Universidade do Minho
Escola de Economia e Gestão

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European Structural Investment Funds support to firms' investment: an analysis of the impact on firms' productivity and market structure

April, 2025

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Miguel Chaves

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European Structural Investment Funds support to firms' investment: an analysis of the impact on firms' productivity and market structure

Doctorate Thesis
Doctorate in Economics

Work developed under the supervision of:
Professor Fernando Alexandre
Professor Miguel Portela

April, 2025


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This document was created with the (pdf/Xe/Lua)LaTeX processor and the NOVAthesis template (v7.1.7) (Lourenço, 2021).

Acknowledgements

I am deeply grateful to my supervisors, Fernando Alexandre and Miguel Portela, for their continuous support throughout this journey. I sincerely appreciate their guidance, insightful advice, productive meetings, and the excellent working and personal relationship we built along the way.

I am also thankful to Sara Calligaris, Chiara Criscuolo, Josh De Lyon, Andrea Greppi, and Oliviero Pallanch for welcoming me into their team at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. I truly value the knowledge I gained from working in an international organisation and the opportunity to develop research that contributed to one of the chapters of this thesis.

I acknowledge the funding provided by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology, scholarship UI/BD/150753/2020.

In the background, I owe special thanks to my parents, Olga and Gabriel, to my girlfriend, Filipa, and to my family and friends for their constant support and for always providing a positive and encouraging environment.

STATEMENT OF INTEGRITY

I hereby declare having conducted this academic work with integrity. I confirm that I have not used plagiarism or any form of undue use of information or falsification of results along the process leading to its elaboration.

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Resumo

O apoio dos Fundos Europeus Estruturais e de Investimento ao investimento das empresas: uma análise do impacto na produtividade das empresas e na estrutura de mercado

Esta tese investiga a interação entre subsídios ao investimento, concorrência e o desempenho das empresas e das indústrias. Com base em dados detalhados ao nível da empresa em Portugal e em análises setoriais considerando diversos países europeus, a tese explora a importância da concorrência e avalia como os programas de subsídios públicos moldam os resultados microeconómicos e influenciam a dinâmica industrial. Os quatro capítulos que compõem esta tese utilizam estratégias empíricas robustas, incluindo "Regression Discontinuity Designs", modelos de efeitos fixos, medidas refinadas de concentração industrial e medidas inovadoras de concentração de subsídios, para avaliar a concorrência industrial e o impacto da implementação dos subsídios ao investimento no desempenho das empresas e das indústrias, nomeadamente na produtividade. O primeiro capítulo avalia a eficácia dos subsídios de apoio ao investimento no desempenho das empresas, recorrendo a "Regression Discontinuity Designs" e utilizando dados administrativos das empresas portuguesas relativos ao apoio do Fundo Europeu de Desenvolvimento Regional (FEDER) entre 2007 e 2018. Os resultados revelam que, enquanto um único subsídio melhora o desempenho das micro e pequenas empresas, um segundo subsídio é ainda mais eficaz no aumento do valor acrescentado e da produtividade laboral, indicando que a atribuição de múltiplos subsídios à mesma empresa pode ser uma estratégia eficaz para melhorar o seu desempenho. Contudo, a ausência de efeitos significativos na "total factor productivity" sugere que existe margem para aprimorar o desenho destes programas. O segundo capítulo analisa a evolução da concentração industrial ao longo do tempo, considerando 15 países europeus, e introduz medidas de concentração refinadas que incorporam uma classificação industrial mais desagregada, a dimensão geográfica e ligações entre grupos empresariais. A análise indica que a concentração industrial média aumentou cinco pontos percentuais entre 2000 e 2019, registando um crescimento mais acentuado nas indústrias que competem a nível doméstico, em comparação com aquelas que competem internacionalmente. O terceiro capítulo investiga a influência da alocação de subsídios ao investimento na performance das indústrias e na concorrência. Embora os subsídios públicos sejam concebidos para corrigir falhas de mercado e promover a competitividade e a produtividade, uma elevada concentração de subsídios entre um número reduzido

de empresas pode, inadvertidamente, aumentar o seu poder de mercado e distorcer a concorrência, falhando, em última instância, em potenciar a produção agregada. Os resultados indicam que uma maior concentração de subsídios está associada a uma redução da produtividade laboral, sem efeitos significativos sobre outras medidas de performance. Além disso, neste capítulo, não se encontram evidências de que a concentração de subsídios influencie a concorrência ou a dinâmica de mercado. O quarto capítulo estuda o intervalo temporal ótimo entre múltiplos subsídios ao investimento. Implementando "Regression Discontinuity Designs" e utilizando dados ao nível da empresa sobre o FEDER, compreendidos entre 2007 e 2019, este capítulo demonstra que receber um segundo subsídio num intervalo mais curto – especificamente, dois subsídios em quatro anos – é mais eficaz na melhoria do emprego, do valor acrescentado e da produtividade laboral do que intervalos mais longos. Esta tese oferece novos contributos sobre a concorrência e os impactos heterogéneos dos subsídios ao investimento, analisando estes fenómenos a partir de perspetivas complementares, tanto ao nível da empresa como ao nível da indústria.

Palavras-chave: política industrial, subsídios ao investimento, concorrência, concentração, produtividade

Abstract

European Structural Investment Funds support to firms' investment: an analysis of the impact on firms' productivity and market structure

This thesis investigates the interplay between investment grants, market competition, and both firm and industry performance. Drawing on detailed firm-level data from Portugal and cross-country industry analyses across European countries, this thesis explores the role of competition and evaluates how public grant programmes shape microeconomic outcomes and influence broader industry dynamics. The four essays included in this thesis employ robust empirical strategies, including Regression Discontinuity Designs, fixed effects models, refined measures of industry concentration, and innovative measures of grants concentration, to assess industry competition and the impact of investment grants designed to support firms' investment on firms' and industry performance, particularly productivity. The first Chapter evaluates the effectiveness of investment grants on firms' performance by employing a Regression Discontinuity Design, using Portuguese administrative data on European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) support between 2007 and 2018. The results reveal that while a single grant enhances the performance of micro- and small-sized firms, a second grant further boosts value-added and labour productivity, indicating that allocating multiple grants to the same firm may be an effective strategy for enhancing firms' performance. However, the absence of significant effects on total factor productivity suggests that there is scope for improving the design of such programmes. The second chapter focuses on industry concentration trends across 15 European countries by introducing refined measures that incorporate a more disaggregated industry classification, geographical dimensions of competition, and business group linkages. The analysis indicates that average industry concentration increased by five percentage points between 2000 and 2019, with concentration rising more in industries competing at the domestic level than in those competing internationally. The third chapter investigates the influence of investment grant allocation on both industry performance and competition. While public grants are designed to address market failures and promote competitiveness and productivity, a high concentration of grants among a limited number of firms may inadvertently increase their market power and distort competition, ultimately failing to enhance aggregate output. The results indicate that higher grants concentration is negatively associated with labour productivity, with no significant impact observed on other performance measures. Furthermore, this chapter finds no evidence that grants concentration affects competition or market dynamism. The fourth

chapter studies the optimal time interval between multiple investment grants. Employing a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) with ERDF firm-level data from 2007 to 2019, this chapter demonstrates that receiving a second grant within a shorter interval – specifically, two grants within four years – is more effective in enhancing employment, value-added, and labour productivity than longer intervals. Overall, this thesis provides insights into market competition and the heterogeneous impacts of investment grants, drawing on both firm-level and industry-level perspectives.

Keywords: industrial policy, investment grants, competition, concentration, productivity

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Acronyms

AdC Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion *(pp. 10, 77, 78, 96–98)*

CBS Central Balance Sheet *(pp. 10, 77, 96, 98)*

EC European Commission *(pp. 8, 59, 97)*

ERDF European Regional Development Fund *(pp. 1, 3, 6–12, 14, 15, 33, 34, 72–75, 77–81, 95–99, 101, 112)*

ESIF European Structural Investment Funds *(pp. 8, 77, 97)*

HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index *(pp. 3, 41, 73, 77, 78, 81, 82, 84, 86, 87, 89, 91)*

ICIO Inter-Country Input-Output *(pp. 38, 46, 47)*

NA National Accounts *(pp. 38, 43, 45, 46)*

NACE Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community *(pp. 13, 36, 44–46, 59, 78, 98)*

NSRF National Strategic Reference Framework *(pp. 1, 8–11, 77, 97)*

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development *(pp. 35, 36, 38, 45, 46, 64, 71)*

RDD Regression Discontinuity Design *(pp. 1, 3, 7, 8, 13–16, 18, 20, 21, 96, 99, 101, 105, 111)*

SBIR Small Business Innovation Research *(pp. 6, 7, 95)*

SBS Structural Business Statistics *(pp. 38, 43, 45, 46)*

SNA System of National Accounts *(p. 45)*

STAN Structural Analysis *(pp. 38, 45)*

TFP Total factor productivity *(pp. 2, 4, 6, 9, 13, 19, 20, 23, 25, 27, 28, 30, 74, 96, 98, 99, 105, 107, 108, 110–112)*

1

Introduction

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the four essays presented in this thesis, highlighting the main motivations behind each topic and summarising their key findings. All of the research essays in this thesis adopt an empirical approach, focusing on investment grants, market competition, and firms' performance - particularly productivity.

The first chapter of this thesis (Chapter 2) studies the effectiveness of investment grants on firms' performance. Recent years have seen a new wave of industrial policy worldwide, often involving public grants to firms. Such policies aim to address market failures and foster firms' productivity and competitiveness. However, industrial policy can favour certain firms over others, potentially distorting competition, hindering efficiency, and strengthening selected players at the expense of their rivals. Concerns become particularly acute when multiple grants are repeatedly allocated to the same firm instead of being distributed to firms that have never received a grant for an investment plan. Under the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) programme, Portuguese data reveal that a small number of firms received multiple grants, thereby concentrating a large share of total funding. The aim of Chapter 2 is to evaluate the impact of investment grants on firms' performance, with a particular focus on the effect of awarding a second investment grant to the same firm. Using Portuguese firm-level data, which include information on ERDF support, the study assesses how a second investment grant influences firms' performance, with particular emphasis on productivity.

The first contribution of this chapter is an effective identification strategy for evaluating the impact of awarding multiple investment grants to the same firm, an emerging concern that has not yet been extensively examined in the literature. Relying on a rich administrative database covering the population of Portuguese firms that applied for ERDF support between 2007 and 2018 – encompassing two multi-annual financial frameworks, namely the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF), 2007–2013, and PT2020, 2014–2018 – and combining it with a database providing annual economic and financial information on firms operating in Portugal, this analysis employs a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to identify the effects of multiple grants allocated to the same firm. The second contribution shows that a single investment grant has positive effects on the performance of micro and small-sized firms, but no significant effects on medium- and large-sized firms. The third contribution provides evidence that

a second grant further increases value-added and labour productivity, with a larger effect than a single grant, suggesting that allocating multiple grants to the same firm may be an effective way to improve firms' performance. However, there is no effect on Total factor productivity (TFP). The fourth contribution investigates the heterogeneous effects of a second grant by firm size. The analysis confirms the positive impact of the second grant on the performance of micro- and small-sized firms.

Chapter 3 studies industry concentration trends. Competition plays a pivotal role in fostering innovation, driving efficiency, and enhancing consumer welfare, and there is broad consensus in academic and policy circles on the importance of maintaining a dynamic competitive environment. Industry concentration, defined as the share of an industry's output produced by its largest firms, is frequently used as a proxy for competition. However, the literature presents mixed conclusions regarding concentration trends over time, primarily due to differences in the type of data used, countries studied, and methodological assumptions.

Motivated by these considerations, Chapter 3 examines industry concentration trends across European countries, introducing several methodological refinements. First, this chapter employs a more disaggregated approach by defining industries at the 3-digit level, enabling the computation of leading firms' market shares in relatively detailed markets. Second, it considers the geographic level at which competition occurs: domestic, European, or global, and then computes concentration measures for each industry accordingly. This approach recognises the relevant geographic dimension of competition and indirectly accounts for the role of international trade within each region. Third, it accounts for linkages among firms within the same domestic or multinational business group in the relevant geographic region of competition, treating all subsidiaries of the same group that operate in the same market as a single entity. This approach allows to account for the overall sales of multinational firms in any relevant market, and also considers the role of mergers and acquisitions in driving concentration trends. The final sample covers 15 European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and focuses on the mining, manufacturing, non-financial market services (excluding real estate), and utilities sectors at the 3-digit industry level from 2000 to 2019. The results indicate that average concentration across these 15 European countries increased by five percentage points between 2000 and 2019. Furthermore, concentration rose more in industries competing at the domestic level than in those competing at the European and global levels.

Chapter 4 links the themes of investment grants (introduced in Chapter 2) and industry competition (investigated in Chapter 3) by exploring the effects of investment grants allocation on industry performance and market competition. While public grants aim to enhance productivity and address market failures, their implementation requires careful management to avoid conferring excessive advantages on certain firms, which may violate competition rules and undermine efficiency. Concentrating grants among a small set of firms risks crowding out competitors, potentially affecting overall economic output. These considerations raise important questions about the optimal level of funding allocated to each firm, the frequency with which firms receive grants, and the broader implications of such allocations. Although

several studies have analysed the impact of grants at the firm-level, it is equally important to assess how the concentration or dispersion of these grants affects overall industry performance, particularly through possible externalities and spillover effects on non-supported firms. This concern becomes more salient when a significant share of total grants is concentrated among a small number of firms, thereby potentially increasing their market power and distorting competition. The existing literature on how investment grants influence industry competition remains limited, while some studies suggest a decline in competition in recent years. Drawing on ERDF data from 2008 to 2021, as well as annual economic and financial information on Portuguese firms, Chapter 4 evaluates the effects of investment grants concentration on both industry performance and competition. The firm-level dataset is aggregated at the 3-digit industry level, allowing for an industry-level analysis.

This chapter contributes to the literature by implementing industry concentration measures within the context of grant allocations. To measure grants concentration, this chapter employs indices commonly used in industry concentration research, but applies them to grant allocations rather than output shares. Specifically, it calculates the share of investment grants allocated to the top four and top eight supported firms, as well as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). This chapter also contributes by assessing how grants concentration affects industry performance, the relationship between grants concentration and industry competition, and how industry concentration relates to industry performance. Regarding the effects of grants concentration on industry outcomes, the findings suggest that increases in grants concentration negatively affect industry labour productivity in the medium and long term, with no significant impact on other outcome variables such as investment, employment, or value-added. Additionally, there appears to be no relationship between grants concentration and industry competition or market dynamism, such as entry and exit rates. Finally, further analysis shows that higher industry concentration has a positive short-term effect on exports but does not significantly affect labour productivity.

Chapter 5 returns to a firm-level perspective and delves deeper into the effectiveness of awarding multiple investment grants, building on the evidence from Chapter 2. Various grant programmes allow firms to receive more than one grant, yet the extent to which this strategy truly enhances firms' performance remains open to debate. Notably, in the case of ERDF support to Portuguese firms, a significant share of total funds is concentrated among a small subset of firms that receive multiple grants. Empirical evidence on the impact of multiple grants is mixed, although studies consistently point to stronger positive effects for small-sized firms. Beyond firm size, additional factors such as the design of the grant-allocation programme may also lead to heterogeneous effects when a second grant is awarded.

This chapter evaluates how the time interval between two investment grants awarded to the same firm affects its performance. It aims to determine whether shorter or longer intervals between two grants lead to greater improvements in firms' performance, particularly regarding productivity. Using ERDF data from 2007 to 2019, the analysis employs an RDD approach to identify the causal effect of receiving two grants over different time intervals. The results suggest that a shorter time interval, namely receiving two grants within four years, seems more beneficial than a longer interval of five or more years. Firms that receive two grants within four years increase their employment, value-added, and labour productivity.

Additional analysis shows that awarding two grants in exactly two or four years has positive effects on value-added and labour productivity, whereas two grants awarded in exactly three years does not yield significant performance gains. Meanwhile, two grants awarded in exactly five years does not affect labour productivity, though it appears to increase TFP.

Taken together, these four essays shed light on the role of investment grants in shaping firms' performance and their potential implications for industry competition. While Chapters 2 and 5 provide firm-level analyses on the effectiveness of multiple grants and the optimal time interval between them, Chapters 3 and 4 place these findings within the wider context of industry dynamics. By combining micro- and macro-level perspectives, this thesis offers new insights into how public grants can enhance firms' productivity and shape the competitive landscape.

2

Investment Grants and Firms' Productivity: How Effective is a Grant Booster Shot?

2.1 Introduction

This paper evaluates the impact of investment grants on firm performance.[1] Our analysis focuses on the effectiveness of awarding a second investment grant to the same firm. There is considerable consensus among economists about the benefits of investment grants; however, there is mixed evidence on their effectiveness in improving firms' productivity (e.g., Cerqua & Pellegrini, 2014, Bronzini & Iachini, 2014, Bronzini & Piselli, 2016, Bernini et al., 2017, Criscuolo et al., 2019 and Dvouletý et al., 2021). Some challenges that the empirical literature on the impact of public grants faces partly result from incomplete and non-representative data samples, or identification issues related to, for example, the self-selection of applicants (e.g., Bronzini & Piselli, 2016, Criscuolo et al., 2019, Criscuolo et al., 2022). These limitations are even more pertinent when assessing the impact of allocating multiple grants to the same firm (e.g., Howell, 2017, Srhoj & Walde, 2020 and Muraközy & Telegdy, 2022).

Public grants are an important policy tool and are back to the limelight – see, for example, Cheng et al. (2019), Fang et al. (2018), and Lim et al. (2018) on public grants in China, Brown and Earle (2017) on the public support to small firms by the Small Business Administration in the United States, and the European Commission's NextGenerationEU (European Commission and Directorate-General for Budget, 2022). In this context, it is crucial to evaluate the outcome of this new wave of industrial policy, namely the effectiveness of public grants to firms (e.g., Criscuolo et al., 2022).

Investment grants aim to address the presence of market failures, namely financial constraints (e.g., Fang et al., 2018 and Hall & Lerner, 2010), knowledge spillovers and disincentives for socially optimal levels of investment in R&D (e.g., Arrow, 1972 and Bloom et al., 2019). The mixed evidence on the benefits of grants to firm performance reflects the limitations of industrial policy. The effectiveness of investment grants also depends on eligibility criteria: sectors and firms to be targeted (e.g., Jugend et al.,

[1] This chapter is co-authored with Fernando Alexandre and Miguel Portela, and is published as Alexandre et al. (2024).

2020); the type of grant, that is, grants or subsidized loans (e.g., Huergo & Moreno, 2017); the optimal amount of funds to allocate to each firm (e.g., Görg & Strobl, 2007); the certification effect of grants, namely for ventures (e.g., Lanahan & Armanios, 2018); the characteristics of firm owners, namely gender (e.g., Gicheva & Link, 2013); or firms' characteristics such as size or their participation in international trade (e.g., Rotemberg, 2019). The selection process is also crucial to attaining their economic and social goals. The assessment of applications by independent experts, based on objective criteria, is a necessary condition for a transparent and effective allocation of investment grants. Otherwise, the industrial policy may favour specific firms over others, breaking competition rules and, thus, distorting the level playing field and hindering efficiency (e.g., Akcigit et al., 2023). The expansion of selected firms at the cost of their competitors might wreak havoc impact on aggregate output (e.g., Rotemberg, 2019). These risks are magnified when multiple grants are allocated to the same firm, resulting in high concentration of public grants in a small number of firms (e.g., Trajtenberg, 2020), raising concerns about the effectiveness and fairness of the allocation of public grants.

Several papers have found a positive impact of public grants on firms' investment, employment and turnover (e.g., Cerqua & Pellegrini, 2014; Cingano et al., 2022), while there is ambiguity regarding the impact on productivity. Srhoj and Walde (2020) and Srhoj, Lapinski, and Walde (2021) evaluated the impact of specific grants programs on the performance of firms in Croatia. Srhoj and Walde (2020) found that an export-oriented grant program has a positive effect on exports, sales and value-added, but no effect on employment, and a slight effect on TFP. Crespi et al. (2020) and Cin et al. (2017), analysing grants for R&D to firms in Chile and South Korea, respectively, found a positive impact on firms' productivity. Muraközy and Telegdy (2022), in an analysis of ERDF grants for Hungary, found a positive impact of grants on labour productivity but no effect on TFP. Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014), investigating the impact of the main Italian regional policy, found a negligible effect. Criscuolo et al. (2019) found no evidence of a positive impact of investment grants on productivity. Mesquita et al. (2022) and Santos (2019) investigate the impact of ERDF grants in the Portuguese economy and found no effect on productivity.

The empirical evidence of the impact of multiple grants allocated to the same firm is scarce and mixed. The concentration of grants in a small number of firms raises concerns that the strategy may not be effective both in improving firm performance and the country's competitiveness. The results of Feldman et al. (2022), for the U.S. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, emphasise the benefits of awarding several R&D grants to the same firm. These authors show that in every outcome dimension – commercial activity, human capital development, patents, scientific publications – there was a positive effect, that also benefited the government and society. Muraközy and Telegdy (2022) investigate the impact of multiple ERDF grants for Hungarian firms. Those authors concluded that firms receiving multiple grants grow faster than those receiving only one and that multiple grants may favour the efficiency of the European Union's Structural and Cohesion Funds. Srhoj and Walde (2020) use the full database of publicly co-financed projects over the period 2009–2012 in Croatia. Those authors investigate the impact of two types of export-oriented grants, the grants for technology-oriented and for commercialization activities,

using a differences-in-differences matching estimator. In this study, the treated group is composed of firms that received export-oriented grants and have also received other grants from the government. The results of Srhoj and Walde (2020) show a positive impact of the additional grant on export growth, in particular of the export-oriented grants. Howell (2017) uses an extensive database of ranked applications to the US Department of Energy's SBIR to evaluate a two-stage R&D grant program. In this program, only the winners of grants in Phase I could apply to Phase II. The author considers different competitions and centres the ranks around zero to implement a sharp RDD by comparing firms in the neighbourhood of the cut-off. Howell (2017) concluded that the first treatment strongly affected innovation and financial and commercial success. On the other hand, the author found no effects for the grant awarded in Phase II, which may be due to eligibility criteria and adverse selection. Moreover, the author concluded that a single grant is more effective for firms facing financial constraints.

