongues and religions (art.2). Both Greek and Turkish are made official languages of the Republic and Greek and Turkish flags are authorised to be flow together with the flag of Cyprus (arts.3 and 4). A consociational democracy is generated where all branches of power are shared by the two communities. With a presidential political regime, the Republic's presidency is vested to a Greek Cypriot President elected by the Greek Cypriot community and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President elected by the Turkish one, who are joint chief executives with the same authority and veto power, who can only jointly promulgate legislation (art.1, 39 and 50). In the Council of Ministers seven are to be Greek Cypriot and three Turkish Cypriot and any one of the Foreign Affairs, Defence or Finance Ministries has to be entrusted to a Turkish Cypriot minister (art.46). The legislative branch is also divided in a 70 percent to 30 percent ratio of seats distributed to Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots respectively in the House of Representatives (art.62) and the same ratio defines the distribution of the civil service positions available (art.123). Each community is also to have a Communal Chamber with exclusive authority in matters of a purely communal nature such as religion, education, culture, education or personal status (art.87). In the judicial branch of government a "neutral" citizen or country is to be appointed as President in the Supreme and the High Courts of Justice by the President and Vice-President of the Republic who shall also nominate in agreement the Greek and Turkish members (arts.112 and 133). The ordinary courts of justice are to be administered according to each communities' communal principles. At the local level of government, in the five largest Cypriot towns, separate municipalities should to be established together with a coordinating body to deal with matters that are of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot interest (art. 173).

Apart from defining *ipsis verbis* the future Constitution of the independent Cyprus state, the Zurich-London Agreements also comprise three international treaties with constitutional force, the Treaty of Guarantee, of Establishment and of Alliance, all generated for the purpose guaranteeing the supremacy of the Constitution. In the Treaty of Guarantee, political or economic union with another country or the partitioning of the island are forbidden and the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey are invested guarantor powers of the "independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic" (art.2) compromising themselves to consult each other and to take concerted action if any of the provisions of the Constitution are breached. If concerted action proves impossible, the Treaty provides for unilateral action "with the sole aim of re-

establishing the "state of affairs" (art.4) set forward in the Zurich-London Agreements. In the Treaty of Guarantee, Greek, Turkish and Cypriot Governments also undertake to respect the integrity of the areas to be retained under British sovereignty (art.3). UK rights over these areas are defined in the Treaty of Establishment, whose provisions are solely designed to ensure a secure and effective British operation of the two retained military bases of Akrotiri and Dhekelia (art.2). Finally, the Treaty of Alliance, signed by the three guarantors, provides for a military guarantee of independence and integrity of Cyprus, setting out a Tripartite Headquarters to which Greece and Turkey should send contingents to provide for the training of a Cypriot army (art.3 and 4).

On the 16th of August of 1960 the Republic of Cyprus is officially founded and the independent country of Cyprus becomes, shortly after, an UN member-state, but the constitutional arrangement designed at Zurich and London would collapse in merely three years. Friction over interpretation of the provisions of the constitutional arrangements emerged shortly after the independent state was born. In 1963, now President of the Republic of Cyprus, Makarios proposed a set of amendments to the constitution, which became known as the "13 points" (Richmond b1998, 253). These are generally measures[6] that aim at unifying the existing separateness in political and public life but one that had been designed to protect Turkish Cypriot access to the political *apparatus*.

For Turkish Cypriots, the "13 points" were regarded as propaganda to blame the Constitution for the governmental crisis when, in their perspective, the government never properly functioned due obstacles created by Greek Cypriots for their lack of truthful goodwill to fully implement the Constitution[7] (Plaza 1965, 17). Makarios' proposed amendments were regarded by the Turkish Cypriot community as an expression of Greek Cypriot determination to achieve *enosis*, one that they believed never faded with the signing of the Zurich-London Agreements, which the Greek Cypriots had no intention to honour. For the Greek Cypriots "[The] Turkish Government rejected them before the Turkish Cypriot community had the chance even to examine these proposals" and "[The] Turkish Cypriot leadership fell in line with Turkeys' long-

[6] Makarios' "13 points" were set forward as necessary to achieve a good functioning and progress of the State and suggested the abolition of separate majority voting in the House of Representatives for certain law-making, of the President and Vice-President veto power or the unification of justice administration, the unification of municipalities, the President and Vice-President of the House of Representatives to be elected by unified majority voting of the House or the abolition of the Greek Communal Chamber (Richmond b 1998).

[7] The Turkish Cypriot charges that the President had sought to vitiate the agreed Constitution were not unfounded since Makarios himself had publicly objected the agreement, which he considered to have been given no alternative but to accept, and continued governing as if the changes he proposed had been made after Turkish Cypriots leaders expressed their opposition to them (Castleberry 1964, 122).

term policy of seeking the partition of the island", regarding the subsequent events as insurrection by Turkish Cypriot extremists (The Republic of Cyprus 2000, 17,81).

Demarcation of the separate municipalities, the failure to agree on the formation of the intercommunal army and the Turkish Cypriot veto of the state budget (Anderson 2008, 8) were among the litigious issues that gave rise to a period of constant constitutional crisis, government paralysis and increasing communal tensions. In 1963, constitutional rule collapses as all Turkish Cypriot officials resign their offices. Violence breaks out at Christmas time.

On the one hand, the solution found in the Zurich-London Agreements institutionalized the influence of Greece, Turkey and UK over Cyprus and, on the other, the differing ethnic characters of the two communities. Thereafter, both communities felt the settlement was imposed on them and that their representatives pressured to accept an unfavourable arrangement. Greek Cypriots contend the two communities were excluded from the negotiations and that the 1960 Constitution was an imposition from abroad and tend to stress its inflexibility and the institutionalization of the division between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (The Republic of Cyprus 2000, 17), whereas Turkish Cypriots are generally of the opinion that the Cypriot state was created for two communities who had no "urge" (Yilmaz 2005, 30), or were not prepared, to live together or to share power. Furthermore, the constitutional framework did not provide for an evolution of circumstances that could make the rigid division of powers obsolete, essentially failing to create the need for the two communities to work together (Vlanton and Alicia 1984, 6). The international guarantee of the 1960 Constitution provided in the Zurich-London agreements failed to preserve the "state of affairs". The three Guarantor powers, which had compromised themselves to consult and intervene in the event of a breach of the settlement, did not do so in the face of the grave constitutional demise that unravelled in 1963. Britain feared becoming entangled in its former colonies' politics and a renewed armed conflict, whilst Greece or Turkey where incapable of neutrally intervening. For Britain to act in a manner that would have been perceived as neutral and of the interest of both communities, it would have had to gather the support of both the other guarantors, what proved impossible (Grant 2008, 53).

The events that lead to the creation of the short-lived 1960 Republic of Cyprus show that Cyprus' transition to a post-colonial order based on the birth of the modern nation-states has been one of a peculiar kind. Notions of nation and nationalism did not take on the island in a "traditional" way, in a sense that they did not aim at independence, as they did anywhere else in the post-colonial world. Cypriot nationalism is bipolar, with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot

nationalisms developing both on Cypriot soil and both, due to historical and political circumstances, did not fall within the territorial boundaries of the island or desired a state-building of any kind. Instead, the Greek Cypriot colonial struggle against the British Empire in the first half of the 20th century and the "counter-nationalism" (Kizilyürek 2008, 95) of the Turkish Cypriots both aimed at union with their communities' countries of origin, Greece and Turkey.

The international arrangement that created the Republic did not suffice to turn the communities' leaders away from their atypical nationalist aspirations and the people from their cultural and spiritual union with their "motherlands". The power-sharing consociational political interaction (Sözen 2007, 38) designed for the Cypriot state did not remove identity from politics. Instead, it further entrenched the ethnic element into the political structure and failed to push loyalty away from the ethnic communities to the unified state and to produce one political community that would be able to integrate the society around a unified sense of citizenship, political belonging and territoriality. Cyprus had become a state but not a nation (Castleberry 1964, 124).

3.2 Internationalization Process Towards UN Involvement

The Cyprus conflict had had, since its birth, an international dimension due to the three Guarantors' and US strategic interests on the island. However, it is only from 1964 onwards, with UN involvement, that the Cyprus *question* becomes internationalized and considered a threat to international peace and security. As US and UK efforts to bring peace to Cyprus fail, with the British eager to attain assistance or, ultimately, relief to his peacekeeping force, Security Council meetings start to discuss the form of UN action. As the British insist on the deployment of an impartial peacekeeping force as priority, Makarios seeks for a resolution that could be interpreted as an annulment of the Treaty of Guarantee, asserting that the priority should be on protecting Cyprus from a Turkish invasion (Stegenga 1970, 2). At the request of the Cypriot government, which continued to act under the powers given to them by the Constitution, but without Turkish Cypriot participation, a limited peacekeeping British force was sent to the island. A cease-fire was arranged but the small contingent would not be able to restore peace. Britain then gathers the

other Guarantors and the two communities' leaders for a conference in London, in January 1964, in a last effort to maintain the 1960 *state of affairs*.

Greek Cypriots now demanded a unitary and integral state with a Parliament elected by universal suffrage and a unified executive and judiciary powers, alongside with the revocation of the treaties of Guaranty and Alliance. In this unified state conceived by the Greek Cypriot leadership, mechanisms would be developed to assure Turkish Cypriot representation, their religious, educational and cultural autonomy and human rights. The Turkish Cypriot leadership, on the other hand, added the physical, territorial, separation of the two communities to their concept of partition of the Island, whereas a concentrated Turkish Cypriot community would develop its own political and administrative structure, whilst the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance would remain in force (Plaza 1965, 17-18). These irreconcilable hardened positions inflamed by the tension and violence on the island rendered this British attempt at mediation useless.

As Turkey threats to unilaterally intervene in Cyprus under the Treaty of Guarantee, a NATO plan is conceived by the US and Britain for action to be taken in a way that would not upset Turkish and Western interests. For the US, it was vital to avert a Greco-Turkish war and avoid a USSR exploitation opportunity. Furthermore, this limited version of internationalization of the conflict would avoid a full-fledged internationalization through UN involvement and USSR having a say in it through the Security Council. However, this NATO peacekeeping and peacemaking plan was opposed by Greece and Greek Cypriots, who saw in the UN a better intervener to protect their Cypriot sovereignty against a Turkish invasion, whereas NATO would probably negate their objectives (Coufoudakis 1976, 463). Makarios was confident that securing UN involvement would legitimise and generate international support for his political goals of creating a unified state in Cyprus (Stegenga 1970, 2). The NATO plan was also not supported by France and Germany, who were reluctant to be enmeshed in the Anglo-American interests in Cyprus (Coufoudakis 1976, 463). The US then turns to a unilateral effort to solve the situation through George Ball's and Senator William Fulbright's shuttle diplomacy, which also proved fruitless. Thereafter, Turkey decides to intervene military to support Turkish Cypriots, sending troops and performing air attacks on Cypriot soil in August 1963.

On the 26th of December that year, Makarios writes a letter to the Security Council complaining about what he considered an aggression to his government by Turkey and an intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus by menacing its territorial integrity and political

independence and requests a meeting with the Council to debate UN action (UN Security Council 1963). Unanimously adopted, after the Soviet Union's request to take a separate vote on paragraph 4, referring to the stationing of international troops on the island (Stegenga 1970, 3), Resolution 186 of March of 1964 establishes the creation of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The adoption of 186 resolution by the Security Council was taken at a time when discussions on article 19 of the UN Charter was at its climax and perspectives on the impact of peacekeeping in conflict pacific perpetuation were clashing in the international community. The fact that UNFICYP was given a time limit for action, since the mandate would have to be renewed by the Security Council after three months - one that has actually been continuously renewed to the present day –, differed from past UN missions and made it more acceptable for France and Soviet Union by assuring them some control over the Secretary General's actions (Coufoudakis 1976, 464). Furthermore, the appointment of a mediator symbolised the UN recognized that peacekeeping does not necessarily imply peacemaking (Coufoudakis 1976, 465) and that, for peace to be established, these two activities would have to be recognised as two different instruments, with specific tasks for specific aims, that ultimately can lead to the greater one, that of establishing peace.

The UNFICYP force is to be mandated and directed by the Secretary-General U Thant after consultation with the governments of Cyprus, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, to perform the tasks of preventing the recurrence of fighting and restoring law and order. Adding to the peacekeeping effort, resolution 186 also provides for a peacemaking one, asking the Secretary General to appoint a mediator, in agreement with the four governments mentioned above and the two Cypriot communities, to assist the parties in reaching a durable compromise on their political issues. The appointed mediator:

> "(...)shall use his best endeavours (...) for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement (...) having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security."

Although UNFICYP was welcomed by the parties on the island, their perspective on its presence differed substantially. For Greek Cypriots the UN force was an international contribution to the suppression of the Turkish Cypriot rebellion against their recognized government. For the Turkish Cypriots, the purpose of the UNFICYP was to protect them against Greek Cypriot attempt

to oppress their desire for partition along confederal lines and, ultimately, to help them achieve and secure this partition (Stegenga 1970, 7).

Apart from adopting the provision on peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts for Cyprus, the resolution calls on all member-states "to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus", clearly directed at Turkey. It also recognizes the Government of Cyprus' "responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order" and asks of it to "take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus". For Makarios, this became the provision that recognised his government - the only one that was actually governing the island at the time - as the legitimate Cypriot government, meaning the accomplishment of the Greek Cypriot appropriation of power. Furthermore, Makarios claimed that the Security Council had set aside the Guarantors' power to intervene and that, therefore, Turkey could no longer make the case of intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee (Reddaway 1986, 552).

The Turkish leadership opposed the Greek Cypriot interpretation that the Treaty of Guarantee had been rendered void, sustaining that the Zurich-London Agreements were fixed and could not be altered by any of the changing conditions in Cyprus. Both for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, the resolution rewarded the Greek Cypriots for the aggression against them and the 1960 Constitution. Being granted legitimacy by the international community, Greek Cypriots grew more intransigent toward the Turkish Cypriots, who became internationally portrayed as the separatist minority who rebelled against its government (Coufoudakis 1976, 466).

At this stage, internationalization was beneficial for the Greek Cypriot cause, but not to the Turkish Cypriot one. Makarios and the Greek Cypriots where politically more expedite in making their case in the international arena, which contrasted with Turkey's inability to gain international recognition for the validity and restoration of the Zurich-London Agreements and the Turkish Cypriot cause (Coufoudakis 1976, 466). For Turkish Cypriots, the international community was unjust and mistaken in recognising the Greek Cypriot government as lawful and in relegating their cause to a case of rebellion.

With the outburst of communal fighting in 1963 and the events that led to its occurrence, the relationship between the two communities was transformed. War instituted an adversarial relationship engraved with deep feelings of mistrust towards the "other", which prevented a solution from being found at this early stage of the conflict, when the communities' positions became resentful and rigid. The unsuccessful attempts by the British and the US to mediate a

solution and avoid Turkish military action began the process of internationalization, but the containment of this internationalization process with the NATO plan was rejected. The UN alternative is preferred and UNFICYP is established and is successful in protecting the cease-fire and establishing the necessary peace for the mediating efforts to occur, at a time when UN peacekeeping is under scrutiny and peacemaking is recognised as a separate and unconditional tool for conflict solution. The parties were now aware of the gains a full internationalization of the conflict through the UN could offer their positions, namely making their case internationally and gaining international support for their cause, but its benefits did not come equally to both parties. Internationalization altered the perceived power distribution in the parties' positions by offering legitimacy and recognition to Greek Cypriots and disempowering the Turkish Cypriot cause and delegitimizing Turkish involvement, a process that will negatively impact on the mediation efforts that followed and, consequently, on the conflicts' evolution.

3.3 The Conflict Re-Escalates

In June 1964, General Grivas had assumed control of the Cypriot National Guard, which had been created by Makarios, and was accused, by Turkey and Turkish Cypriots, of infiltrating Greek regular troops into it (Anderson 2008, 11). Consequentially, relations between Turkey and Greece aggravated. Turkish troops are assembled near the Thracian border and the two countries come to the brink of war (Solsten 1991). To avoid the Greco-Turkish eminent war, American President Lyndon Johnson forbade the Turkish use of any US military equipment upon its intervention. The successful leverage Johnson used against Turkey refrained its leaders from acting under the Treaty of Guarantee. However, the American action was interpreted as an act of support to Greek Cypriots, who felt a future Turkish threat would be faced again with US leverage. This latter impacted on the UN's mediating efforts with Greek Cypriots feeling their diplomatic position had been strengthened (Güney 2004, 30).

Until 1967, an uneasy peace had prevailed with the presence of the UNFICYP in Cyprus. In April that year, the civil government of Papandreou in Greece was overthrown by a military junta. A split between Athens and the Greek Cypriot Government began to take place as Makarios became weary of merging Cyprus with the dictatorship. Baked up by the new regime in Greece,

who saw him as the best man to replace Makarios, Grivas starts pressuring Turkey by sending heavily armed troops to patrol the Turkish Cypriot enclaves and tension rises sparking intercommunal fighting (Solsten 1991).

Again, a Greco-Turkish war is imminent, with Turkey issuing an ultimatum demanding the expulsion of Grivas, the retreat of Greek troops from the island and the dissolution of the National Guard, otherwise it would intervene to protect Turkish Cypriots under the Treaty of Guarantee (Adams 1972, 102). American diplomat Cyrus Vance begins a shuttle diplomacy between Ankara, Athens and Nicosia to urge the newly born regime in Greece to accede to the Turkish demands. Consequently, over 3000 Greek troops (Sözen 2008, 72) are withdrawn from the island and Grivas is forced to resign the Cypriot forces' command. Although Makarios was able to prevent the National Guard from being dissolved (Adams 1972, 102) and other conditions of the ultimatum were not fulfilled, Turkey refrained from using this as a pretext to intervene and, once again, war between the two NATO members was avoided.

In 1967, weary of Grivas moves and seizing the moment of the ending crisis, the Turkish Cypriot leadership announces the formation of a "Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration" to, presumably, transitionally govern the community until the 1960 Constitution is fully re-established. Fazil Küçük would be the President and Rauf Denktas the Vice-President of this provisional administration, a formation readily interpreted by Greek Cypriots as a step towards partition (Solsten 1991).

By 1970, the Turkish administration had *de facto* achieved partition. The Turkish enclaves were governed by this provisional administration and Makarios' authority over the Republic did not extend to them. Actually, the President's authority became progressively threatened not only by Turkish Cypriots, but also by the Greek military junta and a powerful faction of the Greek Cypriot community, who began to denounce Makarios for betraying *enosis* (Anderson 2008, 11-12). Grivas secretly returned to Cyprus and, with the support of the Greek junta, set up a new organization, EOKA B, to perform various terrorist actions, murder AKEL members and other left-wingers and to undertake further attacks at Makarios' life. Much more than its predecessor, EOKA B existed to terrorize the population and ultimately overthrow Makarios' from power, dead or alive, and achieve *enosis* (Anderson 2008, 12).

With Grivas' death in 1974, EOKA B becomes under direct control of the Greek junta. Makarios begins to publicly denounce the regime in Athens for the attacks on his life, on his government and for fomenting civil war in Cyprus with the purpose of gaining control over the

island. As Cypriot intelligence uncovers evidence that EOKA B was planning to overthrow the government, Makarios publicly demands Greece to withdraw its officers from the Cypriot National Guard, but to no avail. On the 15th of July, the Greek junta undertakes its coup d'état against Makarios and replaces him by Nikos Sampson. An advocate of *enosis,* Sampson readily appointed EOKA B elements as his ministers (Anderson 2008, 12).

For Turkey, since the coup was undertaken by Greece, it meant the Treaty of Guarantee was undoubtedly being breached. Consequently, Turkey turned to Britain for support in an intervention to reverse the coup. Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit demanded from Greece that Sampson be removed from Cypriot Presidency, that Greek officers are withdrawn from the National Guard and a guarantee be given that Cyprus would remain independent thereafter (Solsten 1991). Greece and Sampson refused to comply with Turkish demands and Britain to take part in the requested intervention. Turkey decided to intervene unilaterally and an all-out war began in Cyprus that shaped the reality on the island to this day.

Faced with Turkish military action, the Security Council promptly issues a resolution condemning intervention in Cyprus and calls upon all parties to refrain from any action that "might further aggravate the situation" (UN Security Council 1974). Ignoring consecutive Security Council resolutions calling for the respect of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus (UN Security Council 1974), the Turkish army continues to progress through the northern flank of the island. Turkey was no longer interested in performing the reestablishment of the "state of affairs" predicated on the Treaty of Guarantee, instead it was aiming for partition (Anderson 2008, 13)

The Turkish forces were able to progress quickly on the ground and seize 37 percent of the island's territory, setting their predetermined "Attila line" from Morphou Bay, in the north shore, to Famagusta, in the southeast. Thousands of people were dead and wounded, both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, and migration was taking place on a large pace, as Greek Cypriots were fleeing their homes in the north to escape Turkish troops and Turkish Cypriot combatants and Turkish Cypriots in the south were running for protection in the north (Anderson 2008, 13). The number of refugees quickly amounted on both sides of the barricade and became a great concern for the international community and human rights defenders. In 1974 almost 50 percent of the Cypriot population were refugees (see UN Security Council Resolution 361 1974). The right of return of these people and their property rights will become a sensitive issue of contention between the two communities in the future course of peace negotiations.

Makarios returns to the island to reassume his Presidency after a cease-fire was reached at the Geneva Talks and finds a *de facto* partitioned island (Anderson 2008, 15). To separate the opposing forces, UNFICYP had established ceasefire lines and a buffer zone extending approximately 180 kilometres across the island and varying in width from less than 29 meters to 7 kilometres, covering about 3 percent of island's territory (UNFICYP 2011). The "Green Line", as it came to be known, has become vital ever since in the prevention of the reoccurrence of fighting, with UN troops supervising land and air throughout the whole extension of the buffer zone.

In 1974, the northern flank of the Green Line became under total control and occupation of the Turkish army. In February 1975 Turkey annexes the area to its territory, proclaiming it the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, a declaration immediately condemned by the Security Council, who urged the two communities to proceed with the negotiations (UN Security Council 1975). From April 1975 to February 1976, intercommunal talks are held in Vienna, which most notably resulted in an agreement of transfer of population from north and south, institutionalizing the ethnic territorial divide along the territorial dividing line on the island (Sözen 2008, 74). Before his death in 1977, under great external pressure, a tired and dispirited Makarios will accept the Turkish idea of the creation of a bi-communal federal republic, marking a definite departure from the 1960 Constitution.

Since the Turkish intervention of 1974, despite sporadic events of aggression between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot individuals, there have been no outbursts of communal violence. From then on, the Cyprus conflict enters a new phase of consecutive peace talks and mediation attempts. The intractability of the conflict, the antagonistic objectives, the hidden agendas and the overwhelming mistrust the two communities developed towards each other throughout these 10 years of fighting will carry its toll on the *peacemaking* efforts to find a longstanding solution. Consecutive mediation and third-party initiatives, mainly of the UN, but also of the US, have come close to bringing the two parties to agreement, but ultimately failed, further tying the Cypriot "knot". From 1974 onwards, Cyprus ceases to be a *conflict*, in a physical aggression perspective to become a growing *problem* for the international community to solve. The mediation initiatives undertaken in Cyprus will be the subject of detailed description and analysis in the following chapter of this dissertation. For now, it is relevant to understand the *status quo* that has been lived on the island ever since 1974, in which the mediating efforts have occurred.

3. 4. The Ending *Conflict* and the Growing *Problem*

On the Greek Cypriot side of the dividing line, the Republic of Cyprus has continued to exist in the same mould it had been since the Turkish Cypriots left the government in 1963, governed solely by Greek Cypriots under the very same Constitution of 1960. Spyros Kyprianou, of the Democratic Party, became President of the Republic in 1978 and was again re-elected in 1983, only to be substituted in the 1988 elections by George Vassiliou, an independent liberal who had gained support from AKEL. Glafcos Clerides had split politically from Makarios in 1976 and found a new conservative party, the Democratic Rally, arriving at Presidency again in 1993. Clerides was defeated by Tassos Papadopolous in 2003 with the help AKEL voters. Although Papadoplous was a former EOKA fighter, he exercised a progressive presidency, preaching the need for moderation and change in Cyprus (Dunphy and Bale 2007, 294-295). Most recently, Dimitris Christofias has become President in 2008 and has been taking part on a positive moment of rapprochement between the two communities. Economically, the Republic of Cyprus has exponentially flourished. The tourist industry has greatly contributed to the modernisation and economic success of the Republic. With a per capita income superior to that of Greece or Portugal and one of the lowest unemployment rates in the Europe. The Republic of Cyprus became a member of the European Union in 2004 and a member of the Monetary Union in 2008. Having an European integrated economy, Greek Cypriots enjoy, today, a western European standard of living and life style.

North of the Green Line, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was unilaterally proclaimed an independent sate on the 15th of November of 1983, being immediately declared illegal by the Security Council in resolution 541 and not being internationally recognized by any state, except from Turkey, to this day. A parliamentary democracy was established with its own Constitution approved by the Turkish Cypriot electorate in 1985. Rauf Denktas became the first President of the TRNC and consecutively re-elected until 2005. Right and left-wing parties developed around divergent views on the politics of partition, from the National Unity party of Denktas, who stood on a more separatist stance, to the Communal Liberation Party and the Republican Turkish Party who advocated closer relationships with the Republic of Cyprus. Political positioning towards the Turkish settlers also became a point of divergence between left and right. After the partitioning of the island in 1974, Turkey encouraged Turkish citizens,

especially families from Anatolia, to settle in the northern Cyprus, where they were offered housing and agricultural land which, in some cases, had been evaded by Greek Cypriots. An estimated over one hundred thousand Turks settled in the TRNC and Turkey became increasingly accused by the Greek Cypriot side of changing the islands demographics to impact on the TRNC elections and, consequently, on its ideology and leadership (Akçali 2007, 71-74). Mehmet Ali Talat was elected as second president, in 2005, who unlike his predecessor, was supportive of reunification and of entrancing the European Union. Talat has been substituted by Dervis Eroglu in the 2010 Presidential elections, who has affirmed is desire to continue negotiations to find a UN-backed solution (Arsu 2010). Faced with an international embargo imposed by the Republic of Cyprus, the TRNC was isolated and became greatly dependent on subsidies from Turkey and enjoys a limited autonomy. The police are controlled by the Turkish army and the local government costs are entirely covered by Ankara. Although the Turkish side has also benefited from the tourist industry, the state employs the majority of the citizens (Anderson 2008, 16). Incomes are substantially lower than those enjoyed on the Greek side, but still, Turkish Cypriots managed, at times, to enjoy a better standard of living than that of Turkey and to build a modern education system up to the university level (Solsten 1991).

Over the past 27 years it has not been only the economical gap that has increased between the two communities. The establishment of unilateral governments represented a hardening in the positions on both sides that has been detrimental to the international community's attempts at solving the problem. Actually, the international community has only been able to restrain the main actors from precipitating the re-emergence of conflict while, in the meantime, UNFICYP becomes one of the longest peacekeeping missions ever carried out by the UN.

If Turkish Cypriots are persistently mistrustful of Greek Cypriots for the events between 1960 and 1974, Greek Cypriots are so towards the Turkish Cypriot side for the ones after 1974. Being that the events of 1974 where brought by Turkey and that Greek Cypriots consider Turkey has an overwhelming influence on the Turkish Cypriot leadership which it manipulates in order to maintain its presence in Cyprus, Greek Cypriots tend to consider Turkey, and not the Turkish Cypriots, as their real opponent and the one that keeps preventing the peace negotiations to end and reunification to occur (Cyprus Mail 2003). Nonetheless, Greek Cypriots have been more successful in making their case internationally and diverting attention from the events that broke down the 1960 Republic, while Turkish Cypriots feel they had no alternative but to steer away

and set up their own administration and that this new entity they established is legitimate and worthy of recognition (Reddaway 1986, 548,553).