Existing literature also suggests heterogeneity in the effectiveness of investment grants across firm sizes. The results by firm size show that investment grants have a greater impact on small-sized firms (e.g., Criscuolo et al., 2022). Santoleri et al. (2022) investigated the impact of the SME Instrument, a two phase R&D grant program targeting innovative and small and medium-sized firms, implementing an RDD. The authors conclude that Phase 1, which awards small R&D grants, was not effective, whereas Phase 2, that awards R&D grants up to €2.5 million, had sizeable effects on firm-level outcomes, namely on investment, innovation, employment and revenues. These effects were stronger on smaller and younger firms, and also for firms with higher financial fragility. Srhoj, Lapinski, and Walde (2021) showed that business development grants have a positive effect on capital stock, bank loans, intermediate inputs and value-added, but no positive effect on productivity, sales and employment. Srhoj, Lapinski, and Walde (2021) also highlighted that the findings rely on the positive effects of small-sized firms. Criscuolo et al. (2019) investigating the impact of investment grants from the Regional Selective Assistance program in the United Kingdom found a positive effect on employment, but only for small-sized firms. Analysing an R&D grant program implemented in Italy, Bronzini and Iachini (2014) found that the grants increase investment by small-sized firms, whereas there is no impact on larger firms. Bronzini and Piselli (2016) evaluating the impact of R&D grants in Italy also found a positive impact of the program on the number of patent applications, but the effect was greater for smaller firms. Those results suggest that the impact of grants on investment, employment and turnover is more pronounced in small-sized firms.

Our paper contributes to the literature on the evaluation of the impact of investment grants, namely on the effectiveness of awarding a second grant to the same firm. The contributions of our evaluation are fourfold. First, we propose an effective identification strategy to evaluate the impact of awarding multiple investment grants to the same firm, a topical issue scarcely explored in the literature. We use a rich firm-level administrative database that includes the population of Portuguese firms that have applied to the ERDF in 2007-2018. In that period, a high concentration of grants in a small group of firms, that have received multiple grants, stands out. Around 30% of the supported firms were awarded multiple grants, representing about 65% of the total ERDF. Among those, a group of 2,167 firms received almost 50% of the total funds. Our database comprises 54,765 applications by 24,627 firms, 16,428 funded projects

of 10,980 firms, corresponding to 5.9 billion euros. We have information about the application scores for selected and non-selected firms, which a committee of independent experts awards, the applications' and the projects' implementation dates. The combination of that data with detailed balance sheet information on the financial and operational status of firms allows us to assess the impact on productivity of awarding multiple grants to the same firm. This data allows us to implement a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) strategy to identify the effects of allocating multiple grants to the same firm, namely on its productivity.

Second, our RDD estimates show that a single investment grant has a positive and statistically significant effect on the performance of micro and small-sized firms and no effects on medium- and large-sized firms, corroborating the findings in the literature. Third, the estimates concerning the grant booster shot show a positive and statistically significant impact on value-added and labour productivity. The impact of the grant booster shot on those variables is significantly larger than the effect of a single grant. Therefore, our results suggest that allocating multiple grants to the same firm may be an effective strategy to improve firm performance. However, no effects were found on total factor productivity. Fourth, a more granular analysis by firm size shows that the overall effect of the investment grant booster shot is confirmed for micro- and small-sized firms. The analysis for other firm sizes warrants further research.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the ERDF investment grants program and describes the database. Section 2.3 presents the empirical strategy. Section 2.4 presents the descriptive statistics underlying the RDD analysis. Section 2.5 presents and discusses the results of the RDD analysis. Section 2.6 provides a robustness check analysis. Section 2.7 concludes and discusses the policy implications of allocating multiple grants to the same firm.

2.2 Program description and data

In our empirical analysis, we use data from the ERDF to support Portuguese firms' investment. This data includes two multi-annual financial frameworks: the NSRF, 2007-2013, and PT2020, 2014-2018. The ERDF aims at strengthening economic and social cohesion in the EU and is one of the five funds settled by the European Structural Investment Funds (ESIF), managed by the European Commission (EC) and the EU member states.

ERDF grants to firms aim at increasing firms' productivity and competitiveness, improving economic specialisation, regional development, and the economy's internationalization. These objectives are of utmost importance in the context of the Portuguese economy, which has lived through a long period of low growth, protracted productivity stagnation and economic divergence in the 21st century (e.g., Blanchard & Portugal, 2017 and Eichenbaum et al., 2017).

ERDF has been an important instrument in Portuguese policymakers' toolkit to promote competitiveness and productivity. The ERDF program comprises three instruments to support different types of firms' investment: the Innovation Incentive System, the Qualification Incentive System and the Research and

Development Incentive System.[2]

The Innovation Incentive System aims at promoting investment in innovation and the firms' internationalization, accounting for over 65% of total ERDF in the NSRF and in PT2020. This instrument supports investment in tangible and intangible assets, including machinery, equipment and software, and also the construction of facilities. These investments aim at increasing the production of goods and services, to improve production processes or to expand the production capacity of high-technology goods. The Innovation Incentive System also supports the creation of new firms based on high-skilled labour force and targeting international markets. Santos (2019) provides a detailed description and an impact assessment of this program, and concludes that grants have a positive impact on investment, employment, sales and TFP. The Qualification Incentive System aims at increasing SME productivity and internationalization through investment in intangible assets, accounting for around 20% of total ERDF. Wagner (2007) surveys the evidence between exporting and productivity and shows that exporting firms have higher productivity and, in many studies, higher productivity growth. Although there may exist self-selection of more productive firms into export markets, public grants programs that aim at stimulating exports also address competitiveness and productivity. For example, Srhoj and Walde (2020) evaluate the impact of two types of exported-oriented programs for Croatia and conclude that the program that resulted in a higher impact on exports was also more effective in fostering labour productivity. The third ERDF instrument is the Research and Development Incentive System which aims at increasing investment in R&D and the development of new products and services, involving entities of the scientific and technological system, accounts for around 15% of total ERDF. This program aims at stimulating technological innovation that will translate into higher productivity. Alexandre et al. (2023) conclude that the impact of R&D grants on firm productivity in the Portuguese economy, in the period 2007-2019, seems to be transitory.

It must be stressed that the mechanisms through which those three instruments impact on productivity are very different. Dimos et al. (2022) for R&D grants, Dvouletý et al. (2021) for SME business development grants and Srhoj et al. (2023) for export boosting policies show that the impact of grants on firm performance varies significantly across different grant programs. However, in our econometric analysis, we include the investment grants awarded to firms by those three programs. Although those three instruments subsidize different types of investments, namely, tangible and intangible assets, the ultimate goal of those three instruments is to foster firms' productivity. However, given the specificities of the Research and Development Incentive System, in our robustness check analysis we will exclude it from our analysis. Dvouletý et al. (2021), in a survey of the impact of public SME grants on firm performance, also excluded grants that support R&D activities. The application to grants for firms' investment projects by ERDF follows calls for tender. The selection criteria are made available in the call that announces the opening of the tender. Applications are evaluated by a group of independent experts of recognised

[2] In fact, the designation of those three ERDF instruments is slightly different in NSRF and in PT2020. In NSRF the incentive systems were the following: Innovation; SME Qualification; and Research and Technological Development. In PT2020, the three instruments were the following: Entrepreneurial Innovation and Entrepreneurship; Qualification and Internationalization of SME; and Research and Technological Development.

merit and suitability, with a significant share selected among scholars from the main Portuguese universities. Applications' scores vary between 0 and 5. The best-scored projects are awarded a grant until the program specified budget line. Selected projects receive grants according to the project's specifications, investment implementation and goals contracted.

In our empirical analysis, we use two rich longitudinal firm-level administrative databases for the Portuguese economy. The database from the Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion (AdC) includes information for the population of applications to ERDF grants, including the firm identification, the application evaluation score for selected and non-selected firms, the application and contract dates, the amount of the ERDF benefit and total investment, both for NSRF and PT2020 (the data has been used at the Banco de Portugal Microdata Research Laboratory (BPLIM), 2019). The database from AdC comprises 24,627 firms and 16,428 funded projects corresponding to 10,980 firms. The AdC database allows us to identify the number and timing of grants allocated to each firm in the period 2007-2018.

The second dataset used in our analysis is the Central Balance Sheet (CBS) from the Bank of Portugal (see Banco de Portugal Microdata Research Laboratory (BPLIM), 2020). The CBS database provides annual economic and financial information on firms operating in Portugal, since 2006. The CBS database contains firm-level administrative data, including balance sheets and other accounting data, such as the turnover, value-added, labour costs, leverage, total assets or the number of employees. This information allows us to compute labour productivity and total factor productivity. These data are available yearly for the population of non-financial private sector firms, from 2006 to 2018 (about 390 thousand firms per year).

Those two datasets can be linked at the firm-level as they use the same (anonymised) firm identifier. By linking the two longitudinal databases, we can apply adequate identification strategies to gauge the impact of multiple grants on firms' performance.[3]

In the NSRF, ERDF grants to firms' investment reached an amount of 3.3 billion euros, corresponding to a total investment of 8.3 billion euros, allocated to 6,487 firms. In PT2020, ERDF grants amounted to 4.2 billion euros contracted until 2018, the period of our analysis, corresponding to a total investment of 9.2 billion euros, allocated to 7,243 firms. Figure 1 presents the number and value of grants by year. Since 2012, the number of grants to firms has increased substantially and 2016 was the year with the highest amount of projects contracted (around 4,000) and the highest amount of grants awarded (over 1.5 billion euros).

The analysis of the distribution of ERDF grants to firms' investment shows a high concentration in a small number of firms, both in the NSRF (2007-2013) and in PT2020 (2014-2018). Figure 2 presents the decile distribution of ERDF grants to firms' investment in both programs. Figure 2 shows a high concentration of ERDF grants, where 10% of the firms which received the highest grants account for 69% and 66% of total ERDF grants to firms' investment in the NSRF and in PT2020, respectively.

Figure 3 presents an overview of the distribution of the ERDF grants to firms' investment. In the

[3] A full description of the variables used in our empirical analysis is presented in Table 29 in the Appendix.




Figure 1: Number and Value of Grants by Year




Figure 2: Decile Distribution of ERDF Grants for Firm Investment: NSRF (2007 - 2013) vs. PT2020 (2014 - 2018)

period 2007-2018, 24,627 firms applied to ERDF grants, 10,980 received ERDF grants, and 13,647 were not selected to receive a grant. Thus, 55% of the firms that applied to receive ERDF grants were not supported.

From the analysis of the data in Figure 3, a feature stands out in both ERDF programs: a significant share of firms have received more than one grant; that is, 3,226 firms of the awarded firms (29%) received more than one grant. From the group of firms that have received multiple treatments, 2,167, were awarded a grant, both in the NSRF and PT2020. That group of firms received around 1.6 billion euros in the NSRF (47.7% of total ERDF) and 1.9 billion euros in PT2020 (43.8% of total ERDF). On the other hand, 519 and 540 firms received multiple grants in the NSRF and in PT2020, respectively.

The availability of detailed information on the timing of grants and the application scores allows us to

investigate in a more effective way the effectiveness of allocating multiple grants to the same firm, that is, the effectiveness of investment grants booster shots.




Figure 3: Overview of the Distribution of the ERDF Grants for Firm Investment, 2007 - 2018 (NSRF and PT2020)

Table 2 shows the distribution of firms by the number of grants and the corresponding share of ERDF. The one-off treatment, that is, firms that received only one grant, accounts for 7,754 firms (around 70% of the total supported firms), corresponding to 35% of total ERDF grants. On the other hand, around 30% of the awarded firms received multiple grants, which accounted for 65% of the total ERDF grants to firms. For example, 1,900 firms received two grants, accounting for 22% of total ERDF.

Table 2: Firms Count and Grant Shares by Number of Grants Received (2007 - 2018)

Grants	Firms	Share (%)
0	13,647	0
1	7,754	35
2	1,900	22
3	732	15
4	292	11
5 or more	302	18

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion.*

2.3 Empirical strategy

In this section, we describe our empirical strategy to evaluate the impact of an investment grant on firms' performance. The empirical literature on the impact of public grants is ambiguous in part due to incomplete and non-representative data samples and identification issues (e.g., Bronzini & Piselli, 2016, Criscuolo et al., 2019, Criscuolo et al., 2022). We implement a sharp RDD to identify a causal relationship between grants and firms' performance, namely on firms' productivity. The availability of the scores of both non-selected and funded applications allows us to carry out a robust identification strategy to evaluate the impact of a grant booster shot on firms' investment, employment, value-added and productivity. In our analysis, we consider two measures of productivity. Labour productivity is computed as the ratio of value-added over the number of workers. Total factor productivity is computed following Gandhi et al. (2020) at the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE) 1-digit sectors (10 sectors). The outcome is the log of real sales and the inputs considered are fixed assets, hours worked, and intermediate inputs. The intermediate inputs are determined by the sum of the cost of goods sold, materials consumed, supplies, and external services, serving as a measure of flexible inputs. All variables are represented in logs and monetary variables are adjusted for inflation and winsorized. Additionally, the estimation includes the ratio of intermediate inputs to sales as a regressor.[4]

In our econometric specification, the dependent variable is generically defined as Y_i and can take two possible values, $Y_i(1)$, under the treatment, and $Y_i(0)$ in its absence. The running variable which defines the treatment assignment is the application's (standardised) score (S_i) – see Angrist and Rokkanen (2015). The treatment indicator (T_i) is a binary variable that assumes the value 1 if the firm receives the grant (score equal to or above zero, $S_i \geq 0$) and 0 otherwise (score below zero, $S_i < 0$). Equation (2.1) presents firms' two potential outcomes:

$$Y_i = (1 - T_i) \cdot Y_i(0) + T_i \cdot Y_i(1) = \begin{cases} Y_i(0) & \text{if } S_i < 0 \\ Y_i(1) & \text{if } S_i \geq 0 \end{cases} \tag{2.1}$$

The average treatment effect is estimated as the difference in the outcomes between the treated and the control group at the cut-off (c) – see equation (2.2).

$$\tau_{RDD} = E\left[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0) | S_i = c\right] \tag{2.2}$$

The key assumption underlying our identification strategy is that firms with scores in the neighbourhood of the cut-off are similar and have the same potential outcome. Thus, the causal effect is identified by comparing both groups in the neighbourhood of the cut-off – see Lee and Lemieux (2010), M. D. Cattaneo et al. (2020) and M. D. Cattaneo and Titiunik (2022) for a detailed discussion of the RDD strategy.

[4] As a sensitivity analysis, we estimated TFP replacing the hours worked with the number of employees. The results, available upon request, are consistent with our main findings.

Figure 4 outlines our two-step RDD empirical strategy. First, we assess the impact of receiving a single grant versus no grant on firms' performance. The sample used in the analysis corresponds to Box A of the diagram, where treated firms are those that received a single grant. Second, we examine the effect on firms' performance of receiving a second grant. For this step, our sample includes firms that have already received one grant and have applied for a second. The sample evaluating the booster shot effect is represented by Box B in the diagram. In this context, the treated group consists of firms that secured the second grant.




Figure 4: Control and Treatment Groups

The analysis incorporates two distinct control groups. In the first step, the control group consists of firms that applied for a grant but were never selected for funding. In the second step, the control group comprises firms that were awarded a first grant, applied for a second grant, but were not selected.

In our dataset, firms may submit multiple applications within the same year. However, our econometric strategy only allows us to consider a single application per firm per year. Therefore, we apply the following application selection criteria. First, we prioritize the chosen application with the highest score. Second, in cases where all applications were rejected, we select the one with the highest score.[5]

2.4 Descriptive statistics for the RDD analysis

In this Section we present the descriptive statistics of the sample used in the RDD analysis. In the period 2007-2018, we consider 705 calls for the allocation of ERDF grants to support firm investments. We exclude from the analysis the calls without a cut-off, that is, the calls in which all applications were selected for funding or all applications were non-selected.[6]

The sample used in the first step of our empirical strategy, that assesses the impact of receiving a single grant versus no grant, includes 6,409 firms from 485 calls, where 2,650 firms were not selected

[5] As a robustness check, we excluded firms with more than one successful application in a given year from the estimations, and the corresponding results remained consistent.

[6] Table 30 in the Appendix presents the descriptive statistics for the calls excluded from the analysis. The total number of calls in which all applications were selected for funding is 94, corresponding to 173 selected applications from 154 firms, each firm averaging 66 employees. These calls are characterized by a small number of applications per call, ranging from 1 to 8 per call, with a median of 1 application. The average grant awarded per application was approximately € 443 thousand, while the median grant amount was around € 144 thousand. On the other hand, there were 110 calls where no applications received funding, encompassing 275 applications from 267 firms - the median number of applications per call is 1.

and 3,759 firms received a single grant. When a firm submits multiple applications for ERDF grants across different years and none of the applications are selected, we consider only the firm's first application.[7]

Application scores range from zero to five. Each call possesses a cut-off that distinguishes between funded applications and those not selected. The calls have disparate numbers of applicants, awards, and cut-offs. To pool these calls we must standardize the scores. In our methodology, we adopt the approach of Howell (2017), who centres ranks around zero. We accomplish score standardization by establishing the within-tender score as the difference between the continuous raw score and the cut-off. Consequently, the cut-off is uniformly set to zero for all calls. All calls are then merged into a single dataset, with each firm represented by a single observation.

Figure 5 presents the distribution of the scores after standardizing the cut-off of all calls to zero. The scores equal to or above zero correspond to firms that received a single grant, while those below zero correspond to non-selected firms. The standardization implies that the scores vary between minus five and five. Within the bandwidth typically used in the RDD regression analysis, which will be discussed in the following section, there is significant variation in score.[8]




Figure 5: Standardised Score Distribution – No Grant vs. a Single Grant

The sample used in the second step of our analysis, where we assess the impact of a grant booster shot, includes 220 calls and 821 firms, where 260 firms were not selected to receive a second grant, and 561 firms were awarded a second grant. In order to improve the identification of the impact of the grant booster shot we exclude non-selected applications in years when a firm has received a grant from

[7] In the context of the regression analysis detailed in Section 2.5, we replicated the estimations considering the non-selected application with the highest score. We found similar results.

[8] In Figure 5, the highest bar includes scores above the cut-off, ranging from [0;0.1[, with 49% of those scores being 0. Since the scores are standardized and the cut-off is set to 0 (the threshold for funding), there is a concentration of scores at 0. As a robustness check, we implement a series of "donut" RDD regressions, excluding scores of 0, between -0.02 and 0.02, and between -0.05 and 0.05, as detailed in Section 2.6 of the paper.

a previous call. We also exclude firms that received a third treatment within three years of receiving the second grant.

Figure 6 presents the distribution of the standardised scores for firms that have received a single grant (scores below zero) and firms that have received two grants (scores equal to or above zero). As with the first-step of the analysis, there is significant variation in the scores around the cut-off.




Figure 6: Standardised Score Distribution – a Single Grant vs. Two Grants

Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the outcome variables in the year before firms have applied for a grant. Panels A and B correspond to the sample used in the first step, No Grant vs. a Single Grant, while panels C and D provide statistics for the second step sample, a Single Grant vs. Two Grants. For the two assessments, we report the statistics for the full sample, panels A and C, as well as for the sub-samples inside the bandwidth around the cut-off used in the regressions analysis, panels B and D. For the first step analysis the bandwidth corresponds to the set of estimations presented in Section 2.5.1 and is computed according to Calonico et al. (2014). Due to the small number of observations available for the second step of our RDD empirical strategy, we define the bandwidth as 50% of applications in the neighbourhood of the cut-off.

The $t-tests$ presented in Table 3 assess the difference in mean values of the firms' performance measures between the treated and control groups in the year prior to application for a grant. For the full samples, panels A and C, there are statistically significant differences between treated and control firms, regarding employment, value-added and labour productivity. Narrowing the sample to the observations inside the bandwidth, which are used in the regression analysis, panels B and D, we do not reject the null hypothesis of absence of statistically significant differences between the control and the treated group, except for labour productivity in the case of No Grant vs. a Single Grant.[9]

[9]Given the small number of observations in some of the samples, we report a statistical power analysis in Section A.1.1 of the Appendix. The results provide support to the similarity of treated and control groups before grant application.

It should be stressed that firms included in the sample of the analysis of the first treatment invest less, are smaller, have a considerably smaller gross value-added and are less productive than those that receive the grant booster shot.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Outcome Variables in the Year Before Application (2007 – 2016)

	Control				Treated				
	Obs.	Mean	Median	s.d.	Obs.	Mean	Median	s.d.	$t-test$
Panel A: No Grant vs. a Single Grant, Full Sample									
Investment	2622	174.84	19.12	553.91	3754	195.76	30.10	561.99	-1.47
Employment	2622	24.73	9	50.52	3754	27.67	12	49.13	-2.33**
Value-Added	2622	783.87	209.34	1909.11	3754	862.93	299.51	1786.21	-1.69*
Labour Productivity	2622	27.96	22.16	23.37	3754	29.91	24.27	22.75	-3.32***
TFP	2540	0.04	0.02	0.05	3654	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.71
Panel B: No Grant vs. a Single Grant, Inside the Bandwidth									
Investment	672	167.47	12.95	545.77	2413	201.11	23.16	600.43	-1.31
Employment	672	22.40	6	51.52	2413	25.83	9	50.56	-1.56
Value-Added	672	744.93	140.55	1989.35	2413	839.64	238.93	1883.94	-1.14
Labour Productivity	672	26.81	21.55	22.67	2413	30.07	23.97	24.09	-3.15***
TFP	648	0.04	0.01	0.05	2337	0.05	0.03	0.05	-1.61
Panel C: a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Full Sample									
Investment	260	514.98	68.61	1554.36	561	549.32	120.65	1257.03	-0.34
Employment	260	48.76	17	130.11	561	67.20	26	135.74	-1.83*
Value-Added	260	1768.34	465.16	6360.42	561	2714.44	799.49	7262.62	-1.80*
Labour Productivity	260	31.61	25.75	23.99	561	35.50	29.91	23.42	-2.19**
TFP	253	0.05	0.03	0.05	557	0.05	0.03	0.05	-0.24
Panel D: a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Inside the Bandwidth									
Investment	140	494.85	44.22	1603.02	282	554.07	101.16	1385.63	-0.39
Employment	140	46.53	16	130.09	282	61.09	20	139.05	-1.03
Value-Added	140	1675.20	448.02	5462.45	282	2519.39	616.02	7417.23	-1.20
Labour Productivity	140	33.05	26.69	24.93	282	36.41	30.70	24.76	-1.31
TFP	135	0.05	0.03	0.05	278	0.05	0.03	0.05	-1.22

Notes: Investment, value-added, and labour productivity are expressed in thousands of euros. The $t-test$ assesses the difference in mean values between the treated and control groups. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. 'Obs.' stands for the number of observations, and 's.d.' represents the standard-deviation.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Tables 31 and 32 in the Appendix breakdown the information provided in Table 3 by year for the samples inside the bandwidth.[10] For each year represented in these tables we report the statistics for firms that applied for a grant in the following year. For example, within each table, the section labeled '2010' reports statistics for firms that applied for a grant in 2011. Looking to Table 31, No Grant vs. a Single Grant sample, we observe that in the majority of the cases treated and control firms are identical in the year before the grant application. The noticeable exceptions are the year 2011, where we find discernible differences for employment and value-added, and the year 2012, where treated and control

[10] In the case of Table 31 in the year 2014 there was a negligible number of applications and, therefore, we do not present the descriptive statistics for the year 2013. We also do not report the statistics for 2017, as the last year used in the sample is 2018 and we are not able to evaluate the impact of grants received in that year. For Table 32 the descriptive statistics for 2008, 2009, 2013, 2015 and 2016 are not presented given the small number of observations in those years.

groups are statistically different for the five outcome variables.[11] Regarding a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Table 32, we do not find statistical differences between treated and control firms for most of the cases. In a few cases, we only find statistical differences at the 10% significance level.[12]

In our empirical analysis, we also evaluate how the impact of a single grant and a grant booster shot hinges on firm-size. We consider three firm-size classes: micro-, small-, and medium/large-sized firms.[13] For the analysis of the impact of a single grant the distribution of observations among micro-, small-, and medium/large-sized firms is 40.6%, 46.9%, and 12.5%, respectively. For the analysis of the impact of a grant booster shot the distribution is 22.2%, 53.0%, and 24.8%, respectively.

2.5 Results

This section presents the results of the RDD estimations from our two-step empirical strategy: the impact of a single grant and that of an investment grant booster shot on firm performance. We evaluate the impact one, two, and three years after the firm has received the grant, represented as leads $t+1$, $t+2$, and $t+3$, respectively. We present these results for the entire sample and by firm size.

2.5.1 No grant versus a single grant

The RDD plots presented in Figure 7 illustrate the differences in investment, employment, value-added, and labour productivity near the cut-off, between non-selected firms and those that received a single grant in lead $t+3$. The sub-panels of Figure 7 suggest a potential discontinuity between the control and treated groups, especially in terms of investment, value-added, and labour productivity. This anticipates some of the RDD estimation results that we present below.


Table 4 presents the RDD estimates of the impact of a single investment grant on firms' performance.[14] Each set of lines corresponds to a regression where the dependent variable, defined in logs, is

[11] Table 3 shows that, in the case of No Grant vs. a Single Grant within the bandwidth, the treated and control groups are statistically significantly different solely in terms of labour productivity. Table 31 suggests that this difference may be largely attributable to the year 2012, which corresponds to the application year 2013. Consequently, we run a robustness test using a sample excluding this application year. On the one hand, we do not find statistically significant differences between the control and treated groups conducting the $t-test$. On the other hand, we estimated the regressions for No Grant vs. a Single Grant, and we found consistent results.

[12] The statistical power analysis is presented in Section A.1.1 of the Appendix.

[13] For the classification of firm size, we follow the classification defined in the Official Journal of the European Union, L 124 , 20/05/2003 P. 0036 - 0041, Annex, Article 2: "1. the category of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is made up of enterprises which employ fewer than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 million. 2. Within the SME category, a small enterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 50 persons and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed EUR 10 million. 3. Within the SME category, a microenterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 10 persons and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed EUR 2 million." For more details see the information at http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2003/361/oj.

[14] Overall, for the different regressions, the control and treatment groups inside the bandwidth represent between 11% and 25%, and between 32% and 51%, of the sample, respectively. For example, the sample used to analyse the impact of a single grant on employment over a one-year lead ($t+1$) consists of 6,358 observations, as shown in Table 4. The control group



(a) Investment (b) Employment

(c) Value-added (d) Labour Productivity

Note: Local linear plots based on a triangular kernel or outcomes in lead $t+3$.

Figure 7: RDD plots – No Grant vs. a Single Grant

identified in the first column. For the outcomes investment, employment, value-added, labour productivity, and TFP, we evaluate the impact in leads $t+1$, $t+2$, and $t+3$ after the firm has received the grant.[15] For each dependent variable and lead we report two estimates, corresponding to the two definitions of the kernel function underlying each regression. In odd columns we report the estimates using a triangular kernel function, where observations are assigned a weight that declines symmetrically and linearly with the distance to the cut-off. In contrast, in even columns we use an Epanechnikov kernel to set the weight as a quadratic decaying – see M. D. Cattaneo et al. (2020). In both cases, observations outside the bandwidth have a zero weight. We allow the bandwidth to differ on each cut-off side.[16] Following Gelman

comprises 2,611 firms, while the treated group contains 3,747 firms. Within the bandwidth used for the Triangular kernel estimation, the control group includes 669 firms, and the treated group has 2,409 firms.

[15] We drop observations where employment, value-added, labour productivity or TFP are zero.

[16] We replicated the estimations discussed below using a symmetric bandwidth and the results are consistent.

Table 4: RDD Estimation Results – No grant vs. a Single Grant

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	1.978***	2.025***	1.512***	1.396***	1.835***	1.793***
	(0.313)	(0.294)	(0.283)	(0.258)	(0.290)	(0.314)
N	6389	6389	5511	5511	4614	4614
Employment	0.120*	0.128**	-0.028	0.006	-0.012	0.072
	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.062)
N	6358	6358	5481	5481	4614	4614
Value-Added	0.201**	0.196***	0.085	0.097	0.093	0.198**
	(0.079)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.066)	(0.086)
N	6213	6213	5389	5389	4614	4614
Labour Productivity	0.110**	0.119***	0.046	0.088***	0.094***	0.095***
	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.030)
N	6194	6194	5374	5374	4614	4614
TFP	0.036	0.038	0.016	0.010	0.031	0.017
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.048)
N	6274	6274	5392	5392	4520	4520

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

and Imbens (2019), we use local linear RDD estimators.

Our estimations follow a non-parametric approach that includes covariates – see Calonico et al. (2019) for a detailed discussion of the methodology and Greenstone et al. (2022) for an application showing that it provides consistent results. We consider the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, size and sector of activity defined by the one letter code.[17] In line with M. D. Cattaneo et al. (2020), we clustered the standard errors. As the application year is different according to the calls, we cluster at the application year level.

The results presented in Table 4 indicate that, except for TFP, a single grant has a positive impact on firms' investment, employment, value-added and labour productivity.[18] However, the persistence of these effects varies among different outcomes. In terms of investment, and looking to the estimates based on the Epanechnikov kernel, the results show that three years after receiving the initial grant, firms' investment more than doubled. Conversely, the effect on employment stands at approximately 14% (computed as

[17] As a robustness check, we have also included as covariates NUTS III regions, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is an exporter, and the variables used in the TFP calculation (hours worked, and intermediates). Overall, the results from these estimates corroborate the results presented below.

[18] Following the suggestion of an anonymous referee, we estimated a set of models where we use the variables included in the TFP estimation as outcomes to analyse why TFP does not change. The results suggest that the absence of effects on TFP might be due to inefficiency in the allocation of capital.

$(e^{0.128} - 1) \times 100$), but is statistically significant only in the year immediately following the treatment. The average employment for treated firms is 27.7 (as shown in Panel A of Table 3 in the Appendix), implying an increase of nearly 4 employees.

One year after obtaining the first grant, firms' value-added experiences an increase of over 20% (+/- 15 percentage points, computed from the 95% confidence interval). No significant impact on value-added is observed two years after treatment. Our estimates reveal a value-added impact in the third year, statistically significant at the 5% level, although this significance disappears when the Triangular kernel is considered.

The positive impact on labour productivity is approximately 10% (+/- 6 percentage points) three years after the firm receives the initial grant. This effect remains significant across all three time leads. Given an average productivity of 30 thousand euros (Panel A of Table 3), the increase in productivity amounts to nearly 3 thousand euros.[19]

The impact of investment grants may change with firm-size. The economic rationale for public grants to firms is based on liquidity constraints, that may affect more micro and small-sized firms – see, for example, Fazzari et al. (1988) and Zwick and Mahon (2017). Public grants may foster firms' investment by reducing the cost of capital. Therefore, we expect the impact of grants to be stronger for micro and small-sized firms (e.g., Criscuolo et al., 2022). Our results for micro- and small-sized firms corroborate the findings in the empirical literature.

The results for micro-sized firms, Table 5, show that a single grant has an effect on investment, employment, value-added, and labour productivity. In comparison with the aggregated results presented in Table 4, we stress the following: the effect on employment persists in the three years following the receipt of the public grant, representing an increase of 15.3% (+/- 11 percentage points) after three years; the effect on value-added approaches 30% after three years; the impact on labour productivity is around 12%, but becomes non-significant after the first year following the grant receipt.

Concerning small-sized firms, the RDD plots presented in Figure 8 show discontinuities at the cut-off on investment, value-added, and labour productivity in lead $t + 3$. The results presented in Table 6 show that a single grant yields a favourable labour productivity increase of approximately 19% (statistically significant at the 5% level). This effect is more robust and enduring when contrasted with the effect of the public grant on micro-sized companies. Notably, there is no observable positive impact on employment. The positive influence on gross value-added is sustained only for a year after the company receives the public grant (around 21%, with a margin of +/- 17 percentage points). The stronger impact of grants on small-sized firms is in line with the studies of Bronzini and Iachini (2014), Decramer and Vanormelingen (2016), Howell (2017), Criscuolo et al. (2019), Srhoj, Škrinjarić, and Radas (2021), Santoleri et al. (2022) and Dechezleprêtre et al. (2023).

Combining micro- and small-sized firms, the results show a positive effect on value-added in the first

[19] As a robustness check, we implemented a placebo cut-off following M. D. Cattaneo et al. (2020). We set an artificial cut-off at 0.5 for the treated group evaluation and -0.5 for the control group. Overall, we found no statistically significant results. Furthermore, we replicated our estimates for different bandwidths around the threshold and the results remained consistent.

Table 5: RDD Estimation Results – No Grant vs. a Single Grant, Micro-sized Firms

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	1.630***	1.626***	1.947***	1.939***	1.833***	1.844***
	(0.374)	(0.365)	(0.509)	(0.521)	(0.572)	(0.605)
N	2603	2603	2224	2224	1929	1929
Employment	0.077*	0.094**	0.098**	0.105**	0.137**	0.143**
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.059)	(0.057)
N	2574	2574	2198	2198	1929	1929
Value-Added	0.194**	0.213**	0.064	0.072	0.260**	0.259**
	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.128)	(0.125)
N	2485	2485	2146	2146	1929	1929
Labour Productivity	0.114*	0.113**	0.009	0.017	0.075	0.073
	(0.059)	(0.052)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.056)	(0.059)
N	2468	2468	2131	2131	1929	1929
TFP	0.083	0.079	0.101	0.102	0.090	0.096
	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.109)	(0.110)
N	2500	2500	2117	2117	1845	1845

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.


and third leads (statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively) and a positive impact on investment and labour productivity during the three years following the awarding of a grant (statistically significant at the 1% level) – see Table 34 in the Appendix.

For medium- and large-sized firms, we did not find any positive impact on firms' performance – Table 7. The noteworthy outcome is the negative impact on value-added in the third lead, which is statistically significant at the 5% level of significance.

2.5.2 A single grant versus two grants

In this section, we implement the second step of our empirical strategy, which aims at evaluating the impact of an investment grant booster shot. We add as a control variable the amount of grant received in the first treatment and we define the bandwidth as 50% of applications in the neighbourhood of the threshold.[20]

[20]We also estimated the impact of a grant booster shot defining the bandwidth according to the optimization techniques discussed in Calonico et al. (2014). The results are consistent with the ones presented in this section – see Tables 35 and 36 in the Appendix.



(a) Investment (b) Employment

(c) Value-added (d) Labour Productivity

Note: Local linear plots based on a triangular kernel for outcomes in lead $t + 3$.

Figure 8: RDD Plots – No grant vs. a Single Grant, Small-sized Firms

Table 8 presents the estimates of the impact of a second grant on firms' performance.[21] The second grant only has a positive and statistically significant impact on investment in the first year at the 5% significance level. Compared to the effect of a single grant, Table 4, the impact on investment is considerably lower, and temporary. Regarding employment, our analysis suggests no significant effect. On the other hand, the results from Table 8, specifically in the Epanechnikov column, indicate that a grant booster shot positively and significantly impacts both value-added and labour productivity. This effect remains statistically significant for the three years after receiving the second grant for value-added and is observed in the first and third years for labour productivity. However, our estimates do not show any effect of the second grant on TFP. Overall, for value-added and labour productivity, the magnitude of the coefficients is much higher for an investment grant booster shot than for a single grant – see Table 4. The impact of a booster shot on value-added and labour productivity in lead $t + 3$ is more than twice as large as the

[21] Within the bandwidth used for the following estimations, the control and treatment groups account for 12% to 17% and 34% to 38% of the sample, respectively. For instance, when estimating the impact of a grant booster shot on employment in the first lead using a triangular kernel function, the sample comprises 817 observations, as shown in Table 8. The control group consists of 258 firms, while the treatment group contains 559 firms. When considering firms with scores close to the cut-off, the control group includes 138 firms and the treated group has 280 firms.

Table 6: RDD Estimation Results – No grant vs. a Single Grant, Small-sized Firms

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	1.791***	1.821***	1.008***	1.006***	0.915***	0.901***
	(0.468)	(0.482)	(0.348)	(0.349)	(0.340)	(0.344)
N	2987	2987	2595	2595	2115	2115
Employment	0.037	0.077	0.068	0.124	0.009	0.009
	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.096)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.089)
N	2985	2985	2594	2594	2115	2115
Value-Added	0.179**	0.188**	0.125	0.134	0.144	0.136
	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.096)	(0.092)
N	2943	2943	2561	2561	2115	2115
Labour Productivity	0.151***	0.143***	0.137**	0.142**	0.177**	0.171**
	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.084)	(0.081)
N	2941	2941	2561	2561	2115	2115
TFP	-0.006	-0.009	-0.039	-0.058	-0.014	-0.018
	(0.106)	(0.109)	(0.101)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.102)
N	2977	2977	2586	2586	2106	2106

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

one of a single grant. Three years after receiving the second grant, the positive impact on value-added is about 50% ($(e^{0.406}-1)\times 100$) and statistically significant at the 5% level. On labour productivity, the second grant has a positive effect of about 25% at the 1% significance level (+/- 17 percentage points, considering the 95% confidence interval), which means that considering an average labour productivity of 36 thousand euros, we expect an average increase of about 9 thousand euros.

Similar to our approach for no grant versus a single grant, we evaluate the potential heterogeneity in the impact of a second grant according to firm size. Since the number of observations for micro-sized firms and medium- and large-sized firms is small, we conducted a statistical power analysis by firm size – see Section A.1.2 of the Appendix. We conclude that for micro-sized firms and for medium- and large-sized firms, there is insufficient statistical power to detect economically relevant effects. As such, we present the results for micro- and small-sized firms combined, Table 9, and for small-sized firms, Table 10. The size of the firm is defined at the time it applies for a second grant.[22]

[22]As pointed out by an anonymous referee, if the amount of grants is different between micro-sized, small-sized, and medium-large-sized firms, the heterogeneity of the grant impacts by firm size could catch differences in the grant amounts by firm size. Table 33 in the Appendix shows that in our sample there are substantial differences across firm size as well as between single grant and multiple grants. In the case of a single grant there is not an obvious solution to account for the amount of the grant, as the value is only available for grant receivers. Under our identification strategy followed in the paper, we cannot address this issue. In the case of the booster shot we include in the estimations the grant amount received in the

Table 7: RDD Estimation Results – No grant vs. a Single Grant, Medium- and Large-sized Firms

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.311	0.193	0.081	-0.018	1.276*	1.032
	(0.538)	(0.516)	(0.308)	(0.361)	(0.679)	(0.653)
N	799	799	692	692	570	570
Employment	-0.019	-0.072	0.026	-0.036	-0.030	-0.092
	(0.160)	(0.152)	(0.172)	(0.170)	(0.232)	(0.214)
N	799	799	689	689	570	570
Value-Added	-0.023	-0.042	-0.089	-0.109	-0.352**	-0.366**
	(0.137)	(0.135)	(0.148)	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.146)
N	785	785	682	682	570	570
Labour Productivity	0.056	0.093	-0.031	0.017	-0.173*	-0.122
	(0.062)	(0.067)	(0.092)	(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.116)
N	785	785	682	682	570	570
TFP	-0.044	-0.036	-0.098	-0.096	-0.070	-0.084
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.149)	(0.148)	(0.166)	(0.173)
N	797	797	689	689	569	569

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

We found a statistically significant positive impact of an investment booster shot on investment, value-added, and labour productivity for micro- and small-sized firms, as shown in Table 9. The positive impact on investment is statistically significant at the 1% level in the first lead, but is transitory. The investment grant booster shot has a positive impact on value-added in the first lead of approximately 32% ($(e^{0.279} - 1) \times 100$), statistically significant at the 5% significance level, while in the third lead it is only statistically significant at the 10% significance level. We found a positive impact on labour productivity in the first and third leads of about 26% ($(e^{0.229} - 1) \times 100$), significant at the 5% level.

Focusing on small-sized firms, our estimates in Table 10 reinforce the conclusion that a grant booster shot has a positive impact on investment. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level in the first year and at the 5% level in the second year. There is a sizeable, but transitory, positive effect in the first year on value-added of approximately 65% ($(e^{0.504} - 1) \times 100$) and on labour productivity of about 45% ($(e^{0.385} - 1) \times 100$), both statistically significant at a 1% level. The results for small-sized firms corroborate the conclusion of no impact of a second investment grant on TFP.

Following Calonico et al. (2014), we analyze the effect of the second grant for small-sized firms using an optimized bandwidth. The results, detailed in Table 36 in the Appendix, are broadly in line with those

first treatment.

Table 8: RDD Estimation Results – a Single Grant vs. Two Grants

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.975**	0.913**	0.493	0.530	1.159	1.260
	(0.396)	(0.375)	(0.536)	(0.509)	(0.886)	(0.900)
N	817	817	756	756	729	729
Employment	0.057	0.065	0.156*	0.162*	0.133	0.130
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.168)	(0.157)
N	817	817	756	756	729	729
Value-Added	0.243**	0.242**	0.214*	0.210*	0.398**	0.406**
	(0.102)	(0.098)	(0.124)	(0.117)	(0.193)	(0.202)
N	804	804	744	744	729	729
Labour Productivity	0.194**	0.187**	0.080	0.071	0.216***	0.228***
	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.083)	(0.088)
N	803	803	744	744	729	729
TFP	0.114	0.075	0.120	0.086	0.179	0.182
	(0.241)	(0.239)	(0.262)	(0.259)	(0.247)	(0.243)
N	808	808	747	747	716	716

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of grant in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

presented in Table 10. The notable difference is the positive impact of the grant booster shot on labour productivity in the third year, strengthening the conclusion of a beneficial effect on labour productivity. The coefficient's magnitude is considerably greater for small-sized firms when compared to the entire sample (Table 8), and to micro- and small-sized firms (Table 9). Hence, an investment grant booster shot appears to effectively enhance the performance of small-sized firms.

2.6 Robustness checks

In this section, we present the results of robustness checks for our empirical analysis. First, we consider estimations specific to the manufacturing sector; second, given the specificities of R&D investment projects we exclude them from the sample; and finally, we conduct a "donut" analysis to account for the possibility of sorting in the selection process.

First robustness check The manufacturing sector is the most representative in our sample. For example, in the estimations presented in Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 the manufacturing sector accounted for, respectively, 34.2% and 47.9% of the sample – see Tables 37 and 38 in the Appendix.

Table 9: RDD Estimation Results – a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Micro- and Small-sized Firms

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	1.266***	1.202***	0.639	0.724	1.267	1.435
	(0.437)	(0.410)	(0.719)	(0.655)	(1.041)	(1.050)
N	614	614	565	565	541	541
Employment	0.054	0.076	0.119	0.141*	0.084	0.101
	(0.082)	(0.078)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.204)	(0.196)
N	614	614	565	565	541	541
Value-Added	0.268**	0.279**	0.193	0.206*	0.337*	0.356*
	(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.121)	(0.115)	(0.183)	(0.184)
N	601	601	554	554	541	541
Labour productivity	0.243**	0.229**	0.116	0.101	0.225*	0.229**
	(0.100)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.094)	(0.121)	(0.114)
N	600	600	554	554	541	541
TFP	0.251	0.212	0.273	0.238	0.352	0.350
	(0.263)	(0.268)	(0.315)	(0.313)	(0.283)	(0.282)
N	605	605	556	556	528	528

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of grant in the first grant and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

For the manufacturing sector, the results regarding the impact of a single grant can be seen in Table 11. The findings for investment and TFP are consistent with the estimates discussed in Section 2.5.1. However, there are noticeable changes for employment, value-added and labour productivity. First, regarding employment, firms in the manufacturing sector that received the grant experienced a stronger impact on employment, which amounts to almost 29% in lead three – see Table 11. Second, firms in the manufacturing sector exhibit a higher increase in value-added over three leads – almost 24 percentage points relative to our baseline case. The impact is of 45.5% ($(e^{0.375}-1)\times 100$). Third, unlike the findings for the whole sample presented in Table 4, the manufacturing sector does not exhibit a significant impact of grants on labour productivity, although the magnitude of the estimate is in line with the one we find for the whole sample.

The estimates for micro-sized firms, Table 39 in the Appendix, confirm the positive impact of a single grant on investment, employment and value-added that we found when we consider the sample with all sectors (Table 5). Nevertheless, for manufacturing micro-sized firms, a single grant has no impact on labour productivity throughout the three leads.

From the results for manufacturing small-sized firms, Table 40 in the Appendix, we highlight three aspects. First, the short-term impact on value-added loses its statistical significance compared with the

Table 10: RDD Estimation Results – a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Small-sized firms

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	1.593***	1.488***	1.763**	1.789**	1.765	1.787
	(0.604)	(0.527)	(0.830)	(0.811)	(1.149)	(1.116)
N	435	435	405	405	385	385
Employment	0.087	0.085	0.090	0.082	0.108	0.093
	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.260)	(0.249)
N	435	435	405	405	385	385
Value-Added	0.504***	0.504***	0.265	0.246	0.451	0.423
	(0.195)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.308)	(0.321)
N	431	431	403	403	385	385
Labour Productivity	0.386**	0.385***	0.188	0.183	0.299	0.285
	(0.150)	(0.147)	(0.134)	(0.132)	(0.210)	(0.215)
N	431	431	403	403	385	385
TFP	0.459	0.391	0.421	0.346	0.383	0.345
	(0.324)	(0.323)	(0.390)	(0.378)	(0.555)	(0.550)
N	435	435	404	404	382	382

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of grant in the first grant and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

estimates considering all sectors (Table 6). Second, a positive impact on labour productivity is visible in the first lead. Third, we stress the positive and significant impact of a grant on TFP in leads one and two for small-sized firms in the manufacturing sector.