The fact that only the Republic of Cyprus came to enjoy EU membership further complicated the peacemaking efforts. Although the EU conferred membership to the whole island, and therefore did not *a priori* exclude the Turkish Cypriot side from being part of the Union, since it only recognizes the government of the Republic of Cyprus as legitimate, only the Greek Cypriot side has been enjoying full membership. When Cyprus became a EU member in a package of ten European countries, mainly eastern European, a solution to the Cyprus problem was supposed to have been accomplished under the auspices of Secretary General Kofi Annan but the "no" from the Greek Cypriot community in the referendum of the "Annan Plan" prevented the country from being reunified prior to the date set for EU ascension. Consequently, for the Turkish Cypriots it has become vital to enjoy full membership of the EU and put an end to decades of isolation that have deterred its development and increased the economic gap between the two Cypriot Communities. In this context, Turkey's accession also becomes entangled in the Cyprus problem with the Greek Cypriot side blocking its entry to strengthen its position at the negotiations table with the Turkish Cypriots. TRNC's and Turkish EU full membership has become a pivotal issue in the peace negotiations, one that has been played by both sides, altering the stakes, the strategies and positions and further elongating the journey to resolution.

Until the opening up of crossing points of the Green Line in 2003, the two communities had none or little contact. Up to 2008, an estimate of 40 percent of Greek Cypriots and 30 percent of Turkish Cypriots had never crossed to the other side (Lordos 2008, 257). To this day, Turkish Cypriots' houses in the south and Greek Cypriots' in the north remain abandoned. On both sides of the divided capital of Nicosia these houses can be seen locked with iron chains and padlocks, waiting their owners return. Nicosia's high street on the European cosmopolitan Greek Cypriot side, abruptly ends at the Lidras Street crossing point. A radical change in context takes place in a visibly poorer and less "europeanized" Turkish side. Despite the growing intercommunal activities promoted by international entities, the *status quo* of 1974 remains static with the existing physical barrier of the Green Line. The military context has remained unchanged until further progress is achieved on the diplomatic one, when the two communities agree on how to co-exist in an united Cyprus. Still, for both communities the long-living current *status quo* is increasingly unbearable.

4. UN and US Mediation in Cyprus

The protracted social conflict in Cyprus has persisted throughout decades of escalation, de-escalation and re-escalation due to the Cypriot communities' incapacity or refusal to devise a political understanding and structure under which they could coexist peacefully. The search for the fulfilment of their mutually exclusive interests and objectives as rendered the communities the perception of the dispute as a zero-sum game, where one side's gain corresponds to the other side's loss (UN Secretary General 2003, paragraph 143). The search for the involvement of an outside party to support their positions and maximize the potential of realization of their interests in detriment of those of the other has been the pattern of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot behaviour in the Cyprus conflict and one that maintained the "motherlands", Greece and Turkey, at the epicentre of the dispute (Richmond b1998 XV). This pattern of behaviour is also followed by both communities regarding the involvement of a third party that enters the conflict to attempt to settle it and one that has defined the course of mediation throughout decades of initiatives and activities.

The present chapter presents the various mediation initiatives of the Cyprus conflict since its outburst in 1963, and the first US-lead mediation efforts, until 2004, the year in which the initiative that has come the closest to achieving a definite solution for Cyprus took place under UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's mediation. Within this pre-established 41 year timeframe, a description of the US and UN mediation initiatives of the Cyprus conflict will be made in order to ascertain the characteristics of these actors as mediators, their results and their consequent impact on the conflict's evolution itself. Ascertaining the two actors' activities in this parallel description will allow an understanding, not only of their isolated mediation initiatives, but also of the degree to which they acted alone or in a coordinated form and on how this factor contributed to the success or failure of the various initiatives and to the evolution of the conflict itself. In order to perform this task, it becomes necessary to approach the mediators' initiatives in the light of the context in which they take place, primordially the conflict's environment at the given moment the mediator is exercising its task. Equally, variables that conditioned the UN and US mediators' performance will be taken into account, namely, who is the individual mediator leading the each entity's initiatives, what mediation style and strategies, were of their choice, if it is the case, the

agreement they proposed, the parties' positions during the negotiations process and the overall result of each initiative.

In the present chapter, the various mediation initiatives undertaken in Cyprus in the referred time-frame will be divided into four periods, a division that is based on the level of isolation and integration of UN and US mediation initiatives and their characteristics at each moment. The first period is dedicated to the isolated mediation initiatives undertaken by the US in the conflicts' early period. These were the first mediation attempts to be brokered in Cyprus when it erupted in 1963 with the demise of the 1960 Constitution and were exercised prior and at the early stages of UN involvement. A second period will begin with the start of UN involvement in 1964 and dedicate itself to the only UN "official" mediation initiative lead by Galo Plaza and which's result deeply impacted UN subsequent mediatory capacity and activity. A third period will group US and UN paralleled mediation initiatives undertaken from 1968 to 1983 under the intercommunal talks framework. This third period will be divided in two moments that identify a first and a second phase of intercommunal talks, a division that is justified by the fact that the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 changed the conflicts' characteristics and, thus, the parties' positions at the negotiations table. A fourth and final period will be dedicated to the initiatives undergone from 1983 to the 2004 referendum of the Annan Plan. Although intercommunal talks will continue to be a framework for negotiations in these subsequent mediations, what distinguishes this time-period from previous ones is the change in UN mediation strategy with the formulation of settlement proposals, which will consequently see a change in US-opted strategies. Given that written proposals for settlement will be under negotiation during this fourth period, it will be divided in the two proposals' negotiation, the Draft Framework Agreements and the Annan Plan.

4.1 US Early Mediation Initiatives: Preventing the Conflict's Internationalization

As it has been described in the previous chapter, the early mediating initiatives in the Cyprus conflict were undertaken by the US. Cyprus' strategic importance for the US during the Cold War years will dictate its involvement in the devise of a settlement for a conflict that

menaces US interests in the region and worldwide. The protection of these interests and its underling objectives of preventing war between the two NATO members, Greece and Turkey, that could undermine NATO's southern flank, alienate Turkey from the West and allow the expansion of Soviet influence in the Mediterranean, will bring the US, incited by the UK at its early stage, into the conflict resolution efforts and dictate its mediation strategies and mediating style, which will impact not only on the results they accomplished, but also in the transformation of the conflict itself. With Greco-Turkish relations at the centre of American concern in Cyprus, the US naturally found these two actors the ones between whom a settlement would have to be devised, therefore, the US did not consider the two Cypriot communities as central parties in the dispute. Being that the US undertook the first mediation initiatives of the Cyprus problem, the first attempts of mediation for conflict settlement made in Cyprus are brokered between Greece and Turkey, excluding Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.

In 1963, when Turkey was threatening to intervene, the British, unable and under-resourced to keep the peace in Cyprus, perceived the US as the only actor capable of deterring Turkish intents (Güney 2004, 29). Since the end of the Second World War both countries' growing tensions with the Soviet Union provided for a convergence in Turkish and American interests and foreign policies. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, which marked US succession to Britain in foreign policy making in the region, further pushed Turkey to align with the US (Balci 2009, 1). The US was now in the most favourable position to influence Turkey's foreign policy concerning Cyprus, but was reluctant to get involved at a time when the Vietnam war and the dispute over Berlin with the Soviets were only a few of the crises the US already had at hand. However, not to get involved meant the Cyprus conflict would be handed to the UN, through which the Soviet Union would gain leverage over the Cyprus issue. Also, the US feared the UN would not be able to deliver a quick enough response to refrain Turkish intentions. After the British required assistance to President Lyndon Johnson, the US became involved in mediating the Cyprus dispute for the first time (Ball 1982, 340).

The first mediation attempt came from President Johnson himself, inviting Greece and Turkey for talks in Washington. In early 1964, a British-sponsored Conference was organized in London. After both initiatives failed to ease the growing intercommunal tensions on the island (Sözen 2007, 2), Johnson directed his Under Secretary of State, George Ball, to mediate the search for an acceptable solution for Greece and Turkey of the Cyprus problem. The Anglo-American NATO Plan began to be devised, which contemplated a NATO peacekeeping force to

expand the already stationed British forces and to observe the cease-fire and the appointment of a mediator who could seek settlement within the NATO framework and, therefore, within American and, also, Turkish interests (Coufoudakis 1974, 36).

In his memoires, Ball (1982, 342) describes the Turkish flank positions at the time as follows: "Turkish Cypriots demanded partition and the right to govern their own community" and "preserving Turkey's right to intervene" as a security assurance against Greek Cypriot attacks and perceived domination intentions, a demand also emphasised by the Turkish Government. Ball also refers the US considered that Turkey would never be deterred from this perceived intervention right by a UN force, which would be viewed as a vehicle of Soviet involvement or subject to Makarios' UN manipulation. As for the Greek Cypriot leader, Ball states they "wanted union with Greece but, "at least for tactical purposes, was demanding a fully independent Cyprus run by the Greek majority" where the Turkish Cypriot community would be reduced to a protected minority status, while the Greek Government also "pressed for *enosis".*

Through January that year, shuttling between Ankara, Athens and Nicosia, Ball was able to gain support for the NATO Plan from Turkey, whose only condition for acceptance was that its right of intervention to protect Turkish Cypriots would not be impaired. In Athens, the political scene was dim, with caretaker governments succeeding each other and probing Greece unable to sustain any position other than the one approved by Makarios (Ball 1982, 343). Makarios' acceptance then became the cornerstone for getting the NATO Plan approved, which he vehemently opposed on the grounds that it compromised Cypriot sovereignty and its non-aligned polices and put Cyprus under the orbit of Western interests (Savvides 1998, 40). Therefore, Makarios insisted the Cyprus *problem* should only be addressed by the UN Security Council (Ball 1982, 344). Through the UN framework, Makarios believed a Turkish intervention would be "illegalized" and blocked (Ball 1982, 345) and the Greek Cypriot sovereignty right recognized.

Ball tried frightening Makarios out of his rigid position by suggesting the US and Western countries would not intervene against Turkey and proceeded to reformulate the initial plan to exclude the necessity of Makarios' consent on the creation of a peacekeeping force. In the revised plan, the peacekeeping force would be deployed, not by NATO but, by the three guarantor powers simultaneously, exercising their rights of intervention provided by the Treaty of Guaranty. This peacekeeping force was set to stay in Cyprus until the UN deployed an international force. With this condition, Ball assured Turkey the protection of the Turkish Cypriot community while the UN took its time to formulate its action plan, while also assuring Britain the long-desired

support to its troops in Cyprus (Ball 1992, 347). Despite Ball's scare tactics, Makarios did not move from his previous position and Britain was now displeased with Ball's alteration of the plan, which frustrated the purpose of British push for US involvement, that of divesting itself of the peacekeeping efforts in Cyprus altogether (Ball 1982, 348).

With the British refusal of the revised plan, the US realised the "only available course was to work through the UN" (Ball 1982, 348) and, therefore, that internationalization of the Cyprus conflict was inevitable. During debate sessions at the Security Council, the US pressed for a UN force to be quickly deployed in Cyprus to avoid Turkish military intervention, while successfully manoeuvring to prevent Soviet participation in the force and to the rights of intervention by the Guarantors from being nullified in a resolution[8] (Balll 1982, 348).

In April 1964, despite Sakari Tuomioja's ongoing talks with Greek, Turkish and Cypriot leaders and UNFICYP deployment, fighting had again broken out on the island. With renewed fighting came the continuing Turkish threat of intervention, which maintained US presence in the mediating scene. In June 1964 Turkish forces were already being deployed in Cyprus when President Johnson, in his letter to Turkish President Inonu, leveraged against the Turks to stop a full-blown intervention. Thereafter, Ball invited Dean Acheson to perform "quiet mediation" (Ball 1982, 349) between Athens and Ankara. Acheson had had a central role in American Cold War diplomacy and the formulation of the Truman Doctrine and, thus, was thought by Ball to have the personal prestige in Greece and Turkey and the negotiating skills necessary to succeed in a mission "that would inevitably be complex, frustrating, of indefinite duration" and with "high stakes involved" (Ball 1982, 349-350). Ignoring the UN peacemaking process, President Johnson separately invited Greece and Turkey to Washington for discussions on Cyprus. Both meetings were attended by Acheson who tried to persuade the two leaders to overcome their long-lasting differences and antagonistic ethno-nationalistic identities and mistrust and view a Cyprus settlement in a NATO framework (Brinkley 1988, 9).

If Greece was suspicious of the US from the start, since the Johnson Letter event, Turkey was disappointed at the US as an ally and was now "realizing" its international "isolation", in fact, even questioning the usefulness of its NATO membership. The Johnson letter had become a turning point in Turkish foreign policy making and US-Turkish relations (Balci 2009, 6). Notwithstanding, Ball warned Papandreou that after the Johnson letter, the US was expecting greater cooperation from Greece or it would not make such a dramatic diplomatic move to stop

[8] Security Council resolution 186 was ambiguous regarding intervention rights even to the extent of allowing the parties to interpreter in opposite ways, with Makarios regarding it as an end to Turkish rights of intervention and Turkey as a preservation of those rights (Balll 1982, 348).

Turkey again (Ball 1982, 353). Although Ball was convinced the Greek President was unable to take any hard decisions regarding Cyprus, they were necessary to undermine Makarios and get an American-made peace-plan approved, but Papandreou's position was ever more rigid and in line with Makarios' demands. He refused to negotiate directly with Turkey, while claiming UN mediation would be more appropriate (Savvides 1998, 41). When President Johnson's initiative failed to break the stalemate, Ball immediately moved to press the UN Secretary General U-Thant to endorse the next American mediation effort, once again, only between Greece and Turkey, to take place at Camp David, in which Tuomioja would be replaced by Dean Acheson (Brinkley 1988, 10).

Fearing the US were taking over the diplomatic initiative or, at least, that he would be charged by the Soviet Union of allowing it, U-Thant resisted to accept the American proposal and suggested the meeting to be held on neutral ground with the neutral UN mediator. Ball insisted that American authority was necessary if there was to be any accomplishment, to what U-Thant ceded by allowing Acheson's presence at the negotiations' site in Geneva for the parties to consult with (Savvides 1998, 42). Sakari Tuomioja, the UN-designated mediator, like the US, viewed the Cyprus dispute as international or regional in nature, as essentially a conflict of interests between Greece and Turkey, the key actors between whom the settlement could be agreed. Nevertheless, contrary to the US, Tuomioja could not agree on *enosis* as the course for settlement, since it would mean the dissolution of a UN member-sate (Ker-Lindsay 2005, 8). Although Tuomioja was the "official" mediator at Geneva, Acheson's proposal was the one being discussed at the negotiations' table, what Ball predicted Acheson's strong personality would accomplish (Brinkley 1988, 10). The "Acheson Plan" proposed a "double *enosis*" (Ball 1982, 356), meaning Cyprus would be united with Greece and divided into ten cantons, whereas two enclaves would be under full Turkish Cypriot control and Turkey would be granted a large and strategically important military base on the island and the Kastellorizon island (Savvides 1998, 42). The Plan was rejected by both sides, but although Turkey accepted it as a basis for future negotiations, when Makarios pronounced himself against the Acheson Plan, Greece followed suit, fearful of the increased Turkish presence in Cypriot soil devised by the plan. To persuade the Greek government, Acheson revised the initial plan limiting the possession of the base by the Turkish to a fifty year lease and the territorial division from cantons to prefects, but now not only the Cypriot and the Greek governments, but also Turkey was against it (Savvides 1998, 42-43).

In principle, the "double *enosis*" concept of the Acheson Plan was accepted by Greece and Turkey and, ultimately, was only refused due to Greek intimidation by Makarios' denunciation of the plan as "NATO trap" and Greek and Turkish suspicion of US intentions. Nevertheless, Acheson had devised a plan that satisfied both Greek and Turkish nationalistic goals of *enosis* and *taksim* that could ease the ethnic tension, but Makarios would not permit the American intention of dissolving the Cypriot state to be realised (Brinkley 1988, 11, 13-14). An independent Cyprus threatened Greco-Turkish relations and had hampered those of these states with the US, while disrupting NATO, straining the UN and strengthening the Soviet position in the Mediterranean. The threat to American interests the Cypriot state represents is ever more significant when considering that the US could not envision any other option for a solution other than terminating Cypriot sovereignty and placing the territory under NATO control (Brinkley 1988, 12). Therefore, for the US it was mandatory to deflect Makarios [9].

Despite the diplomatic deadlock in which the Geneva negotiations terminated, Acheson was successful in persuading the parties to negotiate, establishing a greater confidence between Greece and Turkey and providing some room for agreement in the deeply divided positions of the two profoundly antagonistic parties (Brinkley 1988, 15, 17). But Acheson's and US' approach to mediation was deeply flawed for it did not consider what the Cypriots themselves desired for Cyprus and even bypassed one of its leaders. The NATO and Acheson plans are a classic exercise of US great power diplomacy and *realpolitik* (Brinkley 1988, 18), where American interests surpass all others and are blindly pursued and people become secondary to state interests. Even if the US considered Makarios a despotic leader, the Turkish Cypriot position was also never considered. The US preferred to neglect the fact that Cyprus, although forged recently as state, had not been under control of either Greece or Turkey for decades or centuries and that these actors were not at the centre but at the periphery of the Cyprus conflict. In the midst of the Cold War, US mediation in Cyprus was devoted to preventing the conflict's internationalization through UN involvement that could facilitate Soviet progression into the eastern Mediterranean (Savvides 1998, 40). Even when it was no longer possible to maintain the UN at arm's length the US continued the isolated pursuit of a settlement for the Cyprus conflict by marginalizing the organization's role in its own mediation initiative. Guided by its own interests and concentrated in the avoidance of a Greco-Turkish war which, nonetheless was achieved in this period, the US

[9] George Ball himself was involved in the "Grivas plan" to remove Makarios from Presidency: "Though Grivas was, of course, a passionate advocate of *enosis,* he might, I thought, be easier to work with than Makarios, so we established an underground contact with Socrates Iliades, who was Grivas' lieutenant and director of the defence of Cyprus." (Ball 1982, 357).

perceived the Cyprus conflict as a regional and international one and failed to recognise its existence at the local level, where in fact it had originated and from where its solution would need to emerge.

4.2 The UN Takes-Over the Impasse: The Plaza Report

With the death of Tuomioja in August 1964, U-Thant appointed Galo Plazo to continue UN mediating efforts. Instead of viewing the Cyprus conflict as an international or regional problem, Plaza approached it in intrastate and communal terms (Ker-Lindsay 2005, 9) and, therefore, as a conflict in which a solution would have to be mediated between the two Cypriot communities and not their "motherlands". Plaza was, in the end, dismissed from his duties altogether with the breakdown of UN official mediation in Cyprus after being accused by Turkey of exceeding the limits of his mandate and becoming an arbitrator. Although having the pernicious effect of limiting UN mediation activities in Cyprus for years to come, Plaza's mediation and his views on a solution for Cyprus defined the guidelines and objectives for future UN mediation.

From the 16th of September 1964 to the 26th of March 1965, Plaza established headquarters in Nicosia and visited the capitals of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, performing three series of consultations. He dedicated a first round to ascertaining the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot positions with the purpose of finding areas where compromises and agreements could be attempted, but he noted that despite the parties' willingness to discuss their positions, these were far apart. Although at the first round of consultations the parties appeared to be willing to make concessions, at the second round they had gained rigidity, with both parties further adhering to their irreconcilable stands and now unwilling to come together for direct discussions and negotiation (paragraphs 6, 88, 89) as the General Assembly's discussion of the Cyprus problem was close to happening and each of the parties were expecting to gain the Assembly's support for their respective stands. Eventually, the General Assembly did not debate Cyprus, nor took a stand on the problem. Plaza saw the moment as appropriate for a third round of consultations, after which his report was written and in which the parties positions' had become more open to concessions, although to these they attached irreconcilable preconditions.

In his report to the Secretary General, of March 1975, Plaza states that Makarios stressed the Republic was founded by international agreements that did not take into consideration the will of the people of Cyprus, whose leaders felt obliged to sign and, therefore, should be void and a new and completely independent unitary state, with all powers emanating from its people in the exercise of their international right of self-determination, should be edified. The Greek Cypriot leadership also rejected, what they considered, the favoured treatment the Constitution gave to the Turkish Cypriot minority that had given it the same rights in political power exercise as the Greek Cypriot majority and desired a new constitution to be based on the democratic principle of majority rule. Legislative power would be exercised by a single-chamber elected by universal suffrage to which the executive should answer and the judicial power exercised by a single independent judiciary in a state where minority rights would be safeguarded by humans rights in general (paragraphs 62-69). To facilitate a solution, the Greek Cypriot community was willing to make concessions, for Cyprus to be, as long as it remained independent, a demilitarized and non-aligned country, and to accept additional measures and guarantees for the protection of Turkish Cypriot minority rights (paragraph 92). However, exercising their right of self-determination meant, for the Greek Cypriot leadership, that once the independent state was established, the Cypriot people would decide through a referendum their political status and relationships with other states, choosing between continuing independent or unifying with Greece (paragraph 94). Given that Greek Cypriots are the majority, *enosis* would be the most probable and expected result. Regarding the British sovereign bases, the Greek Cypriot leadership held the view that they should be incorporated into the Republic of Cyprus and opposed holding multilateral talks among all the parties. Notwithstanding, they agreed, in principle, to undertake bilateral talks with Turkish Cypriot representatives only to discuss minority rights, since all other principles regarding the character and functioning of the State were considered non-negotiable (paragraph 96).

In consultation with the Cypriot Vice-President Küchük, Plaza refers the Turkish Cypriot community's main concern was with their security and property. Initially, Turkish Cypriots wished to be physically separated from the Greek Cypriot community through the physical partition of Cyprus and the creation of two separate nations. However, Küchük modified his position to supporting the creation of a federal state, once he recognised Greek Cypriots would never agree to physical separation. The Turkish Cypriot proposal for the creation of a federal state included a compulsory exchange of population between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot

communal areas, which would enjoy self-government in all matters other than federal affairs. Each area would maintain its cultural and economic ties with Greece and Turkey and be allowed to enter in international agreements with them. A 30 per cent Turkish Cypriot to a 70 per cent Greek Cypriot ratio would be applied to the legislative and executive branches of power and a federal President and Vice-president elected by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities respectively. Union of the Federal Republic with another country would be forbidden, as well as its partition, and both the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance would continue to integrate the Constitution (paragraphs 70-76). Turkish Cypriots contended that if a right of self-determination was accorded to the Greek Cypriots, which they would exercise by uniting with Greece, they would have to be granted the same right and be free to exercise it by partitioning the country to unify with Turkey (paragraph 134). Unlike Greek Cypriot, the Turkish Cypriot leadership preferred multilateral to bilateral talks, to which they could only be after the restoration of the constitutional order and the removal of Greek and Greek Cypriot created forces but not a final settlement since, its negotiation, they thought, should include Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom (paragraph 101).

The Government of Greece held that the future of Cyprus should be decided by the majority of the Cypriot people and that Turkey had no legitimate claim in Cyprus, although, in the event of *enosis* Greece showed willingness to discuss the issue and make certain concessions to the Turkish Government (paragraph 102). Greece aligned with the Greek Cypriots in considering the Zurich-London agreements unworkable and supporting a solution based on the full independence and sovereignty of Cyprus. In the same vein, Turkey supported the Turkish Cypriot position of a solution through the creation of a federal state (paragraphs 77-79) and insisted on two necessary conditions for settlement: the prohibition of *enosis,* a necessary precondition for Cyprus becoming the demilitarized and non-aligned state desired by Greek Cypriots; and the communities' geographical separation and transfer of population between the two federated states. As a concession, Turkey was willing to agree on a reduction of the area claimed by the Turkish Cypriot community, from 38% to 20% of the territory and held that discussions of a solution could only take place under five-party talks and could not be left to people of Cyprus to discuss alone (paragraphs 107 to 109).

The positions of the parties remained far apart through the consultations phase and, because of the unattainable preconditions by the parties to enter into direct talks, a minimum understanding was not reached that could bring the parties to meet and to establish a direct line

of communication, which Plaza considered essential for the successes of the mediation efforts in finding a solution to the Cyprus problem[10] (paragraph 120). Since it was not possible for the parties to reach agreement among themselves and for direct negotiations to take place under the ongoing circumstances, the mediation had reached an impasse. Putting forward his own proposal for agreement was, to Plaza, the next necessary step in an attempt to find common ground that would "allow the parties to go as close as the circumstances permit to their legitimate objectives" (paragraph 121) and the "directions along which they should reasonably be expected to meet and try to seek an agreement" (paragraph 124).

Contrary to the previous US approaches, Plaza opposes the idea of dividing the island under any form, whether *enosis* or partition, or even the creation of a federal state. Instead, Plaza stresses the political unity of Cyprus as the basis for solution, one that should not deny the political majority their right to rule but that would be able to avoid dominance of one community over the other and that would not jeopardize or delay indefinitely the unity of the population (paragraph 163). The consociational character of the 1960 Constitution is criticized by Plaza, who describes it as a "constitutional oddity" (paragraph 163) that is difficult to implement, that does not fully protect the minority against subjugation by the majority community or ensure a proper voice to its communal affairs in the longer run and that, ultimately, perpetuates the communities' separateness. He claims that the 1960 Constitution, although going into great lengths to confer and protect Turkish Cypriot political rights, was impossible to maintain against the will of the majority who regarded the minorities' political rights as disproportionate and unfair. Also, unlike the American approach, Plaza though a solution had to be found among the Cypriot people themselves and not the "motherlands". First, for Plaza, it was not feasible to find a solution that could not be accepted by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in the first place and, secondly, it would be taken by the Cypriot people, and especially Greek Cypriots, as an imposition from abroad, and allow for the 1960 Agreements' stigma to remain. Also, he believed that if a solution could be found within the Republic, between the two communities, the other parties, Greece and Turkey, would find it to be on their best interest to adhere to that solution (paragraphs 126, 127).

For Plaza, a sustained long-term solution for Cyprus should be found within the framework of a unitary and sovereign state capable of preventing domination of one community

[10] Plaza regarded the consultations phase as an important first step leading to direct multilateral talks. Plaza states that direct talks should be held "at the earliest possible moment" in a mediation process, however, he also found these could not be hastened, otherwise, the absence of a "minimum common understanding" between the parties could risk "a further deepening of the impasse" (1965, paragraph 89).

over the other while promoting the communities' integration. He believes all parties involved should refrain from attempting to restore the 1960 Constitution, which he believed to be "psychologically and politically impossible" (paragraph 129) and pursue the creation of a new independent sovereign state of majority rule where Turkish Cypriot minority rights would be protected (Coufoudakis 1974, 36). For this new independence to be established, one that differed from the Greek Cypriot demand of "unfettered independence" with the demand for self-determination, suspicion and fear would have to be countered by Greek Cypriot abandonment of the political goals of *enosis,* "the most explosive aspect of the Cyprus problem" (paragraph 137) and reciprocated by Turkish Cypriot abandonment of the pursuit of *taksim*. In this sense, the right of self-determination would be exercised, not by the communities individually, but by the State, who would be in the best position to decide on what is best for the well-being of its citizens as a whole and for international peace and security (paragraph 143). The protection of the Turkish Cypriot community would not to be assured by geographical divide and people's transfer but through the establishment of transitional but "most rigorous possible guarantees" (paragraph 160) of individual and minority rights "without weakening the unity of the State" (paragraph 163). Cyprus would be demilitarized and the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance abrogated, but the context of the settlement would provide for guaranties of the country's independence to meet Turkey's security concerns (paragraph 147), where Plaza foresaw the UN acting as the new Guarantor (paragraph 168).

The Plaza Report was eventually accepted as a basis for future negotiations by the Greek Cypriots but rejected by Turkey and Turkish Cypriots who were not willing to agree on a proposal that would abrogate the Turkish right of intervention in Cyprus. During the consultations period, Turkey had expressed that to issue proposals on a solution was beyond the mediator's tasks. Turkey argued that, being put forward by a UN mediator, Plaza's proposals bore the moral stamp and force of the UN, therefore constituting an arbitrator's and not a mediator's task (Plaza 1965, 44). Considering that in making his agreement proposals Plaza went beyond the limits of his mandate, Turkey rejected the report and called on his resignation. The Greek Cypriots reacted to the Turkish stand by refusing to accept a replacement in the event of Plaza's resignation. Faced with these reactions, U-Thant decided to make his good offices available to the parties and Plaza resigned soon after, was never replaced, and the UN official mediation was altogether abandoned (Ker-Lindsay 2005, 9).