Combining micro- and small-sized firms in the manufacturing sector (Table 41 in the Appendix), the positive impact of a single grant on investment and value-added is in line with the estimations including all sectors (Table 34 in the Appendix). However, there are two noticeable differences between the two samples. Firstly, micro- and small-sized firms in the manufacturing sector seem to increase their employment in the third year after receiving an investment grant (statistically significant at the 5% level). Secondly, in the manufacturing sector, we do not find statistically significant results for labour productivity.

Our findings on the impact of an investment grant booster shot within the manufacturing sector are detailed in Tables 12, 13, and 42 in the Appendix. When evaluating manufacturing firms of all sizes, Table 12, the results on value-added corroborate our main estimations (Table 8). Specifically, a second investment grant produces a positive effect in lead one. The impact stands at approximately 35.5%, surpassing the 27.4% observed for the whole sample. Contrary to our main findings for all economic sectors, the impact on labour productivity for the manufacturing sector emerges only in the third lead – see Table 12.

Table 11: RDD Estimation Results – No Grant vs. a Single Grant, Manufacturing Sector

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	2.320***	2.281***	2.201***	2.098***	2.025***	1.930***
	(0.470)	(0.463)	(0.527)	(0.525)	(0.388)	(0.410)
N	2178	2178	1848	1848	1411	1411
Employment	0.124	0.136	0.198*	0.203**	0.247**	0.254**
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.116)	(0.121)
N	2175	2175	1842	1842	1411	1411
Value-Added	0.254***	0.252***	0.206***	0.210***	0.388***	0.375***
	(0.085)	(0.082)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.139)	(0.131)
N	2129	2129	1822	1822	1411	1411
Labour Productivity	0.061	0.054	-0.021	-0.004	0.122	0.129
	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.087)	(0.087)
N	2127	2127	1821	1821	1411	1411
TFP	0.224*	0.232*	0.222*	0.175	0.124	0.043
	(0.134)	(0.132)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.128)	(0.121)
N	2168	2168	1833	1833	1405	1405

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age and size. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application/year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

When focusing on micro- and small-sized manufacturing firms, we do not find an effect of an investment grant booster shot on labour productivity – see Table 42 in the Appendix. The positive impact on value-added in the first lead is consistent with what we find for all economic sectors (Table 9).

For small-sized manufacturing firms, the estimates presented in Table 13 show a positive and significant effect on value-added and labour productivity, which is in line with the results for all sectors (Table 10). However, for the manufacturing sector, we find no positive effects on investment.

Second robustness check In our main estimations, we included the three systems of incentives: the Innovation Incentive System, the Qualification Incentive System, and the Research and Development Incentive System – see Section 2.2. The goals and the specificities of R&D investment projects are expected to take longer to impact on firms' performance. Therefore, as a robustness check, we exclude the applications to the Research and Development Incentive System and replicate our estimations as defined in our empirical strategy.

The estimates from this new sample, Tables 14 and 15, align with the findings of our baseline estimates (Tables 4 and 8, respectively). In the case of a single grant, we observe a robust impact on investment and a mildly visible effect on employment in the first lead. There is also an immediate positive

Table 12: RDD Estimation Results – a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Manufacturing Sector

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.344	0.477	-0.053	0.094	-0.267	0.059
	(0.943)	(0.985)	(0.910)	(0.930)	(1.429)	(1.472)
N	392	392	363	363	354	354
Employment	0.208	0.210*	0.245	0.251	0.178	0.198
	(0.130)	(0.123)	(0.199)	(0.194)	(0.302)	(0.299)
N	392	392	363	363	354	354
Value-Added	0.308**	0.304**	0.153	0.154	0.477*	0.556*
	(0.139)	(0.143)	(0.128)	(0.123)	(0.284)	(0.328)
N	388	388	362	362	354	354
Labour Productivity	0.077	0.063	-0.112	-0.116	0.231*	0.264**
	(0.135)	(0.131)	(0.114)	(0.107)	(0.123)	(0.118)
N	388	388	362	362	354	354
TFP	0.558*	0.499	0.513	0.443	0.752	0.664
	(0.323)	(0.324)	(0.387)	(0.376)	(0.546)	(0.517)
N	391	391	362	362	353	353

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of grant in the first grant and size. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

and significant influence on value-added – see Table 14. Labour productivity shows an effect after three years, ranging between 8% and 10%. However, we found no discernible effects on TFP. As observed in the baseline case, an investment grant booster shot, Table 15, yields immediate effects on investment, while showing no significant impacts on employment and TFP. There is an effect on value-added in the first lead. Furthermore, there is an impact of 30% on labour productivity after three years.

Aggregating micro- and small-sized firms, the results in Table 43 in the Appendix show a positive and statistically significant impact of a single grant on investment, value-added, and labour productivity, consistent with the results including R&D grants (Table 34 in the Appendix). The impact of a single grant on labour productivity is statistically significant at the 1% level for the three leads. The results for the second grant (Table 44 in the Appendix), combining micro- and small-sized firms, also align with previous findings (Table 9). Excluding R&D grants, the second grant has a positive effect on labour productivity in the first and third leads, statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

For small-sized firms, Table 45 in the Appendix, we find no positive effects of a single grant on employment and TFP. However, there is a positive impact on value-added in lead one, in line with the results including R&D grants (Table 6). The significant effects on labour productivity take place in the first two leads. Analysing the effects of a grant booster shot, the results in Table 46 in the Appendix show a

Table 13: RDD Estimation Results – a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Manufacturing Sector, Small-sized Firms

Dependent variable (in logs)	t+1		t+2		t+3	
	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.955	1.068	0.431	0.533	-0.639	-0.631
	(0.646)	(0.661)	(0.660)	(0.631)	(1.338)	(1.282)
N	226	226	209	209	201	201
Employment	0.108	0.102	0.102	0.105	-0.004	0.003
	(0.176)	(0.173)	(0.267)	(0.272)	(0.487)	(0.491)
N	226	226	209	209	201	201
Value-Added	0.464**	0.439**	0.192	0.174	0.225	0.212
	(0.193)	(0.199)	(0.177)	(0.175)	(0.358)	(0.371)
N	223	223	208	208	201	201
Labour Productivity	0.352***	0.332***	0.102	0.090	0.228	0.207
	(0.123)	(0.122)	(0.139)	(0.133)	(0.190)	(0.189)
N	223	223	208	208	201	201
TFP	0.515	0.423	0.312	0.202	0.479	0.359
	(0.520)	(0.523)	(0.668)	(0.671)	(1.006)	(0.996)
N	226	226	208	208	200	200

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age and amount of grant in the first grant. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

consistent positive effect on labour productivity for small-sized firms over three consecutive years. Our previous results, considering all three incentive systems, showed a positive impact on labour productivity that only lasted for one lead (Table 10). Comparing the magnitude of the effects for small-sized firms with that for micro- and small-sized firms combined (excluding R&D grants), the impact of a second grant on labour productivity seems to be stronger for small-sized firms – see Tables 44 and 46 in the Appendix.

Third robustness check The slight concentration of scores above the threshold visible in Figures 5 and 6 could be a sign of sorting in the selection process, which would invalidate our RDD analysis. Therefore, following Barreca et al. (2011), we implement a series of "donut" RDD regressions. Our analysis is carried out in three stages: first, we excluded scores of 0; next, scores between -0.02 and 0.02 were omitted; and finally, scores in the range of -0.05 to 0.05 were dropped.[23] See Tables 47 through 52 in the Appendix for a breakdown of the results. Overall, the results of the "donut" analysis corroborate the results presented in Section 2.5. Considering the zero versus one treatment, for the

[23] For example, looking at the impact of the single treatment in the first lead, $t+1$, in general, the proportion of observations eliminated in each stage represents roughly 4%, 5%, and 7% of the entire sample, respectively – see Tables 47, 48 and 49 in the Appendix.

Table 14: RDD Estimation Results – No Grant vs. a Single Grant, Excluding R&D Grants

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	1.963***	1.982***	1.502***	1.363***	1.791***	1.743***
	(0.324)	(0.304)	(0.282)	(0.249)	(0.332)	(0.351)
N	6119	6119	5259	5259	4390	4390
Employment	0.115	0.106*	-0.039	0.003	-0.024	0.071
	(0.070)	(0.061)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.065)
N	6089	6089	5230	5230	4390	4390
Value-Added	0.159**	0.154**	0.064	0.068	0.041	0.172**
	(0.079)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.076)	(0.064)	(0.086)
N	5945	5945	5141	5141	4390	4390
Labour Productivity	0.079*	0.085**	0.027	0.068*	0.082**	0.079**
	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.036)
N	5927	5927	5127	5127	4390	4390
TFP	0.032	0.034	0.014	-0.001	0.025	0.017
	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.050)
N	6006	6006	5144	5144	4297	4297

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

overall sample, Tables 47, 48 and 49, the results are very robust: highly significant positive effect on investment, an immediate return on employment, which disappears for leads two and three. The positive effect on value-added becomes more evident when we drop those observations exactly in the cut-off, being statistically significant at the 1% level in leads one and three (except in lead three under the triangular kernel, when it is significant at the 5% significance level). The results for productivity reported in Section 2.5.1 are fully corroborated for those three stages. Considering the grant booster shot, Tables 50, 51 and 52 in the Appendix, the main difference to the results reported in Section 2.5.2 is the lack of an effect on investment, and a slight decrease in significance for labour productivity, which is statistically significant at the 5% significance level when we drop observations with scores between -0.05 and 0.05 – see Table 52 in the Appendix.

As an additional verification, we have analysed if there is manipulation of firms' application scores. We follow M. Cattaneo et al. (2020) and conduct manipulation tests on the density of the running variable, that is, the scores. Our results indicate no significant differences in the number of observations just above and below the cut-off for both the score distributions of no grant versus a single grant and for the score distribution of a single grant versus two grants. In the first case, the test statistic is 0.30 with a corresponding p-value of 0.76, while in the second case, the statistic is 0.38 with a p-value of 0.71.

Table 15: RDD Estimation Results – a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Excluding R&D Grants

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.815*	0.825*	0.187	0.280	1.048	1.221
	(0.484)	(0.477)	(0.601)	(0.573)	(0.903)	(0.900)
N	661	661	600	600	573	573
Employment	0.000	0.014	0.085	0.095	0.040	0.040
	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.171)	(0.165)
N	661	661	600	600	573	573
Value-Added	0.212**	0.219**	0.151	0.153	0.360*	0.370*
	(0.099)	(0.097)	(0.129)	(0.126)	(0.199)	(0.210)
N	650	650	589	589	573	573
Labour Productivity	0.216**	0.211**	0.104	0.096	0.256***	0.270***
	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.081)	(0.085)
N	649	649	589	589	573	573
TFP	0.073	0.057	0.060	0.040	0.095	0.095
	(0.274)	(0.275)	(0.300)	(0.300)	(0.267)	(0.265)
N	653	653	593	593	562	562

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of grant in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

2.7 Concluding remarks

ERDF support to firms' investment has been a pivotal instrument in Portuguese policymakers' toolkit to promote competitiveness and productivity. These objectives are of utmost importance, especially considering the Portuguese economy has experienced an extended period of low growth, prolonged productivity stagnation, and economic divergence throughout the 21st century. In the period 2007-2018, a high share of total ERDF has been allocated to a small number of firms that have received multiple grants. Awarding several grants to the same firm, rather than distributing them to firms that have never benefited from a public grant for an investment plan, raises concerns about the effectiveness of this strategy in enhancing firm performance and the eligibility criteria used. In fact, several authors have noted the risk that firms receiving multiple grants might rely on government funding without bringing any benefits to the country or society. On the other hand, the concentration of funds on a small number of firms may be more effective to foster firms' productivity growth. Therefore, evaluating the impact of these investment grant booster shots on firm performance is of paramount importance, both for equity and efficiency reasons.

Our results show that a single grant has a positive impact on firms' employment, value-added and labour productivity. Concerning the analysis of the impact of awarding a second grant to the same firm, our estimates show that it affects its value-added and labour productivity. The magnitude of these effects

from the grant booster shot is significantly greater than that of a single grant. These findings suggest that allocating multiple grants to the same firm might be an effective strategy for enhancing labour productivity. A more granular analysis shows that only micro-sized and small-sized firms benefit from a single investment grant, namely on value-added and labour productivity. Regarding the effects of an investment grant booster shot, while the overall positive effect on labour productivity is confirmed for the micro- and small-sized firms, the analysis for other firm sizes warrants further research. It is also worth noting that we observed no effect on total factor productivity, regardless of whether it was a single or second grant.

In conclusion, while there is scope to improve programs funded by ERDF, our results indicate that an investment grant booster shot can be effective in enhancing firm performance. This research may contribute to improve the program design of grants allocation. The success of those firms' projects is vital for the transformation of Portugal into an innovation-driven economy. Two avenues to consider in further research include the certification effects of grants and the role of the characteristics of founders and managers in the impact of grants on firm performance.

3

Industry concentration in Europe: Trends and methodological insights

3.1 Introduction

Competition plays a pivotal role in fostering innovation, efficiency, and enhancing consumer welfare.[1] Consequently, there is widespread recognition across academic and policy circles of the importance of promoting a dynamic competitive environment (Aghion et al., 2005; Babina et al., 2023; Backus, 2020; Buccirossi et al., 2013).

While competition is conceptually straightforward and theoretically well-defined, there is no direct empirical method to measure it. Therefore, the economic literature has developed alternative proxies to assess the degree of competition. Market concentration, defined as the output share of a market accounted for by the largest firms, serves as a key proxy for competition (or lack thereof) and it is widely used by governments, competition authorities, and researchers. The underlying idea is that a high level of concentration may reflect excessive barriers to entry or collusion of market leaders.

In recent years, a lively debate has emerged regarding whether market concentration has increased across Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (Bajgar et al., 2023) and to what extent this reflects a decrease in competition. While most studies document a rise in concentration (Autor et al., 2020; Barkai, 2020; Bighelli et al., 2023; Covarrubias et al., 2019; Furman & Orszag, 2015), a few have found concentration to be flat or even decreasing (Amiti & Heise, 2024; Benkard et al., 2021; Gutierrez & Philippon, 2023; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2023). These differences come either from the type of data used, the country or countries covered, or the methodological decisions taken to measure concentration.

Although the concept of concentration is conceptually intuitive, several methodological decisions must be made to measure it (OECD, 2018). One of the most critical decisions is defining the relevant market. The antitrust and competition communities identify the latter as the bundle of products that consumers

[1] This chapter is co-authored with Sara Calligaris, Chiara Criscuolo, Josh De Lyon, Andrea Greppi and Oliviero Pallanch, and is published as Calligaris, Chaves, et al. (2024a).

perceive as substitutes, based on product characteristics and the geographic region from which customers can purchase.[2] This seemingly simple definition, however, often poses significant empirical challenges. There is no clear definition of which products should be included within a single market and, due to data limitations, most studies rely on industry-level data instead of product-level data. Moreover, while competition can occur at local, national, or international levels depending on the specific market characteristics, all existing studies typically consider a single level of aggregation to define the geographic boundaries of a market. Additionally, researchers and practitioners must decide which firm boundaries to consider – for example single firms or business groups.

As a result, the literature is characterised by differences between alternative approaches, leading to different concentration measures. These variations have sometimes resulted in opposing conclusions about the evolution of concentration over time. Understanding whether and how different assumptions shape the measurement of concentration is crucial for drawing accurate conclusions about the state of competition.

This paper measures concentration using the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4), which is the ratio between the total output of the four largest business groups and the total output in the market. The paper makes three important contributions to the existing literature. First and foremost, it introduces several methodological refinements in the measurement of concentration: it defines industries at a more disaggregated level; it calculates concentration at the geographic level at which competition takes place; and it accounts for linkages between firms within the same business group in the geographic region of competition. Second, it applies such improvements to representative data for 15 OECD countries and shows that average concentration increased by about 5 percentage points (henceforth, p.p.) over the period 2000-2019, from 26% to slightly more than 31%. Third, the paper conducts a thorough investigation to assess if and how each of the methodological improvements affects the levels and the trends of concentration. Overall, this study provides robust evidence on the evolution of concentration in OECD countries and informs future analyses of concentration on the importance of robust measurement decisions.

The first methodological innovation consists of defining industries, in a cross-country study, at a more granular level compared to much of the existing literature. The finer granularity of industry detail brings the concentration measure closer to the true definition of a market in the absence of data at the product market level. Unlike previous representative cross-country studies that measure concentration at the 2-digit level (for example, Bajgar et al., 2023 and Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2023), industries are defined in this study mostly at the 3-digit NACE Rev.2 level (with some higher aggregations due to data constraints). Additionally, supplementary analysis is conducted at the 4-digit level for selected manufacturing industries (where data quality allows).[3]

[2]The concept allows to identify the boundaries of the market in which companies compete and is used to assess market power for competition policy purposes. See Commission (1997).

[3]Note that the IMF (2019) use data at the 4-digit industry level. However, they rely for both the numerator and the denominator of the concentration measure on the Orbis dataset. Orbis is not representative of the entire population of firms, has poor coverage for small firms, and heterogenous coverage among countries (see Bajgar et al., 2020 and Bajgar et al., 2019 for further details). Therefore, Orbis is not a suitable dataset to compute the denominator of the concentration measure

Second, for each industry, concentration is measured at the geographic level at which competition takes place. The geographical boundaries of each industry are determined by a taxonomy of geographic competition developed in Calligaris, Criscuolo, et al. (2024). Industries may differ in their extent of international integration due to differences in their physical characteristics, technology, and policies. For example, industries such as "Manufacture of communication equipment" operate in global markets in which firms from all over the world can potentially reach any customers. In contrast, industries like "food services" are constrained to serving local customers only. Understanding the degree of internationalisation across industries allows to characterise the geographical boundaries of markets, which is crucial from a competition perspective. By comparing the value of European trade, extra-European trade, and the value of domestic sales in each industry, the taxonomy developed by Calligaris, Criscuolo, et al. (2024) defines the geographical dimension at which each industry competes. Industries are classified as competing mainly at the domestic level (i.e., nationally), at the European level, or global level.[4] [5] The three geographical categories will be also referred to, throughout the paper, as geographical buckets.

Importantly, by aggregating firms' activities at the relevant geographic level determined by the taxonomy, the present concentration measure accounts for firms' sales to other countries within the same geographical market region. Put differently, the taxonomy indirectly accounts for international trade within the relevant geography, even in the absence of firm-level trade data, which are not available in a cross-country setting. Recent research by Amiti and Heise (2024) shows that concentration in the United States has not increased when accounting for the growth of import penetration. The present analysis accounts for such trade within the relevant geographic level of competition by aggregating activities across countries within the relevant geographic region.[6] In addition, robustness checks are conducted considering the role of imports and exports from outside the geographic region and from countries not included in the sample.

In what follows, the term market will refer to the combination of the industry dimension – mainly defined at 3-digit level – and the geographical scope implied by the taxonomy developed by Calligaris, Criscuolo, et al. (2024). The baseline concentration measure is computed at the corresponding level.

Third, relying on the procedure of Bajgar et al. (2023), ownership linkages between firms are accounted for, and all the subsidiaries belonging to the same business group and active in the same market are treated as a unique entity. This paper makes a step further with respect to Bajgar et al. (2023) by

especially when comparing countries over time. This paper overcomes this difficulty by obtaining production data at the 3-digit level that are representative of the firm population and comparable across countries and, as such, suitable to capture the overall size of the industry output (e.g., the denominator of the concentration measure). A detailed description on how the internationally comparable production data at such a level of granularity, can be found in Calligaris, Criscuolo, et al. (2024).

[4] In this cross-country setting, data on sub-national activities of firms are not available. Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2021) show that concentration measured at the local level in the United States may have declined. However, Autor et al. (2023) show that only local employment concentration fell, while local sales concentration increased.

[5] The taxonomy is developed from a European standpoint, drawing on data from 15 European countries. However, the distinction between whether an industry is tradeable or non-tradeable is likely to have broadly applicability, albeit with some caution, to non-European countries. See Calligaris, Criscuolo, et al. (2024) for further details.

[6] As an example: industry "052" (Mining of lignite) is classified as domestic and, therefore, industry "052" in France and industry "052" in Germany represent two distinct markets. Industry "132" (Weaving of textiles) is instead classified as European and, therefore, industry "132" is considered as a unique market across European countries.

also relying on the taxonomy developed in Calligaris, Criscuolo, et al. (2024) to define the geographical boundaries of markets. Bajgar et al. (2023) considered all industries as competing domestically or, alternatively, at the European level, and summed the activities of firms within business groups accordingly. The present paper, instead, accounts for business group linkages across countries included within the relevant geographic market of each industry. Therefore, concentration is computed at a different level of geographical aggregation depending on the industry considered and the activities of business groups are aggregated accordingly. This is a key contribution of the paper as it allows to account for the overall sales of multinational firms in any relevant market, and to consider the role of mergers and acquisitions in driving concentration trends. Neglecting these ownership linkages, as well as their heterogenous geographical extension across industries, may lead to underestimating concentration. The propensity to consolidate in groups can indeed be different across industries and could for example depend on the geographical level at which competition takes place.

These three important methodological improvements are then applied to analyse concentration trends in a cross-country setting. To do so, significant efforts have been made to construct the final dataset, which includes 127 industries, mostly at the 3-digit level, for fifteen European countries over the period 2000-2019, as detailed in Calligaris, Criscuolo, et al. (2024).[7]

The final dataset has been obtained by merging detailed data collected from numerous sources. The total value of production for each industry-country-year is a key variable used to compute the denominator of the concentration measure. Production data is collected from National Accounts (NA), the Structural Analysis (STAN) database, and Eurostat's Structural Business Statistics (SBS). The primary source for firms' production and ownership linkages information, needed to compute the numerator of the concentration ratio, comes from Moody's Orbis database, which is supplemented with data from the Orbis M&A database of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). The comparison and robustness exercises leverage on international trade flows data from OECD Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) tables, the "Base pour l'Analyse du Commerce International" (BACI) dataset, and the Trade in Services by Partner (TISP) data.[8]

The study finds that, on average and over the period considered, concentration increased by 5 p.p., from an initial level of 26% to 31%. Interestingly, the taxonomy of geographic competition also enables concentration trends to be examined separately for industries competing mainly at the domestic, European, and global levels. Industries competing at the domestic level have higher levels of concentration, on average 40% over the period considered, and have experienced the highest increase in concentration, of approximately 6 p.p. over the period analysed. Industries competing at the European and global levels exhibit lower levels of concentration, on average approximately 28%, and have experienced a slightly less pronounced increase in concentration of approximately 4 p.p. These findings, obtained in a large cross-countries sample and applying relevant methodological improvements, are in line with several analyses

[7] For industries competing at global level, three additional non-European countries are included in the analysis (Japan, Korea and USA).