Plaza approached Cyprus not as an international problem but rather as a communal one and, from now on the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities would always be the central actors in the international mediation and negotiation efforts. With this change in approach, Greece and Turkey are no longer the central actors, nor are their interests. In the previous mediation led by the US, preventing a Turkish intervention was the mediation's main concern and objective that attributed a greater weight to Turkey's interests and their satisfaction. When the mediation initiative is taken over by the UN and executed by the organization alone through Plaza and the mediation target shifts from the "motherlands" to the communities, from searching for a solution to the problem in its international and regional dimensions to its local one, Turkey's interest automatically became less relevant and were less privileged in the proposed solution. The shift in the mediation approach ultimately led to Turkey's unacceptance of Plaza's proposals.

Nonetheless, Plaza's mediation approach and the parameters for a solution he proposed where a novelty. The previous approaches and extreme solutions where rejected by Plaza, who envisioned the path to a long-standing solution in the opposite direction, one that would stem from the local sphere of the problem and spill-over to the regional and international spheres. This was contrary to the methods pursued by American mediators, whose vision was that a solution found at the larger spheres would automatically be tacitly accepted by, or imposed to, the lower one. Consequently, opposed to American perspective, in Plaza's mediating strategy Makarios would inevitably have to take part in the solution-building. A solution was now suggested to lay in the creation of an independent and sovereign Cyprus, not through any kind of partition nor union, and to be devised by the two communities through intercommunal negotiations, not by leaving it to the two "motherlands" to decide on the future of the Cypriot people.

The breakdown of the first and only UN mediation event will reduce the organization's mediatory capacity of the Cyprus crisis for years to come, in which the organization will find itself limited to performing the least intrusive mediation strategies in order to remain an acceptable third party to all parties. Despite this pernicious result, Plaza's mediation defined guidelines for future UN initiatives, such as the more accurate and interest-free view of the conflict as essentially Cypriot, yet inflamed by Greco-Turkish antagonism at the regional level and therefore, as one in which the pursuit of a settlement would have to follow the same pattern, being found between the two Cypriot communities through direct talks and supported regionally and internationally.

4.3 UN and US Mediation During Intercommunal Talks

Direct negotiations, or intercommunal talks, will intermittently occur from 1968 to 1983, mainly held in secret, or not under international sponsoring, and with punctual US intervention for conflict management and prevention purposes. The initiative will launch the newly adopted good offices policy and consist in a more modest mediation approach, aiming not at the development of a proposal to be bargained by the parties but, at bringing the parties together to discuss and agree on a settlement through direct negotiations. Although the new UN peacemaking initiative was launched in 1966, a period of conflict re-escalation will not allow the UN to bring the parties into the negotiations table until 1968. Intercommunal talks only become possible after American mediation of the conflict at the regional level – between Greece and Turkey and consequent tension deflation at the regional and local conflict levels. This first event sets the pattern for UN and US intervention in the conflict until Turkey takes military action in 1974, being that while the UN follows a facilitative mediation, one that during a first phase is reduced to its minimum level of involvement in the provision of neutral ground for the Cypriot leaders to negotiate directly, in a second one, the UN mediator will be present and more participative and the US sporadically intervene to deflate tension or incentivise the parties to make progress towards an agreement. The impact of Turkish military action in 1974, its impact on the conflict's context itself and, consequently, on the positions held by the parties at the negotiations table will mark the differentiation between, what is in this analysis identified, as two phases in intercommunal talks, between the talks pre-1974's status quo and post-1974 status quo.

4.3.1 The First Phase of Intercommunal Talks

Brazilian Ambassador Carlos Bernardes, who in 1964 had been nominated the Secretary General's Special Representative for Cyprus, initiated a new UN attempt at peacemaking in March 1966. The coup in Athens and intercommunal turmoil in Cyprus coupled with the growing threat of Turkish intervention rendered it impossible for any direct discussions to take place. In June 1966, in a letter to Secretary-General U-Thant, Bernardes stated there was a "complete absence of a spirit of compromise in the Island at the moment" and that at that given moment "a

contingency plan was needed to avoid an international crisis", one that "would only work if the British and the Americans were brought into the picture" to "exert enough pressure on both Greece and Turkey to promote a settlement". When intercommunal fighting re-escalated in 1967, Turkey was again announcing its preparation for a full military intervention in Cyprus. In late November, American President Johnson appointed, former deputy of defence, Cyrus Vance to launch a new shuttle diplomacy initiative to exert diplomatic pressure and persuasion upon Greece and Turkey to prevent an all out war from bursting on Cypriot soil [11] (Güney 2004, 31-32). Vance set his strategy to concentrate efforts on finding "an agreement between the Greeks and the Turks as the two principal protagonists and then try to get the Cypriots to agree" (Mulhollan 1969, 4). He would first attempt to ascertain the two countries' positions to find if there was any common ground on which to base the agreement and would shuttle back and forth between the two capitals only to communicate to the parties each other's positions. Vance further decided that "mediation" would not be used if enough common ground could be found though this communications facilitation approach. As Vance would be shuttling between Athens and Ankara, UN Special Representative José Rolz-Bennet was sent to Nicosia by U-Thant to meet the Cypriot leaders (Mulhollan 1969, 2-3).

After two trips back and forth, Vance found it to be impossible for Greece and Turkey to agree on the other's positions. Turkey demanded that Greek troops withdraw from Cyprus, in numbers accordingly to what was set in 1960 Treaty of Alliance, the disarmament of civilians and militias by the UN, the strengthening of UNFICYP's mandate for peacekeeping, the transformation of the Cypriot police into a mixed-community force, compensation for the conflict victims and security measures for Turkish Cypriots (O'Malley and Craig 2007, 128). Taking on a "mediator's role" [12], as defined by himself, Vance proposed a four-point settlement, which he believed satisfied both parties' essential needs while, at the same time, providing a "face-saving" device for the countries to step back from their aggressive stand without appearing weak (Mulhollan 1969, 4-5). After what Vance describes as "the most agonizing negotiations" with the Turkish representative (Mulhollan 1969, 5), a middle ground that was acceptable to both Greece and Turkey was found. Greek forces above the permitted limit set by the Treaty of Alliance would be withdrawn from the island, Greece would assist in rehabilitating and resettling Turkish Cypriots

[11] Cyrus Vance flew out to Ankara on the same day he was nominated to mediate a settlement between Greece and Turkey to prevent Turkey from militarily intervening in Cyprus that was scheduled for the following day (Mulholan 1969, 1).

[12] Cyrus Vance describes only the presentation of the "four-point settlement" to the parties as a mediation act, but does not consider his initial facilitative shuttle diplomacy as being one (Mulholland, Paige 1979).

and avoid military support against Turkey and prevent military aid from being provided by other countries (Wenzke and Lindley 2008, 26). With no desire to face Turkish military might in a war that would have dreadful consequences for their country, coupled with the desire to preserve US approval and support, a factor that Vance himself considers to have weighed in Greece's decision-making, made Greece amenable Vance's proposed solution (Mulholland 1969, 7). Never wishing to military compete with Turkey and to lose US approval, Greece had no alternative but to pull back from the brink of war and accept the diplomatic solution brokered by Vance.

Vance's mission was a success, one he attributes to the cooperation between the US, the UN and NATO which, he points out, made mediation and negotiation between three countries, in the small time-frame available, possible. In Vance's opinion, Greece and Turkey "found themselves in a situation where they had gone too far and both were looking for a way out" facilitated by the mediation process (Mulhollan 1969, 7-8). Showing that compromise was possible between the "motherlands", the Greeco-Turkish agreement prevented, once again, war between the two motherlands to erupt over Cyprus. Intercommunal fighting came to a halt and 10,000 surplus Greek troops were withdrawn from Cyprus, which was favourable not only to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot sides, but also a relief from Greek pressure and growing opposition to Makarios (O'Malley and Craig 2007, 130).

Only in August 1968 was the conflict "pacified" enough for intercommunal talks to be held under the auspices of the Good Offices of the UN Secretary General U-Thant and the support of Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the US. Greek Cypriot President of the House of Representatives Glafkos Clerides was appointed by Makarios and, President of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber, Rauf Denktash appointed by Küchük as their respective representative negotiators for the first round of intercommunal talks (Ker-Lindsay, 2005, 10). During the talks, Turkish Cypriots suggested the institutionalization of an enclave system whereas Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot villages and municipalities would be self-run with limited regulation by their communities' respective members of the House of Representatives, a system that moved away from the previous Turkish Cypriot demand for a federal one (Keith 1997, 16). However, Greek Cypriots could not agree on the conditions in which this local government would come to exist and on the limits of its functions, contending that the Turkish Cypriot proposed system would create a "state within the state" (Denktash 1971). Clerides argued that the creation of separate local government authorities would render the administrative system unworkable and costly, and become a source of friction between the two communities. Also the

Greek Cypriot side did not which to re-enact the extinguished Greek Communal Chamber (Clerides 1971).

Both Cypriot negotiators lacked consistent political support and were persistently criticised by locally. This was especially the case for Clerides, whose commitment to reaching an agreement was often undermined by the Greek Cypriot media and not always supported by Makarios (Keith 1997, 16). Being, himself, undermined by the new military regime in Athens, Makarios' public speeches supporting *enosis* made Denktash suspicious towards Clerides intentions[13]. Denktash's demands towards an agreement that "categorically" ruled out *enosis* grew rigid, being more detailed and demanding, which made Greek Cypriots grow even wearier of Turkish Cypriot intentions (Denktash 1971). Security and protection from Greek Cypriots was, however, always the central concern of Turkish Cypriots and the main interest around which their position and their demands gravitate but, in turn, the demands Turkish Cypriots considered essential to satisfy this core interest were frowned upon by Greek Cypriots who felt these hid an ulterior Turkish Cypriot federalist aim. Denktash's rising demands gave Greek Cypriots the impression that the Turkish Cypriot side was being "held in check by Ankara" (Keith 1997, 17), from which they thought the federal/ local government ideas where stemming from.

If Clerides thought the Turkish Cypriots held an intransigent and uncompromising position toward the Greek Cypriot refusal to establish separate communal local governments (Clerides 1971), Denktash accused the Greek Cypriot side of trying to create a Constitution for the creation of Greek Cypriot state, not a Cypriot one (Denktash 1971). Although both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiators were strongly committed to reaching a settlement, both sides felt they were the ones making greater concessions, therefore the other side was always perceived to be trying to gain an advantage. Mistrust led the negotiations into constant setbacks, derailing into discussions on procedural aspects of the negotiations themselves[14] that made progress on substance matters difficult and time-consuming. Growing suspicion and lack of trust poisoned the negotiations, with the Turkish Cypriots suspecting Greek Cypriots could not agree to their demands because *enosis* was still their ultimate goal and Greek Cypriots suspecting Turkish Cypriot intentions by perceiving their demands as a means to an increasing separation and

[13] Makarios' and Clerides' positions on the issue of local self-government differed substantially. Makarios found this demand unacceptable and understood it as the Turkish Cypriot federative aim in disguise that would undermine the unity of the Cypriot state, whereas Clerides found that the Turkish Cypriot demand was a legitimate subject of negotiation (Makarios letter to the Greek President, 24th of June, 1971).

[14] In the letters exchanged by Clerides and Denktash on the 26th of June and the 24th of August, 1971, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiators tend to debate details on certain issues, such as which issues fall within the pre-established negotiations' limit to Constitutional aspect or the definition of the word "unitary".

partition and the undermining of the unitary State. Nonetheless, these negotiations were particularly useful in creating a working cooperative relationship among the two sides that had never existed before. Furthermore, intercommunal talks were held without a neutral participator who would facilitate the overcoming of the constant obstacles and setbacks the negotiations where facing, until they broke down in 1972.

4.3.2 The Geneva Conferences

After the Greek coup and consequent Turkish military intervention of July 1974, in resolution 353, the Security Council called on the Guarantor powers to negotiate and bring peace to Cyprus. Two conferences were held, being that only on the second were the two communities invited to participate. At the Geneva conferences it was the UK who took on the leading mediating role, whose mediating efforts fall outside the selected actors of this case-study. What will be relevant to the present analysis is not the action of the UK as mediator but the inaction of the US and its decision not to mediate or to support British efforts at this period and its impact on the conflict's and negotiation's evolution.

At the Palace of Nations in Geneva, Constantine Karamalis of Greece, Bulent Ecevit of Turkey and James Callaghan of the UK, negotiated the ceasefire terms for the restoration of peace in Cyprus. In line with what was demanded by the Security Council Resolution 353, the three Guarantors agreed that all unauthorised troops would withdraw from the island and that the areas already controlled by either Greece or Turkey would not be extended. A buffer zone would be established and patrolled by UNFICYP to guaranty either faction would not breach the agreement. Greek Cypriots were to allow Turkish Cypriots to evacuate enclaves and hostilities were to terminate for a further conference to be held with the presence of the two Cypriot communities to re-establish negotiations on the constitutional order (Mirbagheri 1998, 89).

On the second round of talks in Geneva, Greece and Greek Cypriots felt the ceasefire agreement had left Turkey and Turkish Cypriots in a stronger position by acknowledging the existence of two separate administrations in Cyprus. At the negotiating table, the parties traded accusations of breaching the ceasefire (Mirbagheri 1998, 89), while Denktash refused to sit at the table where his sit alongside Clerides was labelled "The Cyprus Republic", being that he considered there was no valid one since 1963. For the Greek side, to accede to Denktash's demands meant they where recognising the existence of a separate Turkish state (O'Malley and

Craig 2007, 207). In substance, the main conflicting issue between the Greek and the Turkish flanks was whether the 1960 Constitution would be the basis for future negotiations on the Cyprus settlement since now Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots were claiming it was unworkable and should be dismissed (Mirbagheri 1998, 89), while Greece and Greek Cypriots called for the full restoration of the Constitution, once it was under that same Constitution, through the Treaty of Guarantee, that Turkey claimed to have acted. When the Turkish side proposed a solution for Cyprus based on a federation with a cantonal system where Turkish Cypriots would be allowed to administer their own area, comprising 34 % percent of Cypriot soil, it fuelled Greek Cypriots fears that the existence of two separate zones would trigger partition and Turkish annexation of the Turkish Cypriot area (Mirbagheri 1998, 89). But after the attempted Greek coup, the Turkish side was not willing to accept anything other than a geographical separation they claimed was essential for the protection of Turkish Cypriot community (Keith 1997, 18). Clerides argued that given recent Turkish action, its military capacity and its proximity to Cyprus, Greek Cypriots had become the true defenceless minority and proposed a plan for a bicommunal constitution that provided for Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot local administrations based on what had been negotiated in past intercommunal talks, but the Turkish side did not move away from demanding a federal cantonal solution. Clerides became increasingly pressured to yield to the federation principle and asked for a recess to consult with Athens and Makarios, in London, a demand that Turkey denied him, claiming the Greek side was trying to play for more time (Keith 1997, 18).

A US representative, Hartman, was also present at the Geneva conferences, sent by the newly invested President Kissinger to observe the talks. To press Turkey to cooperate in finding a diplomatic solution, Callaghan asked Hartman to convey US support for an Anglo-American military intervention threat that would back Turkey down from any further military intention to advance on Cypriot territory. Through Hartman came Kissinger's response that the US was satisfied with Ecevit's assurance that they were committed to a diplomatic solution and that UK should refrain from further pressuring Turkey (Droushiotis 2010).

Unlike when faced with past Turkish threats, this time the US did not perceive itself in a position to leverage against Turkey. Since the Acheson Plan US-Turkish relations had worsen and US, Henry Kissinger decided on a policy of "tolerance" towards Turkey, stating that only a US military intervention could have stopped Turkey this time, which was simply not possible. In fact, the US had refrained itself from condoning the Greek junta coup and vetoed a Security Council draft resolution that was to condemn Greece for its doing. US containment regarding Greek

action was followed by tolerance on Turkish intervention to not further alienate Turkey and push it closer to the Soviet Union and threaten NATO's cohesion (Güney 2004, 33-34). Faced with Kissingers' decision, the UK decided to follow suit, having no desire to act on itself without US support or to undermine US' strategy with any action (Anderson 2008, 14). This ambiguous US policy intended to have a containing constructive effect and to prevent the situation that ultimately unravelled, but as a strategy of crisis mediation it failed utterly. The irreconcilable and inflexible positions of both sides at Geneva ultimately broke down the negotiations and the second and final phase of the Turkish military action was initiated. With Turkey's intervention came the partitioning and annexation of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus".

4.3.3 A Second Phase of Intercommunal Talks

Held between April of 1975 and February 1977 under the good offices of the Secretary General, the Vienna talks will mark the starting point of, what is here identified as, a second phase of intercommunal talks that will go on and off until 1983. The characterization of the intercommunal talks in this period as a different phase stems from the fact that Turkey's military presence on the island altered the parties' positions at the negotiating table and, also, unlike in the 1968 to 1974 period, these will be held in the presence of a UN representative. Throughout this new phase, intercommunal talks negotiations will focus on finding agreement between the two communities on the basis for future negotiations on a settlement for Cyprus, but not on a definite settlement itself.

In April of 1975, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim launched a new good offices mission, gathering Clerides and Denktash, who was now the President of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus", for a meeting in Vienna. The two parties were able to agree on issues such as the reopening of the Nicosia International Airport, that had been declared a UN controlled area to stop Turkish army progression on the territory, or provisions for the well-being of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot citizens trapped on the opposing side of the Green Line, but no agreement was reached on the two most contentious issues of territory and government powers and functions. Ultimately, the agreement on the population transfer became the most important outcome, being that an ethnic divide was created and territorially demarcated, with the Greek Cypriots in the southern region and the Turkish Cypriots in the northern one (Yesilada and Sözen 2002, 266).

In January 1977, Waldheim was able to arrange for a meeting between the two Cypriot leaders, Denktash and Makarios, in the presence of UN Secretary General Representative Javier Perez de Cuéllar. A breakthrough was achieved with the signing of a four-point agreement on the basis for future negotiations, "The Four Guidelines" (Richmond b1998, 258) upon which the next round of Vienna talks would be based. The two leaders were able to agree on the pursuit of an independent bi-communal Federal Republic, on the discussion of the territory under administration by each community, in light of economic viability and productivity and ownership, of questions of principles of freedom of movement, settlement and property and of the powers and functions of the central federal government (UN Secretary General 1997, paragraphs 4-5). The fact that the Four Guidelines were not only agreed but also signed by both parties made them the building block for all negotiations to come (Sözen 2007, 5). The Makarios-Denktash meeting also marks a substantial change in the Greek Cypriot position, which now accepted reunification through a federation, while Turkish Cypriots were formally accepting the unity of the state, therefore *enosis* and *taksim* were out of the equation (Ker-Lindsay 2005,13). However, while Greek Cypriots viewed reunification through the establishment of a centralized government, the Turkish Cypriots preferred increased powers for two separate states under a weak federal government (Mirbagheri 1997, 91).

In February of 1977, US President Jimmy Carter dispatched Clark Clifford to Athens, Ankara and Nicosia to pressure the parties to encounter a solution based on the current geographical division installed in Cyprus after the Turkish intervention. However, given the Greek and Greek Cypriot vision of the US as partial towards Turkey after American inaction upon Turkish "invasion" of Cyprus, Clifford's proposal was presented to the two communities and the Secretary General, in November of 1978, as drafted by the US, Britain and Canada (Necatigil 2001, 161). The "Twelve-Point Proposal" or, as it became known, the "ABC plan" (Fisher 2001, 315), envisaged a solution based on a bi-zonal federation, with a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President and a bicameral legislature, with an upper chamber - where representatives of the two communities would be represented equally - and a lower chamber - where the principle of proportionality would be applied. The powers of the central government would be inscribed in the constitution and all other matters would be dealt by the "provinces". It also proposed a geographic adjustment to favour the Greek Cypriot province territory including the re-settlement of Varosha and that non-Cypriot troops presence in the island would be reduced

(Ker-Lindsay 2005, 14). Economic assistance from the formulators was offered in the proposal to support the settlement's implementation (Fisher 2001, 315).

Clifford's plan was rejected by Greek Cypriots who argued the three freedoms, of movement, settlement and property were not properly protected (Ker-Lindsay 2005, 14). What also contributed to the Greek Cypriot rejection of the plan was the Greek suspicion towards US involvement, but it has also been considered that Makarios' believed that the new American President would pressure Turkey to resolve the dispute and that Turkish Cypriots would make concessions in the future and that Greek Cypriots could have a settlement more favourable to their position (Savvides 1998, 45). Although the plan was rejected, Clifford's initiative was successful in putting into concrete terms a basis for a permanent settlement, whose principal elements would be incorporated in subsequent UN proposals (Necatigil 2001,162) and, also galvanized both parties interests to continue the negotiations and to translate their positions into concrete proposals.

During the sixth round of talks at Vienna, in April of 1977, the Greek Cypriots put forward their idea of the island's geographical division in a map proposal (UN Secretary General 1977, Annex B). The territorial aspect and the question of the displaced persons were the central issues of the Greek Cypriot position, two issues they found were indivisible and had to be addressed through a "package deal" (Annex C). A territorial proposal submitted by Clerides containing a map embodying the Greek Cypriot conception of the bi-communal arrangement, which would be subject to the preservation of the sovereignty and unity of Cyprus and to the guaranty of all Cypriot citizen's rights to freedom of movement, residence, work and property (paragraph 9). Greek Cypriots also presented a proposal on the constitutional structure of Cyprus, suggesting a Federal Republic with a single indivisible territory containing two separate regions that would be under one sole constitution (Annex C). Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, focussed on the constitutional aspect, proposing a "partnership in power" where the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot administrations would be equal political entities under a federal administration, each possessing its own constitutions (Annex D).

In his report to the Security Council, of the 30th of April of 1977, Waldheim states that there it had not become possible, at Vienna, to bridge the gap between the rigid and antagonistic views of the two sides to arrive at "a stage where an effective negotiating process could evolve out of the present (...) conflicting positions" to a point where necessary concessions begin to be made (paragraph 14). If for the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriot constitutional proposal

provided, not for a federal but, for a confederal system of government, which was to them unacceptable, Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, contended the Greek Cypriot territorial proposal was not bi-zonal and it provided for a unitary state, and not a federal one. Also they argued they were not, and neither were expected to be, in a position to submit a territorial counter-proposal at the present negotiations (paragraph 13). For Waldheim and Cuellar the mediation efforts needed to be able to transform the negotiations into a more constructive process, hopefully helped by political developments that may bridge the substantial differences that make the parties inflexible and unappreciative of "one another's positions, apprehensions and aspirations (paragraph 15).

When Makarios dies unexpectedly in August of 1977, a political vacuum is left in the Greek Cypriot community until the election of Spyros Kyprianou in February 1978. Only the following year did Waldheim find the circumstances appropriate to undertake a new initiative for the resumption of intercommunal talks. In May 1979, he was able to convene a high-level meeting at the UNFICYP headquarters in Nicosia with Kyprianou and Denktash in which a "spirit of enlightened statesmanship and co-operation prevailed" (UN Secretary General 1979, paragraph 62) that reaffirmed the previously agreed Four Guidelines and made a new agreement on the basis for future negotiations possible. The "Ten-point Agreement" (Richmond b1998, 259) included a number of new provisions ranging from the demilitarization of Cyprus to a compromise from both parties on abstaining from actions that may jeopardize the talks and to eschew union in whole or part with any other country. Agreement was also reached in giving priority to the resettlement of Varosha[15] under UN auspices to the discussion of any other issues (paragraph 51).

A new round of intercommunal talks was initiated a month later, with Umit Suleyman Onan representing the Turkish Cypriot community and George Ionnides the Greek Cypriot. Turkish Cypriots refused to discuss Varosha as a priority, as agreed in the "Ten-point Agreement", on the basis that the provisions for agreement should be taken all together with the Varosha issue in a package deal (Keith 1997, 23). With a package deal pursuit, they were seeking to trade-off Varosha for the lifting of the economic blockade Greek Cypriots were sustaining against the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (UN Secretary General 1979, paragraph 51). Greek Cypriots were discontent with the form of resettlement being offered by the Turkish side, which they felt would turn Varosha into a Greek Cypriot enclave, since Turkish Cypriots

[15] Varosha is a mainly Greek Cypriot village in the surroundings of Famagusta, located in the northeast of Cyprus, that came under Turkish occupation in 1974.

demanded accesses to Varosha be controlled by Turkish Cypriot police (Keith 1997, 23). Because the parties were unable to achieve agreement on the prioritized Varosha issue, the discussion on the territorial and constitutional issues was blocked and, therefore, no progress on the settlement was made. Intercommunal talks again stalled and are put on hold by the UN.

In the summer of 1980, Waldheim appointed Hugo Gobi as his Special Representative to resurrect intercommunal talks through the presentation an Interim Agreement. The proposal aimed at the promotion of a positive atmosphere on the island able to sustain progress at intercommunal talks. It suggested the reopening of the Nicosia Airport, as agreed at the first Vienna round, the placing of Varosha under civilian control and a Greek Cypriot lifting of the majority of economic restrictions to Turkish Cypriots (Richmond b1998, 159). Negotiations opened in August and continued almost weekly until April 1981 focusing on four issues, improving goodwill among the parties, resettling the Varosha refuges and on the constitutional and territorial aspects of the settlement. Discussion over the interpretation of the term "bi-zonality" became the central issue in which agreement was not possible, with Turkish Cypriots viewing it in terms of a confederation of two states with their own sovereignties and Greek Cypriots defending the federation standard model of sovereignty lying with the central government (Ker-Lindsay 2005, 15).

After the Plaza mediation breakdown, with the offer of the good offices of the Secretary General the UN was no longer officially mediating the Cyprus conflict but was able to remain an acceptable mediator to the parties in conflict and to continue its peacemaking efforts. However, this entitled a reduction in its mediatory capacity that restrained it to the use of the least intrusive mediation strategies. In fact, in the first phase of intercommunal talks the UN acted as a minimally intrusive facilitative mediator that merely incentivised the parties' encounters and discussion without even taking part in them. Only in the second phase, with the conflicts' re-escalation and the Cypriot leaders' failure to come into agreement, does the UN feel entitled to make full use of this strategy and become a present and participative actor in intercommunal talks. Furthermore, the UN takes a step further along this tendency towards gaining capacity to follow more intrusive strategy choices when able to incite the parties to agree and sign documents with guidelines for the search of a permanent solution.

Regarding the US, in the first phase Cyrus Vance continued the American tradition of mediating agreement between Greece and Turkey whenever tensions escalate over Cyprus and war becomes eminent. However, on the second phase, the US had also suffered a loss in its

mediatory capacity after the Johnson letter, evident in Kissinger's refusal to again leverage against Turkey and, for the first time, made a contribution to the search of a solution between the two Cypriot parties in the Clifford proposal.

4.4 The UN's Change in Mediation Style

Since Plaza's mediation attempt the UN had taken on the role of facilitator but, with the failure of past initiatives to prevent conflict escalation, the self-proclamation of the TRNC in 1983 and the growing incapacity of the parties to negotiate their own proposals, the UN opts to produce itself the settlement proposals being put on the negotiating table from this point on. Also, instead of focussing on specific aspects of a possible agreement one at a time, the new UN approach focuses on achieving an overall, comprehensive, settlement for the Cyprus problem. From 1983 onwards, faced with a new reality on the island, Perez de Cuellar inaugurates a new choice in strategy for the continuation of the mission of good offices in Cyprus with the adoption of a formulator's role, a role that had been reserved to the US in the past. Consequently, the US will reduce its degree of involvement in this period. However, the formulation of permanent settlements by the UN will be criticised by both parties in different moments of this period and, inclusively, become an issue for discussion itself during the negotiations. Nonetheless, the UN will continue to follow this strategy, which will find its epitome in the production of the Annan Plan in 2004. Cyprus' accession to the EU will also become a new and main issue of contention between the parties, which will be initially detrimental to progress in permanent settlement negotiations. When these are not possible, the UN will focus negotiations on goodwill and trust-building measures, such as the "Set of Ideas" and Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).