[8] For further details on the data, and on the methodological steps required to prepare them, please refer to the companion paper by Calligaris, Criscuolo, et al. (2024).

in the literature suggesting a decline of competition in the markets (Autor et al., 2020; Barkai, 2020; Covarrubias et al., 2019; Furman & Orszag, 2015).

As an additional key contribution, the paper provides – in a harmonised empirical framework – a careful examination of the impact of each of the methodological improvements discussed above on concentration trends. Even though there has been a lively debate in recent years about the evolution of concentration across many economies and despite the relevance of the topic from a policy perspective, no unanimous conclusion has been reached on whether concentration has been rising. This lack of consensus is primarily due to differences in methodologies and data.[9] Given the importance of promoting competition and understanding its evolution, it is important to assess the impact of these methodological choices, which this paper does in a harmonised cross-country setting.

Thus, the paper first assesses the choice of the level of industry aggregation.[10] Concentration is computed at different levels of industry aggregation (2-digit vs. 3-digit for most industries and, only for few selected industries, at 3-digit vs. 4-digit). Narrowly defined industries are more closely related to consumer product markets, thus providing a more accurate measure of concentration perceived by consumers. Implementing this step required the development of a novel cross-country harmonised dataset.[11] The level of concentration is substantially higher when industries are more disaggregated, although trends remain similar. The finding that concentration is higher as markets are defined more narrowly is likely to be due to the following reason. At broad industry levels, such as the 2-digit level, even the largest business groups are unlikely to be active and sell in all the different 3-digit industries. In more narrowly defined, and hence specialised, industries, large players are more likely to participate in all the economic activities within the industry.

Second, concentration measures which consider the geographical level of competition for each industry, predicted by the taxonomy in Calligaris, Criscuolo, et al. (2024), are compared to measures that do not account for the taxonomy. As explained above, when relying on the taxonomy, concentration is computed for each industry at a different geographical level: either domestic, European, or global.

Without the taxonomy, as standard in most of the literature, all industries are assumed to compete at the domestic (i.e., national) level. The exercise shows that neglecting the taxonomy and, therefore, the geographic boundaries of the market, leads to an overestimation of both the level and growth of concentration. When computing concentration using the taxonomy, the sales of the subsidiaries of a business group active in the same industry are summed over various countries.

A third exercise considers the role of international trade when measuring concentration, in the spirit of Amiti and Heise (2024). Even though the taxonomy accounts for international trade within the region,

[9] For example, some papers argued that concentration has been flat in the United States when accounting for international trade (Amiti & Heise, 2024), when defining the market at a detailed product market level (Benkard et al., 2021), or at local geographical level (Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2021).

[10] It is beyond the scope of the present paper to provide a comparison between product market concentration and industry concentration. While this is conceptually important, it relies on access to product market data and is, thus, left for future work.

[11] In particular, it has required to develop a methodology (see Calligaris, Criscuolo, et al., 2024 for the details) to apportion 2-digit level figures coming from National Accounts, which are representative of the population of firms and comparable across countries at the 3-digit.

it does not account for trade from countries outside the region.[12] Using industry-level trade data enables additional trade adjustments to be made. However, as international trade affects both the sales of the top four firms and the total market size (respectively, numerator and denominator of the concentration measure) while firm-level trade data are not available, strong assumptions must be made to implement trade adjustments to the numerator in this setting. Despite this, the results are informative, and suggest that adjusting for international trade dampens the rise in concentration, in line with Amiti and Heise (2024). In contrast to their paper, which finds that US concentration is flat after accounting for trade, average concentration still increases in the EU even after accounting for trade flows. However, the trade correction does dampen the increasing trend found for the baseline concentration measure, suggesting, in line with Amiti and Heise, an increase in import competition over the period considered.

The fourth exercise computes concentration trends neglecting the ownership linkages between firms. In the baseline concentration measure, the sales of all subsidiaries belonging to the same business group and active in the same market are summed up, and the sales of the four largest business groups (rather than firms) in market are summed up to get the numerator of the concentration measures. In the alternative measure, instead, each subsidiary is considered as a separate entity and, thus, the numerator is computed at the firm, rather than the business group, level. As expected, not considering the business group dimension leads to lower levels of concentration across all geographical buckets, with the difference being larger in the European market.

The results also show that ignoring the role of business groups and their dynamics would lead to underestimating the growth in concentration over the twenty years considered. Without accounting for business groups, concentration has been relatively flat in industries competing at the European and global level, whilst still rising in domestic industries. This suggests that the increase in concentration when accounting for business group linkages is at least partly driven by the expansion of business groups through their subsidiaries, or through acquiring new subsidiaries both within and across borders, rather than individual firms getting a larger share of market sales.

While the proposed refinements affect the average level of concentration and the magnitude of its increase over time, which explains the mixed findings in the literature, the direction of its evolution remain consistent, with concentration increasing across almost all specifications.

The structure of the paper is the following. While the remainder of this introduction reviews the relevant literature, Section 3.3 describes the various datasets used in the analysis. The methodology used to define concentration is outlined in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents trends of the baseline concentration measure, as well as several exercises showing how the different methodological decisions (geographic aggregation, industry aggregation, trade corrections, and ownership structure of business groups) affect the aggregate concentration trends. Finally, Section 3.6 draws together all the analysis and discusses some implications.

[12] Due to data limitation, some European countries, such as Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, are not included in the sample. Therefore, trade with these countries is not accounted for automatically by the taxonomy.

3.2 Literature review

Concentration is considered a proxy for competition and has been used widely in academic and policy circles (OECD, 2021).[13] For example, the European Commission considers a firm as dominant if its market share exceeds 40% of the relevant market. This notwithstanding, as it emerges from the industrial organisation literature, the theoretical relationship between competition and concentration is not univocal. In elementary models, it is possible to have competitive outcomes with high concentration (Bertrand) or with lower concentration (Cournot). The relationship becomes more nuanced when product differentiation is added to the models. The trade literature shows that an increase in competition from foreign firms due to a fall in trade costs can lead to a rise in the market share of the most productive domestic firms (Melitz, 2003). For classic discussions on the topic, see Demsetz (1973), who pointed out how high concentration can be the outcome of a competitive process, with firms gaining market shares outperforming rivals, and Schmalensee (1989), who reviewed the early literature relating concentration with other proxies of competition. For more recent references see Berry et al. (2019) and Syverson (2019), who provide an overview of the advantages and drawbacks of using concentration to assess market power.

There is an extensive literature measuring trends in concentration. The works vary in the country covered, type of data used, and methodological decisions taken to define concentration, mostly concerning the boundaries of markets. Most studies are based on measures defined at the industry level, as industry-level data are more readily available. In contrast, few studies measure product market concentration, which is more directly in line with practices used by competition authorities in antitrust cases but often only cover a subset of the economy. Analyses also vary in the geographic dimension at which concentration is computed, varying from local (sub-national) to national and international levels. Some studies additionally account for international trade. This section provides an overview of the literature structured along the main contributions of this analysis discussed above.

First, the present paper contributes to the literature by reaching the 3-digit level of industry disaggregation in a harmonised cross-country setting under a host of methodological assumptions. Several analyses that measure concentration ratios at the national industry level, mainly focused on the United States, have documented an increase in national average concentration over the past few decades (Autor et al., 2020; Barkai, 2020; Covarrubias et al., 2019; Furman & Orszag, 2015). Grullon et al. (2019) show that more than 75% of US industries have experienced an increase in industry concentration since the late 1990s. Looking over the past 100 years, Kwon et al. (2023) documented a long-term rise in concentration. In addition to documenting rising concentration, Ganapati (2021) showed that changes in industry concentration in the US are positively correlated with productivity and real output growth, uncorrelated with price changes and overall payroll, and negatively correlated with labour's share of revenue. Industry

[13] Note that this paper focuses only on one measure of concentration, CR4, neglecting alternative measures, such as the HHI. Data limitations drive this choice. As explained later, the firm-level data used in this analysis are obtained from Orbis, which has good coverage of large firms (Bajgar et al., 2020). HHI, instead, requires data on the population of firms. In addition, Orbis's sample of small and medium firms is not perfectly balanced over time, creating additional concerns about using HHI as a proxy for competition.

concentration also increased in Canada, with the largest rise in industries that were already more concentrated (Canada Competition Bureau, 2023). Outside North America, studies have also found increasing industry concentration, albeit usually at a lower rate than in the United States. For example, Lashkari et al. (2024) and De Ridder (2024) both found rising industry concentration using administrative data for France, and De Loecker et al. (2024) showed similar patterns for the United Kingdom.

Previous works performing cross-country analysis considered either industries at the 2-digit (or higher) level of aggregation (Bajgar et al., 2023; Bighelli et al., 2023), or reached a high level of disaggregation but only for a limited set of industries and countries (Koltay et al., 2023). The IMF (2019) documented rising average concentration at the 4-digit level across 27 economies, both advanced and developing. To reach such a disaggregated level of analysis, the concentration measure had to be adapted; it has been defined as the ratio between the sales of the top 4 and the sales of the top 20 firms in an industry. This measure is likely to overestimate concentration with respect to the more traditional concentration ratio (by underestimating the effective industry size). A complementary approach has been exploited in recent papers which focused on product market concentration. Affeldt et al. (2021) constructed market shares starting from information available from EU Commission merger cases. They found that concentration has increased over time, in line with Benkard et al. (2021) who showed that product market concentration is higher than industry concentration. In Calligaris, Chaves, et al. (2024b), industry and product-level measures of concentration are shown to be correlated, suggesting that industry-level measures of concentration can be used as proxies for concentration in the narrow markets defined at the product-level.

Second, this paper contributes to the literature through the use of the taxonomy on the geographic level of competition and the implementation of trade corrections to capture the effective size of a market. Recent papers have sought to address issues surrounding the role of international trade on concentration measures. Amiti and Heise (2024) highlighted that existing studies mostly measure industry concentration using only sales of firms located in the relevant country, rather than sales in the relevant market. That is, they do not account for international trade, and in particular for import competition – firms selling their product in foreign countries without establishing a local subsidiary. Their data allow them to cover the universe of US imports since 1992, construct the market shares of the foreign sellers in the United States, and correct for double counting of imports from US plants abroad.[14] Accounting for import competition, they showed that US industry concentration has been flat between 1992 and 2012 because foreign firms have increased their exports to the United States, even if their individual market shares tend to be small. Put differently, on average, foreign exporters increase the overall size of the market more than they impact the contribution of the top firms. Concentration mostly fell in industries with high initial import penetration, that also experienced the fastest growth in import competition. In the United Kingdom, the Competition and Markets Authority (2022) showed that correcting concentration ratios for international trade causes a fall in the level of concentration, but there is still a slight increase over the period 1997-2018.[15]

[14] Matched firm-level data of this nature are confidential and only available for one country at a time, not on a cross-country basis.

[15] Freund and Sidhu (2017) find that an increase in the number of emerging market firms in an industry is associated with

While these studies have highlighted the importance of accounting for the international integration of markets, other studies have argued that for non-tradeable products the relevant geographic dimension is likely to be local (i.e., sub-national). Each of these studies examine local concentration within a single country; due to data constraints, there is no evidence on local concentration in a cross-country setting and such an analysis is also not possible in the present paper. The evidence on concentration trends at the local level is mixed. Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2021) observed that the national trend of increasing industry concentration is not reflected in average local market concentration, which is declining in the United States. They explain the differing trends at the national and local levels by observing that large firms are expanding by opening establishments in new local markets. Relatedly, Hsieh and Rossi-Hansberg (2023) documented how the "industrial revolution in services" – the increasing returns to fixed-cost-intensive technologies and changing management practices in services sectors – has led to the expansion into new markets and a reduction in local concentration. Rinz (2022) found similarly decreasing trends in local industry concentration between 1976 and 2015. However, Autor et al. (2023), still looking at the United States, found that only local employment concentration has decreased, while local sales concentration has increased. They explain the divergence in local and national employment concentration trends with the structural shift of the economy, with a reallocation of economic activity from relatively concentrated manufacturing sectors, where employment concentration is high, to relatively unconcentrated services sectors, where employment concentration is lower. Moreover, looking within industry-by-county cells, concentration has increased, even for employment. They suggested that the differences between their findings and those of Hsieh and Rossi-Hansberg (2023) and Rinz (2022) are explained by the use of alternative datasets. Finally, Benmelech et al. (2022) and Smith and Ocampo (2022) found increasing average local concentration, in line with Autor et al. (2023), with the latter focusing on the retail sector.

Other studies have argued that the relevant market is supra-national. Bajgar et al. (2023) considered the EU as a single market and computed concentration measures both at the national and the European levels. Accounting for the cross-country subsidiaries of business groups, they documented a slight increase in concentration across 12 European countries included in their sample over the period 2000-2014, both at the national and European levels. Lyons et al. (2001) estimated a model of industry concentration which endogenously allows for markets to be defined at either the national or European level, showing that the four countries studied – France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom - varied in their integration with Europe. Affeldt et al. (2021) used market definitions from EU horizontal merger cases to define the geographic scope, showing that concentration increased most in worldwide markets. Note, though, that their sample is an unbalanced panel, and the relevant geography is not fixed over time, so the results could be driven by changing sample composition if more concentrated sectors become global over time.

Third, this paper combines official data sources (NA and SBS database) to measure the evolution of industry output across countries over twenty years and relies on detailed firmlevel information on

a decline in concentration, looking at both manufacturing and services industries.

ownership structure of multinational business groups to reliably identify ownership linkages and their dynamics over this period. Gutierrez and Philippon (2023) reported trends in concentration relying on concentration measures constructed using total market size (the of measure) based on the commercial database Orbis as the denominator, which has increasing coverage of small firms over time and can consequently lead to a spurious increase in industry output and thus to flat industry concentration trends. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2023) did not account for connections between firms within a business group, which, as discussed above, leads to underestimating increases in concentration (see also Bajgar et al., 2019 for a detailed discussion about these two points).[16]

3.3 Data

Measuring concentration at a granular level in a cross-country setting requires merging detailed data collected from numerous sources.

There are three types of variables used in this paper. The first two are measures of production and international trade flows, both at the country-industry-year level. Industries are generally defined at the 3-digit level of aggregation; however, in some cases, industries must be aggregated due to data constraints, as described in this section. The total value of production is a key variable used in the construction of the denominator of the concentration, which captures the total size of a market.[17] Trade flows data are used to carry out robustness exercises in the computation of the concentration measures. Using cross-country data at this level of granularity combined with international trade data is a key innovation of this paper. Finally, the numerator of the concentration measure is constructed using sales data at the firm level, as well as ownership data to reconstruct the structure of business groups.

The final sample covers 15 European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom).[18] In terms of sectoral coverage, the analysis focuses on mining, manufacturing, non-financial market services (excluding real estate) and utilities sectors, following the NACE Rev. 2 classification at the 3-digit

[16] They find increasing concentration trends only when restricting the sample to firms reporting consolidated accounts for the entire business group level. Note that, as explained in details in Section 3.4 and in Bajgar et al. (2019), the methodology followed in this paper does not use consolidated accounts and relies on unconsolidated accounts, meaning that the precise activities of each firm is recorded in the specific industry and country in which it operates, whilst also accounting for connections between business groups.

[17] Note that production data are also used in combination with international trade flows data to capture the geographical level at which competition takes place developed in the geographic taxonomy of industries available in the companion paper by Calligaris, Criscuolo, et al. (2024) and used here to compute concentration.

[18] The analysis also includes data for three extra-European countries (Japan, Korea, and the United States) exclusively when looking at industries that compete at the global level, as defined by the taxonomy (Calligaris, Criscuolo, et al., 2024). Since the analysis is conducted from a European perspective, these three countries are included only for industries belonging to the global bucket.

industry level.18[19] The final sample consists of 127 industries.[20] Out of these, 112 (88%) are at the 3-digit level, 10 (8%) at the 2-digit level, and 5 (4%) aggregating two or more 2-digit industries.[21] The period covered is 2000-2019.

3.3.1 Production data

To measure concentration at the most disaggregated industry level possible, particular attention has been given to measure a denominator that reflects the "true" value of industry output and represents, consistently across countries and over time, the population of firms in an industry. This requires data on the value of production, defined as gross output in millions of euros, at the 3-digit NACE Rev. 2 level which must be internationally comparable and, as such, cannot rely on aggregating commercial firm-level data that might not represent the entire population of firms and whose coverage might not only differ across countries but also within countries over time (see a detailed discussion in Bajgar et al., 2019). Instead, data is collected from official sources, that rely on commonly agreed standards of collection designed to be representative of the business population and comparable across countries.

The main data source for gross output is the Eurostat NA, which is the primary dataset used by countries to measure Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and other key economic variables. NA data are representative of the whole population of firms and comparable across countries.[22] Eurostat publishes NA data, including value of production, at the A*64 level of the industry classification NACE Rev.2, comprising of aggregations of 2-digit level activities. These data are therefore supplemented with data from Eurostat's SBS, which contain information on economic activity of all economic sectors excluding agriculture and personal services and provide data on the value of production at the 3-digit level of aggregation.[23] SBS measure production at a more disaggregated level than NA, and the data are representative of the economy within countries but not across countries (due to different methodologies adopted by National Statistical Agencies to collect them).

[19] NACE is the "statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community" and is the subject of legislation at the EU level, which imposes the use of the classification uniformly within all the Member States. The present NACE Rev. 2 is the new revised version of the NACE Rev. 1 and of its minor update NACE Rev. 1.1.

[20] The data limitations and cleaning steps are fully outlined in Annex A. Among these steps, it has been decided to exclude industries for which there are less than 4 firms – which are required to properly compute the concentration measure. This is a conservative approach which may lead to concentration being underestimated if the observed small number of firms accurately reflects the market, rather than representing data limitations. For example, the tobacco industry is excluded due to limited data availability but is known to be a highly concentrated sector.

[21] For further details on the different levels of aggregation in the sample, refer to Annex A.

[22] These data are collected according to the System of National Accounts (SNA), the internationally agreed standard set of recommendations on how to compile measures of economic activity. The SNA describes a coherent, consistent, and integrated set of macroeconomic accounts in the context of a set of internationally agreed concepts, definitions, classifications and accounting rules.

[23] Additionally, data for extra-EU countries included in the analysis (Japan, Korea, and the United States) are required for industries that compete at the global level, as defined by the taxonomy. Data for the extra- EU countries come from the OECD STAN database, which is also based on National Accounts, complemented with data from the Korean Statistical Information Service (Korea), the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Japan), and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (the United States) over the period 2000-2019. In most cases, these data are available at the desired level of disaggregation in the original data sources used and, as such, no additional cleaning or data preparation was needed.

Therefore, to get production data at the 3-digit level, the 3-digit SBS data are used to construct the share that each 3-digit industry represents within its own 2-digit industry. These shares are then used as weights to apportion each 2-digit production value from the NA to the corresponding 3-digit industry. The 3-digit production data obtained are therefore consistent with NA – and thus representative of the population of firms and comparable across countries – and at the same time available at the desired level of granularity.

More formally, $\mathrm{GO}_{\mathrm{Sct}}^{2dNA}$ is the value of gross output for the 2-digit industry in country c and year obtained from the NA data. Then, $\mathrm{GO}_{\mathrm{sct}}^{3dSBS}$ is the value of gross output for the 3-digit industry in country and year obtained from SBS. The apportioned values of gross output at the 3-digit level $\mathrm{GO}_{\mathrm{sct}}^{3dNA}$ are calculated as:

$$\mathrm{GO}_{\mathrm{sct}}^{3dNA} = \frac{\mathrm{GO}_{\mathrm{sct}}^{3dSBS}}{\mathrm{GO}_{\mathrm{Sct}}^{2dSBS}} \mathrm{GO}_{\mathrm{Sct}}^{2dNA} \tag{3.1}$$

where the first term of the right-hand side are the weights calculated from SBS data, with $s \in S$ representing each 3-digit industry contained in the associated 2-digit industry S, such that $\sum_{s \in S} \mathrm{GO}_{sct}^{3dSBS} = \mathrm{GO}_{Sct}^{2dSBS}$.

A detailed explanation of the steps required to get the final production dataset is reported in Calligaris, Criscuolo, et al. (2024).[24]

3.3.2 Trade data

International trade data are collected from three main sources. The primary data source is the OECD ICIO tables, which provide import and export flows between 76 countries and 45 industries, over the period 1995 to 2020, and can therefore distinguish trade with European and non-European countries for each of the fifteen countries considered. However, ICIO data are only available at the 2-digit at its most disaggregated level. These data are therefore supplemented with highly disaggregated information on trade flows from the Centre d'études prospectives et d'informations internationals (CEPII) "Base pour l'Analyse du Commerce International" (BACI) database for physical goods, and the OECD "Trade in services by partner economy" (TISP) database for non-financial market services. These data are reported at the product level, so crosswalks have been used to convert the product-level data to disaggregated industry level. Following this matching exercise, it is possible to recover goods trade data for all manufacturing and mining industries at 3-digit level, while industries belonging to utilities and non-financial market services have, in some cases, been aggregated to a higher level.

The detailed trade data are used to construct weights at the country-partner-industry-year level, where the partner is usually aggregated to EU or non-EU countries, and an apportioning procedure in the same

[24] There are two additional obstacles to overcome to obtain consistent 3-digit level data on production over the long period considered. First, the SBS dataset contains missing values. Second, the classification of economic activity changed in 2008 (from NACE Rev. 1.1 to NACE Rev. 2). Therefore, an imputation procedure and a conversion from the old to the new NACE classification system are required to have a time series at industry NACE Rev. 2 level from 2000 to 2019.

fashion of that used for the production data is carried out for the trade data. The weights are constructed using BACI and TISP data and are used to distribute the more aggregated trade values from ICIO to more detailed industries. This method maintains the desirable characteristics of the ICIO trade flows data while providing a more disaggregated industry classification.[25]

3.3.3 Firm-level financial data and ownership information

Sales data at the firm-level are required to compute the numerator of the concentration measure. The main firm-level dataset used is the 2021 vintage of the Moody's Orbis database. Numerous steps are undertaken to clean the data, closely following Gal (2013) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2023). Financial information within Orbis is available at the business group level (consolidated financial data aggregated across all subsidiaries of a firm) and at the individual firm level (unconsolidated information referring to individual firms' activities). In this paper, unconsolidated accounts have been used and can therefore be aggregated to the business group level according to the relevant market, as discussed in Section 3.4.[26]

Balance sheet information from Orbis is complemented with Worldscope, a cross-country firm-level commercial database of listed firms provided by Thomson Reuters. This dataset covers 95% of the global stock market capitalisation, substantially increasing the coverage of listed firms included in the sample.[27]

Following the methodology developed by Bajgar et al. (2023), the sum of the gross output of all subsidiaries of a business group within a market (defined as the combination of an industry and a geographical bucket, i.e., domestic, European or global) is used as key variable of interest in the analysis on concentration . To do so, the worldwide structure of business groups needs to be reconstructed, and ownership linkages between headquarters and all their subsidiaries need to be identified.