4.4.1 The Draft Framework Agreements

Javier Perez de Cuellar followed Waldheim as UN Secretary General in 1982. Experienced in the Cyprus crisis, he took on an active role in developing the good offices effort by meeting with the two communities and Greece and Turkey throughout that year. In August 1983, in an effort to resume intercommunal talks, Cuellar proposed a Draft Framework Agreement that

called for a rotating presidency, the establishment of the bicameral Assembly, as previously proposed by Clifford, and a trade-off of land for a 40 percent Turkish Cypriot representation in the central executive (Ker-Lindsay 2005, 15). Although Cuellar and Gobbi were initially capable of bringing momentum to the Good Offices mission, with the Greek Cypriot continued success in the internationalization of their position vis-à-vis the Turkish Cypriots, the mediating efforts were lingered.

Greek Cypriots feared heightened involvement stemming from the Secretary General's formulative mediation would trap them into making concessions to Turkish Cypriots and turned to the General Assembly to secure international support (Richmond b1998, 161). When the General Assembly issued resolution 3212 (XXIX), calling on all states to support the efforts being developed to achieve full sovereignty for Cyprus, it also urged the "speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces". Turkish Cypriots felt the resolution showed UN bias towards the Greek Cypriot side, attributing legitimacy and international acceptance to this side while undermining the Turkish Cypriot one, who paradoxically felt they would have to rely increasingly solely on Turkey for support and aid to fight its growing isolation (Richmond b1998, 155). Following the Turkish Cypriot unilateral declaration of the TRNC the Greek Cypriots refused to hold face-to-face meetings in intercommunal talks, which they felt would put the Turkish Cypriot leadership at an equal status as their own and grant symbolize recognition of the TRNC as a legitimate state.

Cuellar's initiative did not resume until the September of 1984, when the two leaders agreed to meet separately with the Secretary General for "proximity talks". After three rounds of talks, Cuellar presented a "Consolidated Draft Agreement" (UN Secretary General 1986, 7-8) for the establishment of the bizonal, bicommunal, non-aligned, Federal Republic of Cyprus, in which the Turkish federated state would encompass 29 percent of the island and all foreign troops were to withdraw from Cypriot territory. The reduction of the portion of Turkish Cypriot territory was, again, to be traded for Greek Cypriot concessions on constitutional issues (Sözen 2008, 78) and more autonomy to Turkish Cypriot administration. The Draft Agreement was accepted by Denktash but found uncertainty on Kyprianou's part (Richmond b1998, 183). At the High-Level meeting convened on January of 1985 at the UN headquarters in New York, Kypriano refused to sign the agreement defying UN expectations. Despite this disappointment, in his report to the Security Council (UN Secretary General 1986, paragraph 3), Cuellar states that "the gap between the two sides had never been so narrow", an opportunity he did not wish to miss.

In March 1986, taking on what had been agreed by the parties throughout the years, he presented a "Draft Framework Agreement" (UN Secretary General 1986, paragraphs 13-17) to both sides, a "package deal" that dealt with all aspects of the Cyprus problem as "an integrated whole whose elements were interrelated", in order to "neither side would be ultimately committed to an overall solution until all issues had been resolved to their satisfaction" (paragraph 3). It also provided for a system of punishment and rewards to commit the parties to promoting its acceptance at referendums in each community, by threatening to withdraw the offer of the good offices if both parties did not comply, or by the General Assembly reconsidering or re-affirming the legitimacy of the Greek Cypriot government as the legitimate Cypriot government in case Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots, respectively and alone, did not (Reddaway 1987, 28-29).

Although the Turkish Cypriot side was prepared to sign the document as it stood [16], Greek Cypriots were essentially discontent at the fact that the proposal did not address the removal of Turkish forces from Cyprus nor the repatriation of Turkish settlers (Ker-Lindsay, 2005 16), seen by Greek Cypriots as a strategy to change the island's demographics to undermine the Greek Cypriot majority (Sözen 2008, 80). With growing Greek-Turkish tension in the Aegean region as background, Kyprianou insisted agreement was necessary on the issues concerning the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Cyprus, on the form of international guarantees for the preservation of the independence and sovereignty of the future state and on the application of the three freedoms before the Greek Cypriot side was able to sign the proposal. In a letter to Cuellar (UN Secretary General 1986, IV), Kyprianou suggested two alternative procedures, to convene an international conference to deal with the international aspects of the Cyprus problem alone or to a high-level meeting that would also encompass the discussion of the three freedoms issue.

Denktash promptly rejected Kyprianou's suggestions and accused the Greek Cypriot side of stalling by creating procedural difficulties and advised the Secretary General not to exceed the limits of his good offices mission to include new procedural provisions that would bring other parties to the table (annex V). Once again, the mediation itself becomes an issue when used by Turkish Cypriots to compel Cuellar not to accede to Greek Cypriot demands. The impasse created and the proximity of Greek Cypriot presidential elections brought the negotiations to a halt.

[16] It has also been suggested that the Turkish Cypriots had accepted the Draft Agreement so that the blame would fall on Greek Cypriots, since they were convinced the present tense Greco-Turkish relations would make Kyprianou reject it (Richmond 1998, 184).

In February 1988, George Vassiliou is elected President by the Greek Cypriot community. The refreshment of the Greek Cypriot political leadership and the Greco-Turkish *détente* period with the signing of the Davos no-war declaration [17] created *momentum* for Cuellar's new initiative. The two leaders meet with the Secretary General in August 1989 and decide the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979 would again be the starting point upon which intercommunal talks should resume, resulting in a ten-year regression on both sides' positions and the abandonment of the Draft Agreement (Richmond b1998, 192-193). Deadlines were now being set for agreement achievement and direct talks became possible and held in an informal manner between Vassillou and Denktash in the presence of Special Representative Oscar Camilión. This was a novelty and a concession on the Greek Cypriot side which had in the past refused face-to-face meetings that would grant equal status to the Turkish Cypriot leadership (Richmond b1998, 194).

However, talks found a new obstacle when Denktash offered a proposal based on the draft agreement of 1986 introducing the new concepts of "separate sovereignty" and "sovereignty association" that was against Security Council resolutions and prior agreements which stated the Cypriot sovereignty was indivisible (Yesilada and Sözen 2002, 267). To prevent deadlock, Cuellar presented a "Set of Ideas" on a basis for negotiations to produce an outline of a comprehensive agreement by September that year. While neither side was able to fully agree to it, Denktash opposition to the Secretary General's formulative role was escalating, pressing Cuellar to withdraw his latest proposal and trying to persuade Vassiliou to take the negotiations out of the UN's framework, but to no avail (Richmond b1998, 195-196). The Greek Cypriot leadership was not interested in giving up on the gains the internationalization process through the UN framework, especially through the General Assembly, had provided the Greek Cypriot position throughout the years and to lose the capacity to manoeuvre on the international arena.

After considering Cuellar's report (UN Secretary General 1990) stressing the importance of recognizing the two communities political equality to prevent the talks from collapsing, in March 1990, the Security Council issued resolution 649 calling on "the leaders of the communities" to "cooperate on an equal footing" (paragraph 3). By addressing the two communities as equals, the Security Council hoped to revive negotiations and ease Turkish Cypriot suspicions towards the Secretary General's good offices, however, the already unfavourable atmosphere was further deteriorated when the Republic of Cyprus officially

[17] The "Davos Declaration" was signed by Greece and Turkey at the World Economic Forum in 1988 commiting the two countries to settling their disputes, not by the use of force, but through diplomatic means.

announced its application to join the European Community. This unilateral move by Greek Cypriots was, to Turkish Cypriots, a breakdown in trust that led Denktash to call-off the talks.

The content of the "Set of Ideas" (UN Secretary General 1992, paragraphs 5-7) would again come to the table in 1992 when Boutros-Ghali became UN Secretary General. The Ideas comprised the most detailed plan underlying a solution for the Cyprus problem. Among other, it incorporated agreed understandings on the creation of a territorially bizonal and constitutionally bicomunal federation, where both communities would enjoy political equality, through the effective participation of both communities in all branches of power, and whose unity would be ensured by its single international personality, sovereignty and citizenship (paragraphs 18 to 21). It included a "non-map" suggesting territorial adjustments that attribute Morphou and Varosha to Greek Cypriots and provisions regarding the three freedoms, that of movement to be enjoyed by all citizens as soon as the federal republic was established and those of settlement and property to be implemented after the resettlement needs arising from the territorial adjustment were completed (paragraph 23). Security of both communities was to be guaranteed by the 1960 Treaties and, thus, all forces not contemplated in the Treaty of Alliance were to withdraw from Cyprus (paragraph 24). The "Set of Ideas" also provided for measures to correct the economic imbalance between the two communities and proposed for the question of EC membership to be submitted to approval by the two communities through separate referendums (paragraph 26). With all the permanent five Security Council members endorsing the Set of Ideas and international expectation mounting, Ghali further increased the pressure on both leaders to come into agreement by stating that UN peacekeeping in Cyprus could not exist indefinitely, especially at a time in history when peacekeeping demands where exponentially increasing and voluntary financing and troop contributions to UNFICYP where persistently decreasing (Richmond b1998, 200-201).

Denktash had refused from the start to substantially discuss the "Set of Ideas" and had again criticised the Secretary General's approach and called for direct talks without UN involvement. Another rejection from Greek Cypriots and Turkey's US requested pressure brought Denktash back to the negotiations table, however, he now complained the proposal did not adequately recognize the Turkish Cypriot community and that the territorial adjustments it proposed would make refugees out of a great number of Turkish Cypriots (Richmond b1998, 200-201).

In October of 1992, Boutros-Ghali was able to bring Vassiliou and Denktash together for a final round of talks in New York, where the two leaders came very close to an agreement with the Greek Cypriots accepting the Set of Ideas basis for future negotiations and the Turkish Cypriots accepting 91 out of the 100 "ideas" (Ker-Lindsay 2005, 18). However, when Ghali permitted the two leaders to return to Cyprus for consultations and get away from the pressure, they changed their views and refused the proposal (Sözen 2008, 83). Greek Cypriots were not satisfied with the provisions regarding the issues of continued Turkish troop presence on Cypriot soil and Turkish involvement, as well as with the fact that they contained a hint of a confederation by considering that sovereignty derived from the two communities and not from a central government (Richmond b1998, 200- 201), but it was tactically important for Vassilou to accept, even if only as a basis for negotiation, a document endorsed by the US and, also not to take the blame for its dismissal. Indeed, Turkish Cypriots where held responsible for the lack of progress in 1992, being actually the first time the Secretary General and the Security Council blamed either side (Keith 1997, 28).

In the aftermath of, yet, another setback, Boutros-Ghali changed the focus from the achievement of a comprehensive agreement to the stimulus of a favourable environment for negotiations through the promotion of a goodwill and trustful climate between the parties by proposing eight Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) (Richmond b1998, 262). Ghali and his Special Representative, Joe Clark, would now be concentrating on issues the two sides were, at the time, willing to agree on and prepared to implement (UN Secretary General 1993, paragraph 13). The CBMs proposed to the parties in March of 1993 aimed at developing intercommunal cooperation in an array of areas, such as water supply, education, media, commerce, health and environment, electricity and the free movement of goods, but also included the transference of Varosha's control and resettlement process to the UN and the the reopening of Nicosia International Airport (annex I).

After Glafcos Clerides took over the Greek Cypriot Presidency, in February 1993, It was expected that the long-standing relationship between him and Denktash would further contribute to a climate of confidence. Although a short period of optimist emerged with the two leaders being easily able to meet face-to-face, Denktash was not prepared to accept the CBMs package (Ker-Lindsay 2004, 19). The Turkish Cypriot side wished to exclude the northern part of Varosha, including the port of Famagusta, from the deal. Also, as compensation for relinquishing the remaining area from its control, the Turkish Cypriot leadership demanded the lifting of the

embargo, particularly by allowing Turkish Cypriot Erçan (Tymbou) airport to receive direct flights from European destinations, as well as the lifting of restrictions on seaports. However, as the Secretary General came to understand, it was not possible to accede to Denktash' demands "without implying recognition by the Greek Cypriot side of 'TRNC' authorities" (UN Secretary General 1993, paragraph 21). Once again, agreement was being impaired by Greek Cypriot sensitivity to measures that could symbolise TRNC's recognition and Turkish Cypriot sensitivity to the Greek Cypriot government being recognised as the sole legitimate one. Towards the end of negotiations on the Varosha/Nicosia Airport package of the CBMs, Denktash was leaving the negotiations table to take long periods of consultations in Nicosia and Ankara, which were not clearly seen as necessary by the Secretary General. With the report of the European Commission on Cyprus application for membership coming close to being issued, Denktash stalled the negotiations until he refused to attend a further round of talks (Keith 1997, 30).

Under great pressure from Greece, on the 30th of June the European Commission issued the *Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership* considering Cyprus eligible for membership. In a document that criticises the 1974 events and the resulting presence of military forces and Turkish settlers, Cyprus accession process is said to start "as soon as the prospect of a settlement is surer" (paragraphs 17, 18 and 48). By refraining from entering immediate accession negotiations, the Commission looked to avoid disencouraging the parties from cooperating with the Secretary General. However, the document also envisaged "the possibility of the failure of the intercommunal talks", in which case "the situation should be reassessed in view of the positions adopted by each party" (paragraph 51), thus permitting Greek Cypriot accession in case a settlement was not able to be reached.

By mid-1993, US President Clinton was calling on the Turkish Cypriot leader to accept the CBMs package while Ghali was, once again, holding Turkish Cypriots responsible for the negotiations' impasse (Richmond b1998, 205). However, Greek Cypriots were becoming increasingly critical of UN efforts and the Secretary General's incapacity effectively to coerce Denktash and were now considering the alternative and pursuing integration with the EU (Richmond b1998, 206-207). Turkish Cypriots, who were increasingly economically impaired by the Greek Cypriot unofficial embargo and facing a Turkish lira crisis, further harden their position and continued to refuse to adhere to the CBMs package. In effect, the CBMs package, which aimed at promoting trust, was being proposed at a period of time when historical events were detrimental to its end. Consequently, these measures of an essentially humanitarian, social and

economical character became increasingly politicized by both communities' leaders (Sözen 2008, 86). Politicization, in turn, impacted on the parties' perception of the Secretary General's and Joe Clark's actions when pressuring the parties not to discard the proposal, being viewed by each side as biased toward the other (Richmond b1998, 207). Paradoxically, because of the absence of a trustful and proactive environment Ghali's measures meant to install, the parties refused to continue negotiations and Boutros-Ghali's CBMs package was never adopted and, therefore, the conditions for agreement on the "set of ideas" were not laid.

4.4.2 The Annan Plan

In 1997, Kofi Annan had taken over Boutros-Ghali as UN Secretary General. Although at the time the two factions were at a point of great antagonism, Kofi Annan decided to pursue the peace process' reactivation. In July and August that year he was able bring Clerides and Denktash, who had not met for nearly four years, to face-to-face talks in New York and Geneva. Although progress was made in opening the way for further talks in Nicosia over humanitarian issues, when the European Commission announced at the Corfu European Council that Cyprus would be included in the next enlargement wave, negotiations broke down (Ker-Lindsay 2004, 21-22).

Turkey and Turkish Cypriots protested Cyprus' accession on the grounds that there was no legitimate Government of Cyprus and that Greek Cypriots had no right to act on behalf of the entire Cyprus. Soon after, the European Court of Justice disallowed the movement of Cypriot goods not certificated by the Government of Cyprus to circulate in the EU, therefore restricting Turkish Cypriot exports, which further fragilized the Turkish Cypriot economy. Embittered, Turkish Cypriots announced themselves in favour of greater integration with Turkey over the pursuit of a Cypriot federation (Keith 1997, 31).

To ease the growing tension, the EU was to create a customs union with Turkey but its implementation was blocked by a Greek veto. In return for lifting the veto, Greece demanded the EU to set a definite timetable for Cyprus accession negotiations, which were set to start six months after the end of the Union's Intergovernmental Conference of July 1996, in the early months of 1998 (Keith 1997, 31). In retaliation, Turkey announced that any integration between Greek Cypriots and the EU would be reciprocated by Turkey and the TRNC (Ker-Lindsay 2005, 20). The two signed a joint declaration stating that both would only join the EU if simultaneously

and that they would only enter accession negotiations when Cyprus becomes a federal State and began to mimic the cooperation and harmonization processes between the Greek Cypriot Government and the EU (Keith 1997, 31). Tension was further incremented by the threat of a regional arms race when Greek Cypriot intention of buying S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Russia was publicly known. While Clerides argued that this was merely a defensive action, it was seen by Turkish Cypriots and Turkey as a threat of an act of war (Keith 1997, 32), who vowed to match any Greek Cypriot military build up on the island (Ker-Lindsay 2004, 21).

During July and August of 1997, US president Bill Clinton[18] appointed Richard Holbrooke [19] as his special envoy with the primary mission of finding a common ground that would assist the UN in making progress towards a settlement, in order for the render the Greek Cypriot missile purchase unnecessary (Usborn 1997). Since accession to the EU had become the priority issue in the Cyprus problem, Holbrooke advocated a settlement for Cyprus should be linked to the accession process, meaning that a solution would have to be found prior to Cyprus accession to the EU. Pursuing this strategy, Holbrooke foresaw, would not only put pressure on the Greek Cypriot government to commit to a solution, but also advance Turkey's accession aspirations. Contrary to the traditionally aggressive EU stance towards Turkey, Holbrooke's approach supported the idea that both Cyprus and Turkey are part of Europe. The Russian missiles crisis was surpassed by providing Clerides the face-saving option of deploying the missiles not on Cypriot territory but on the Greek island of Crete (Migdalovitz 2002, 6). Holbrook's mediation efforts were, however impaired by Denktash demands that the application for EU accession be removed and refused to enter joint Cypriot negotiations for accession until the TRNC's legitimacy was recognized[20] (Usborn 1997). Holbrooke's mediation will, however, define the course of subsequent mediation efforts.

For the first time the US mediation did not propose a draft plan for a solution. Unlike in past initiatives, the US was leaving that task to the UN and offering its support to Annan's efforts, which were deeply influenced by Holbrooke's views. In 1999, Kofi Annan was faced with an

[18] After the end of the Cold War, Cyprus remained of strategic interest to the US since its conflict weakened not only NATO, but also EU expansion. Turkey also continued to be perceived as a crucial agent of American interests in the unstable Middle East, as a vital ally geographically proximate to Iran, Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, British Bases in Cyprus were of strategic importance for the US on the verge of the Gulf crisis (Savvides 1998, 49-50).

[19] Holbrooke's experience in architecting of the 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the Bosnian conflict made welcome to both parties. David Hannay, the UK envoy who worked alongside Holbrooke, states he aimed at "getting the key players to take the big decisions" (2007, 77), wishing to cut through the procedural aspects and technicalities of the process of settlement-making that had often derailed the Cypriot peacemaking efforts.

[20] Upon a visit to Cyprus on May 1998, Holbrooke, while reiterating that the TRNC could not be recognized, he proposed that the Greek Cypriot government "acknowledge" the Turkish Cypriot political entity as legitimate representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, similarly to Israel's "acknowledgement" of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the 1993 Oslo peace process (Coufoudakis 2004, 67-68).

evolving context of the Cyprus problem, with "an unique set of circumstances" (UN Secretary General 2003, paragraph 5) that could qualitatively impact on the parties' attitudes and positions, one that was a product of the new European factor that offered new incentives and deadline for the "diplomatic Rubik's cube" (paragraph 4) to be solved. In a period of Greek-Turkish rapprochement and following the European Council's decision to grant candidacy status to Turkey, Annan and his special adviser, Alvaro de Soto, launched a new effort to reach a settlement that would allow for the Treaty of Accession to the EU to be signed by a reunited Cyprus.

Overall, Kofi Annan found his mediation's main obstacle to be the parties' perception of the negotiation as a zero-sum game and, thus, of convincing the parties that his proposed solution offered them a win-win situation, that failure to accept it would signify a great loss to all parties involved, not only Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots but also Greece and Turkey, and that reaching a settlement was in the interest of all and the grand objective all should focus on (UN Secretary General 2003, paragraph 143). Five rounds of proximity talks were held from December 1999 to November 2000, a process the Secretary General describes as "one of procedural wrangling, verbal gymnastics, shadow boxing, and mini crisis" (paragraph 23) where Annan and De Soto's attempts to move the parties forward to give and take negotiation were fruitless. The main obstacle hampering negotiations was, again, the recognition issue, with Denktash blaming the Security Council resolutions for the situation and questioning UN impartiality and thus, that of Annan and De Soto. In fact, the meetings were held in a "proximity talks" format because Denktash had refused to have direct talks without recognition.

Instead of relying on documents and position papers issued by the parties, in Annan's mediation the UN would be the sole formulator by presenting the parties with "non-papers" continuously revised after considering the parties reactions to them. On the 11 of November of 2002, Annan presented a document containing the "Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem" to both parties and to Greece and Turkey. According to the document, all concerned would commit to finalizing the negotiations with the UN and to submit the agreement to separate simultaneous referenda in each community, in order to the new state of affairs to have come to being by the time the Treaty of Accession to the EU was to be signed, on the 16th of April of 2003 (UN Secretary General 2003).

After consultations with the parties, a second version of, what came to be known as, the "Annan Plan" was prepared to be presented to the parties and the guarantors in the EU

Copenhagen enlargement summit of December of 2002. When Denktash abstained from attending the summit and an important opportunity for breakthrough was missed. Filling in the gaps on what had not been agreed, Annan presented a third version of his plan and proposed a date for its simultaneous referenda, but in March of 2003 in a meeting in The Hage, Denktash refused to commit due to objections to the Plan and to Turkey's incapability to sign the guarantor's statement the plan requested, a commitment the Greek Cypriot side also insisted was necessary prior to the referenda. When Denktash also refused to accept an extension of the deadline for negotiations and a new date for referenda, Kofi Annan announced his abandonment of the process, though leaving his proposal on the table (UN Secretary General 2003, paragraphs 54-60). Prime responsibility for the loss of breakthrough opportunities at Copenhagen and The Hage are attributed by Kofi Annan to the Turkish Cypriot leader, who he found constantly emphasised conceptual and interpretational issues where the two communities' positions had always been irreconcilable instead of focusing on the search for practical solutions[21] (UN Secretary General 2003, paragraph 130).

After the mediation breakdown at The Hage, negotiations on the Annan Plan would only resume in February 2004. The Turkish Cypriot community was growing impatient at the negotiations impasses and, with the presidential elections results, forced Denktash into making a coalition with Mehmet Ali Talat's main opposition and pro-solution party. With his political position weakened and facing growing pressure by the new Turkish government, Denktash reluctantly returned to the negotiations table together with Talat (Ker-Lindsay 2004, 24, 26). However, Tassos Papadopoulos, who had previously been elected Greek Cypriot President, appeared to similarly be attempting to hinder the negotiations process with delayed reactions to the Annan's proposals and by publicly disclosing the negotiation's contents (UN Secretary General 2004, paragraphs 22-23).

A fourth version of the Annan Plan was the basis for negotiations at Bürgenstock, Switzerland, on the 24th of March, where Papadoupolos, Talat, the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey and the European Commission for Enlargement joined the Secretary General for a final opportunity to agree on a finalized plan (UN Secretary General 2003, paragraphs 31, 32). Though Denktash, who had been the main impediment for agreement in the previous round,

[21] Kofi Annan describes Denktash position as one that, being consistent throughout the decades, failed to recognise the confrontational atmosphere of 1960 had undergone a "sea change" to the Europe that Cyprus was about to join (paragraph 135), stating that Turkish Cypriots were convinced that Greek Cypriots were not seriously interested in reaching a settlement since their accession to the EU was guaranteed and feared that Greek Cypriots still viewed Cyprus as a Greek island and that they were still not ready to accept Turkish Cypriots as equal partners (paragraph 138).

refused to be present at Bürgenstock, Papadoupolos became the new one by refusing to have face-to-face meetings with Talat's delegation (paragraphs 26, 33-35).

Unagreed issues were then left for the Secretary General to use his discretion to "fill in the gaps" of a fifth and final version of the Annan Plan that was presented to the parties on the 31st of March of 2004. The "Annan Plan"(UN Secretary General 2004) proposed the Cypriot leaders that the name of the new state be "United Cyprus Republic", a "federal government", as preferred by Greek Cypriots, with "two constituent states" of equal political status, not that of a minority and a majority, as preferred by Turkish Cypriots (paragraph 65), with its own new flag and anthem (paragraph 68). However, the parties could not agree to whether the new state of affairs would come into being by transforming the existing Republic of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot reintegration into that state, a Greek Cypriot preference, or whether an entirely new state would be founded, a Turkish Cypriot preference. To Annan there was no other way out other than allowing both communities to keep their views by providing the settlement with elements of continuity of their each present state of affairs (paragraphs 66 and 67). Notwithstanding, opposing positions on the sovereignty issue remained with Greek Cypriots defending the single, undividable, sovereignty of the federal state and Turkish Cypriots proposing a layered sovereignty, with each constituent sate enjoying whatever sovereignty that was not deposited in the new state. Resorting to the Swiss and Belgian constitutions, Annan proposes a the new state have a single international personality and sovereignty, where partition an secession and prohibited and where, at the same time, the constituent states sovereignely exercise those powers not vested in the federal state, in which there is no hierarchy between federal and constituent state law-making (paragraphs 74 to 76).

On the functioning of the executive government, a political equality that also reflected the demographic Greek Cypriot majority and still guaranteed the government's effective functioning and prevent against domination of one side over the other was needed to bridge the two communities positions, therefore, again inspired by the Swiss case, Annan proposed the formation of a Presidential Council, of 6 elected members, 4 Greek Cypriot and 2 Turkish Cypriot, whose chairmanship would rotate among its members (paragraphs 82 to 84). On the legislative powers, a lesser difficult issue, the Plan proposes that the federal Parliament be constituted by a 50-50 composed Senate, that reflects the communities' political equality, and a lower-Chamber of Deputies whose seats distribution would reflect the demographic difference (parapraph 86).

To bridge Turkish Cypriot desire for its constituent state to have an unfettered right to decide on the establishment of residency issue and Greek Cypriot fears that the Turkish Cypriot position would amount to ethnic purity and prevent Greek Cypriots from returning to their homes in the north, the plan suggested a gradual lifting of limitations on the freedom of settlement and the authority to impose further restrictions to lay with the European Union (paragraphs 95 to 98). Residency rights are de-linked from property and compensation rights in the plan, on which issue it seeks a compromise between current property users and prior to 1974 with a scheme of incentives, compensations and bonds for displaced and dispossessed land owners to give up their properties at the other constituent state territory to current users (paragraphs 109 and 110). Given that the previous provision would be most unfavourable to Greek Cypriots it would be compensated by a territorial adjustment that would allow a greater portion of Greek Cypriots to return to their homes, thereby returning Varosha to Greek Cypriots and allowing for Turkish Cypriots to retain the Karpas peninsula and, in total, 29 percent of the territory (paragraphs 113 and 116). Also, the UK would cede almost half of its Sovereign Base Areas, mainly in favour of the Greek Cypriot constituent state, to facilitate a balanced territorial proposal (paragraph 116).

The plan provided for longer transitional periods to favour the fragile economy of the Turkish Cypriot community in the application of the *aquis communautaire* (paragraph 95) and, on the issue of security guarantees, the plan would be internationally endorsed by the Security Council, the EU, the Council of Europe and Greece and Turkey (paragraph 78). The Treaty of Guarantee would remain in force, while the number of troops present on the island would be reduced under a reformulated Treaty of Alliance, whereas all these troops would withdraw from island upon Turkey's accession to the EU. Also, a UN peacekeeping operation would monitor the agreement's implementation (paragraphs 120 to 122).

Most importantly, being that the act of reunification would be exercised by the people of each community through separate simultaneous referendums (paragraph 72), not needing to be previously signed by the leaders, the weight of the final and irreversible step into agreement would be withdrawn from the leader's shoulders and be put on the people's hands.

During the subsequent month, the parties began to form and publicly display their positions regarding the plan. On the Turkish side, while Denktash pronounced himself against, Talat and Turkey strongly displayed their support of a "yes" vote of the Turkish Cypriot community in the referendum and also sought to convey Greek Cypriot support for it. Papadopoulos, on the other hand, publicly declaring that the finalized plan satisfied Turkey's

concerns and ignored Greek Cypriot ones and that it would undermine the Republic of Cyprus precisely at the time its political weigh would be internationally strengthened with EU accession, called upon the Greek Cypriot community to resoundingly vote "no" to the plan (UN Secretary General 2004, paragraphs 64-66). On the 1st of May of 2004, 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots approved the Annan Plan, while 76 percent of Greek Cypriots rejected it (paragraph 72), only the Republic of Cyprus enjoys a EU membership and the island remains divided and militarized to the present day.

From Perez de Cuellar to Kofi Annan's mediation, there is a continued tendency for the UN to increase its mediatory capacity and to assume itself, not only, as a legitimate and credible communications facilitator, but also as formulator of a permanent settlement. This tendency was growing since past UN initiatives incited the two parties to sign documents on agreed guidelines for a solution and further evolved with Cuellar's proposal for a permanent settlement. Notwithstanding, the UN's enhanced role to push for the search of a permanent solution between two parties that have been, for decades, incapable of overcoming their differences throughout negotiations, with minor breakthroughs and constant setbacks and deadlocks, did not come without cost. With the parties' resistance to the UN mediator's capacity came criticism and discredit with the aim of reducing the Secretary General's role that forced Boutros-Ghali to step back into negotiating practical issues and agreeable guidelines. The entrance of the EU accession issue into the negotiations process and the imperative put on reaching a settlement ultimately prompted the fulfilment of a formulative strategy through Kofi Annan's mediation. With Annan, the UN's role as formulator is increased, with the Secretary General becoming entitled to use its discretion to "fill in the gaps" by bridging the parties' position on issue they were not able to come into agreement themselves.

Similarly to what had been the case in the past, the growth of UN's mediatory capacity is accompanied by a reduction in US intervention. The US only intervenes once in this period to promote de-escalation after tension rising over the EU accession issue and only to facilitate communication between the parties and, inclusively, abandons its past role as formulator not to clash with UN ongoing efforts but still offering guiltiness and legitimise and support its progress.

5. A Holistic Analysis of UN and US Mediation in Cyprus

The two Cypriot communities have historically lived separately on the Cyprus island, preserving their own different traditions, culture, language, religion and historical ties to Greece and Turkey. The socio-cultural separateness in which Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have historically lived on the island prevented them from developing a geographical common sense of belonging and fate and for the shared existence in the same territory to channel their affection and loyalty into a mutual nationality. The two Cypriot communities preserved their sense of belonging to the "motherlands" Greece and Turkey, which provided for the unique character of the Cypriot nationalisms, originally dethatched from the island's territory and from independence and which allowed for two communities to develop into two distinct national communities (Castleberry 1964, 124). Consequently, the right to self-determination, to legally and politically determine the territory in which a people live in, was atypically considered by the Turkish Cypriot community and the Greek Cypriot community, at the early stages of conflict, as assisting a peoples' will to join another state as much as it does a people's will to establish their own. Instead of aiming at the creation of a new independent state, the Cypriot communities' nationalistic ideologies, *enosis* and *taksim*, aspired for their national community's and the whole (*enosis*) or part (*taksim*) of, the island's territory to be united with already existing nation-states.

Mediation has been performed in Cyprus by a state actor, the US, and an international organization, the UN, in different styles, guided by different interests, objectives and views of the Cyprus conflict and relative importance of the actors involved. The US takes on the initiative to mediate the Cyprus conflict due to the political and strategic interests related to the third parties involved in the dispute at its regional level, Greece and Turkey, and the subsequent disrupting potential the Cyprus conflict had on NATO and American influence in the southern Mediterranean European flank. When powerful states are mediators, mediation can be analyzed as an extension of the state's foreign policy, which is visible in US' defence and promotion of its international influence through mediation in Cyprus. In such cases, a *power* mediation, as opposed to a *pure* mediation, process is led by these states and the use of leverage, through benefit promises an threats of punishment to push for compromise on a settlement, aims at guiding the parties and the mediation process into the arrival at a solution along the lines of the powerful state's interests (Güney 2004, 28). Being a resourced and powerful state mediator, to protect its interests and

pursue its goals, the US performed mediation in Cyprus in a directive style (Güney 2004, 27-28), providing incentives and issuing ultimatums to affect the parties conflicting issue-framing to pressure them into agreeing to its proposed settlements.

The UN, on the other hand, becomes involved in the Cyprus dispute in response to the Greek Cypriot call for UN involvement. Being a neutral mediator, the UN has mainly performed facilitative and formulative style mediation in the Cyprus conflict, whether through "official" mediation or good offices. Under the good offices framework the practice of mediation at different moments in conflict and by different individuals varied substantially from a good offices policy that merely provides the parties neutral ground for direct negotiations, to a very low intrusive facilitative mediation and a perceivable progress in the non-directive spectrum strategies to formulative and even binding mediation.

In the present chapter, the information gathered will be analysed under the pre-established theoretic framework. A holistic analysis of the Cyprus mediators' performance will be made through a multiparty mediation approach to US and UN mediation initiatives that will allow, not only the analysis each mediator isolated performance at each mediation initiative, but also for an assessment of the degree in which the mediators performed mediation isolatedly or in cooperation, on the impact each mediator's performance had on the ones led by the other and, also, the mediators' overall performance impact on the evolution of the mediation process in Cyprus. After jointly accessing the Cyprus mediator's level of cooperation, concerting and sequencing of mediation styles and strategies and, through it, holistically understanding what were the mediators' performance overall successes and failures, the impact of the internationalization process through the use of mediation in the Cyprus peace process will be evaluated. Starting by highlighting relevant characteristics of the Cyprus conflict that set the context in which the mediation process occurs, the mediator's performance analysis will be performed accordingly with the analytic time-periods set on the previous chapter and will be divided into five parts. A second part will assess US and UN mediation initiatives undertaken at the early stages of conflict, followed by the period comprising the two phases of intercommunal talks and from then until the rejection of the Annan Plan in 2004. The fifth part will dedicate itself to the internationalization overall phenomenon's impact on the Cyprus mediation process. A synthesis of the various variables at the all mediation initiatives is provided for in Table 2, at the end of this chapter.

5.1 The Cyprus Mediation Context

Colonial inherited imbalances and the imprudent post-colonial policies adopted by Britain set the stage for conflict (Masunungure and Bazada 2010, 213) in Cyprus. The Cypriot incompatible nationalistic aspirations were fuelled by security and self-preservation concerns. While Greek Cypriot *enosis* is a product of a sense of repression and the consequent need for autonomy and liberation from British rule and, in reaction, Turkish Cypriot *taksim* emerged from fear of Greek Cypriot political domination over Cyprus if the island was to be annexed to Greece.

Since in their struggle for political and economic resources, the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities began to perceive themselves as having distinct identities, the Cyprus conflict is also one of an ethnic character. Ethnicity has provided the polarizing and segregating dividing line between the Cypriot communities to a *destruction* stage of conflict escalation of ethnic cleansing and total physical separation. The separate ethnic identities of the two Cypriot communities were formed and changed through a social construction processes in response to circumstance and contextual conditions (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004, 148). This formulation and re-formulation process is visible in the period prior to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, when the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities where not hostile to each other. In this embryonic stage of the conflict, Greek Cypriots did not hold Turkish Cypriot as opponents to their struggle for *enosis,* this transformation occurs only after the Cyprus Republic is created. Ethnicity provided the focus for union among Cypriot individuals, it was not the source of conflict in Cyprus but, the "us versus them" labelling process through cultural, religious and linguistic differences between the two groups with different and opposing political aspirations. On the interviews performed in Cyprus, the interviewees considered that the Cyprus conflict is both an identity and a power dispute but that it were the identity issues and ethnic divisions that were embedded in the communities' political cleavages and need for political survival, but like any other social construction, these can become porous and eventually evaporate.

The 1960 Constitution institutionalized the ethnic element and overlooked the existing negative, stereotypical feelings and distance between the two communities. The devise of separate communal chambers on culture and education institutionalized and further fostered separateness and the maintenance of psycho-cultural ties with the motherlands among the Cypriot communities and, thus, further gave rise to mistrust and antagonism that prevented both

from transferring their loyalties into the new state (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993, 343). The 1960 Constitution gave an unproportionate share governmental power to the Turkish Cypriots minority, but if Greek Cypriots found the new political order unfair, for Turkish Cypriots the consociational system was essential for their security and self-preservation, however, the constitutional power-sharing arrangement provided by the Zurich-London Agreements perpetuated division instead of promoting union and cooperation between the Cypriot communities and did not allow for insecurity to fade (Castleberry 1964, 124). Both communities perceive the governing structure set by the Zurich-London Agreements to being incapable of addressing their needs and it is this perceived need deprivation that is the basic condition that sets out conflict, and not the identity/ethnic element (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004, 147).

The conflict that followed the demise of the Republic of Cyprus in 1963 is an atypical intrastate conflict not only due to the kind of nationalisms that ideologically sets the Cypriot communities' national self-consciousness at their "motherlands" but also regarding the characterization of the disputants involved. In the literature, the Cyprus conflict has been referred to both as a *civil war* and, as an *intercommunal war,* which derives from considering or not if the Greek Cypriot government, that remained in power when the Turkish Cypriot resigned for state offices in 1963, should or not be considered as the a state government entity. If the Greek Cypriot government is considered to have a state government status, since they legitimately held it when the Turkish Cypriot officials resigned from government in 1963, the Cyprus conflict is to be considered a *civil war*. However, if it is considered that the power-sharing government falls when Turkish Cypriots abandon it, then none of the two communities can be considered to represent the state's government and the Cyprus conflict should be characterized as an *intercommunal war.* Greek Cypriots remained in control and consequently monopolized the state apparatus and its resources, but considering that the Greek Cypriot government is the state-entity and that the Turkish Cypriots are non-state entity can be unfair and inaccurately portray the historical circumstances in which the Cyprus conflict emerged, one in which the Turkish Cypriot community was also a legitimate state actor when the Republic broke down in 1963. Therefore, the Cyprus conflict is better characterized as an intercommunal war.

The mediation process in Cyprus has been impaired by the adversarial relationship deepened by the ethnic element and, thus, embedded in misperception, miscommunication and mistrust (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993, 341). The main issues at stake in the Cyprus conflict are sovereignty issues - the two Cypriot communities have incompatible

sovereignty claims over the islands' territory - ; ideology issues - they hold different values and beliefs regarding the nature of the political system that should exists on the island - ; security issues - that generate the need for a border to be established; and issues of self-determination and independence (Bercovitch et al. 1991, 14). Ideology and independence issues are difficult to address through a negotiations process than security and sovereignty issues. Issues related to values and identity are zero-sum and not negotiable, however these are difficult to separate (Kleiboer 1996, 364). Mediation aims to address the tangible sovereignty and security issues in conflict but will also be forced to consider the other discriminatory principles that frame ideology and self-determination issues.

Upon the interviews performed in Cyprus, interviewees expressed differing opinions regarding UN and US involvement in the Cyprus conflict. While the UN is consensually seen as an ineffective conflict resolution actor, when this was considered to mean that the Organization is an inadequate peace-broker between the Cypriot communities, it is supported that the US should enhance its involvement and more actively pressure the parties in conflict to agree. On the other hand, other opinions expressed that, while the UN may not be effective, no other actor would gain sufficient trust from the Cypriot parties to be able resolve their differences and, therefore, the UN was the only possible option. Notwithstanding, although they all considered impartiality to be fundamental for in the conflict management in Cyprus, none considered the UN to have been an entirely impartial actor but one who favoured either side's position during the years. Opportunities for settlement were generally considered to have been missed throughout the years and external interests, the parties' historical mistrust and UN's failure to take full advantage of them are all pointed out as causes for the lack of capitalization on these moments' potential for settlement-reaching.

5.2 Uncooperative US Directive Mediation and UN Facilitative Mediation

During the Cold War period, the preservation of US military and political presence in the eastern Mediterranean was vital to US interests (Savvides 1998, 34). The US image of Cyprus during this period influenced American policies toward the Cyprus conflict, namely that a unified Cyprus state could become a Soviet ally and that assuring Greece's and Turkey's presence on

the island would not allow for the communist Cypriots to align Cyprus with the communist bloc. To eliminate the threat of war between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, partition became, thus, the ideal strategic solution to protect US interests (Savvides 1998, 35, 36) and introducing NATO as the *peacekeeping* force in Cyprus the way to pre-empt a UN involvement that would allow the Soviet Union to be involved in the Cyprus dispute via decision-making in the Security Council (Coufoudakis 1974, 36).

In the NATO and Acheson initiatives, because the US pursued solutions to the Cyprus conflict that could better serve its interests, both plans proposed partition on weak federal/ confederal power-sharing system of political government. The US believed that any solution that could satisfy Greece and, primarily, Turkey's demands over Cyprus would eliminate the possibility of war between the two NATO allies. Fulfilling Greek desire for *enosis,* which expectedly would allow Greece to remove Makarios from power, and protecting Turkish security interests by providing it sovereign bases on Cypriot soil, was thought by the US as sufficient to eliminate intercommunal fighting between the Cypriot communities (Savvides 1998, 32, 47-48), but although this satisfied Greece and Turkey, such a solution suppressed Greek Cypriot aspirations. The US, however, overlooked Greek Cypriot ambitions in the NATO and Acheson Plans not only due to self-interest, but also due to American view of Makarios as a despotic leader, sympathetic to communist ideology and responsible for the violent attacks that Greek Cypriot troops were inflicting on the Turkish Cypriot community (Castleberry 1964, 120) and, thus, did not feel Makarios' demands should be addressed even when he persistently frustrated US mediation initiatives, forgetting that they were also upheld by one of the communities to which the settlement plan would apply. Despite George Ball's pressure and scare tactics (Coufoudakis 1974, 36), Makarios did not cede to US threatening directive strategies.

US leverage in the NATO and Acheson mediation initiatives was able to reproach Greece and Turkey and avoid a Greco-Turkish war at the conflict's early stages and in moving the two regional actors into accepting a settlement that would satisfy American interests. However, Makarios' influence over Greek policy-making toward Cyprus and his eventual success in pushing for UN involvement and the conflicts' internationalization, a manoeuvre designed to protect himself against American attempts to evade Makarios from the peace process and eventually capitulate him from power (Coufoudakis 1974, 38-39), US directive mediation tactics were unsuccessful.

US first mediation initiatives in the Cyprus conflict do not lend support to the idea that the use of directive mediation in the early stages of conflict has a higher chance of producing a successful outcome (Bercovitch and DeRouen's 2004, 166). The use of directive mediation by the US alone was not sufficient to effectively resolve the Cyprus conflict at its early stages for two reasons. The first and overall reason for these US initiatives' lack of success is a product of the US framing the Cyprus conflict as a regional and international dispute between Greece and Turkey and the consequent neglect of the Cypriot communities as the key disputants. In a manner compatible with its own concerns and interests, the US understood that Greece and Turkey where the key disputants in conflict when, in fact, these two actors where third parties in the conflict. Instead of mediating a solution between the local disputants, between whom the conflict was initiated, the US was doing so with the two third parties. While the Cypriot communities' external sources of power, influence and support undoubtedly condition the conflict environment and the mediation environment itself (Bercovitch and Houston 2000, 198), the Cypriot parties are the key actors in the conflict and should be so in the mediation process. Consequently, the US was not seen as a trustful and credible mediator. Makarios perceived that the US to have an outcome preference for the Cyprus conflict that was contrary to its interests, therefore the Greek Cypriot leadership did not accept the US as mediator and kept pushing for UN involvement, which was perceived as having an outcome preference more favourable to Greek Cypriot interests. It was not only the fact that the US was a partial or *biased* actor that put off Makarios but the fact that this particular actor was *biased* against him and that it was not a transparent mediator and, therefore, could not be trusted nor could the proposals made be fair.

Secondly, US directive mediation involved a formulative role but was not preceded by any kind of facilitative mediation (Fisher and Keashly 1991, 40). This second reason is, naturally, also a product of the first. Since the US did not place the Cypriot communities at the centre of the mediation process, as the main disputants, naturally the need to improve the parties adversarial relationship in order for them to accept any agreement proposal was not recognized or addressed and was, in fact, suppressed and ignored. Equally to the process that led to the signing of the Zurich-London Agreements, the Cypriot communities were again being left out of the design process of their own state and their own fate, what may suggest that even if the US was successful in pressuring Greek Cypriots to sign any of the US-proposed settlements, because none was perceived as fair, the conflict would eventually re-escalate (Bercovitch and Gartner 2009, 28).

The UN, on the other hand, was a preferred mediator to Greek Cypriots, however, this was not because it was a neutral actor but because it was perceived as possibly tending to favour the Greek Cypriot against the Turkish Cypriot view of the conflict. Makarios forced the Cyprus conflict upon the UN against British and American preferences not because he perceived any interests in the involvement of the UN as a mediator but because he wished to obtain a Security Council resolution that would safeguard Cyprus from a Turkish intervention and provide a basis for announcing that the Treaty of Guarantee had thereby been terminated (Castleberry 1964, 129). Regardless of Greek Cypriot views on UN involvement, the organization was motivated in mediating the Cyprus conflict purely for humanitarian, conflict management and peace re-establishment concerns, however, resolution 186 did recognize the legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus and deposit in it the responsibility of restoring law and order. Notwithstanding, this is not a product of a lack of neutrality in UN intervention in the Cyprus conflict but a reflection of the organizations' perception on how its preferred outcome, guided by its in conflict management and peace-establishment objectives, could better be achieved, which at that moment was centred in avoiding Turkey's military involvement (Reddaway 1986, 552). The UN is a neutral actor because the purpose of its involvement was no other than that of peace, even if that was seen as being pursued through recognizing the Greek Cypriot-led Republic of Cyprus' legitimacy.

UN mediation by Plaza brings the Cyprus communities to the centre stage of the mediation initiatives, not leaving Turkey and Greece aside but addressing them as interested third parties in the mediation process. The Cypriot parties themselves viewed their involvement in the process as a necessity, once their goals were yet set on *enosis* and *taksim.* Plaza performed a passive facilitative mediator, posing as a vehicle for contact and a message transmitter between the Cypriot parties who did not wish to appear weak or lose face by establishing direct contact with each other. During the consultations period, Plaza aimed at facilitating cooperation between the parties by identifying their interests and conflicting issues in order to stimulate their discussion and, ultimately, stimulating the parties to interact. However, Plaza was not successful in achieving his aims. In his report to the Secretary General (1965, paragraphs 89, 121 and 124), Plaza himself refers the impossibility of holding direct multilateral talks between all the interested parties as the shortcoming of his facilitative mediation. Incapable of breaking the impasse created by the parties' unwillingness to hold direct talks, Plaza suggested a minimum common ground that he hoped would bring the parties into the negotiations table. Although Plaza aimed at enriching the negotiations' substance with a concrete solution to be negotiated on,

Plaza moved to formulative mediation when the facilitative mediation process was underachieved, rendering the UN incapable of pressuring Turkey and Turkish Cypriots into accepting the Plaza report as a basis for further discussions.

Once Plaza approached the Cyprus conflict at its epicentre, targeting its local level and viewing it in intercommunal terms (Ker-Lindsay 2005, 9), the Plaza proposal offered a solution in an entirely different direction to that suggested by the US NATO and Acheson proposals. Contrary to US perspective, Plaza viewed the path to a long-standing solution as emerging from an agreement between the two Cypriot communities to which the motherlands would ultimately be drawn to agree to. This has two main reflections in Plaza's report proposal. First, the nationalistic-ethnic element would have to be taken out of the equation to promote cooperation and integration between the Cypriot communities and, therefore, neither *enosis* nor *taksim* would be satisfied in a solution, what completely opposed US partition proposals based on ethnic lines. Secondly, the third parties' interests, those of Greece and Turkey, are no longer central to the search of a solution, therefore, unlike in US proposals, the Plaza report stated the necessity of abrogating the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance and, thus, terminating Greece, Turkey and the UK's right of intervention, being that the implementation and safeguard of the new settlement plan would be provided by the UN. In result, the shift from US to UN mediation was most detrimental to Turkey's interests above all other parties. The proposal did not fully satisfy any of the parties' interests. It prevented Greece and Greek Cypriots from achieving *enosis,* however, the UN was perceived as favouring Greek Cypriots since resolution 186 and, contrary to the US, was bringing Makarios into the solution-building process, therefore it was not on the Greek flank's interests to push the UN away from it. Plaza's proposal also prevented Turkish Cypriots and Turkey from partitioning the island, although Turkish Cypriots would be protected from Greek Cypriot domination in the new state. Turkey, however, would lose its only asset over Cyprus issue, its right of intervention, and be de-linked from Cyprus' future for no compensation. The shift to UN mediation meant a greater change for Turkey, shifted from being the actor whose interests would mostly have been satisfied in US mediation to an actor whose interests were totally secondary to the Cyprus solution in UN mediation. Pushing the UN away from the solution-finding process in Cyprus, thus becomes vital for Turkey and hence the motive for accusing Plaza of arbitration and terminating UN mediation.

Turkey's argument that Plaza's report bear the moral stamp of the UN and that Plaza's report-issuing was arbitrative is not a valid argument. First, the Plaza report provided for a basis

for a settlement proposal negotiations and not a definite solution to be implemented as it stood. Secondly, if Plaza's mediation was arbitrative the parties would have had to accept its binding character beforehand any settlement plan was presented to them and, thirdly, by creating a proposal, Plaza was merely performing formulative mediation and not one of an arbitrative kind. Turkey refused the Plaza mediation simply because Plaza's and the UN's outcome preference was not satisfactory to its interests and not because it was being bound to accept the Plaza report as the definite settlement.

Despite the invalidity of its accusation, Turkey was, however, successful in undermining, not only Plaza's mediation process but, together with the Greek Cypriot refusal to accept that Plaza be replaced by another UN mediator, in terminating UN official mediation altogether with the arbitration card. Since Turkey's arbitration accusation was not valid, UN official mediation should have not been abandoned, nor should the UN have been disempowered as an intervener in the Cyprus conflict. With the arbitration accusation Turkey successfully transformed the mediation process into the issue in conflict that leads to the Plaza's mediation deadlock. This is an indicator of how little control the UN had over the mediation process, not being capable of curbing the Turkish argument and in exerting influence over the parties to prevent them from abandoning the mediation process. In result, the organization was forced to abandon official mediation and adopt the provision of good offices and see its mediatory capacity diminished to a minimal facilitative mediator, until Waldheim assumes the good-offices provision in 1972.

Mediation in Cyprus was initiated early in the dispute, with US mediation initiatives taking place right after the demise of the Republic of Cyprus and the conflict's first escalation process. UN mediation led by Plaza also took place a year after the conflict emerged. However, both mediators' initiatives were unsuccessful in resolving the Cyprus conflict. This suggests that more important than the timing for a mediation initiative is the mediation type or style that is used a given moment in conflict. The US addressed the conflict only at its surface, not at its root, not realizing that Greko-Turkish tensions were only the "tip of the iceberg" of the Cyprus conflict. If the Plaza facilitative initiative had not followed US directive mediation, it would potentially have been viewed differently by the parties in conflict. In performing directive mediation, the US impacted on the conflict's substance, framing the conflict's context accordingly with its own interests and at the expense of its disputants (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004, 158). The US intervention and the use of directive strategies altered the parties' balance of power and their expectations on victory, affecting the parties' willingness to settle now or continuing the dispute

(Regan 2002, 60). US mediation especially affected Turkey's perspectives and expectations over the mediation process which made the shift to UN mediation be perceived as a positional loss. Once the US mediation had put Greece and Turkey at the centre of the Cyprus dispute, Turkey reacted to the "downgrading" to a third party to the conflict that Plaza conferred it and in which Turkey could not hold the same expectations. (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004, 155).

When a universally accepted definition of a conflict is not upheld by intervening international conflict managers, attempts to craft a lasting solution are impaired (Masunungure and Bazda 2010, 229). In result, in the first mediation attempts of the Cyprus conflict, the two mediators are intervening isolatedly and uncooperatively. The supposedly US-UN cooperative mediation initiative turns out to be one where the US, no longer being able to prevent UN involvement and the conflict's internationalization, continues to successfully marginalize the organization's role in the mediation process, the reason for this initiative to be identified here as the Acheson-US mediation initiative. Equally, at the downfall of UN mediation, the US did not oppose to Plaza's resignation, nor did it press or support the appointment of another official UN mediator (Coufoudakis 1974, 37). The US was successful in de-escalating the conflict and in pressuring the parties into negotiating, however, it did not even consider the need for one that could address and improve the parties' adversarial relationships in order for them to be open into making concessions towards the other side. The use of a facilitative mediation for this purpose, ultimately impaired by the rush to the use a formulative mediation, was performed in UN mediation by Plaza, however, the organization lacked control over the mediation process and resources and power to pressure the parties into staying at the negotiations table. Complementarity between the directive US mediation and UN facilitative and formulative mediation was not capitalized by the mediators and was mainly impaired by US pursuit of an agreement along the lines of its interests, that is, the imposition of its formulative role in the mediation process. This may suggest that, had this US and UN first mediation initiatives complementarity potential capitalized, the US could have pressed the parties into not evading the UN's mediation process and the conflict's subsequent re-escalation may had been avoided.

5.3. US and UN Paralleled Mediation Initiatives at Different Conflict Levels

In the outbreak of intercommunal violence of 1967 and the threat of violent conflict spill-over to the regional level with Turkey's threat to intervene, the US returns to the mediation scene. In Vances' mission, the US uses its power and influence on Greece and Turkey to successfully defuse the eminent war threat and de-escalate the conflict. With UN representative Rolz-Bennet communicating with the Cypriot parties and collaborating at the local level with Vances' mission, this time the US was successful in de-escalating conflict both at the regional and local levels due to the collaborative performance of the two interveners and NATO, as Vance himself points out (Mulhollan 1969, 7-8). When conflict tension escalated, US directive mediation was effective in generating incentives for Greece and Turkey to step back from the brink of war. US mediation was able to broker an agreement that satisfied Turkey's demands, while its intervention through mediation and not through the use of direct leveraging over Turkey disillusioned Greece's perceived US bias to their favour. With Vance's shuttle diplomacy, the US was able to offer a "way out" of inevitable war to Greece and Turkey and the face-saving image that the agreement had been imposed by the US (Güney 2004, 33). No longer being able to rely on US leverage to deter Turkey and faced with the impossibility of being victorious in a war against Turkish forces, Greece is cornered into accepting Vances' proposal.

The US was, thus, successful in providing the needed pacified environment for UN post-crisis facilitative mediation to take place at the local level and for political issues to be addressed (Fisher 2001, 314), however, the American directive mediation between Greece and Turkey was not followed appropriately by facilitative mediation (Fisher and Keashly 1991, 41). During the first phase of intercommunal talks, the UN was impaired in its mediatory capacity by the Plaza mediation breakdown and was merely providing neutral ground for direct negotiations to occur between the Cypriot negotiators. It was through the offer of the Secretary General's good offices that the UN was able to remain in the Cyprus conflict mediation scene. Reducing its intrusiveness level in the mediation process to the performance of the minimally intrusive facilitative mediation, the UN was able to remain a legitimate intervener to all Cypriot parties.