Orbis data contain detailed ownership information, with each firm being linked to its global ultimate owner. The global ultimate owner is defined as the firm owning at least 50.01% of total shares of a subsidiary. However, Orbis ownership information only covers the period 2007-2020. To get this information for the years pre-2007 and to further complement and quality-check the existing information, Orbis is supplemented with data from the Orbis M&A database, also provided by Moody's. This database reports information on the M&A activities of firms around the world. It captures both domestic and cross-border

[25] For further details about the international trade datasets, please see the companion paper (Calligaris, Criscuolo, et al., 2024).

[26] As explained in detail in Section 3.4, the measures of concentration built in this paper use business group activities. This approach fundamentally relies on unconsolidated data of the individual subsidiaries within a business group, as the objective is to identify the precise industry and location of all the subsidiaries belonging to a group, and to correctly apportion the group sales to the markets in which the business group is active. In Annex A, additional details on the data cleaning and preparation are provided, especially on when and how consolidated accounts are used to supplement data on unconsolidated accounts.

[27] These additional data are especially important in providing relevant information for non-European countries, which are usually less represented in Orbis. As explained in Bajgar et al. (2019), Orbis data are generally well suited to analysing industry concentration in Europe, since it has a good coverage of medium and large enterprises in these countries. In contrast, Orbis generally has poorer coverage of subsidiary-level information for non-European countries, especially for US firms. Note that this concern does not apply to business group-level information (consolidated accounts), since Orbis and WorldScope together cover close to the universe of listed firms.

M&As and covers deals involving target and acquiring firms across all industries, enabling changes in ownership to be tracked over the years and the identification of business group structures pre-2007.

A detailed discussion of the methodology is provided in Annex A, together with further details on the process of cleaning and harmonising multiple data sources. For a detailed explanation of the methodology used to build the business group structure, see Bajgar et al. (2023).

3.4 Methodology

This section defines the baseline measure of concentration and describes four aspects of its computation: first industry aggregation; second, the role of markets' geographical boundaries and, relatedly, the impact of adjusting for international trade. Finally, it discusses the importance of considering business group activities rather than those of individual firms.

3.4.1 Concentration measure

The concentration ratio captures the share of gross output accounted for by the largest business groups in a market. Its measurement involves several crucial methodological decisions. Specifically, it requires: understanding what are the boundaries of the "relevant market"; what is meant with "largest business groups"; properly capture the boundaries of "business groups"; define how to measure output (for both business groups and industries).

Analytically, the baseline concentration ratio (CR4) is defined as follows:

$$CR^4_{s,g,t} = \frac{\sum_{f \in \text{Top 4}} S_{f,s,g,t}}{S_{s,g,t}} \tag{3.2}$$

The gross output of the four largest business groups (numerator) is defined as $\sum_{f \in \text{Top 4}} S_{f,s,g,t}$.[28] [29] The overall size of a market (denominator), $S_{s,g,t}$ is defined as the total gross output in an industry s, in its relevant geographic region of competition g, at time t. As already mentioned, industries s are mainly

[28] Note that throughout the paper "top 4 firms" refers to the 4 business groups (not firms) with the largest gross output in each market. The term "firm" has been preferred to "business group" for simplicity of explanation.

[29] The numerator is obtained by adding the sales (as a proxy of gross output) of the largest business groups in the relevant market, while the denominator is defined using the measured gross output of an industry. Using at the denominator the sum of sales of all the firms contained in the Orbis dataset would not provide an accurate representation of a market in this setting, since Orbis is not representative of all firms, and therefore does not capture the overall economic activity produced in a market (Bajgar et al., 2020). This would lead to an underestimation of the denominator, especially in the initial years of the sample, which in turn would introduce a downward bias in concentration trends as the sampling of smaller firms increased over time (Bajgar et al., 2023). Note that, for most industries, sales and gross output are very similar and, as such, the term "gross output" will also be used when discussing the numerator. However, in certain industries, such as Wholesale and Retail, there might be differences. These concerns are addressed in various robustness exercises (see subsection on robustness in Section 3.5). It is important to note that both the possible discrepancy between sales and gross output concepts and the difficulty of measuring industry output at the 3-digit level of aggregation might lead to cases in which measured concentration exceeds 1.

defined at the 3-digit level, reaching a higher level of disaggregation than previous representative cross-country analyses. Geographic regions of competition g are defined as domestic, European, global using the taxonomy of industry tradeability (Calligaris, Criscuolo, et al., 2024). To define the contribution of the leading firms to the market, the analysis aggregates all activities of relevant business groups within a given industrygeographical region of competition ("market" in this setting). This means that concentration is calculated at different levels of geographic aggregation for different industries.

The remainder of this sub-section provides details on the methodology used to compute this concentration measure. In particular, it outlines the methodological choices related to the level of industry aggregation, the geographical scope of the market considered, and the boundaries of the firms considered.

3.4.2 Industry aggregation

When examining concentration, the "relevant" market must be defined. Competition authorities, in assessing cases, typically identify relatively narrow markets – based on product rather than industry classification systems. Empirical cross-country analyses are restricted by the availability of data, which are usually collected at the industry, not product, level. In addition, existing industry data used to construct concentration measures are normally available at relatively aggregate levels, which depart from the notion of relevant market.[30] As a result, existing cross-national studies rely on data at the 2-digit (or higher) industry level (for example, Bajgar et al., 2023 and Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2023). Studies within single countries may have information at a more detailed industry level but are often unable to account for the cross-border activities of firms and to be easily comparable with analyses in other countries. For these reasons, there have been concerns that measuring concentration at the industry level does not accurately capture its actual level (Benkard et al., 2021; Berry et al., 2019; Shapiro, 2018; Werden & Froeb, 2018).

This paper tries to overcome some of these concerns by developing measures of concentration for more detailed industries – typically 3-digit level, whenever possible – while incorporating a cross-country dimension and allowing for international activities of firms (see below). In total, industry concentration can be calculated for 127 industries across mining, manufacturing, utilities and non-financial market services sectors. Manufacturing industries are almost all defined at the 3-digit level, while some services industries are slightly more aggregated to allow an accurate match with the trade data, necessary to apply the taxonomy on geographic scope, discussed next. For a complete list of the sample of industries used in this paper see Table 53.

3.4.3 Geographic scope

The second dimension that defines the relevant market is its geographic scope. Technological, physical, and policy-related factors – which differ for each industry – determine the geographic boundaries of each

[30] For example, "manufacture of food products" is a 2-digit industry, but consumers are unlikely to consider meat products and oils and fats (both three-digit industries) as substitutable when making their purchasing decisions.

market. For instance, consumers in markets in which it is not costly to supply products across borders are able to purchase products sourced outside their home country.

In this paper, the geographic level at which each industry competes is determined by the taxonomy of industries developed in (Calligaris, Criscuolo, et al., 2024). By comparing the value of international trade with the value of production in each industry, the taxonomy distinguishes between industries that compete mainly at the domestic level (non-tradeable) and those that compete internationally (tradeable). When trade is high relative to the value of production, an industry is considered tradeable. For industries that are identified as tradeable, a further distinction is made between whether the industry competes at the European level or at a global level.[31] As a result, all the industries considered are classified as competing at the domestic, the European or the global level. Note that the taxonomy is fixed across time and countries.

The taxonomy allows concentration to be computed at the appropriate level of geographic competition and, thus, advances on previous measures of industry concentration. The rationale is the following. For nontradeable industries, competition takes place mainly domestically. Consequently, concentration measures should be computed within each country-industry. For industries that compete at the European level, the activities of business groups are aggregated across all European countries (noting that the activities of non-European subsidiaries are excluded, as discussed in detail in the next sub-section). For example, when defining concentration, the numerator includes the gross output of the biggest four firms across all European countries in each industry and the denominator aggregates industry level gross output across all European countries. Similarly, for industries defined as competing globally, both business groups and industry-level gross output are aggregated over all countries in the sample.[32]

Aggregating tradeable industries across countries offers a significant advantage by capturing the entirety of trade activities among countries within the geographic region, even in the absence of firm-level data on international trade. Given the importance of trade in shaping concentration trends (Amiti & Heise, 2024), and the lack of detailed firm-level trade data across countries, this is a very important benefit. For example, in global markets, the full activities of firms in each industry are accounted for, regardless of where production and consumption take place (although note that with the data limitations, some countries remain excluded). By aggregating firm and industry-level gross output across countries within each geographical bucket, there is no need for intra- region trade adjustments. Therefore, the taxonomy provides a conceptually sound and empirically feasible solution to account for the globalised nature of highly tradeable industries when computing concentration.[33]

[31] Among the 127 industries considered in this paper, the taxonomy allocates 27 of them in the domestic bucket, 80 in the European bucket, and 20 to the global bucket.

[32] Recall that, outside the EU, data are available for three additional countries: Korea, Japan, and USA.

[33] In principle, when looking for example at industries competing at domestic level, only the gross output sold domestically by the top firms should be considered in the numerator of concentration, subtracting therefore their exports. On the contrary, when looking at industries competing at the European level, all exports of top 4 firms to other European countries are correctly included in the numerator of the CR4.

3.4.4 Accounting for international trade

While the taxonomy indirectly accounts for international trade between countries within the geographic region in which the industry competes, it does not account for trade with countries outside that region (or those not included in the sample). Trade can affect both the numerator and the denominator of the concentration ratio. Imports increase the overall size of a market (the concentration ratio's denominator), and to the extent that foreign firms serving a market only through imports could be among the top firms, trade could also increase the numerator. The value of exports would decrease the overall size of the market i.e. the denominator of the concentration ratio and likely also its numerator, as exports are likely to be disproportionally represented by an industry's top firms. The overall effect of accounting for trade is therefore ambiguous as is the role of any adjustment on concentration trends. Amiti and Heise (2024) use confidential firm-level micro data for the United States to show that industry concentration, which is increasing if the import correction is not made, becomes flat after accounting for the gross output of foreign exporters.

It is important to reiterate the interaction between the taxonomy and trade corrections. The taxonomy is defined using data on international trade. Industries with high values of trade will be classified either as competing at the European or the global level, and therefore only imports from outside the region are added in the denominator. For industries competing at the domestic level, imports comprise a smaller share of production. Hence, in the presence of the taxonomy, the import correction is less impactful.[34] Furthermore, while Amiti and Heise (2024) have access to confidential firm-level micro data on sales of firms in the US, this is not available in a cross-country setting, yet the taxonomy can still indirectly account for much of international trade.

Despite this, as a robustness check, international trade from outside a geographic region g is incorporated into the concentration measures. The adjusted measure can be written as:

$$CR^{4}_{s,g,t} = \frac{\sum_{f \in \text{Top 4}} S_{f,s,g,t} - \alpha X_{s,g,t}}{S_{s,g,t} + M_{s,g,t} - X_{s,g,t}} \tag{3.3}$$

the denominator is adjusted to account for imports into the geographic region ($M_{s,g,t}$) and exports from it ($X_{s,g,t}$). Note that imports and exports between countries within a region, e.g., gross output of Italian firms in Spain for an industry defined to compete at the European level, do not need to be corrected as they are included in the production value of the exporting country (Italy, in this example).[35]

A further correction could be made in the numerator to account for the value of the top 4 firms' gross output that is exported to different markets. However, as firm-level data on trade are not available, an assumption must be made on the share of total exports that is accounted for by the top 4 firms, denoted

[34] An important caveat is that, due to data availability, there are only three additional countries (Japan, Korea, and USA) included in the global category. Therefore, the import correction always accounts for imports from other non-European countries, such as the People's Republic of China.

[35] Note that not all European countries are included in the sample, so also their imports are incorporated in the adjusted denominator.

by α. For example, α is assumed to be equal to the share of total production accounted for by the top 4 firms, this is likely to underestimate their share as larger firms are more likely to export (Bernard et al., 2012). Additionally, it is assumed that firms that only sell in a market across borders – i.e., via exports – but are located abroad are not large enough to be in the top 4 (supported by the findings of Amiti & Heise, 2024).[36]

In this paper, the robustness checks performed to capture the impact of exposure to international competition on concentration are implemented in two ways. The first only makes a correction for imports in the denominator, while the second makes a correction for both imports and exports in the denominator and relies on the proportionality assumption between export and sales shares for top four firms to estimate the "export-adjusted" numerator.

Given the lack of the necessary firm-level data, these trade corrections are only used as robustness checks and not incorporated in the baseline, while in the baseline the taxonomy is relied on to account for the role of trade integration for concentration measures. This further highlights the key advantage of the taxonomy already mentioned: by aggregating sales across countries in tradeable industries, the inclusion of the taxonomy in computing concentration measures allows to account for trade within the relevant geographic region at which each industry competes, reducing the importance to correct for trade flows.[37]

3.4.5 Identifying activities of business groups

Firms operating in the same market may be part of the same business group (Altomonte et al., 2021). This is likely more relevant when concentration is measured at the global or European level, because business groups often serve each country through a different firm entity. Market power is likely to be determined at the business group level, because the activities of firms within the same group can be coordinated, and groups may acquire firms in the same industry to consolidate their market share. Therefore, it is crucial to account for the gross output of business groups when measuring concentration, and not to focus on individual firms or any other economic entity.

Building on Bajgar et al. (2023) and Bajgar et al. (2019) (who, in turn, build on Bloom et al., 2013), this paper focuses on the activities of business groups. When measuring concentration, different subsidiaries belonging to the same business group and active in the same market are treated as a unique entity, as neglecting these ownership linkages would lead to an underestimation of concentration. Bajgar et al.

[36] Given that, unlike Amiti and Heise (2024), firm-level international trade data are not available, if the foreign exporters rank amongst the top 4 firms, then the measure of concentration would be downward biased. Amiti and Heise (2024) show that exporters into the US market tend to be smaller, which explains why accounting for increases in imports flattens the concentration trend.

[37] For example, consider an industry that competes at the European level. For this industry, the relevant measure of concentration is based on the sales of the top 4 firms across European countries. Therefore, it is not necessary to subtract a firm's exports to other European countries to have the correct numerator, i.e., the total sales in European countries of each top 4 business group. Similarly, the denominator for an industry that competes at the European level is given by the sum of gross output of all European countries in that particular 3-digit industry. Since trade flows are symmetric, all imports/exports between European countries cancel out by construction, and as such the correction for trade flows within Europe is not needed.

(2023) show that considering the business group dimension has a substantial impact on concentration measures. Therefore, accounting for linkages between firms in the same business group is important when measuring concentration, which the paper does taking also into account the level at which the specific industry competes. The use of the taxonomy developed in Calligaris, Criscuolo, et al. (2024) complements such a methodology. The taxonomy allows to aggregate business groups' activities to the level at which the specific industry competes (rather than assuming that all industries competed at either the national or the European level, as in Bajgar et al., 2023 and Bajgar et al., 2019.

To construct the relevant activities of a business group in each market, the unconsolidated gross output of each subsidiary is aggregated across all subsidiaries that operate in the relevant geographic region and industry.[38] [39]

Figure 9 illustrates the methodology using as an example a fictitious business group composed of: i) the headquarter, and ii) five subsidiaries, operating in three different industries and five different countries. Assume that the market for industry 1 is global, for industry 2 is European, and for industry 3 is domestic. The business group is active in four different markets (each represented by a different colour in the figure): i) industry 1, where it competes at the global level, with total gross output equal to 80 (headquarter 70 + subsidiary A 10); ii) industry 2, where it competes at the European level, with total gross output equal to 55 (subsidiary C 25 + subsidiary E 30); iii) industry 3 in Spain, where it competes at domestic level, with total gross output equal to 50 (subsidiary D); and iv) industry 3 in France, where it competes at domestic level, with total gross output equal to 15 (subsidiary B). These are the different aggregation of the firm sales that would be compared with the total sales in each market. For further details, see Annex A and Bajgar et al. (2023), Bajgar et al. (2019).[40]

3.5 Trends

This section begins by presenting the evolution of the baseline concentration measure. Concentration has increased by 5 percentage points over the period, from 26% to 31%. It then compares the baseline to measures of concentration computed under alternative specifications. First, when industries are more

[38] Note that in Orbis all firms (at the unconsolidated level) are registered as active only in their main industry of activity, although their activities could well span across different industries. Prioritising the use of unconsolidated rather over consolidated accounts partly reduces this issue because it uses the industry code of individual firms rather than of the headquarter. This notwithstanding, the consequence of registering all the activities in one single industry might result in an overestimation of the numerator of concentration, and potentially in concentration exceeding one and more so at more granular levels of industry aggregation.

[39] Consolidated accounts are used only to correct the unconsolidated information in cases where the total subsidiary sales exceed group sales (due to inter-company transactions) or where unconsolidated data are missing. See Annex A for further details.

[40] Except for Bajgar et al. (2023), previous studies have mainly followed two approaches to deal with cross-ownership linkages. A first approach is to neglect business groups and focus only on unconsolidated information of individual firms. This method underestimates concentration if multiple firms in the same market are part of the same group. A second approach is to neglect subsidiaries and focus only on the consolidated accounts of the headquarters. This method attributes the entire activity of the business group to the headquarters, overestimating (underestimating) the concentration in the headquarters' (subsidiaries') market. See Bajgar et al. (2019) for additional explanations on these alternative approaches.




Figure 9: Example of the apportioning technique of business group activities

disaggregated, the average level of concentration and its growth over time are higher. Second, accounting for the international dimension at which an industry may compete decreases the average concentration level and growth. Third, correcting for international trade leads to a lower growth of concentration. Finally, neglecting the ownership structure of business groups lowers the average level of concentration and its growth, especially in industries competing at the European and at the global level. Importantly, while the different assumptions affect both the average concentration level and its evolution over time, concentration remains increasing across almost all these different specifications.

3.5.1 Trends of the baseline concentration measure

The baseline concentration trends are first presented at the aggregate level and then separately for each geographical bucket. For both types of exercises, the evolution of the baseline concentration measure is presented by plotting both levels and the cumulative unweighted average change since the year 2000 (normalised to 0). In each year, the average yearly change is computed across all industries within a bucket for the European and the global buckets, and across all country-industries pairs within domestic industries. The cumulative change is computed by summing up the yearly changes starting from the base year 2000. Moreover, the percentage change of cumulative growth (where cumulative change is divided by the initial level of average concentration) is also discussed.[41] [42] In the baseline trends, the

[41] This is because average concentration can start from different initial levels in the various exercises of this section and comparing only cumulative changes might be misleading. There may be minor differences between the trends in the cumulative changes and the average level of concentration, as the former holds the sample constant between periods while the latter may be affected by a small number of cases whereby industries enter or exit the sample.

[42] Concentration trends are presented both in levels and as cumulative growth. Note that, given that the sample used in the analysis is not fully balanced, the cumulative average changes control for any changes in sample composition over time, while trends in levels can potentially exhibit jumps caused by industries with substantially different levels of concentration compared to the average level entering and exiting. Therefore, trends of cumulative changes are more methodologically stable and, as

unweighted average is taken across industries for numerous reasons, which are discussed in detail later in the section, and comparisons to the unweighted trends are conducted and presented.

Figure 10 shows the average level (top panel) and cumulative changes (bottom panel) in concentration across all markets. To derive average concentration trends, i.e., averaging across domestic, EU, and global industries, it is important to note the following. Concentration for industries competing at the domestic level is computed for each country-industry-year. Concentration measures for industries competing at the European and global levels are computed at the industry-year level, as country-level data have been aggregated to the relevant level of geographic competition. Therefore, appropriate weighting is adopted to ensure that the trends do not over-represent domestic industries.[43]

Average concentration rose, from around 26% in 2000 to above 31% in 2019 (top panel). In line with this, the bottom panel of Figure 10 shows that concentration increased by 5 percentage points (p.p., henceforth) between 2000 and 2019. This is equivalent to an increase in average concentration of about 21% in percentage terms. This result aligns well with other findings in the literature. Bajgar et al. (2023) find that concentration over 2000-2014 increased by about 2 p.p. in Europe and by 7 p.p. in North America. Autor et al. (2020), focusing on US data, find that concentration increased across all broadly-defined sectors of the economy within a range of 5 to 15 p.p. between 1980 and 2012. Furman and Orszag (2015) found that concentration increase, over 1997-2007 in three-fourths of the Census Bureau defined broad sectors.

Figure 11 reports concentration levels (top panel) and cumulative unweighted average changes (bottom panel) for each of the three geographical buckets, disentangling the information contained in the aggregate graphs of Figure 10 (a discussion on the choice of the weighting scheme adopted is provided in the next sub-section). The average level of concentration is higher in industries competing at the domestic level than in those competing at the European and global levels, with the latter two having similar levels of concentration. Specifically, the top 4 firms comprise around 43% of the total gross output of the industry in industries competing at the domestic level, and around 26% in the other geographical regions (on average, over the period considered).

The bottom panel of Figure 11 shows that industry concentration has increased across all geographic buckets. Industries that compete at the domestic level had the greatest increase in average concentration, by around 6 p.p. between 2000 and 2019. Industries that compete internationally – either at the

such, are the preferred option to show the evolution of concentration over time. More generally, concentration levels should always be considered with caution due to data limitations. Levels of concentration might be affected by specific data issues for several reasons, including: different data sources and definitions for the main variables for the numerator and the denominator; output measures being potentially volatile and difficult to measure at the 3-digit level in certain industries; attribution of all firms' sales to a unique industry, which may lead to an overestimation of the numerator, as discussed in Footnote 3737. Each of these caveats might lead to measured concentration in a specific market being higher than 1 (see also footnotes 3727 and 3937 for further details).

[43] For industries competing at the European and at the global levels, each industry-year observation is counted 15 times (the number of countries in the data) to ensure they are weighted equally with industries competing at the domestic level (otherwise, industries competing at the domestic level would disproportionally influence the statistics). This approach effectively assigns each country the same value of concentration within an industry-year for industries competing at the European and global levels.




Figure 10: Concentration aggregating across geographical buckets




Figure 11: Concentration across geographical buckets

European or global level – experienced an increase in concentration of approximately 4 p.p. However, while industries competing at the domestic and European levels see a smooth increase over the period considered, in industries competing at the global level concentration is relatively stable up to 2012, and then starts to increase from 2012 onwards.[44]

[44]Note that, in each year, the global bucket includes 20 observations (industries), the European one 80 observations (industries), while the domestic buckets includes 405 observations (27 industries for 15 countries). The trend for the global bucket is therefore slightly more volatile than the trends for other buckets: since it covers fewer observations, it is more sensitive to single industries' changes in concentration.