During the first phase of intercommunal talks, the UN does act accordingly to the traditional definition of a good offices provider's tasks, limited to being a message transmitter and a "go-between" between the disputing parties (Bercovitch et al. 1991, 8). In performing

mediation in its most passive form, the UN is able to facilitate direct contact between the Cypriot communities (Zartaman and Touval 1996, 454). However, the absence of a UN mediator in the Cypriot communities' direct negotiations signifies that the organization has, not little, but no control whatsoever over the process and, therefore, is incapable of performing other tasks in the facilitative mediation strategy spectrum, such as helping the parties in identifying their interests and issues (Bercovitch and Su-Mi Lee 2001) and to identify all possible nonviolent outcomes within a zone of agreement or clarifying misconceptions and reducing mistrust in the parties visions of each other (Beardsley et al. 2006, 62-63). Consequently, without the assistance of a more active facilitative mediation during the first phase of intercommunal talks, capable of affecting the parties' polarized and mistrustful views of each other that would allow for their adversarial relationship to develop into a more cooperative one that would, in turn, allow for compromises to be reached with the parties being open to making meaningful concessions to each other, Clerides' and Denktash' direct negotiations stall and the negotiations process crystallizes over the territory and governance issues. In the absence of a more active facilitative UN mediator, and perceiving the other as trying to gain advantage, Clerides and Denktash were stuck in the discussion of their initial bargaining positions and their static adversarial dual game endured because their relationship was not transformed into the dynamic cooperative triad (Terris and Maoz 2005, 564-569) that a more active facilitative UN mediator could have achieved.

Vance's mediation was able to de-escalate the Cyprus conflict from the mutual *destruction* stage into the *segregation* one, where the parties are still profoundly antagonized but violence, or the threat of violence, ceases. In the first phase of intercommunal negotiations that follows and the Cypriot communities start to negotiate, the conflict further de-escalates to the *polarization* stage. This moment could have been ripe for UN facilitative mediation to affect the Cypriot parties' relationship, their perspectives of each other and their interests, in order to further de-escalate the conflict into the *discussion* stage where progress could have been made toward a peace agreement between the Cypriot communities that, perhaps, could have avoided the 1974 events. US and UN mediation was paralleled in this period once, although it the two actors acted cooperatively they did not act concertedly.

5.4 Active UN Facilitative Mediation and Passive US Directive Mediation

The Cyprus conflict had been freezed since US directive mediation and the "Johnson letter" successfully de-escalated tensions between Greece and Turkey when they again re-escalated in 1974, triggered by the Greek coup. After the Turkish military intervention a new stalemate period emerges in the Cyprus conflict, one that sets a new *status quo* on the island (Faber 2000, 66). At the cease-fire negotiations in Geneva, unlike in 1967, US leverage was not used against Turkey to prevent war and the *de facto* partition of Cyprus. In the events of 1974, the US refrained from condemning the Greek coup but was, on the other hand, again impaired in its capacity to leverage Turkey into not intervening. Kissinger's containment policy and the desire to not worsen US-Turkish relations restrained the US from more actively intervening to prevent conflict escalation in Cyprus. The US could have used its leverage upon Greece and Turkey to, once again, prevent war, but opted for an ambiguous stance towards both actor's action and, thus failed to avoid the most important turning point in the Cyprus conflict's history (Güney 2004, 34). While the alliance commitments with Turkey compelled the US to act in the Johnson period, in the Kissinger period, these commitments constrained its action (Regan 2000, 94).

Constraints from domestic politics and constituencies, strategic interests and international events (Regan 2000,105) made the new Kissinger administration perceive that the US was less politically, economically and diplomatically resourced to perform directive mediation and also less capable of enduring the political and diplomatic costs of leveraging Turkey at that given moment in history. For Henry Kissinger, neither the opportunity to act in the preferred manner, that is to exert pressure or Turkey, nor the willingness, a product of a risk assessment in terms of the assessment of the political ramifications and implications of the conflict at the time and in terms of the domestic implications of acting in that preferred manner, were present. With the conditions for opportunity and willingness to act being absent, "doing nothing" was Kissinger's preferred choice[22] (Regan 2000, 92). The result is a failed directive mediation process that inaugurates a new protracted conflict prolonged reality on the island (Fisher and Keashly 1991, 41).

[22] Regan (2000, 92) also notes that the"doing nothing" strategy can be a calculated choice, the best strategy for a certain desired outcome to come into being. Regarding Kissingers' inaction and in line with Regan's observation, Coufoudakis (1974, 41) argues that Kissinger's decision not to leverage Turkey was strategic, to allow for Turkey to finally be able to land its troops on the island to allow for Makarios' political neutralization and the partition of Cyprus.

The Cyprus conflict is, originally, an asymmetric one, product of an initial asymmetry between the Greek Cypriot faction, who monopolizes the state's political power and its military and economic resources, and the Turkish Cypriot minority group who loses access to state resources when they defect a government they were part of. With the changes in the conflict's environment after 1974, the Turkish Cypriot position is empowered by the Turkish military presence on the island. The asymmetric relationship that previously existed fades and a relative symmetry exists between the two parties that changes the mediation process. Turkish support had the effect of bolstering Turkish Cypriot expectations, galvanized to make greater demands at the negotiations table and less inclined to settle (Regan 2002, 61). In result, if intercommunal talks before 1974 focused on the creation of a unitary state where Turkish Cypriots would enjoy a local autonomy, from 1974 onwards the focus is shifted to a federal solution (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993, 344 - 345). During the second phase of intercommunal talks, Greek Cypriots will, in turn, fundamentally wish to retain sovereignty and control over the states' resources and territory by not recognizing the Turkish Cypriot "rebel" claims and preventing their contact with the outside world (Richmond a1998, 710).

The change in the conflict's context in 1974 consequently changed the mediation context. After the 1974 coup and the consequent Turkish intervention, a new reality was set on the island and, therefore, negotiations would also be set on different terms and positions. At the mediation context level, from 1974 onwards, the US is no longer as involved in the mediation process. It remains a highly influential actor but one that becomes more distanced, only mediating at particular moments, mainly to support UN mediation leadership. In parallel, marked by the events on the island but also by Kurt Waldheim's succession to U-Thant as UN Secretary General, the UN progressively and increasingly assumes more active mediation styles in the Cyprus conflict.

At the Vienna Talks, Kurt Waldheim inaugurates a more active facilitative UN mediation. Due to the Cypriot communities' failure to find an agreement during the first phase of intercommunal talks and the consequent conflict re-escalation with the 1974 events, in the second phase of intercommunal talks the UN mediator feels entitled to be a present and active participator in the negotiations process and to perform those facilitative mediation tasks the previous good offices initiative had left out, helping the parties identify their main interests and issues and possible zones of agreement. Although what was negotiated during the six rounds of Vienna Talks were the guidelines on what issues were to be negotiated and not a definitive

settlement itself, Waldheim was a more powerful mediator in creating and leading the parties into accepting agreements on the basis for future negotiations, which resulted in a first step towards unblocking the parties' constraints to accepting a solution (Zartman and Touval 1996, 454). With the signing of "Four-Guidelines", Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were, for the first time, able to agree and compromise themselves in a written document on the pursuit of an independent bi-communal federal solution (Sözen 2007, 5), which meant that if Greek Cypriots were now accepting the creation of a Cypriot federation, Turkish Cypriots were also committing themselves to the unity of the new state (Ker-Lindsay 2005, 13).

Although the Cypriot parties' were able to agree on a federal solution, they held differing perspectives on its interpretation and materialization (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993, 345). The Turkish intervention in 1974 had increased the Turkish Cypriots' expectations regarding the mediation outcome. Because they found themselves in more empowered position with Turkish presence on the island, Turkish Cypriots felt more capable of extracting concessions from Greek Cypriots, but because Greek Cypriots refused to concede in their demand for a strong central government, Greek Cypriot concession-making did not correspond to Turkish Cypriot expectations a hurting stalemate occurs (Regan 2002, 61).

In the subsequent Clifford initiative, the US mediates the Cyprus conflict at its local level for the first time by attempting to find an acceptable agreement formulation between the two Cypriot communities. Economic assistance to the agreement implementation was the "carrot" offered in US-led directive mediation headed by Clifford. However, once the US was perceived by Greek Cypriots has having allowed for the Turkey to "invade" and, therefore, to be biased towards Turkey, they refuse to be directed by the US and turn down the proposal on the grounds that it was not fair. Suspicion of US intentions and lack of trust that the US mediator was being truthful in the counselling it was giving, that it hid ulterior intentions that favoured the adversary, increased Greek Cypriot resistance to US directive mediation (Fisher 2001, 315), which contradicts Kydd's (2003) argument that directive mediators are more credible than neutral ones.

Although the Clifford initiative failed as a directive mediation attempt by the US, the "Twelve-Point" had the positive effect of stimulating the Cypriot parties' to formulate their own proposals on a settlement and, therefore, to prompt progress towards a discussion on a concrete solution. This progress, however, is shortly lived as the parties' become ever-more resistance to making concessions as a definite settlement becomes a more palpable possibility. This

resistance can also be interpreted as a consequence of the increase in UN activeness and involvement, which withdraws some of the parties' control over the mediation process and increases their fear of being forced to make concessions (Richmond 1998, 161). This is visible in Turkish Cypriot blockage of intercommunal talks by refusing to discuss Varosha, when it had been previously agreed to be a prioritized issue in the signing of the "Ten-Point Agreement" and, again, with the negotiation stalling after the signing of the "Interim Agreement" over the interpretation of "bi-zonality".

In the second phase of intercommunal talks, the UN's good offices can be characterized as active facilitative mediation with formulative characteristics. The "Four guidelines", the "Ten-point Agreement" and the "Interim Agreement" are the palpable product of Waldheim's new take on the UN's good offices offer, one that fully encapsulates a facilitative mediator tasks and capacity but also one that goes beyond the facilitative role to a formulative one. In highlighting common interests and generating understandings between the Cypriot parties and in helping them decide what issues should be prioritized in the settlement negotiations (Bercovitch and Su-Mi Lee 2001), Waldheim performed a minimal intrusive formulative mediation. Although this signals the UN's increase in mediatory capacity and its regained legitimacy and tendency to perform more intrusive mediation styles, Waldheim does not yet fully capitalize on a formulative mediator capacity by not yet performing certain formulative tasks. Waldheim does not have control over the mediation environment (Bercovitch and Su-Mi Lee 2001), he does not set the format, the where, when or how often negotiations events take place, which are set according to the parties' willingness to meet and, also, although Waldheim is a proposition creator, these are on the basis for future negotiations and not on a definite settlement. Waldheim has more control over the mediation process and is able to influence the parties' perspectives and improve their relationship and, with the signing of guidelines for a solution, Waldheim is able to break the negotiations' consecutive stalemates and to keep the increasingly concession-making resistant Cypriot parties to return to the negotiations table. Ultimately, the broadening of the tasks performed through the good offices framework, the UN becomes capable of generating a favourable environment for negotiations on a settlement to occur, thus, improving its conflict management capability (Bercovitch and Su-Mi Lee 2001).

US and UN mediation were complementary throughout the two phases of intercommunal talks. When the UN is restrained to the minimum level of interference and without the capacity to advance progress on the conflict's intercommunal level, the US power-mediates an agreement at

the regional level. In turn, de-escalation brokered by US mediation makes it possible for the UN to promote a solution at local level. Also, when the UN increases the level of involvement of its mediation strategy, the US decreases its own to that of only a formulator to provide stimulate the parties to agree under UN-led mediation, one that will, otherwise, stimulate the UN itself to continue to recuperate its lost mediatory capacity and to be able to opt for more intrusive strategies without risking to be dismissed by the parties.

5.5 An Empowered UN Mediator and an Increasingly Absent US Mediator

When Perez de Cuellar takes over as UN Secretary General and begins to mediate the Cyprus dispute in a full formulative mediator capacity, his initiative is lingered at its early stages by the Turkish Cypriot unilateral proclamation of the TRNC and the consequent growing intractability of the Cyprus conflict (Fisher 2001, 315). This event marks an increase in rigidity in both Cypriot parties' positions in the mediation process while, at the same time, Cuellar's more active formulative mediation increases concession-making and agreement pressure upon them.

Once the UN did not fulfil Turkish Cypriot expectations regarding TNRC's recognition, the Turkish Cypriots were not willing to accept its new mediator role, its new formulative style mediation. Perceiving UN bias toward Greek Cypriots with the issuing of the General Assembly resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots increasingly resist UN's more intrusive involvement in the negotiations process (Richmond 1998, 155). Turkish Cypriots did not trust UN mediation could serve their interests, once it did not recognize their most essential claim, that of recognition. Amplified by Greek Cypriot refusal to hold face-to-face talks, the issue of recognition becomes increasingly central to the Turkish Cypriot position and, thus, the UN's more intrusive involvement increasingly undesirable.

Cuellar is, however, capable of overcoming the unfavourable mediation environment by holding separate "proximity talks" with the Cypriot leaders, allowing the parties to continue to talk without Greek Cypriots appearing to be conceding recognition to Turkish Cypriots (Greig and Diehl 2009,172). By separately meeting with each side, Cuellar is able to formulate the "Draft Framework Agreement", the first settlement proposal to come closer to becoming a definite solution. By the time the High-Level Meeting was held in New York all main issues had been

addressed and the moment was ripe for settlement conclusion. Surprisingly, however, it was Kyprianou who only accepted to endorse the document as a basis for future negotiation. In result, all main issues were again susceptible to be renegotiated (Fisher 2001, 315). Nonetheless, Cuellar was determined not to lose the ripe moment for agreement and increases the pressure on the parties to cooperate with threats of withdrawing the good offices offer or have the General Assembly reconsider the Greek Cypriot government legitimacy. Cuellar's threats are effective towards Greek Cypriots, who were not interested in losing the legitimacy gains from UN involvement, but are also towards Turkish Cypriots. Although the UN was not giving them international recognition and the increased intrusive strategies pursued by a perceived biased UN mediation were seen as detrimental to Turkish Cypriot interests, it was only through the UN mediation framework that the Turkish Cypriot administration was able to directly represent themselves internationally, either than through Turkey. The presence of the UN mediator is important for both communities, therefore, showing cooperativeness was needed to remain under UN auspices (Richmond 1998, 150).

While Greek Cypriots push for UN involvement but are not willing to arrive at an agreement, Turkish Cypriots aim at diminishing UN mediatory capacity by threatening to abandon the UN framework but never actually doing so. In result, while Kyprianou raises new issues and procedural demands, when the Draft Framework Agreements negotiations come close to agreement, Denktash insists on the recognition issue even after Greek Cypriots concede to holding direct talks and the Security Council affirms the Cypriot communities' political equality. This search for a greater recognition and status, which they knew the UN framework could not provide can be understood as a Turkish Cypriot strategy to impair UN mediation (Fisher 2001, 316). During Cuellar's mediations, the parties do show cooperativeness and Cuellar is consistently successful in having the parties return to the mediation table after each mediation deadlock, however, when decisive moments for agreement arrive, one or the other steps back.

Although the parties are willing to continue to negotiate in order to remain under the UN umbrella, they do so in the pursuit of their own interests and are not focused on solution-finding. How the UN framework would be able to aid each of the Cypriot parties in their objectives is more valued by both than finding an agreement (Richmond b1998 39). In result, Cuellar's more active mediation style is targeted by both parties in a similar way Gallo Plaza was (Richmond b1998 139), with the Turkish Cypriots demanding the Secretary General not to overcome what they perceived as the good offices' mission limits, overstepping the role of a good offices provider

to that of an active mediator, actually, a formulator (Fisher 2001, 316). As it was in the Plaza mediation, the mediator is targeted as a strategy to undermine the mediation process and the discussion over the Secretary General's role becomes an issue in the mediation process that allows the parties to derail negotiations and prevent agreement arrival (Richmond b1998, 37-39, 140).

Boutros Ghali continues Cuellar's formulative mediation, but with a reduced level o pressure by the presentation of "non-proposals". The "Set of Ideas" and its "non-map" incorporate a detailed solution plan but are not put at the negotiations table as a settlement but as "ideas" to be discussed. The events that follow the ultimate rejection of the "Set of Ideas" are very similar to those that had led to the discard of the Draft Agreements. Although Ghali's aim is to push the negotiations forward with this new "non-proposal" formulation strategy, Turkish Cypriots continue to resist UN formulative mediation (Fisher 2001, 316) and, ultimately be blamed by Ghali for the negotiations' failure. However, once again, when the ripe moment comes, again at New York, for the arrival at a definite solution, Greek Cypriots also decline the opportunity.

The Confidence Building Measures are then successful in returning the parties, once again to the negotiations table, however, this regression in Ghali's formulative role from mediating the discussion of a definite settlement to CBM's negotiation does not ultimately pay off. With Ghali's CBMs package the UN was now receding to a facilitative mediation that aimed at promoting the goodwill and trustfulness that he found had not existed in the previous formulative mediations. The Turkish Cypriots, however, did not cede to the intrusiveness reduction in UN mediation and continued to push for recognition through the Erçan Airport issue, while Greek Cypriots call for an increased UN capacity to coerce Turkish Cypriots (Richmond 1998, 206). In result, what where essentially humanitarian measures were politicized by both parties by becoming new conflicting issues in the mediation process and neither trust was promoted nor was the continuation of the negotiations on the "Set of Ideas" possible.

When the Annan initiative begins in 1997, the mediation process had been multiply staled and deadlocked over procedural matters and over whether priority should be given to the external over the internal aspects of the Cyprus problem, whether issues such as the withdrawal of Turkish troops should be prioritized over those concerning the constitutional provisions or good will measures, and with negotiations being endured by parties to avoid appearing uncooperative and intransigent to the UN and the outside world (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993,

345). Formulative mediation based on trade-off of concession-making between the Cypriot parties was not able to create a negotiations environment where the parties' become available to address and accommodate each other's needs and, instead, consistently held the concessions they made as losses towards an untrustworthy and self-interested other. In result, their antagonistic positions remained essentially untouched and their adversarial relationship was preserved or even amplified (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993, 346). With the UN presence being viewed increasingly as a vehicle for legitimization and recognition, and thus of empowerment vis-à-vis the other, the will and the confidence to sincerely negotiate an agreement were absent and Cypriot parties continued to view each other as opponents instead of collaborators in the search for a solution (Richmond 1998, 43-47).

Greek Cypriot application to the EC and the knowledge of its eventual accession is another identifiable changing moment in the Cyprus conflict, an event that will again change the conflict's status quo and, therefore, the mediation's dynamics once the parties' power balance is shifted to Greek Cypriots favour, disempowering the Turkish flank and rendering Turkish Cypriots a weaker position in the new asymmetrical relationship. Under pressure from Greece, the EU's becomes one of the main actors in the Cyprus conflict (Nicolet 1999, 99). Although the EU acceptance of Cyprus accession aimed at accelerating the conflict resolution process, it became a third party to the conflict when it relinquished the necessity of the conflict's resolution prior to Cyprus' admission as a member-state and one who, in the end, has supported the Greek Cypriot side. All interviewees in Cyprus were critical of EU's policy towards the Cyprus *problem.* The views expressed considered the EU an inefficient bureaucracy whose political elite's lack of consensus has caused it to be seen as a suspicious and *biased* actor to both communities since, if Turkish Cypriots feel the EU has failed to deliver its promise on the alleviation of Turkish Cypriot isolation and partial towards the Greek Cypriot side, Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, feel that, in the Annan Plan's refusal aftermath, in supporting their economic development and in trying to bring Turkish Cypriots closer to the EU, the EU is serving Turkish and Turkish Cypriot interests.

Annan was able to capitalize on the changes in the Cyprus conflict context brought by Greek Cypriot application to the EC as a ripe mediation moment, but not without the US intervening to de-escalate existing tensions. Although Holbrook intervened without proposing a draft plan himself, he eventually decided the conditions in which UN mediation would follow, linking the Cyprus settlement to EU accession, thus providing the "carrot" that would commit Greek Cypriots to a solution while, at the same time, generating a possible gateway for Turkey's

own accession. In Holbrook's mediation Turkey can be seen once again as the key actor for the US in the Cyprus problem, by the effort to bring Turkey into the EU accession process. This effort is further evidenced in US leveraging upon Greece regarding the acceptance of Turkish candidacy to the EU in the Helsinki Summit, which considerably contributed to a relaxation in Turkish resentment towards Greece and the EU (Güney 2004, 37-39).

The two Cypriot communities agree to move forward to the Annan Plan negotiations to govern Cyprus in jointly cooperative manner, but negotiations stall, as usual, over the same issues and the TRNC recognition issue still continuing to hamper the negotiations progress. The time pressure to devise an agreement by the time the Treaty of Accession to the EU was to be signed dictated an increased intrusiveness in UN mediation. Annan was now, not only fully controlling the negotiations' environment and deciding the when, where and how often they would take place, setting agendas and deadlines, but also exceeding the a formulative mediation's limits by "filling in the blanks" left unagreed by the parties in the settlement negotiations. Ker-Lindsay (2009, 251-253) argues that a new form of mediation was performed in Cyprus by Kofi Annan, that of "meditration" or "arbitral mediation". Ker-Lindsay indicates the decisions regarding the time for the negotiations' ending and the plan's ratification were relinquished from the Cypriot leaders' control, when usually in a mediation process solutions are found with the explicit agreement of the actors involved. The author does not consider that the mediation was transformed into an arbitration process but that aspects of arbitration were used. This sudden change in the "rules of the game", although being positive for allowing a realistic settlement and solution to be devised by the UN for the Cyprus problem, was not able to affect the Greek Cypriot community's perceptions in a way as to accepting the agreement prior to EU accession and, furthermore, had the detrimental effect of discrediting the UN among the Greek Cypriot community. Although highlighting the deficiencies and difficulties that can be presented by this type of approach, the author aims at lending support to the idea that "a more robust approach to mediation to match the more interventionist approach to international affairs that has emerged" is needed.

For Greek Cypriots, instead of representing an opportunity for peace and prosperity and for a new collaborative relationship to develop among the two communities, the Annan Plan referendum was viewed as an opportunity to protect their identity and reinforce their sovereignty under the EU umbrella (Michael 2007, 597). It may be true that because the mediation interaction takes place exclusively with the political elite Kofi Annan's mediation failed to consider

that the federalist solution had never been accepted by all quadrants of the Greek Cypriot community and that Greek Cypriot citizens would be inclined to vote no to a settlement that, due to the time pressure generated by the EU accession conditions, left little time for review, reflection and feedback (Michael 2007, 597-598). However, these arguments fail to consider that the Annan Plan is, in fact, a product of decades of mediated negotiations and exhaustive discussions on each issue and that during the Annan Plan negotiations none of the content of the negotiations were new to the parties, nor were the issues on which they had not previously debated or even agreed on. In this perspective, more importantly then there being quadrants of the Greek Cypriot community they may have been reluctant to accepting a federalist solution is that their leader, the person who himself negotiated the agreement that was being put a under their consideration, pronounced himself against it. Consequently, it seems more accurate to consider that what Kofi Annan's failed to consider was that Papadopoulos would turn against an agreement that he himself had negotiated when bypassed by Annan's arbitrative mediation.

When the UN starts to more actively participate in the mediation process, the UN mediators became more active in their attempts to cease ripe moments for mediation, but also in generating them. The US punctually supported the UN mediation in the attempt to capitalize on these ripe moments by pressuring Turkey into pressuring Denktash into returning to the negotiations table, by endorsing the "Set of Ideas" and by de-escalating the conflict with Holbrook's mediation, one that prepared the ground and defined the strategic course Annan mediation would follow (Coufoudakis 2004, 2-3). However, the US did not support the facilitative and formulative UN strategies used throughout Cuellar's and Ghali's mediation with a directive one that could pressure the parties into abandoning the will to win-over each other and compromise over the Draft Framework Agreements or the "Set of Ideas" in New York. However, the US maintained its policy of intervention only at moments of conflict escalation and failed to perceive that its directive mediation could have been decisive at the most de-escalated moments in conflict, to pressure the parties to take the final step towards an agreement and sign a definite solution that they had for long been discussing, negotiating and compromising over. The interviewees in Cyprus all considered the UN to have been either inapt or impaired to get the Cypriot communities to agree on a settlement, however, some consider that no other actor, especially a state, even if able to be more effective, would be allowed by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to mediate the Cyprus conflict, first because both communities are suspicious of

any other external actor's intentions and, secondly, because neither of them is interested in removing the Cyprus issue from the UN framework.

Making use of increasingly intrusive but non-directive mediation styles, the UN was able to pressure the parties into repeatedly coming back to the negotiations table and to be cooperative with the mediation process, a capacity that stemmed from the organizations' international status and reputation and the consequent need of the parties to project a cooperative image internationally (Richmond b1998, 10, 37-39). However, the fact that the UN's greater interest is in preventing violence and the spread of the conflict made susceptible to criticism and discredit by two Cypriot parties trying to capitalize on internationalization gains and to prevent ripe moment for agreement arrival that could corner them into a definite solution (Richmond a1998 714). By the time the Cypriot parties where gathered to accept the Draft Framework Agreements, or the "Set of Ideas", all main issues had been addressed and agreed on. The agreements' declination is ultimately justified by the raising of new issues. What this suggests is that it is not the agreement itself that prevents the parties into arriving at a solution but the expectation that if they do not settle now, they may be able to achieve a more satisfying mediation outcome in the future (Richmond b1998, 9). This suggests that the agreements are not seen as unfair by the parties and that, therefore, a directive US mediation strategy that could assist UN mediation to pressure the parties into signing the agreement may have had the potential to fully and permanently capitalize on those ripe moments for agreement.

When the Annan initiative takes place, facilitative and formulative strategies had been exhausted between two Cypriot parties with increasing commitment problems and who did not wish to terminate their ongoing dispute in the mediation process. The Cyprus conflict challenged all the mediation initiatives that in it were conducted and the Annan Plan mediation process is one important example of this. Although in the end the Annan Plan was refused by Greek Cypriots, possibly for the fact that a solution was presented to community of its leader's head as indicated by Ker-Lindsay, it is doubtful that a settlement plan could have been devised to try to capitulate on the ripe moment for a solution provided by Cyprus accession to the EU if Kofi Annan had not enjoyed an arbitrative mediator position. In the Annan Plan negotiations the Cypriot leaders, although it can be argued that they were pressured, voluntarily agreed to the mediators' arbitrative role. This strategy, however, may have been flawed by relinquishing the need for the leaders' endorsement to the settlement devised but, it was also curtailed by the EU's de-linkage of Greek Cypriot accession from the settlement, which may have increased

Papadopoulos' perception that a more satisfying settlement could be achieved as Turkish Cypriots grew increasingly isolated.

The Annan mediation was, in the end, a victim of EU's inability to pursue a consistent Cyprus policy and to persist requiring a unification solution as the condition for accession and, consequently, the EU was viewed by the Greek Cypriot leadership as larger international arena were the conflict could continue to be played out (Michael 2007, 599) and in which Greek Cypriots would be empowered and gain advantage not only over Turkish Cypriots but, more importantly, over Turkey by gaining a vote on Turkey's own accession to the EU. Once again, instead on focusing in finding a solution for their conflict, the Cypriot parties, in this case the Greek Cypriots, once again bet on the gains provided by the continued internationalization of the Cyprus problem and, once again, choose to gain advantage over the Turkish Cypriot in order to achieve a more favourable agreement for themselves in the future instead of settling and ending the dispute at that given moment. The UN could have provided for US participation during the Annan Plan negotiations, which could have promoted good relations between Greece and Turkey (Yesilada and Sözen 2002, 279) to deflect Greece's gains in having a sole Greek Cypriot government in the EU that would align with it against Turkey's accession.

5.6 The Impact of Internationalization on the Cyprus Mediation Process

The Cyprus conflict has an international character from the start due to the de-colonization international process that created the Republic of Cyprus. It can also be considered that the birth of the Cypriot state itself was internationalized as it was a product of international conferences and an international agreement (Masunungure and Bazda 2010, 208). Due to the specific character of the Cypriot nationalistic aspirations of union with the "motherlands" coupled with Greece and Turkey's vested strategic interests on the island, these two actors are drawn into the conflict at its early stages. When the first mediation attempts occur in the Cyprus conflict, the conflict has already been internationalized through Greece and Turkey's involvement to support the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot factions. Internationalization already existed in the conflicts' context but it increased with the existence of a peace process, when more international actors, the US and the UN, became involved (Raheem

and Loganathan 2005, 3). Britain was also pushing for the raising of the profile of the conflict to the rank of an international one by mobilizing the US into participating in the conflict management efforts, a burden that Britain was not able or did not wish to take alone or at all (Masunungure and Bazda 2010, 211). The Cyprus conflict becomes internationalized through the peace process when it is sensed and recognized by the international community as being a problem that merits its intervention (Masunungure and Bazda 2010, 210) but internationalization through the conflict had already taken place.