3.5.1.1 Robustness checks of the baseline concentration measure

This sub-section first discusses different robustness checks performed on the baseline measure. First, the choice of the weighting scheme adopted when computing average concentration. Second, the robustness of the results across subsamples of countries and industries. Third, it reports an alternative concentration measure based on the top 8 business groups rather than the top 4 (CR8 instead of CR4).

The baseline analysis does not weight by the size of the market; instead, it takes the unweighted averages across geographies and industries. The unweighted average is chosen as the baseline for numerous reasons. First, when examining overall concentration trends in each bucket, weighting causes the trends to be strongly determined by just a few big countries and industries (or geography-industry pairs), whereas it is preferable in this context to provide evidence that is more equally representative across countries and industries. Second, due to data limitations, there is variation in the level of aggregation of industry classifications (mostly 3 digit, some 2 digit, and some aggregations of 2 digits). More aggregated industries would mechanically get more weight. Third, once each industry is assigned to a geographic bucket, its weight within the bucket does not necessarily correspond to its share of the domestic economy and, thus, to its relative importance within the country, making the interpretation of the weighted trends challenging. Fourth, the variable available in the data that could be used for weighting is gross output, not value added. Gross output includes the value of intermediates, so weighting by gross output would give more weight to downstream industries relative to upstream industries.[45] Despite these drawbacks, output weighted trends for all three buckets are presented as a robustness checks in the Data Appendix.

Figure 28 shows concentration levels (top panel) and cumulative changes (bottom panel) weighted by market gross output (country-industry for the domestic bucket, industry for the European and global buckets) within each geographical bucket. The comparison of unweighted levels of concentration (Figure 11) with the weighted ones (Figure 28) reveals that weighting by market size (in terms of gross output) reduces the level of aggregate concentration in industries competing at the domestic level, suggesting that concentration is higher in smaller markets (country-industries pairs in this case). On the contrary, the weighting procedure increases the aggregate concentration level in the global bucket and, to a lower extent, also in the European bucket, indicating that in international markets concentration is higher in relatively bigger industries. In addition, the comparison of unweighted and weighted concentration cumulative changes (bottom panels of Figure 11 and Figure 28) shows that, when weighting for the relative size of the markets, concentration looks overall flat over the period 2000-2019 for industries competing both domestically and at the European level. In industries competing at the global level, the weighted trend is decreasing. The combination of these results suggests that for the domestic and European buckets, the increase in concentration mainly occurs in relatively small markets (in terms of gross output), while for the global bucket, the decrease occurs in relatively big industries.

The aggregate trends reported in Figure 10 and Figure 11 can hide substantial heterogeneity across

[45] Take the example of two industries with the same value added, but different value of intermediates. At the same value added, the industry with higher value of intermediates will have higher gross output, and hence a larger weight.

industries (and countries, for the domestic bucket). Therefore, extensive sensitivity tests have been performed to determine whether these trends are driven by a few observations. The main exercise performed to study heterogeneity and robustness across industries involved removing industries from the sample one at a time to assess their relative impact on the cumulative changes trends.[46] In addition, for industries competing at the domestic level, where the country dimension can also be investigated, a similar exercise has been conducted by removing one country at a time.[47] All in all, the trends appear to be robust to the exclusion of single industries and countries, as no single countries or industries drive the cumulative changes of concentration in any of the three geographical buckets.

As a final robustness check the Data Appendix reports the levels and trends for CR8. The average levels (top panel of Figure 29) are higher by construction, the trends are qualitatively similar to those reported for CR4: the domestic bucket displays the highest level of concentration, with the top 8 firms accounting on average for about 50% of the market output, followed by the European and the global buckets, where average concentration level is around 35%. When looking at the cumulative changes (bottom panel of Figure 29) the differences with CR4 are slightly more pronounced, especially for industries competing at the European level: CR8 increased more than CR4 in all the geographical buckets. It increases similarly, about 8 p.p., in the domestic and the European bucket (vs. 6 and 4 p.p. respectively, for CR4), and by about 4.4. in the global bucket (similarly to CR4).

3.5.2 The impact of different methodological assumptions on measured concentration

This sub-section describes the impact of different methodological choices made in the construction of the concentration measure. These alternative measures depart from the baseline's assumptions in terms of geographical aggregation, industry aggregation, trade corrections, and firm's boundaries.

3.5.2.1 The role of industry aggregation

A key contribution of this paper is the computation of concentration at a highly disaggregated industry level, aimed at approximating as close as possible the "relevant" market. To test the effect of changing

[46] Domestic bucket: only three industries marginally affect the average cumulative change trend when removed, either by decreasing it by 1 p.p. (091, Support activities for petroleum and natural gas extraction; 352, Manufacture of gas, distribution of gaseous fuels through mains) or by increasing it, again, by 1 p.p. (353, Steam and air conditioning supply). European bucket: four industries that make the cumulative change in concentration increase by about 1 p.p. each when removed from the sample (232, Manufacture of refractory products; 242, Manufacture of tubes, pipes, hollow profiles and related fittings, of steel; 781 Activities of employment placement agencies; 783 Other human resources provision) and one that makes the cumulative change in concentration decrease by almost 2.5 p.p. (262, Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment). Global bucket: only two industries marginally drive the trends in two opposite directions. Dropping from the sample industry 151 (Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, and harness; dressing and dyeing of fur) decreases the cumulative change of the global bucket by about 1.5 p.p., while dropping industry 303 (Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery) increases the trend by about 2 p.p.

[47] Only Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom can be considered as marginally driving the overall growth in the domestic bucket (excluding Poland or Sweden decreases the cumulative change by about 1 p.p. each, while for Portugal and the United Kingdom the opposite is true, excluding them would increase cumulative change in concentration by 1 p.p.).

the level of industry aggregation on aggregate trends and compare the baseline results of the paper with those in previous cross-country literature (see, for instance, Bajgar et al., 2023), concentration has been also computed at the 2-digit level (following the STAN A*64 classification). This exercise considers all the 2- digit industries whose 3-digit sub-industries belong to a unique geographical bucket.[48] This selection is required to isolate the effect of changing industry aggregation, while keeping the geographical dimension of the market definition fixed. Therefore, this exercise is necessarily based on a restricted sample of industries with respect to the ones considered elsewhere and, as a result, the aggregate figures are qualitatively different from the trends of the preferred baseline measure.[49]

The continuous blue line in the top panel of Figure 12 represents the baseline average concentration level (that is, using the selected industries at the 3-digit level), while the dotted line represents the average concentration computed at the 2-digit industry level of aggregation. Defining concentration at a more disaggregated level raises the average level of concentration from 21% to about 29%. A possible interpretation of these differences is the following. When looking at broad industry levels, for example at the 2-digit level, even the largest business groups are unlikely to be active and sell in all the different activities performed in the industry. When industries are more disaggregated, and therefore more specialised, large players are more likely to produce in all the economic activities within the narrow industry. Therefore, at higher levels of disaggregation concentration is likely to be higher. The bottom panel of Figure 12 shows that in terms of cumulative changes in aggregate concentration, the trends remain similar across different levels of industry aggregation. Due to the smaller sample, cumulative changes in this exercise are more volatile than in the baseline measure.

In a second attempt to understand the importance of industry aggregation when computing concentration, an analysis at the 4-digit industry level has been performed for some selected industries. Due to data limitations, the exercise has focused only on the manufacture of food and beverages (C10 and C11 at the 2-digit level of aggregation). These industries are a particularly relevant component of the manufacturing sector, both in terms of employment and value added, and in recent years they have been under scrutiny by the EC with the aim of improving the state of competition.[50] In addition, the 4- digit industries belonging to the food and beverages industries reach a granular level of detail which are very similar to the equivalent product markets (confirmed both by EC Competition Directorate and from comparing with product market classification systems).

According to the taxonomy of sectors, all the 4-digit industries belonging to the 3-digit industries C101,

[48] For example, it was possible to consider the 2-digit industries C33 (Repair and installation of machinery and equipment), whose 3-digit industries (C331 and C332) all belong to the domestic bucket, and C29 (Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers), whose 3-digit industries (C291, C292, and C293) all belong to the European bucket. Conversely, it was not possible to include mining and quarrying (A08), since one 3-digit industry competes at the European level and the other at global level.

[49] In particular, the 2-digit industries considered are the following (in terms if NACE Rev.2 classification); for the domestic bucket: C33, D35, D36, D37, H55, J59, and J61; for the European bucket: C16, C17, C19, C20, C22, C24, C27, C28, C29, G45, G46, G47H25, H53, J62, M71, M72, M73, N77, N78, and N79.

[50] Please refer to the webpage https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/agriculture/food_en for a discussion of these topics and further links to relevant work.




Figure 12: Concentration with different industry aggregation levels (selected industries)

C105, C107, C109, and C110 are classified as competing at the domestic level, while those belonging to the 3-digit C102, C103, C104, C106, C108 are classified as competing at the European level.[51] Concentration is therefore computed at the corresponding geographical level for each 4-digit industry.

The top panel of Figure 13 shows the average concentration level for these industries in the domestic and European buckets. The average level in the European bucket (about 27%) is higher than the average level found in the corresponding industries at the 3-digit level of aggregation (about 20%); the average level in the domestic bucket is higher (around 59%) than in the corresponding 3-digit (42%).

The bottom panel of Figure 13 reports the average cumulative growth across these industries. As in the baseline results, industries belonging to the domestic geographical buckets experienced, on average, a higher concentration growth than those competing at the European level in the years between 2000 and 2019.

Note that the conclusions drawn from the 4-digit data must be interpreted with some caution, given that with this exercise data have been stretched to their maximum. For example, the range of activities of firms at this level of disaggregation might indeed easily fall into different 4-digit industries, but in Orbis all firms are registered as active only in their main industry of activity. While conceptually this can happen even at higher levels of aggregation, this issue is much more likely to happen when disaggregating at the 4-digit level. Registering all activities in one single 4-digit industry might result in higher market share, and potentially in concentration becoming higher than 1. At the same time, denominators are obtained

[51] A table with the description of the industries considered is provided in the Annex (see Table 53 and Table 54).

following the same methodology outlined in Section 3.4. As explained above, several assumptions and imputations have been made to obtain data of gross output consistent across countries and industries over the years at such disaggregated levels.[52] With this caveat in mind, this exercise is interesting because it allows comparing industry concentration with a measure of concentration even closer to the product level.




Figure 13: Concentration for selected 4-digit industries

3.5.2.2 The role of geography

A key contribution of this paper is to compute concentration while considering the geographical boundaries of the market. In most of the previous studies, concentration is measured by assuming that all industries compete at the domestic level, i.e., at the national level.[53]

The top panel of Figure 14 compares the aggregate baseline concentration levels (continuous blue line, also portrayed in Figure 10) with the aggregate concentration computed by assuming that all industries at the domestic level (dotted line). The average level is consistently higher when concentration is computed as if all industries were domestic, with an average over the period considered of about 49%, against an average level of about 29% when the taxonomy is applied. This is in line with the findings showing that concentration levels are higher when computed within more disaggregated markets, as discussed in the previous sub-section. When computing concentration using the taxonomy, the sales of the subsidiaries of a business group active in the same industry are summed over the countries where they are active. The

[52] For a more thorough discussion on the relationship between industry concentration and product market concentration please refer to Calligaris, Chaves, et al. (2024b).

[53] Three notable exceptions being Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2021) and Autor et al. (2023) who distinguish between local and national trends, and Bajgar et al. (2023), who also compute concentration assuming that all industries in European countries compete at the European level.

numerator of the concentration ratio includes the activities of the largest four groups, with their activities summed across all countries even if their subsidiaries are not in the top four in every market. In contrast, when concentration is computed at the national level, the activities of the largest four business groups in each country are considered (so the same business group in different countries is considered as two distinct ones), but their activities in subsidiaries from outside the country are not considered unless each subsidiary is also in the top four in other countries.[54] Therefore, if the contribution of including the subsidiaries is less important than the contribution of including the four largest firms in each country, the average of domestic concentration is likely to be larger than concentration computed at the international level.

The bottom panel of Figure 14 compares the cumulative growths over the period considered. Concentration increased by about 5 p.p. in the baseline framework, and about 9 p.p. when all industries are considered as competing domestically. This corresponds to a percentage increase: of 25% when all industries are considered as competing domestically, and of about 21% in the baseline framework. Thus, the definition of the relevant market influences the average level of concentration, with concentration being higher when markets are considered only domestic. Concentration is found to be increasing in both exercises, though more significantly when all industries are classified as competing domestically.

The impact of the level of geographical aggregation on the concentration measures is further explored by computing concentration at the national level for all industries but averaging over the different regions implied by the taxonomy. This means that concentration in domestic markets is the same as the baseline one in Figure 11 (because it was already computed averaging the country-industry levels). In contrast, for industries belonging to the European and the global buckets, in this exercise the average concentration across the relevant countries is considered.[55]

The results of the exercise are reported in Figure 15. Accounting for the effective geographical boundaries of a market affects both levels and trends. Figure 15 shows that, relative to the baseline in Figure 11, average national level concentration is higher in European and global markets relative to domestic ones, with an average level of 49% and 60%, respectively. The cumulative changes, reported in the bottom panel of Figure 15, are consistent with the overall view that concentration has increased independently of the geographical boundaries of markets. Differently from the baseline measure, concentration computed at the national level has increased relatively more in industries classified as competing globally (about 12 p.p.), followed by those competing at the European and then domestic level (respectively, around 8.5 and 7.6 p.p.). In terms of percentage growth rates, domestic concentration increases rather uniformly in the

[54] For example, suppose business group X has in a certain industry a headquarter X-A which is in the top four in France and a subsidiary X-B that is not in the top four Spain. Business group X is in the top four at the European level and the contributions of both X-A and X-B would be considered in the numerator. However, at the domestic level in Spain, a different company, Y, is in the top four in the same industry. When computing domestic concentration for this industry, the activities of Y are considered but X-B are not. The overall comparison of concentration at the domestic and European level will depend on the tradeoff between these two factors.

[55] As for the baseline taxonomy measure, JPN, KOR, and USA are accounted for in global industries but excluded for domestic and European ones.




Figure 14: National concentration aggregating over different geographical regions

three geographical buckets.[56] The fact that the ranking of concentration levels and growth by geographical bucket undergoes a reversal with respect to the baseline when computing concentration at domestic level for all industries, highlights the importance of accounting for integration of markets thanks to the taxonomy.

These results also suggest that the largest firms competing in European and global markets are playing an increasingly important role in national economies, and more so than firms competing on national markets. The observation that firms in globally-competing industries have both the highest level and growth of concentration is evidence in support of Melitz (2003), whereby international competition causes a reallocation of resources to the largest and most productive firms.

3.5.2.3 The role of trade corrections

As mentioned, some recent literature (Amiti & Heise, 2024) shows that accounting for international trade might significantly affect concentration trends in the US.

Therefore, a robustness check that accounts for the role of imports and exports is performed (see Section 3 for details). However, this robustness check should be interpreted with caution since, due to data limitations, some important assumptions are made. While Amiti and Heise (2024) have access to confidential firm-level data on sales to the US market of both domestic and foreign firms, this type of data

[56] Domestic, European, and global industries increased, on average, of about 26% (domestic) and 24% (European and global).




Figure 15: National concentration across geographical buckets (all industries as domestic)

is not available in a cross-country setting.[57] Thus, as detailed in Section 3.4, this robustness analysis needs to rely on strong assumptions to estimate the amount of trade conducted by the top four firms in a market and carry out these robustness checks. The lack of firm-level trade data, combined with the fact that the taxonomy already indirectly accounts for most of international trade in each geographic region, are the main reasons why the paper's baseline measure does not include the trade corrections presented in this robustness exercise. Nonetheless, the effects of additional trade adjustments on concentration are presented.[58]

Figure 16 reports the results of the trade correction exercise across the three geographical buckets (domestic in the top-left panel, European in the top-right panel, and global in the bottom-left one). In all the panels: i) the solid blue lines report the baseline specification with no correction for international trade (same as the baseline trends reported in Figure 11); ii) the light blue dashed lines include the import correction in the denominator, but no export correction; iii) the dark blue dotted lines account for both the import and the export corrections. Specifically, in the import correction exercise, imports

[57] In many OECD countries information on trade flows is not available at the firm level as it is collected at the product level by customs and not linked to firm level financials. Note also that this information is often only available for goods trade and not for services trade as it is the case for Amiti and Heise (2024).

[58] Also note that, as described above, while the taxonomy accounts for trade between all countries included in the relevant geography, not all European and (especially) global countries are included in the sample. If data were available for every country in the world, there would be no need for a trade correction in global industries. Trade with countries not included in the sample is accounted for in the trade adjustments, explaining why the further adjustments have a non-trivial effect on the trends (in addition to the caveat that only aggregate, not firm-level, data on trade flows is available so these adjustments are an approximation).

in the same industry from outside the geographical region (domestic, European, global) are added to the denominator, as are imports from countries that are in the region but not included in the sample due to data constraints.[59] In the exercises in which exports are also accounted for, exports in the same industry to the rest of the world (with respect to the geographic region considered) are fully subtracted from the denominator (to account only for the gross output that is consumed in each market), while in the numerator a share of exports corresponding to the share of gross output accounted for by the four largest firms in the market is subtracted (since data do not provide information on the export flows at the firm level). This assumption is likely to underestimate the share of trade accounted for by the top four firms, as larger firms tend to export more (Bernard et al., 2012). This means that the level of concentration with this correction may be overestimated, but it is not clear what the effect on the trend would be, as it depends on the evolution of the relative contribution of the top four firms to exports compared with the one of their overall market shares.

In line with Amiti and Heise (2024), trade corrections tend to dampen the rise of concentration. As expected, trade corrections affect relatively more the trends of industries that compete at the European and global levels, which are more tradeable (see the top-right panel and the bottom-left one in Figure 16). Being more exposed to international trade, these industries are likely to have higher trade flows from outside the geographic region of competition. The growth of concentration in the domestic bucket (see topleft panel of Figure 16) remains virtually unchanged because trade flows are small. This adds further support to the validity of the taxonomy developed by Calligaris, Criscuolo, et al. (2024). Moreover, the diverging trends of the baseline measure with respect to the trade-corrected measures suggest an increase in import competition over the period considered.

In a second exercise trade corrections are applied to aggregate concentration, both computed using the taxonomy and by considering concentration at the national level for all markets.[60] This exercise allows to test the robustness of the baseline concentration measure to applying indirect (taxonomy) and direct trade corrections. If the taxonomy accounts for most of the relevant trade, trade corrections should have a lower impact on the baseline measure than on the alternative concentration measure computed at the national level independently of whether the industry competes at the domestic, European or global level.

The top panel of Figure 17 reports the results of the exercise for the average level of concentration: the continuous blue line represents the baseline concentration measure based on domestic, European and global concentration levels, the continuous red line represents national level concentration for all industries, independently on whether they compete at the international level according to the taxonomy. The dashed lines (red and blue following the distinction above) represent concentration when the import

[59] While there are likely to be many foreign firms that sell in a market, they are likely to be small on average in terms of their sales relative to firms with a domestic presence (noting that foreign-owned firms with domestic subsidiaries would be considered as domestic firms). Therefore, they are likely to impact the total market size, so imports are added to the denominator to capture the full size of a market. However, as they are small on average, they are unlikely to enter the top four and are therefore not considered in numerator of this measure. This is a necessary assumption due to data constraints and is in line with the evidence of Amiti and Heise (2024).

[60] See Section 3.5 on the role of industry aggregation for further details about the two measures.




Figure 16: Different trade adjustments

correction, but not the export one, is accounted for in the denominator. The dotted lines account for both imports and exports, which are subtracted from both the denominator and (a share of) the numerator of the baseline concentration measure. Trade corrections have a much stronger effect when concentration is computed at the national level rather than when the taxonomy is used: the lines in blue are much closer to each other than the red ones. Such a differential impact is reassuring because it suggests that the taxonomy already accounts for the role of international trade in concentration measures. The bottom panels of Figure 17 report the analogous chart for cumulative changes instead of levels of concentration. Also, when looking at changes, trade corrections appear to have a stronger impact when concentration is computed at the national level in all industries (bottom-right panel in Figure 17). The trade corrections seem to slightly reduce concentration levels and their increase over time but both concentration measures are increasing over the period considered. Most importantly the results confirm the validity of the taxonomy to account for trade flows in the measurement of concentration levels and trends.

3.5.2.4 Accounting for business groups activities

Finally, the last sub-section explores the impact on concentration of accounting for the ownership structure of business groups within each market. In the baseline concentration measure, subsidiaries belonging to the same business group and active in the same market are treated as a unique entity. First, even in domestic industries, neglecting the ownership structure would lead to an underestimation of concentration




Figure 17: Concentration level different trade corrections (taxonomy vs. all as domestic)

because subsidiaries belonging to the same business group in the same industry would otherwise be considered as independent entities. Second, in tradeable industries the expansion of a business group into new countries would not be captured as an increase in its market share (and, therefore, of concentration) via the new subsidiary would be ignored as the new subsidiary would be treated as an independent entity. Therefore, analysing business groups rather than firms helps capture potential increases in concentration due to the organic growth of a group's sales via growth of existing entities and greenfield investments as well as its expansion through M&A.

To test the impact of this assumption, the baseline concentration measure is compared with a measure of concentration that ignores the business group dimension. Instead of summing the activities of all the firms within the same business group in each market, this approach considers the activities of all the firms in a business group as if they were independent entities (single firms). Therefore, the numerator of this alternative concentration measure will be the sum of sales of the largest four firms (rather than business groups) in a market.

Figure 18 and Figure 19 show the comparison of the baseline measure (solid line) with the alternative measure of concentration, where the ownership structure of business groups is ignored (dashed line). Figure 18 shows that, as expected, neglecting the business group dimension leads to lower levels of concentration in every geographical bucket, with the difference being more evident in European markets. Moreover, Figure 19 shows that the cumulative changes of the two measures are diverging across the three geographical buckets, with the baseline measure showing the highest cumulative growth. Importantly,

the divergence between the two measures is particularly evident in the European and global buckets. It is worth noting that while concentration remains increasing in the domestic and European buckets when using the alternative measure, concentration is decreasing in the global one. This is most likely due to the inability of this alternative measure of capturing the expansion of multinational activities across countries via greenfield or brownfield (i.e. via M&A activity) investments.

Overall, this exercise shows that neglecting the business group's structure leads to a significant underestimation of both levels and growth of concentration and to different conclusions on concentration trends, especially in industries competing internationally, as ignoring ownership structures would suggest flat (in European markets) or declining (in global markets) concentration trends. These results confirm the importance of considering the ownership structure of business groups when computing concentration as the expansion of business groups within industries and across countries for European and global industries is clearly prevalent. The greater increase in concentration over time when accounting for business groups suggests that this practice has clearly gained importance in the last two decades, especially across European and global markets.