With the internationalization process provoked by UN entrance in the conflict's environment, the parties' international status and recognition became an additional external source of power for the parties to enhance their positions in the negotiations process (Bercovitch and Houston 2000, 179). With the internationalization through the peace process, the two Cypriot parties expect the international community to exert pressure on their opponent. This does not mean that they will not be apprehensive regarding the external involvement as the pressure may fall on them or, on the other hand, that the international involvement may marginalize their role in the conflict management process (Raheem and Loganathan 2005, 6-8). It is the search for this recognition that motivates Greek Cypriot insistence on UN involvement, this perception that the UN as mediator would be more receptive and favourable to the Greek Cypriot position than the US as mediator had shown to be. Greek Cypriots did not wish to be mediated by the UN because it is perceived as a neutral actor but, on the contrary, expected that with UN's involvement they would be able to find support and legitimization of their claims in the international arena (Richmond a1998, 711). The internationalization trough the peace process through the involvement of the UN mediator mostly favoured Greek Cypriots who where ultimately successful in ceasing the gains by having their government recognized as the legitimate one in Cyprus by the UN Security Council, but for the Turkish Cypriots as well, the UN provided a forum to expose and find legitimacy for their cause and recognition for their administration (Richmond a1998, 711). Accepted as a party in the UN mediation process of the Cyprus dispute, the UN is, for Turkish Cypriots, also an agent of legitimization and recognition (Richmond a1998 712).

Internationalization can be the key to explaining the longevity and protractedness of the Cyprus conflict, however, it is the existence of multiple actors and interests in the conflict's context itself that complexify the conflict. Internationalization through the conflict set the conditions for protractedness in the Cyprus conflict and, although the internationalization through

the peace process, brought by mediation, multiplied the panoply of actors involved, it is not in this process that the reasons for the conflict's durability are found. Internationalization through conflict, rather than internationalization through the peace process, has rendered the Cyprus conflict intractable and protracted. It is not the mediation process that prolongs the Cyprus conflict but the characteristics of the conflict itself. The Turkish intervention is one of the factors prolonging the Cyprus conflict due to its transformation of the conflict's context. Opposing interventions from Greece and Turkey exacerbated the conflict and increased its duration (Regan 2002, 71). Changes in the conflict's context, the different levels at which it is played and the characteristics of the parties themselves protract the conflict. It is the conflicts' characteristics that provide for its prolongation through time and not the mediation process.

The EU's involvement in the Cyprus problem further contributed to the internationalization through conflict process. Cyprus membership of the EU was not properly used as a "carrots and sticks" strategy, and could have been decisive if used correctly, but did not do so because the EU failed to hold it as such for both of the Cypriot parties and was a third party biased towards the Greek Cypriots. Had the EU and UN efforts been concerted, the EU could have used its leverage to support the UN's facilitative and formulative mediation and to motivate both parties into the Annan settlement, but the EU never wished to remain a third party and to be involved in the conflict management efforts, impaired by the absence of a common foreign policy, universally upheld by its member-states (Masunungure and Bazda 2010, 226), that would allow it to perform mediation. The rejection of the Annan Plan is the indirect consequence of the change in the conflict's context, which leads to the current impasse and deadlock. With the failure of an "United Republic of Cyprus" to have acceded to the EU, Cyprus has become the crucial issue in Turkey's relations with the EU, who has held penalizing discourse towards Turkey as the invader of an EU member-state (Güney 2004, 38).

Central to the resolution of internationalized intrastate conflicts is "the de-internationalization of the problem and its 'proper' redefinition as a bilateral issue" (Masunungure and Bazda 2010, 211), that is, in the conflict's context, between the two Cypriot communities. Since the internationalization process that elongates and protracts intrastate conflict is the internationalization through the conflict process, this is the significant feature that a conflict management process of internationalized intrastate conflicts must address. The UN worked better at achieving a de-escalation of the internationalization process in the Cyprus dispute by approaching the two communities as the true parties in conflict. However, the internationalization

through the conflict features have not been mitigated, and this has an explanatory value to why the Cyprus problem remains unresolved. Although in the Greek flank, Greece has for long lost its influence upon Greek Cypriot policy-making, in the Turkish flank, Turkey remains as party to the dispute, mainly due to Turkish Cypriot (Greek Cypriot provoked) clientelism and dependence towards Turkey. Enabling the Turkish Cypriot community to be less dependent upon Turkey's economic support is key to eliminating the internationalization through conflict features of the Cyprus problem, and thus for it to be resolved. The US, on the other hand, continues to encourage Turkey's accession to the EU as a means of encouraging Turkish Cypriots into renegotiating a solution, on the basis of a bizonal and bicommunal federation, and to support the UN in finding a resolute solution to the Cyprus problem.

The Cyprus problem is stuck in an "internationalized trap" (Masunungure and Bazda 2010, 229) and is likely to remain so in the future, however, this trap was set in the creation of the Republic of Cyprus, in the conditions and context for conflict, before any conflict management efforts where put in action and mediation initiatives occurred. For the Cyprus conflict to be solved it is necessary that, on the regional level, Greece and Turkey refrain from mixing Cyprus with other issue and including it in the package of historical issues that generate discord between them and using it as a bargaining chip on the international sphere to satisfy their own interests and leave Cyprus to be a country of its own (Nicolet 1999, 104). This conflict's internationalization process needs to be marginalized. The Cypriot parties' perceptions of the conflict and they way in which they frame a solution need to be transformed. Greek Cypriots need to accept that Cyprus must belong to both communities and their demand for the Greek Cypriot 1074 refugees return to their homes to the north be satisfied. Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, need to realize that they cannot indefinitely occupy a large part of the island and their need for security and for not feeling threatened by Greek Cypriot domination must be met (Nicolet 1999, 106-107). Despite the continuing mediation efforts since the 1960s, still no settlement has been achieved between the Cypriot communities. As long as internationalization features allow for each of the communities to hold stakes over the other, the Cyprus problem will remain unsolved. To the question of whether there could still be an united Cyprus, although a renewed political will and a different kind of federation were referred as necessary preconditions, all interviewees in Cyprus gave a positive answer. As long as the Cyprus conflict is perceived to be unsolved by the communities and as long as they still desire a solution, an united Cyprus solution remains possible.

Table 2. **US and UN Mediation Initiatives in the Cyprus Conflict**[23]

Date	Mediator	Individual Mediator	Mediation style	Agreement Proposal	Positions				Result
					Greece	Turkey	Greek Cypriots	Turkish Cypriots	
January 1964	US	George Ball	Directive and Formulative	NATO Plan	Pressed for *enosis.*	Safeguard intervention rights under the Treaty of Guarantee.	-	.-	The NATO Plan failed to materialize when the initial plan was altered to not require Greek Cypriot approval but, instead, required a greater British peacekeeping commitment that the British were unwilling to make.
February- March 1964	US	Dean Acheson	Directive and Formulative	Acheson Plan	Pressed for *enosis* and for mediation to be performed solely by the United Nations.	Protect Turkish Cypriots and Turkish strategic security interests on the island.	-	-	Plan rejected by Greece and Turkey. Turkish military base in Cyprus proposed by the plan was undesirable for Greece, also under pressure from Makarios who was no longer pursuing *enosis* but Greek Cypriot self-determination and independence. Turkey rejected the second version of the plan that limited its possession of the base to a fifty year lease.

[23] In the table presented, the parameter regarding the parties' "positions" selects not necessarily the initial or ending positions but those interests they held that primarily conditioned the mediation's overall result. Also, in the "result" parameter, only the achievements and underachievements of that specific initiative and their implications for the subsequent one are considered, leaving aside context alterations in the conflict itself.

September1964 - March 1965	UN	Galo Plaza	Facilitative and Formulative	Galo Plaza Report	Supported the Greek Cypriot demand for independence and self-determination. Holds that Turkey has no legitimate right on Cyprus but is open for concessions in the event of *enosis.*	Supported Turkish Cypriot demand for a federal state. Willing to make a concession on the percentage of territory being claimed by Turkish Cypriots from 38% to 20%.	Considered the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance void. Demanded an independent unitary state with majority rule and the right to self-determination with the underlying objective of achieving *enosis* with Greece.	Abandoned the demand for *taksim* in favour of a federated state with territorial divide and population transfer, in which the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance would remain valid.	Greek Cypriots accepted Plaza's proposals as a basis for future negotiations but Turkey claimed Plaza went beyond the limits of his mediation mandate when he put forward a settlement proposal in his mediation report. The mediation effort was altogether abandoned by the United Nations.
November 1967	US under UN auspices	Cyrus Vance	Directive and Formulative	Four-point Settlement	Achievement of *enosis* through military and political support of a coup to withdraw Makarios from the Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus.	Greek troops withdrawn from Cyprus accordingly with the Treaty of Alliance, disarmament of civilians and militias, strengthening of UNFICYP's mandate, a mixed-community Cypriot police, compensation and security for Turkish Cypriots	-	-	The Four-point Settlement was accepted after minor alterations. Greece greatly acceded to Turkish demands and Greek forces above the permitted limit set by the Treaty of Alliance were withdrawn from Cyprus. Greece also agreed to assist in rehabilitating and resettling Turkish Cypriots, avoiding military support against Turkey and preventing military aid from being provided to Cypriots by other countries.

August 1968 – 1974	UN	U-Thant	Facilitative	-	-	-	Separate local government would create a "state within the state" and become a new source of friction threatening the Republic's unity.	More flexible towards Makarios' "13 points". Proposed the institutionalization of a self-run municipalities system under limited regulation by the House of Representatives.	Agreement reached on legislative, judiciary and police issues. Local government became the central unagreeable issue due to the parties' suspicion of the others' intent to pursue *taksim* and *enosis.*
April 1975	UN	Kurt Waldheim	Facilitative	-	-	-	Demanded a centralized government.	Demanded increased powers for the two federated states in a weak federal Cypriot State.	Agreement on the reopening of the Nicosia International Airport and on population transfer between the two communal areas was reached. No agreement on territorial demarcation nor on government powers and functions.
January 1977	UN	Kurt Waldheim	Facilitative and Formulative	Four-Point Agreement	-	-	-	-	Breakthrough achieved with agreement on four guidelines for future negotiations: the pursuit of an independent, bi-communal federal republic; territory demarcation discussions to be held in light of economic viability and productivity and ownership; to consider the people's freedom of movement, settlement and property; and to discuss the powers and of the functions of the central federal government.

February 1977	US (Britain and Canada)	Clark Clifford	Directive and Formulative	Twelve-point settlement	-	-	-	-	Greek Cypriots rejected the settlement on the grounds that the three freedoms were not properly protected. The initiative was successful in inciting the parties to formulate their own concrete proposals.
April 1977	UN	Kurt Waldheim	Facilitative	-	-	-	Proposed a Federal Republic with a single indivisible territory containing two separate regions under one constitution.	Proposed a "partnership in power" of two administrations as equal political entities under a federal administration, each with its own constitution.	No agreement reached. Greek Cypriots considered the Turkish constitutional proposal to be that of a confederal system of government and not a federal one. Turkish Cypriots considered the Greek Cypriot territorial proposal was not bi-zonal, providing for a unitary state and not a federal one.
May –July 1979	UN	Kurt Waldheim	Facilitative and Formulative	Ten-Point Agreement	-	-	Argued the Turkish Cypriot offer for Varosha's resettlement would transform it into a Greek Cypriot refugee enclave.	Wanted to negotiate Varosha's resettlement within a "package deal".	Negotiations on territorial and government issues were blocked by absence of agreement on the Varosha resettlement issue.

August 1980 –April 1981	UN	Kurt Waldheim	Facilitative and Formulative	Interim Agreement	-	-	Demanded a standard federation model with sovereignty lying with the central government.	Demanded a confederation of two states with their own sovereignties.	Failure to agree on the interpretation of the term “bi-zonality” blocked the negotiations.
August 1983 - February 1990	UN	Perez de Cuellar	Facilitative and Formulative	Draft Framework Agreement	-	-	Rejected the proposal for not addressing the removal of Turkish forces, the repatriation of Turkish settlers, nor the protection of the three freedoms.	Demanded the concepts of a “separate sovereignty” under a “sovereignty association”. Demanded the recognition of the two communities as political equals.	Greek Cypriots refused to sign the proposal and requested an international conference or high-level meeting to be held for the discussion of international aspects and the three freedoms. A “set of ideas” was proposed to prevent negotiations’ deadlock over the Draft Framework Agreement. Turkish Cypriots demanded political equality recognition as a precondition for further negotiations and called-off the negotiations.

October 1992	UN	Boutros-Ghali	Facilitative and Formulative	Set of Ideas	-	-	Not satisfied with provisions regarding Turkish troops presence and with sovereignty deriving from the communities and not the central state	Accepted 91 out of the 100 "ideas" contained in the proposal during negotiations.	Greek Cypriots accepted the proposal as basis for future negotiations and Turkish Cypriots rejected it.
March 1993	UN	Boutros-Ghali	Facilitative	Confidence Building Measures	-	-	Rejected Turkish Cypriot demands fearing they would symbolize TRNC recognition.	Desired to exclude a part of Varosha from resettlement and demand the lifting of Greek Cypriot airport and seaport embargoes.	Turkish Cypriots refused to continue the talks due to the proximity of the of EU Commission's report issuing on Cyprus' EU accession.
August 1977	US under UN auspices	Richard Holbrooke	Directive	-	Against Cyprus' EU membership without TRNC recognition and its own accession.	Supported Cyprus accession and was against Turkey's candidacy.	Unilateral pursuit of Cyprus' EU accession.	Protested Greek Cypriot unilateral EU membership candidacy. Favoured greater integration with Turkey and refused to enter joint accession negotiations until the TRNC is recognized.	Holbrooke proposed that a settlement for Cyprus be linked to Cyprus' EU accession.

December 1999 –May 2004	UN	Kofi Annan	Facilitative, Formulative and Arbitrative	Annan Plan	-	-	Integration of the TRNC into the existing Republic of Cyprus; one single sovereignty; representation of the Greek Cypriot demographic majority in the executive and legislative powers; right of return to residency and property ownership; international guarantees for the maintenance of the new state of affairs; pro-referendum.	Creation of a new state; layered sovereignty; equal representation in the executive and legislative powers; constituent states with the right to decide on residency establishment; maintain a security guarantee from Turkey through the maintenance of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance; against a referendum.	Proposal for the establishment of "United Cyprus Republic" is rejected by the majority of Greek Cypriots at separate simultaneous referendums in both communities. The Republic of Cyprus enjoys EU membership.

Conclusion

The Cyprus case evidences that mediation is used in the peace processes of the most intractable conflicts. The threat to international security and peace that the conflict poses has been key to the conflict being mediated. Its potential to becoming the epicentre of an interstate war was, thus the motive for both the US and the UN to channel their resources into managing this intense and international insecurity generating conflict and, unlike what is suggested by versatility theory, mediators do not only chose to mediate those conflicts which they believe the adversarial dual game can be more easily transformed into a cooperative triad between mediators and mediated. The fact that mediation occurs in internationalized intrastate disputes, which are characterized by intractability, protractedness and a violent character, that prolong themselves through time in waves of escalation and de-escalation, has been detrimental to the understanding of mediation's utility as an instrument of conflict management because the prolongation of the conflict itself has been pointed out as a product of failed mediation activities. Consequently, mediation has been wrongly pin-pointed as an inadequate tool for managing conflict between the deeply antagonized social groupings, split by ethnic differentiation, as a futile exercise of an unending blame-game which devises inadequate power-sharing short-lived solutions (Fisher 321-323; Kaldor 2000,7).

Mediation is an Adequate Instrument of Intrastate Conflict Management

Intrastate conflicts are often protracted in nature and, especially when they hold an ethnic character, they are fought over issues of survival that are frequently misperceived and misinterpreted by the other party. Mediation is criticized as an instrument of intrastate conflict management due to the ethnic character these often possess, however, this is but one of the many characteristics of this type of conflicts. When the ethnic element is present it becomes necessary that the mediation process addresses those specific needs generated by ethnic-related differentiation and antagonisms, such as the need to improve the parties' relationship and their aggravated security needs produced by mistrustful and demonized visions of each other (Galtung 2007, 14-25). However, the antagonistic relationship and the image and beliefs generated towards "the other" typical of protracted ethnic conflict is not susceptible to be changed by a

game transformation, nor can it be transformed instantly by the mediator. Belief transformation is a slow-evolving and time-consuming process which is helped by the communication channel opened by mediation, but the endurability of these beliefs make disputants inflexible towards the other's demands and often render mediation an alternative mean of continuing the conflict.

The Cypriot communities have developed, each, different social structures that parallel and mimic in physic and territorial reality their perceptions of having separate identities. This ethnic-based separation is impregnated with negative perceptions of each other and demands a greater assistance in the communication aspects of the mediation by the mediator (Bercovitch and Houston 2000, 179). Because survival and self-preservation issues are at stake and are essential to each party, their positions in the bargaining scene are rigid in nature and these parties are caught in "self-defeating processes of antagonism", blaming and attributing negative qualities to the other and polarizing their positions in the mediation process (Fisher 2001, 322). Consequently, the process of concession-making becomes increasingly difficult for the Cypriot parties and call for the need to address the deep fears and basic needs that generate these rigid mistrustful positions which impair and constantly impasse the mediation process (Fisher 2001, 322). When these are not properly addressed, the acceptance of a proposal by one of the sides is susceptible to be seen as suspect or not good enough to the other and when modifications are made the positions reverse. Inexorably, the constant setbacks became additional issues in the Cypriot negotiations and a blame-game was installed and, consequently, the mediation process became itself a source of disputing issues (Fisher 2001, 322).

Although the issue of whether power-sharing arrangements are adequate political solutions for intrastate conflicts is an issue that surpasses the limits and objectives of this work, but one which is closely related to the question of whether partition, with the recognition of the TRNC, could be a solution to the Cyprus problem or not. The evolution of the Cyprus case shows evidence against the adequacy of consociational democracy or of federalism being a feasible solution for intrastate conflict (Nicolet 1999, 109), however, the only power-sharing arrangement that was implemented in Cyprus by the Zurich-London Agreements was shortly lived and its institutions fell even before they had a chance to work. Coupled with the fact that both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots felt that the 1960 Constitution was an imposition from abroad and did not properly address their needs and fears, the 1960 consociational arrangement did not sufficiently accommodate the Cypriot communities' demands and, consequently, their leaders did not feel obliged to deliver on the compromises they made in the signing the Zurich-London

Agreements (Gates and Strom 2007, 1-9). More importantly, Cyprus has been *de facto* partitioned since 1974 and that has neither lead to the conflicts' solution and, on the contrary, provided for its growing intractability and growing insecurity.

Mediation aims, or should aim, at those tangible and negotiable political and economic issues that are the source and the fuel for conflict and insecurity generators and, in the process of doing so through an assisted negotiation, mediation has the potential and the capacity to tone down and contribute to the evaporation of those ethnic-based issues by improving the relationship and reducing the misconceptions and mistrust they generate in the disputing parties. Therefore, in internationalized intrastate conflict management it is especially important that the mediators address the fears disputants are dwelling with and that they can satisfy the disputants' underlying security needs. Mediation processes are, indeed, conducted between the political leaders of each conflicting faction but it is the fact that mediation is occurring that allows for a conducive conflict environment for other *peacemaking* and *peacebuilding* activities to exist at the grass-roots level.

Supporters of idea that mediation should be practiced, because potentially most successful, at the early stages of conflict find that the longer a conflict lasts the less amenable it will be to mediation (Bercovitch et al. 1991, 22). They suggest that mediation is not an adequate tool for managing protracted conflicts when, in fact, it is not that conflict management in general and mediation in particular are never-ending tasks in intrastate conflict contexts, but that this type of conflict has, itself, self-perpetuating escalatory dynamics that demand conflict management and mediation processes to prolong themselves through time. In the Cyprus case, the mediation process has prolonged itself through decades because it has been frustrated and derailed by changes in the conflicts' context. The Turkish intervention of 1974 and the Greek Cypriot accession to the EU changes the conflict's dynamics and, consequently, the mediation context itself. The changing dynamics have forced the mediation process to adapt to new bargaining scenes, when the Cypriot parties' power-positions *vis-à-vis* one another are altered by the changes in the conflict's context. Consequently, previously agreed issues are brought back to the mediation table and the negotiation process recedes to square one, to the renegotiation of the Cypriot parties' initial positions in light of the new power-balance reality. Fisher (2001, 322) argues that as mediation becomes protracted, the conflict becomes intractable, but it is not the mediation process that confers intractability to a conflict. On the contrary, as the conflict becomes intractable, mediation becomes protracted.

It is true that the conflicts' internationalization contributes to the parties' continuing to view the conflict through an "adversarial lens" (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993, 347) by offering new opportunities for ethnic-antagonized parties with zero-sum perceptions of their conflicting issues to maximize their positions *vis-à-vis* the other. The Cypriot parties utilized the internationalization of the conflict through the UN as a means to publicizing their positions and gaining international support for their causes and with this trying to alter unfavourable *status quos* (Coufoudakis 1976, 466). However, these interests held by the Cypriot parties allowed for the UN to mediate the dispute and for the needed level of pacification to exist in the conflicts context that would allow for a favourable mediation environment.

To devise a settlement between two highly antagonized ethnic groups is a hard, complex and time-consuming endeavour, however, UN and US mediating assistance has been crucial to the Cyprus conflict becoming less critical, dangerous and deadly. The fact that it is a misconception that a conflict is resolved once an agreement is reached is an argument presented against the use of mediation in these types of conflicts, however, what this argument fails to recognize is that, although mediation exists and proceeds in helping the parties to achieve and agreement, its achievements far surpass that guiding objective of arriving at a settlement.

Outcome-oriented views fail to consider the effect and achievements made in mediations' process, its impact on the parties' demands and preferences and the improvement of previously violence-prone relationships. Mediation allows the parties to view beyond their indivisibility perceptions and identify common interests and flexibilize their positions and demands. This has been the case for both Cypriot parties, who abandon their *enosis* and *taksim* demand and substitute them by less-exclusive ones and more compatible goals, into to the demand of an united state to that of a federal solution, even though differing interpretations have lead to other incompatibilities (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993, 347-348). Solution-oriented visions fail to acknowledge the full range of mediation successes. The Cyprus mediation process is often referred to as a failed mediation process but, although a solution is yet to be arrived at and the mediation process itself could have been more expedite in fully capitalizing on ripe moments, it cannot be said that the mediation process has accomplished nothing. Mediation has provided for the necessary environment for *peacebuilding* tasks to take place, such as reconstruction and intercommunal activities and the continuation and diversification of these tasks is increasingly more important to maintain and continue to stimulate intercommunal contact that can lower Cypriots' fears and renew their hopes.

Mediation is a dynamic and interactive process of conflict management. Conflict situations have highly variable contexts, in which the parties' characteristics, their perceptions, goals and positions respond to alterations in the disputes evolution, to which mediation's adaptative character renders it a valuable conflict management instrument (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004, 154, 166). Mediation provides disputants in conflict a voluntary, non-coercive and "nonthreatening form of transforming, de-escalating, or settling such conflicts" (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004, 153-154). In a context of hostility and violence, where the conflict needs to be transformed to be solved, mediation is a useful mechanism.

Internationalization Motivates Disputants to be Mediated

When the conflict's context, primordially the parties' perceptions and relationship, has to endure a greater transformation process in order to be solved or for peace to be established, the conflict management process will naturally be more time-consuming. The Cypriot parties were *softened up* to the extent of not desiring to continue their conflict and wishing to be mediated but this attitudinal change from continuing conflict to agreeing to negotiate under mediation does not include a transformation in the disputants adversarial and antagonistic relationship. The Cypriot communities became receptive to mediation as a way of achieving their goals through other means, as an alternative to the militarized conflict option, being that their acceptance of mediation as an instrument to manage their conflict was purely strategic and seen as the option that could allow them to acquire a better outcome for themselves compared to continued fighting. Because in intrastate conflict the parties are more antagonized and do not necessarily engage in mediation with the purpose of resolving their conflict, a mediator needs to be empowered to get the parties to cooperate and not allow them to control it in order to achieve the victory, they could not achieve over their opponent through military conflict, through the diplomatic route.

When the parties' interest in a mediation process is not on finding a compromise solution for their conflict they are, however, aware of the need to be seen as being cooperative. The presence of the mediator will, in fact, stimulate and morally press the parties to be cooperative and they will, in fact, cooperate but, when the time comes for compromises to be made, they hinder or defect the mediation process to prevent it from arriving at a settlement. This has been the typical behaviour of the Cypriot parties throughout the mediation process, where the party

that found itself on a superior relative power position *vis-à-vis* the other party refrained from entering into agreement (Richmond b1998 XV).

Internationalization through the peace process is, despite the negative impact it can have on a mediation process, a motivation for the parties to choose peace and stop fighting. Internationalization allows for international funds to be allocated for post-conflict relief and reconstruction and for economical and societal recovery to begin which, in turn, will generate a more conducive environment for mediation to occur (Raheem and Loganathan 2005, 4). When the two types of internationalization, through the conflict and through the peace process are not properly recognized, the confusion between the two leads into internationalization through the peace process features being perceived as provoked by the peace process. In result, because a mediation process inadvertedly and unavoidably leads to intrastate conflict internationalization, it is considered as the key to a conflicts' prolongation and the difficulty-generator in reaching a resolution when, in fact, those conditions already existed in the conflict due to the internationalization through the conflict process. Naturally, mediation allows for the conflict to continue at a diplomatic sphere but this, in fact, motivates disputants to accept to be mediated, as it did for the Cypriot communities. Furthermore, when the alternative is for conflict to violently continue on the ground, whether mediation prolongs conflict, because it continues to exists at the diplomatic level, becomes a non-issue.

States are Effective in the Short-term and IO's are Effective in the Long-term

In internationalized intrastate conflicts mediators have to react to the parties' use of external power sources to retain and strengthen their position and their control over the conflict management process. When the parties hold "devious objectives", that is, when the parties hold other objectives in the mediation process rather than finding a solution to their conflict, a "third party" must act immediately to avoid that the negotiations to remain futile (Richmond a1998 721). For this purpose, a mediator's action may call for the need for facilitative assistance or a more intrusive and directive form of intervention (Bercovitch and Houston 2000, 196), whichever will be most effective in deflecting the parties' focus on improving their positions *vis-à-vis* the other which, in turn, deflects their intentions from the true purpose of being part of a mediation process of cooperatively negotiating a solution with the other and ending their conflict. Different mediation styles will naturally be more useful and effective at different stages a conflict's

escalation or de-escalation progresses (Fisher and Keashly 1991, 36). While facilitative strategies are increasingly needed to open up or maintain communication between the parties, as the conflict escalates into the segregation and destruction stages, facilitative strategies alone may not suffice to de-escalate the conflict and a directive strategy is needed. Formulative strategies will also be ineffective at the higher escalation stages but can only be effective when the parties are willing to communicate and cooperate with each other.

Whether a state or an international organization, an actors' involvement in a conflict for mediation purposes and, thus, for conflict management and peace establishment, provides them an opportunity to pursue their own aims. The UN and the US have different and, sometimes, opposing visions of the Cyprus conflict, of who the protagonists are, of how to approach them in the mediation process and differing outcome preferences regarding a permanent solution. For the UN, the outcome preference is that which is seen to devise a more stable and potentially permanent solution for the intercommunal conflict between the two Cypriot communities, while the US pursues the mediation outcome that better serves its strategic interests and that, naturally, involves devising a solution at the periphery of the conflict, at the regional and international level, involving Greece and Turkey.

As suggested by versatility theory, the US performs a cost/benefit evaluation of mediating the Cyprus conflict, one that has determined the degree of its involvement in the mediation process and its choice of mediation style. When the US uses directive style mediation, using benefits and punishments to push the Cypriot parties into agreement, it does not become a third party to the Cypriot conflict. The US is a biased mediator, one that benefits or threats either the Greek or the Turkish flank to push for the parties to agree along its own interests and outcome preference, which are mainly concerned in satisfying Turkey's interests. Contrary to the Cypriot conflict's third parties, Greece and Turkey, the US does not become involved in the Cyprus conflict to support one of the disputing Cypriot communities but to offer support to all disputants in their conflict management efforts, even if conducting such a task in the manner that could best benefit its own interests. The US is a mediator in the Cyprus conflict because, first, it was voluntarily accepted by all the disputing parties as such and, secondly, because it intervenes in the Cyprus conflict, non-coercively, with the specific task of mediating the dispute in order to manage or solve the conflict.

The UN, on the other hand, a neutral mediator performing the least intrusive mediation styles has been more successful in resolving the parties' commitment problems, in reducing the

mistrust and misconceptions and fostering the trust that gradually allowed the parties to make commitments that culminate in the creation of the Annan Plan. In a long-term perspective, the UN has been effective in reducing conflict tension by keeping the parties at the negotiating table to such an extent that violent conflict has not re-occurred for more than three decades now and the Cypriot parties continue to be committed to the UN mediation process. However, if the UN has been successful in reducing tensions and generating commitment in the long-run, its mediation initiatives were often ineffective because impaired by the organizations' lack of capacity to induce compromises between the antagonistic and self-interest driven Cypriot parties which, inclusively, target the UN mediation itself whenever it is not perceived as satisfyingly corresponding to their interests.

A broad understanding of the concept of mediation is particularly needed for neutral and less powerful and resourced mediators, such as the UN, in complex intrastate conflicts where the parties are typically less likely to have a cooperative behaviour and stick to their adversarial stances. Because IO's mediation is limited to the use of less intrusive mediation styles and, therefore, have to rely on the parties cooperative behaviour (Smith 1994, 447), in mediating conflicts between parties with adversarial relationships, they need to be empowered in order not to completely lose control over the mediation process and have the mediation process and the mediator's legitimacy undermined by the parties' interests. This was the case in Plaza's UN mediation initiative and an occurrence which disempowered the UN and made mediation fail in a moment that could have been ripe for settlement, early in the conflict, before it became protracted.

Plaza was confused with an arbitrator because arbitrage does not fall outside the mediation spectrum. Bringing arbitrage into the mediation spectrum by distinguishing between binding and non-binding mediation and setting its rules and limits eliminates the possibility of this argument being used by parties against a mediator for their convenience. A holistic view of mediation and mediator empowerment is especially important and needed in protracted conflicts, such as intrastate conflicts tend to be, therefore, mediation should not be considered such a distant reality from that of arbitration. Mediation only comes into being if the parties are willing to enrol in it, whether for the "right" reason (solving their conflict) or not (continuing their conflict by diplomatic means), without this pre-condition mediation does not exist, but what is important is not to allow the parties to control the mediation process on behalf of their own interests and to create a sense of commitment to finding a solution when they request or accept to be mediated.

What is said here is not that mediation should be binding, but only that approximating the two realities by including them in the same conceptual group by considering arbitration a type of mediation eliminates the conceptual confusion that allowed for mediation itself to become an issue in the Cyprus mediation process and cause the only official UN mediation initiative to be altogether abandoned. To not be able to use this argument as an "escape goat" and way to not being seen as uncooperative towards the mediation process will enforce parties focussed on attaining advantage over the other through the internationalization to commit to finding a solution to their conflict. To set the limit to the practice of mediation in the practice of arbitration, viewing these processes as two distant realities, was limitative to mediation practice in Cyprus.

The concept of mediation as a process in which the result is non-binding allowed for the Plaza mediation to be derailed by Turkish accusations when, in fact, Plaza had not performed arbitrative mediation and had, at most, performed a low-intrusive formulative mediation. On the other hand, Kofi Annan did perform arbitrative mediation when filling in the gaps left by unagreed issues by the Cyprus parties in the creation of the Annan Plan, which's refusal had not allowed for the Greek Cypriots to attain EU citizenship, perhaps would have provided for a definite settlement and a final solution to the Cyprus conflict. Mediation, therefore, can, and was, practiced by the UN in Cyprus in an arbitrative style and the misconception that mediation and arbitration are separate conflict management instruments has, in fact, been hurtful to UN's mediation efforts. Secondly, this arbitrative, alongside facilitative and formulative style UN mediation, was performed under the good offices framework, thus, contradicting the notion that good offices is not a form of mediation and, also, that the good offices practice is limited to the "go-between" and "information channel" tasks of least intrusive facilitative style mediation strategies. Through the good offices framework, UN participation as a third party in the Cyprus peace process, not only remained acceptable to the disputing parties but also, through it, the organization was able to continue to perform mediation. Under the good offices framework, UN mediators were consultants and conciliators and, thus, the provision of goof offices consisted not only in a low intrusive "third party" activity but included the performance of the wide spectrum of mediation styles. Even if such UN mediation practice through the good offices framework in the Cyprus case was an exception, real practice exceptions must also be contemplated by theory.

After the Galo Plaza event, the UN was forced to act in an ad-hoc mediatory capacity (Coufoudakis 1976, 467), one that it was able to recuperate over time. However, the UN's mediatory capacity and effectiveness was not only impaired by the parties in conflict but also by

US attitude and deferring outcome preferences toward the Cyprus conflict. Being that UN involvement was the least preferred alternative for the US for the Cyprus peace process, the US fails to provide the UN mediators with the necessary moral and political support, most importantly, at ripe moments for agreement (Coufoudakis 1976, 467).

The prolongation of the mediation process has been detrimental to the mediation efforts themselves. The overall mediation process in Cyprus, and UN mediation in particular, was undermined, at the conflict context, by the actions taken independently by both the disputants and the third parties and, at the mediation context, by US interests in the Cyprus dispute, which altogether has contributed to a "pacific perpetuation" (Coufoudakis 1976, 472) of the dispute. Mediation has not been conducted to its full conflict-solving potential but this was not the cause to conflict intractability and rather must be understood as the mediation process was not able to ideally respond to the changes in the conflict's context by not ceasing ripe moments for agreement.

Recommendation on the Use of Multiparty Mediation in Intrastate Conflict

What the present analysis of the Cyprus case suggests is that the best overall mediation strategy for intrastate internationalized conflict is the capitalization of the mediation capacity of multiple actors: of a neutral mediator's capacity to execute less intrusive mediation styles, being that it will be more effective in transforming and improving the parties' relationship; and of a powerful mediator with the capacity to push parties with unrelenting interests in winning over the other and aiming at gaining an advantage through the internationalization through the peace process, to choose to agree at ripe moments for settlement, that is, to execute a directive mediation that will remove the comparative advantage of continuing to try to gain advantage over the other generated by the internationalization process vis-à-vis celebrating an agreement now. Whereas on the first stages of mediation it was the reliance on directive mediation by the US between deeply antagonized parties whose relationship would not, and did not, allow for serious commitments to be made that undermined mediation effectiveness, from then on the Cyprus mediation process suffers from the reliance on the non-directive, or less-intrusive, strategies performed by the UN and the overall lack of matching and sequencing of the different mediation approaches, styles and strategies (Fisher and Keashly 1991, 41).

When mediation involves multiple actors, their initiatives become uncoordinated when they pursue different, and possibly competing, interests and therefore have different, and possibly competing, perspectives on what the mediation outcome or the conflicts' solution should be, which affects their capacity to cooperate and coordinate their mediation initiatives. Alongside the UN's and the US' different outcome preferences, what was also detrimental to the Cyprus mediators acting in a multiparty mediation dynamic, was the US intermittent participation and inconsistent mediation style, which has varied throughout the Cyprus conflict's evolution. At the early stages of conflict, and until the end of the Cold War, the US is motivated to mediate for concerns on how the instability in Cyprus could affect its strategic national interests and, therefore had a greater willingness to intervene. Changes in both international historical circumstances and domestic ones, such as changes in the political leadership, throughout the conflict's duration have been determinant to US intervention in Cyprus. Consequently, changes in the American perception of the risk involved in intervening or of the threat posed by the conflict (Regan 2000, 91) have impacted on the US choice in mediation style. A state, or a state leader, may perceive itself as being more or less politically, economically, diplomatically resourced at a given time and, in result, as it has been the case for US mediation in the Cyprus conflict, a state mediator, especially when performing a directive mediation style, will have the tendency to not being consistent, which will be detrimental in long-term mediation processes.

The Cyprus case suggests that, given the specific characteristics and complexities of intrastate conflicts, what is preferable is that the mediators act together and, when doing so, that they take full advantage of their different mediation capacities and, therefore, of the mediation style they are better resourced to perform. In the Cyprus case the two mediators did not always perceive the complimentary potential of their mediation styles (Fisher and Keashly 1991, 40). The mix of facilitative and formulative UN strategies with US directive ones could have been the key to the Cyprus' problem solution. When this mix occurs the mediation process is constructive but, when the UN opts to perform more intrusive formulative strategies, the US fades into the background. The US has a significant deterrence and de-escalation value and potential in the Cyprus conflict and, although the US perception of this capacity, or of the costs of putting it to use, has fluctuated, it did not cease to exist in the conflicts' context and could have been used more consistently over-time. In the absence of the directive US capacity, the neutral UN mediator struggled to prevent the parties from controlling the mediation process and, in fact, was

incapable of preventing its first and only official mediation initiative from being undermined by the parties.

For multiparty mediation to be effective, the directive mediator must be present and willing to act whenever internationalized intrastate conflict parties in a mediation process are unwilling to commit to an agreement, not because this agreement does not satisfy their interests and their needs, but because they perceive the internationalization process can offer them advantages over the other and that with them they can achieve a more favourable settlement deal latter. Equally, for the mediation process to arrive at this ripe moment for agreement, it is necessary that the neutral mediator be capable of improving the antagonistic parties' relationship and to generate the necessary previous compromises that allow for the creation of the agreement proposal. As much as the directive mediator needs to fully capitalize on its capacity to leverage the parties when opportunity to push those parties to settle arrives, so does the neutral mediator need to be capable of capitalizing on least intrusive strategies' potential to affect the parties' relationship and, to this aim, not to be susceptible to the parties' control and manipulation over the mediation process (Croker et al. 30-33, 40-42).

Advocates of *pure* and *muscled* mediation are both right in the reasons that make both these types of mediation performance important, however, they fail to see that they are complementary and that directive mediation's positive impact on the probability of success of a mediation process (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004, 162) can and should be used to complement *pure* mediation's capacity to alter the parties' relationship, to generate trust through the use of reasoning and persuasion and the conception of alternatives to their antagonistic aims.

A Holistic Approach for an Empowered Mediation in Intrastate Conflict

UN mediation in the Cyprus conflict demonstrates that there is a gap between how mediation theory has been conceptualized and on how mediation occurs in reality, a gap that has been detrimental to the UN's mediation performance. In mediation situations where parties are not fully engaged in the cooperative search for a solution to their conflict, the mediation is susceptible to being targeted, whether because either the parties feel it is not corresponding to their self-interest-based expectations or because they wish to prevent settlement-arrival in the hope of achieving a better mediation outcome for themselves. A restrict notion of the concept of mediation limits the scope of a mediators' activity and makes the mediation process more

susceptible to successfully being targeted by the persistently antagonistic parties in internationalized intrastate disputes. Mediation does not need to be a powerless act and, on the contrary, can be most effective as an intrastate conflict management instrument when mediators become empowered and more capable of impacting on and transforming the conflicts' context. A holistic perspective of mediation legitimizes neutral mediators in their practice and allows them to retain control over the mediation process and not be so susceptible to parties' relinquishing control over it from them.

It is not the choice for mediation as a conflict management instrument which prolongs the conflict but the conflicts' prolongation itself that elongates the mediation process. This is not to say that mediation itself is sufficient a conflict management tool for intrastate conflict but that it plays a decisive role in allowing for other conflict management instruments to be practiced. Although mediation has been criticized for being state-oriented and for allowing for the leaders' positions to be taken as the whole people's opinions and goals, it is the de-escalation in the adversarial relationship of the political elites that allows for reconciliation strategies to be devised and promoted at the grass-roots level to reduce demonization and stereotyping between the conflicting communities.

Short-term, outcome-oriented, perspectives consider mediation is inadequate for intrastate conflict management fail to consider mediations' capacity to reduce the likelihood of conflict re-escalation and to encourage the parties to recognize each-other's needs and transform their adversarial relationship into a mutually beneficial cooperative one. Although mediation may not be effective in the production of definite settlements in internationalized intrastate conflicts, it has a wide capacity for tension reduction and crises abatement and for the preservation of a peaceful coexistence between the parties which is crucial for *peacekeeping* and *peacebuilding* effectiveness and is, therefore, not only adequate but a crucial conflict management and *peacemaking* instrument in internationalized intrastate conflict.

Even though the internationalization through the peace process generated by the presence of international mediation in a conflict context does have the detrimental effect of clutching the parties to their rigid initial positions, since they focus on gaining advantage over their opponent through the conflict's internationalization instead on concentrating in cooperatively finding an agreement, the interest they hold in the internationalization itself has the positive effect of making the parties receptive to being mediated and obliges them to assume a cooperative behaviour and, this allows for the mediation process to exist and act on the improvement of the

conflict's context and the parties' relationship. The interest in the internationalization is counterproductive to the mediation process and does limit its capacity to get the parties to commit to a settlement and permanently end their conflict and, due to this fact, the mediation process tends to be difficult and time-consuming. However, it is not the prolongation of the mediation process that renders an internationalized intrastate conflict intractable and protracted, the foundations for this lay not on the mediation's failures but on the characteristics of the conflict itself. Because an intrastate conflict does not confine itself to the borders of the state where it emerges, an intrastate conflict is already an internationalized one when mediation occurs. Mediation is, naturally, dependent on the context where it takes place and the shifting in its conditions alters the parties positions in the negotiations bargaining game, which complexify, stalemate or demise mediation initiatives which is forced to recede to the discussion of already agreed issues that either parties feel to be now in a better position to renegotiate and extract greater concessions from the other. It is, thus, the conflict's context that is protracted and not mediation that protracts it.

A holistic perspective of the mediation spectrum is needed to prevent parties from turning the conduct of the mediation process itself a conflicting issue and from targeting the mediators' performance as a way of derailing a mediation that is not corresponding to their self-interested goals because it is, naturally, searching for a middle ground between the two parties' positions or as a strategy to prevent the arrival at a settlement while protecting their cooperative image. A state actor performing biased or directive mediation does not become a third party in the conflict because neither impartiality nor neutrality are necessary preconditions for mediation. A third party is one that enters the conflict to support either the disputants, while a mediator is one who does so for the purpose of helping the parties to manage of resolve their conflict, even if it does so by favouring one of the parties because he pursues his own outcome preference and, in doing so, leverages either of them by offering benefits or punishments. In the mediation of internationalized intrastate conflicts the cooperative and concerted multiparty mediation between this resourced state' directive capacity and an international organization that has the reputation and legitimacy to, through a neutral mediation performance, transform and improve the parties' relationship and to pacify the conflict's context is the most conducive to mediation effectiveness. Acting concertedly, the two mediators will be more capable of capitalizing on their mediating capacities. The states' directive mediation can be used to leverage the self-interest focused

parties of these types of conflict into committing themselves to definite settlement instead of continuing to gain advantage over the other in the international diplomatic arena.

The directive mediator would ideally be able to remove the incentive to the parties have in continuing their dispute through the diplomatic route by providing incentives of punishment in accepting an agreement now and ending their dispute. However, in order for the settlement that would be arrived at to constitute a permanent solution and not only a compromise that the parties are forced to make at that moment but that they will not comply with in the future and, therefore, generate a conflict re-escalation, it is necessary that the neutral international organization improves the parties' relationship and generates sufficient trust between them that they believe the other will not defect and will stick to what they have agreed. An international organization will benefit from the state directive to de-escalate the conflict in moments were re-escalation threats the re-occurrence of violent confrontation, as well as, the directive strategies performed by the state will also be decisive in pressuring parties, who refuse to commit to a definite settlement not because it is unfair but because they are stuck in the perspective of achieving a better outcome for themselves in the future, into committing themselves to an agreement. Overall, the best mediation performance is that which is able to capitalize on a states' directive mediation short-term achievements together with an international organizations' non-directive mediation long-term and conflict pacifying ones.

To avoid the parties from detracting, stalemating or derailing the mediation process it is needed that the neutral mediator is empowered to not lose control of the mediation process and to more effectively generating a truly trustful and cooperative relationship between the parties and the needed long-term commitment to what they will agree. Even if the UN's mediation initiatives were not successful in generating a settlement between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, through them the organization was able to assure the survival of the peace process and to allow for a peaceful coexistence between the two communities on the island. Cyprus is no longer referred to a *conflict* but rather as a *problem* because, even in the absence of a settlement, both negative and positive peace exists on the island. Mediation has not failed in generating a peaceful coexistence between the Cypriot communities and, thus, allowed for the UNFICYP's success in keeping peace and for international UN and EU funds to be channelled for reconstruction of battle sites and other *peacebuilding* communal contact stimulating tasks to be performed.

A holistic perspective allows mediation theory to better mirror reality by considering and recognizing the increasingly various forms and styles in which mediation practiced in reality and through it empowering neutral mediators, such as the UN, in their *peacemaking* efforts, capacity and effectiveness to manage internationalized intrastate conflicts while, at the same time, generating responsibility in other international actors, especially states, to support UN mediation efforts in such conflicts. Only by holistically recognizing and conceptualizing mediation practice, its initiation, process and outcome determinants can its potential as a conflict management instrument be fully recognized and appreciated.

Future Prospects

With the attainment of EU membership, Greek Cypriots can no longer be allured by socio-economic benefits, as well as, have now a lower incentive to relinquish and share their exclusive sovereignty (Michael 2007, 591). However, common interests and mutual benefits from a settlement still exist and can be shared by the two communities but, towards its attainment, the change in the external/regional environment is key to the Cyprus problem, that is, changing the relationship between Greece and Turkey in order for a positive congruence of the internal a external dimensions of the Cyprus problem to exist and allow relaxation in the communities relationship and generate a proactive negotiations process (Michael 2007, 590). The "EU-ization" (Michael 2007, 601) of the Cyprus problem has, nonetheless, had a positive impact by providing economic and security incentives that have facilitated coexistence and opened up interaction on the island allowing for the opening up of the crossing points. This has also the positive effect at the grassroots level by making Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot citizens less susceptible to their political leaderships' political preferences while, at the same time, the EU offers them an alternative source of identity either then their ethno-nationalistic ones. However, even if not part of the EU, it was important that the Turkish Cypriot community would still be represented in the EU institutions as a part of the Cyprus delegation (Michael 2007, 601). This would be an important step that would be able to capitalize on an opportunity for the two communities' reaproachment and, also, a political interaction experience and is, perhaps, a solution that must be hastened and found before the Cypriot presidency comes into being in 2012. Otherwise, the Cyprus problems will continue entangled in Turkey's accession and continue stalemated for much longer (Michael 2007, 603).

The slow but increasing direct contact provided by the opening up of crossing points and intercommunal activities stimulated by the UN, EU and non-governmental organizations have contributed to demystification of the communities' perceptions of each other and paved the way for a growing trustful relationship to emerge between the Cypriot communities (Hadjipavlou 2007, 363). The Cypriot communities themselves have, in a survey conducted in 2007 (Lordos 2008, 256-257), indicated that they do not consider their ethnic nationalisms as being the cause for the Cyprus problem as well as they feel their security needs are the ones that most in need of satisfaction what suggests that there is space in the Cypriot societies for "Cypriotism" to emerge with the demise of the past nationalistic ideals that has been taken place in an increasingly more open and informed Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot civil societies that are increasingly demanding of political leaderships that are more sensitive to their renewed perspectives to which the introduction of European Union values can be even more beneficial (Hadjipavlou 2007, 362-364). In communal terms, the conflict appears to no longer exist, or to not having the potential to be has pervasive as it once was, that is why the Cyprus problem is also not a conflict anymore as it seems to no longer exist in the daily-lives of the Cypriot communities, except for the existence of the Green Line, but one that increasingly does not make sense to two differently but growingly "europeanized" communities. The Cyprus conflict appears today as being one carried by political leadership, one that is executed by the foreign policies of all intervenient and that has the EU as its major stage and conflicting issues source. Nicosia, as can be read on a outdoor sign placed at the entrance of the Lydras Street crossing point, is "the last divided capital" in the world and that is either positively appreciated by Greek Cypriots nor Turkish Cypriots.

International peace is today a more universally accepted goal for the international community than it has ever been at any time in history and the resolution of political conflicts that today represent the greatest threat to human rights and security throughout the world more urgent than ever. Internationalized intrastate disputes are naturally complex and tend to become intractable and protracted conflicts that are difficult to manage but like other conflicts, these too can be de-escalated and made less violent and opportunities for agreement created, all tasks for which mediation has proven to be an adequate tool (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004, 166). With both the UN more active post-Cold War role in conflict management and the promotion of human security through humanitarian interventions and the "responsibility to protect" doctrine, intervention in intrastate conflict is a growing trend, therefore, intrastate conflicts have been

internationalized disputes and will continue to be so in the future (Raheem and Loganathan 2005, 2).

At the time of writing, democratic revolutions have been taking place in Tunisia and Egypt and, in Syria and Yemen, and through the Middle East, civilians have unrelentingly been demonstrating against their dictatorial regimes. Civil combatants supported by NATO forces have the thrown Gaddafi off power in Libya and whether, in Libya or in the other countries, the transition into democratic regimes will be, or continue to be, peaceful still remains to be seen. Ongoing intrastate disputes in Africa continue to demand UN peace efforts and the Arab revolutions have the potential of also demanding so in the future. As the intrastate conflict phenomenon will potentially continue to represent a major threat to peace, UN's *peacemaking* efforts and its role as an international peace and security promoter and provider will remain crucial.

The UN's empowerment as a mediator is ever more important as mediated parties continue to attempt to use internationalization to gain advantage over the other party, as the Palestinians have recently done so by unilaterally applying for UN membership and as totalitarian regimes governing multinational societies' transition to democracy. Being that intrastate conflict will continue to exist, as it has been from in the past, the use of mediation as an intrastate conflict management instrument will also continue to grown, and rightfully so. Mediation is a crucial *peacemaking* instrument*,* in particular, and of conflict management, in general. The UN's *peacemaker* and mediator roles are ever increasingly important tasks to be performed by the Organization in the contemporary world and for it to be able to perform them more effectively in the specifically intractable intrastate conflict contexts becomes fundamental. Mediation is an adequate intrastate conflict management tool and has the potential of being an effective intrastate conflict resolution one and, therefore, is a fundamental instrument for the establishment of a more peaceful world order in the contemporary world.

Research Limits and Further Investigation

"A single case-study cannot produce absolute insights" (Richmond (2) 1998 xxviii), however, even though the analysis made here is of one single conflict case, the Cyprus conflict is broad case in its many specificities. The Cyprus conflict and mediation process has a wide timeframe, has been one where mediation has been performed by more than one mediator and

where mediation has cover a wide panoply of styles and strategies, which allows for an unique analysis of the two main mediation performers in the international system, a state and an international organization, while at the same time, allowing for the analysis of all possible mediation styles in a single case. To enforce the validity of the arguments and conclusions made here further investigation on the existence of other cases where arbitrative mediation has been used and on how the multiparty perspective of mediation performance, by a state and an international organization, could have been beneficial in other intrastate conflict mediation processes. Because mediation in its arbitrative form does not have the capacity, nor is that its aim, to affect the parties in conflict or the conflict's context, mediation in its non-binding form is more versatile and adaptive and can better respond to highly variable intrastate conflict contexts. Further investigation could also be made on the capacity of the various mediation styles defined in the holistic theoretical proposition made here to transform the conflicts' context and the parties' relationship, to also ascertain when and how each mediation style can be used on different conflict stages to capitalize and maximize the transformative potential of each mediator and each mediation style to transform, pacify and, consequently, manage or resolve intrastate conflict.

Annexes

Appendix 1: Timeline of Conflict and Mediation Events in Cyprus




Unilateral declaration of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus"
UN proposes the "Draft Framework Agreement"
1985
Turkey applies for EU membership
George Vassiliou is elected President by the Greek Cypriot community
The Davos no-war declaration is signed by Greece and Turkey
1990
Greek Cypriots apply for Cyprus' EU membership
Turkey and the TRNC establish a Customs Union
Security Council res. 649 calls on the Cypriot leaders to "cooperate on equal footing"
UN proposes the "Set of Ideas" 1992
Glafcos Clerides is elected President by the Greek Cypriot community
Cyprus is found eligible for EU membership
Customs union between Turkey and the EU is vetoed by Greece
Turkey and the TRNC sign a joint declaration to only join the EU if simultaneously
UN proposes the "Confidence Building Measures"
1995
Russian weapons sale crisis
US Holbrook initiative
The Annan Plan negotiations begin
2000
Cyprus becomes a EU member-state, but only the Greek Cypriot-administered Republic of Cyprus enjoys membership
Proposal for the creation of the "United Republic of Cyprus" is rejected by Greek Cypriots in separate and simultaneous referenda.
2005

Appendix 2: Interview Script

Group 1: Questions on the Cyprus Conflict's Internationalization

a) While under British rule the two Cypriot communities, although separately, lived peacefully together. What do you think was the main trigger for conflict and what part do you think the British played in it, if any?
b) Did the consociacionalist approach led by the British further alienate the two communities? What could have been done differently at the time?
c) The Cyprus *problem* is more problem of identity or a power dispute?
d) Do you think the identity element of the dispute is a permanent condition or one that will evaporate over time?
e) How would you best describe the Cypriot problem?

- A crisis of interest between two communities;
- The continuation of an historical mistrust between two countries, Greece and Turkey;
- The epicenter of an international crisis of interests.

Group 2: Questions on the Mediation Process

f) The mediating efforts throughout the 50 years of conflict by the United Nations have been referred to as an "exercise in futility". How do you feel about this comment?
g) Do you find mediation an appropriate tool for addressing ethnic conflict?
h) Do you think there was an honest will of finding a common ground for agreement when the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots accepted to be mediated by the United Nations? Or was the interest in acquiring international supporters for each cause a stronger impetus for mediation?
i) Was the fact that the Cyprus *problem* had become an international *problem* beneficial to prospects of agreement?
j) Do you think the UN is to blame for the fact that all the agreements it proposed failed to be implemented? Or should only the two communities be held responsible for not supporting the agreements?

k) What do you think was the major fault in the mediation strategies used in Cyprus:

- improving relationship and communication;
- creating favorable environments for negotiation;
- the system of rewards and punishment towards agreement?

l) Was the UN always seen as an impartial third-party by the Turkish Cypriots? Or do you think it tended to favor the Greek side at some point?

m) Do you think that a greater involvement of the United States in the mediating efforts of the UN could have been beneficial by, for example, using its power of influence over Greece and Turkey to pressure the two Cypriot communities into agreement?

n) Could the US have substituted the UN as mediator at some point, although the US also failed at their mediation attempts?

o) Can it be said that the US and the European Union, while pursuing the same objective (the resolution of the conflict) ended up unadvertedly sabotaging the UN's mediating efforts?

p) Do you think the lack of coordinated action between these 3 international actors could have been the main reason for the constant failure of mediation attempts?

q) What ripe moments where there, during these decades of conflict, that you consider where not fully taken advantage of by the mediating activities in Cyprus?

Group 3: Future prospects

a) In a Game Theoretic perspective, how do you characterize the current standpoint of the conflict with the renewed talks of Turkish accession to the EU?

b) Who can play the most vital mediating activities at this point, still the UN, the US or the EU?

c) Can there still be an united Cyprus? Under which conditions?

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