Figure 18: Concentration levels, firms vs. business groups

3.6 Conclusions

Concentration is a key indicator of competition. Although conceptually intuitive, its computation involves several methodological decisions that can significantly impact the results. The main contribution of the




Figure 19: Concentration cumulative changes, firms vs. business groups

paper is to propose several methodological improvements to its measurement, with the aim of accurately capture what competition authorities refer to as the "relevant" market and investigate how each of them affects the levels and trends of concentration. These methodological refinements allow to compute market concentration, defined as the market share of leading firms, in fifteen European countries from 2000 to 2019.

First, industries are narrowly defined – mainly at 3-digit industry level. This allows the market shares of leading firms to be computed in relatively detailed markets, and thus more likely to consider only goods perceived as substitutes by consumers.

Second, for each industry, the geographical level at which firms compete is considered. Leveraging on Calligaris, Criscuolo, et al. (2024), each industry is categorised as competing either at the domestic, European or global level. Concentration measures are then computed for each industry at the geographical level indicated by this taxonomy. This approach is important for two main reasons. Differently from previous studies, which typically only measure concentration at the national level, i) it considers the relevant geographical dimension at which competition takes place; and ii) it indirectly accounts for the role of international trade within a region without requiring firm-level data on international trade, which are not available in a cross-country setting.

Third, building on the procedure developed by Bajgar et al. (2019), ownership linkages between firms are considered, and all the subsidiaries belonging to the same business group and active in the same market are treated as a single entity. This allows the overall importance of business groups to be

accounted for. Looking at business groups rather than at individual firms is particularly important in this context, since the propensity to consolidate into groups can vary across industries and may depend on the geographical level at which competition takes place. The integration of data on ownership linkages among firms with the information on the geographical dimension of markets contained in the taxonomy developed in Calligaris, Criscuolo, et al. (2024) is a key contribution of this paper.

These methodological improvements are then used to compute concentration trends for a sample of fifteen European countries. The study finds that average concentration increased by 5 p.p. between 2000 and 2019, from 26% to slightly more than 31%. Interestingly, industries competing at the domestic level show higher and faster-growing concentration with respect to industries competing at the European and global levels. These findings, obtained in a large cross-countries sample and by applying relevant methodological improvements, align with several works that hint an overall decline of competition.

The paper further contributes to the existing literature by studying the impact of each methodological decision on concentration levels and trends in a unified framework. Determining how to appropriately measure concentration is crucial for researchers and policymakers. There is a large literature – among academics, competition authorities, governments, and international organisations – that measures trends in concentration. These studies differ in the type of data used, the country of analysis, and methodological assumptions. Consequently, even studies within the same country often draw different conclusions about concentration trends; comparing them is complicated by differences in datasets and settings.

The first methodological decision examined concerns the level of industry aggregation. The baseline measure of concentration proposed in the paper is compared to a measure which considers industries at the 2-digit level of aggregation. The exercise shows that higher granularity leads to higher concentration levels but similar trends.

Second, the paper examines the choice of accounting for the geographical boundaries of a market when computing concentration. With respect to standard concentration measures, computed exclusively at national level, the baseline concentration measure, which accounts for the taxonomy, exhibits lower levels and growth of concentration. When including the taxonomy concentration increases by about 5 p.p., compared with nearly 9 p.p. when computing concentration at the national level for all industries.

Moreover, additional trade corrections are investigated to try to identify the actual size of each market, adjusting for the value of products that leave or enter the market. However, these corrections can only be implemented under strong assumptions as firm-level trade data are not available, so they are used as a robustness check but not incorporated in the baseline measures. In line with the innovative work of Amiti and Heise (2024), adjusting for trade dampens concentration growth. However, unlike their US-focused paper, in the present paper concentration still shows an increase under each of the trade adjustments considered.

Finally, the baseline measure of concentration, computed using business group information, is compared to an alternative measure that neglects ownership linkages and considers each firm as an independent entity, as standard in the literature. Neglecting the ownership linkages substantially underestimates concentration levels and leads to lower growth from 2000 to 2019.

There are several potential avenues for future work. First, this study, like most other studies on concentration, aggregates firm-level data at the industry level. Recently, some authors have questioned whether industries reflect consumer product markets, even when they are narrowly defined. Investigating the relationships between industry-level and product-level concentration would enhance the informativeness of industry-level analyses. Forthcoming work shows that concentration measured at the industry level and at the product level are strongly positively correlated. Second, to further understand the state of competition, concentration should be investigated alongside other proxies of competition, such as business dynamics and markups. A forthcoming OECD paper shows that there is a lack of business at the top of markets and that this has slightly declined over the period. Third, the possible causes and consequences of increasing concentration should be explored, though this is challenging empirically, due to the difficulty of identifying exogenous variations in concentration. Recent OECD work shows that higher concentration is positively correlated with the intensity of intangible assets, M&As by leading firms, and burdensome regulations in upstream sectors (Calligaris, Chaves, et al., 2024b). Fourth, this study lacks access to sub-national data, which may be more appropriate for computing concentration in some non-tradeable industries and warrants further investigation. Finally, as cross-country data availability improves, the usefulness of the taxonomy increases, as does the validity and representativeness of the findings, so the study could be repeated in the future with new data.

Overall, this paper contributes to the existing literature both methodologically and empirically. Methodologically, it proposes a more precise way to measure concentration. The methodological exercises demonstrate how different assumptions impact concentration measures in a harmonised framework, shedding some light on the sources of controversial findings in the literature. From an empirical viewpoint, the paper shows that overall concentration increased from 2000 to 2019. While the proposed refinements affect the average concentration level and its evolution over time, concentration consistently rises across almost all specifications.

The fact that this result, which informs the debate about a possible weakening of competition, is robust to many specifications has important implications for policymakers. A holistic policy framework encompassing antitrust, industrial, innovation, and broader economic policies must be adopted to ensure healthy competition.

4

Does Investment Grants Concentration Shape Industry Performance and Competition?

4.1 Introduction

This paper evaluates the effects of investment grants concentration on industry performance and industry competition.[1] Public grants have regained prominence as an industrial policy instrument, aimed at addressing market failures and fostering competitiveness, innovation, productivity, and economic growth (e.g., Bloom et al., 2019 and Hall & Lerner, 2010).

Several studies have analyzed the impact of subsidies at the firm level (e.g., Bronzini & Iachini, 2014, Bronzini & Piselli, 2016). In general, grants have a positive impact on investment, employment, and turnover (e.g., Cerqua & Pellegrini, 2014; Cingano et al., 2022); however, their effects on firms' productivity remain mixed (e.g., Bernini et al., 2017, Cin et al., 2017, Criscuolo et al., 2019, and Dvouletý et al., 2021).

Investment grants are typically distributed based on eligibility criteria. Such policies raise questions about the optimal allocation of grants to each firm and its implications (see, for example, Görg & Strobl, 2007), as well as the frequency with which firms benefit from these grants. For instance, Howell (2017) examined two phases of the U.S. Department of Energy's SBIR grant program and found that while the first grant had significant positive effects on patenting and revenue, particularly for financially constrained firms, the second grant had no impact. On the other hand, Muraközy and Telegdy (2022), investigating the effects of multiple ERDF grants on Hungarian firms, found positive effects on employment, sales, and productivity. Likewise, Feldman et al. (2022) highlighted the benefits of awarding multiple R&D grants to the same firm within the U.S. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. Furthermore, Alexandre et al. (2024) analyzed the impact of a second ERDF grant allocated to Portuguese firms and found that it had an even stronger effect on firms' value-added and labour productivity than a single grant.

The implementation of public grants must be carefully managed to prevent certain firms from gaining an undue advantage, which could potentially violate competition rules and undermine efficiency (Akcigit

[1] This chapter is co-authored with Fernando Alexandre and Miguel Portela.

et al., 2023). Allocating disproportionate benefits to a select group of firms may crowd out competitors, leading to adverse effects on overall economic output (Rotemberg, 2019). These concerns become even more relevant when a large share of grants is concentrated among a small number of firms (Trajtenberg, 2020), casting doubts about both the fairness and effectiveness of the grant allocation process.

Studies have analyzed whether investment grants are beneficial and determinant for supported firms. However, it is equally important to assess how the concentration or dispersion of these grants affects overall industry performance, particularly through economic externalities and potential spillover effects on non-supported firms. This concern gains further importance when a significant share of total grants is concentrated among a small number of firms, as observed with ERDF grants in Portugal – see, for example, Alexandre et al. (2024).

On the other hand, concentrating investment grants among a small number of firms, thereby favoring specific firms, may increase their market power and, consequently, affect competition. Several studies suggest that market concentration has been relatively stable or has even declined in recent years (e.g., Amiti & Heise, 2024, Benkard et al., 2021, and Cavalleri et al., 2019). However, there is also evidence of rising concentration (e.g., Autor et al., 2020, De Ridder, 2024, De Loecker et al., 2024 and Lashkari et al., 2024). Calligaris, Chaves, et al. (2024a) report an increase in market concentration in European countries, suggesting that a small number of firms are expanding their market power, potentially leading to weaker competition.

We use a rich firm-level administrative database that includes balance sheets and other accounting information for Portuguese firms, as well as the full population of firms that applied for the ERDF between 2008–2021. The ERDF has been a key instrument in Portuguese policymakers' toolkit, aimed at enhancing competitiveness and productivity. This firm-level dataset enables us to aggregate information at the 3-digit industry level and conduct industry-level analysis. To assess investment grants concentration, we apply industry competition measures, using the same concentration indices commonly employed in industry concentration studies – see, for example, Ganapati (2021). Specifically, we consider the share of investment grants allocated to the top four and top eight supported firms, as well as the HHI.

The contributions of this paper to the literature are threefold. First, we evaluate the impact of investment grants concentration on industry performance. Our results show that an increase in investment grants concentration negatively affects industry labour productivity in the medium and long term, with no observed effects on investment, employment, or value-added. Second, given that in the Portuguese ERDF program, a small number of firms receive a significant share of grants, we investigate whether investment grants concentration influences industry competition, specifically whether concentrating grants among a few firms leads to higher industry concentration. Our findings reveal no impact of investment grants concentration on competition or on market dynamism, such as entry and exit rates. Finally, we examine the relationship between industry concentration and industry performance to determine whether changes in market concentration serve as the transmission mechanism through which concentrated grants might shape industry-wide outcomes. The results suggest that higher industry concentration has a positive short-term effect on exports but no significant impact on labour productivity.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the literature on investment grants, grants concentration, and industry competition. Section 4.3 describes the databases, explains the ERDF program for supporting firms' investment, and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4.4 outlines the empirical strategy, while Section 4.5 discusses the econometric results. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes and discusses the policy implications of grants concentration.

4.2 Grants and Competition

Public grants have been widely implemented worldwide to promote competitiveness, productivity, and economic growth. Examples include the U.S. Small Business Administration's support for small firms Brown and Earle (2017), grant programs in China (e.g., Cheng et al., 2019, and Lim et al., 2018), and grant programs in Europe European Commission and Directorate-General for Budget (2022). Investment grants are commonly employed as an industrial policy instrument to address market failures that hinder economic growth, such as mitigating financial constraints (e.g., Fang et al., 2018 and Hall & Lerner, 2010), enhancing knowledge spillovers, and promoting socially optimal levels of R&D and innovation (e.g., Arrow, 1972 and Bloom et al., 2019).

The effectiveness of public grants has received extensive attention in recent literature – see, for example, Criscuolo et al. (2022). Bronzini and Iachini (2014) and Bronzini and Piselli (2016) examined R&D subsidy programs in Italy, finding that they increased investment among small firms and the number of patent applications, respectively. Cingano et al. (2022) reported positive effects on employment, while Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014), analyzing the impact of Italy's main regional policy, found positive effects on firms' investment, employment, and turnover. Conducting a systematic review on the effects of public grants on firm performance, Dvouletý et al. (2021) found mostly positive effects on employment and turnover, though the evidence on firms' productivity was mixed. Crespi et al. (2020) showed that R&D grants improved firms' productivity in Chile, with Cin et al. (2017) finding similar results in South Korea. Other studies report weaker or negligible effects on productivity. Srhoj and Walde (2020), analyzing export-oriented grants in Croatia, found only a slight effect on TFP, while Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014) found a negligible impact on productivity. In Italy, Bernini et al. (2017) found a negative short-term effect on TFP growth, but signs of positive effects in the medium to long term. On the other hand, some studies found no impact on productivity at all. For instance, Criscuolo et al. (2019) found no evidence of a positive effect on productivity, while Mesquita et al. (2022) and Santos (2019), focusing on ERDF grants in Portugal, showed no significant productivity effects.

Görg and Strobl (2007) raises concerns about the optimal allocation of funds to each firm. Using manufacturing data from Ireland, the authors showed that small grants stimulate private R&D spending, whereas excessively large grants risk crowding out private R&D financing. In a related vein, many grant programs allow firms to receive multiple grants. Howell (2017), evaluating the U.S. Department of Energy's SBIR grant program, showed that while first-phase grants have a strong positive impact on

patenting and revenue, specifically for financially constrained firms, second-phase grants show no effect. By contrast, Muraközy and Telegdy (2022), analyzing ERDF grants in Hungary (2004–2014), found that firms receiving multiple grants exhibit higher growth in employment and sales, enhancing productivity. Similarly, Feldman et al. (2022) showed that multiple R&D grants to the same firm under the U.S. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program contribute to increased commercial activity, human capital development, and patenting. Alexandre et al. (2024) found that Portuguese firms awarding a second ERDF grant have a stronger positive impact on value-added and labour productivity compared to those awarding only a single grant.

The design and allocation of grant programs are essential to ensuring that public grants fulfill their objectives. Funding decisions should be based on clear, transparent, independent, and objective criteria to maximize the effectiveness and fairness of grant distribution while mitigating risks associated with favoring specific firms, which could lead to market distortions and violations of competition rules, ultimately undermining efficiency (e.g., Akcigit et al., 2023). Excessively favoring certain firms can harm competition by strengthening selected players at the expense of their rivals, potentially reducing aggregate output (e.g., Rotemberg, 2019). The concentration of public grants among a small number of firms heightens these risks (e.g., Trajtenberg, 2020).

Beyond analyzing the impact of investment grants at the firm level, it is equally crucial to assess how the concentration or dispersion of investment grants affects overall industry performance. Even if supported firms improve their economic performance, these benefits may not necessarily extend to the broader industry or generate significant economic externalities. This concern becomes particularly relevant when a small number of firms capture a large share of total funding, as observed with ERDF grants in Portugal – see, for example, Alexandre et al. (2024).

The concentration or dispersion of investment grants may also affect industry competition. Brander and Spencer (1985) discuss the role of strategic subsidies in international market competition, mentioning that subsidizing domestic firms enables them to expand their market share and achieve higher profits relative to foreign firms. In the same vein, OECD (2022) discuss how government subsidies affect competition and trade dynamics, emphasizing their potential to distort markets by favoring subsidized firms. The authors explore the trade-offs between promoting economic development and ensuring fair competition. Subsidies can drive economic growth, however, they may also introduce inefficiencies and unfair advantages. The study raises concerns that subsidized firms may engage in predatory pricing, harming competitors and consumer welfare. Therefore, it is essential to investigate whether investment grants foster or hinder market competition and their long-term economic implications. While these grants may enhance the economic performance of supported firms, they could also reduce overall competition.

Industry concentration is widely used as a proxy for competition (e.g., Ganapati, 2021, and Calligaris, Chaves, et al., 2024a). Evidence on the evolution of industry concentration in recent years is mixed, varying by country, type of data, and methodology used to measure concentration – see, for example, Calligaris, Chaves, et al. (2024a). In the United States, several studies find that industry concentration has remained constant (e.g., Amiti & Heise, 2024) or has declined (e.g., Benkard et al., 2021).

Conversely, other analyses found an increase in industry concentration (e.g., Autor et al., 2020, Barkai, 2020, and Grullon et al., 2019) and increasing barriers to entry (e.g., Covarrubias et al., 2019). In Europe, De Ridder (2024) and Lashkari et al. (2024) analyzed industry concentration in France, while De Loecker et al. (2024) focuses on the United Kingdom – all finding evidence of increasing concentration. Calligaris, Chaves, et al. (2024a), using harmonized cross-country data at the 3-digit industry level, show an increase of industry concentration, suggesting a decrease in competition. The authors find that average concentration across 15 European countries increased by 5 percentage points between 2000 and 2019, from 26% to 31%. Additionally, Calligaris, Chaves, et al. (2024a) indicate that the increase in market concentration is more pronounced in domestically oriented industries than in trade-exposed industries. Bajgar et al. (2023) also show a slight increase in concentration at both the national and European levels, analyzing 12 European countries between 2000 and 2014. On the other hand, Gutierrez and Philippon (2023) find that European markets have become more competitive over time.

Several developed countries have experienced a productivity slowdown in recent decades. Some explanations point to diminishing returns on innovation investment (e.g., Bloom et al., 2020, Gordon, 2017, and Jones, 2009) and the rise of intangibles (e.g., De Ridder, 2024). Others attribute this slowdown to a decline in business dynamism (e.g., Decker et al., 2017, and Decker et al., 2020), weakening competition, and higher entry barriers that protect incumbents – see, for example, Philippon (2019).

The relationship between competition and productivity growth has been widely debated in both empirical evidence and theory (e.g., Aghion et al., 2021). According to Schumpeter (1942), competition decreases the expected returns from innovation, which may disincentivize R&D investment, arguing that firms should have a temporary profit advantage over competitors. Demsetz (1973) highlight that high concentration can result from a competitive process, where firms gain market share by outperforming rivals. Ganapati (2021) finds that rising industry concentration in the United States is positively correlated with productivity and real output growth, has no impact on price changes or overall payroll, and is negatively correlated with labour's share of revenue. On the other hand, most of the literature emphasizes the importance of a dynamic competitive environment (e.g., Babina et al., 2023, Buccirossi et al., 2013, and Calligaris, Chaves, et al., 2024a). Backus (2020) suggest that productivity responds directly to competition. Griffith and Van Reenen (2021) highlight the benefits of competition, as new market entrants may force incumbent firms to innovate to maintain their leading position. A dynamic and competitive environment that enables firm entry and allows productive firms to expand encourages the exit of less efficient incumbents, improving resource allocation and enhancing productivity (e.g. Restuccia & Rogerson, 2008).

Given these insights, understanding the impact of investment grants, particularly when highly concentrated, on industry performance and competition is crucial. If the allocation of public grants distorts market structure and weakens competition, it may ultimately hinder productivity growth. Conversely, well-designed grant programs can strengthen competitive pressures by enabling financially constrained but innovative firms to enter or expand, thereby enhancing productivity. Therefore, the design of investment grants and their implications for industry-level performance and industry competition require careful

empirical investigation.

4.3 Data and Descriptive statistics

Our empirical analysis is based on the linkage of two rich longitudinal firm-level administrative databases for the Portuguese economy. The first dataset is the CBS database from the Bank of Portugal (see Banco de Portugal Microdata Research Laboratory (BPLIM), 2020). The CBS contains economic and financial information on the population of non-financial private sector firms in Portugal from 2008 to 2021. It provides annual data on balance sheets and other accounting information, covering approximately 390 thousand firms per year.

The CBS allows us to compute industry competition measures. We consider three industry concentration measures as proxies for competition. First, we use a concentration measure aggregating the market shares of the eight largest firms in an industry-year in terms of sales, following Calligaris, Chaves, et al. (2024a). Second, instead of the eight largest firms, we aggregate the market shares of the four largest firms, as in Autor et al. (2020) and Ganapati (2021). Finally, we compute the HHI, which is the sum of the squared market shares of all firms within an industry-year, in line with Cavalleri et al. (2019).[2] Our analysis also incorporates measures of business dynamism. Entry and exit rates are defined as the number of firms entering or exiting an industry, respectively, divided by the total number of firms in that year (see, for examle, Colantone & Sleuwaegen, 2010 and Tomasi et al., 2023).

Additionally, the CBS provides industry performance outcomes, including investment, employment, value-added, and exports, which are aggregated at the industry-year level. Labour productivity is computed as total value-added divided by the number of employees in an industry-year. Furthermore, the CBS allows us to include control variables, such as total assets and the average firms' age within an industry-year.

The second dataset comes from the AdC and includes information on ERDF support for Portuguese firms' investments (see Banco de Portugal Microdata Research Laboratory (BPLIM), 2019). The ERDF is managed by the European Commission in coordination with EU member states and aims to promote economic and social cohesion within the EU. It is one of the five funds established under the ESIF.

As Portugal, like other developed countries, has experienced a productivity slowdown in recent decades (see, for example, Blanchard & Portugal, 2017 and Eichenbaum et al., 2017), the ERDF can play a crucial role in enhancing firms' competitiveness and productivity. This dataset covers two multi-annual financial programs: the NSRF between 2008 and 2013, and PT2020 from 2014 to 2021. Each program includes three different incentive systems to support firms' investment, depending on the type of investment. These are the Innovation Incentive System, the Qualification Incentive System, and the Research and Development Incentive System.[3] These incentive systems focus on different types of investments and may affect

[2] A full description of the variables used in our empirical analysis is presented in Table 55 in the Appendix.

[3] The nomenclature of these instruments differs slightly between NSRF and PT2020, but their objectives remain largely unchanged. In NSRF, the three incentive systems were Innovation; SME Qualification; and Research and Technological Development, whereas in PT2020, they were Entrepreneurial Innovation and Entrepreneurship; Qualification and Internationalization

firms' performance differently (see, for example, Dimos et al., 2022, Dvouletý et al., 2021 and Srhoj et al., 2023). However, in our analysis, we include investment grants from all incentive systems, as their ultimate goal is to increase firms' productivity and foster economic growth.

To obtain ERDF grants, firms submit investment project applications through calls for tenders, each with its own specific selection criteria. Independent experts, including scholars from major Portuguese universities, evaluate the applications, and grants are awarded to the highest-scoring applications, subject to the program's budget constraints. The AdC database contains information on the population of firms' ERDF applications, including selected and non-selected applications, application and contract dates, the amount of grants awarded to firms, total investment, and firm identification. This allows us to track which firms received grants, when they received them, and the amounts awarded between 2008 and 2021. During this period, approximately 14 thousand firms were awarded ERDF grants.

The AdC database also allows us to compute grants concentration measures. We apply the previously discussed concentration measures to the grants context. The first measure calculates the share of grants received by the eight firms with the highest grant amounts within each industry-year. The second measure follows the same approach but considers only the four firms with the highest grant amounts. The third measure is the HHI for grants, computed as the sum of the squared shares of grants within each industry-year.

The two longitudinal databases are linked at the firm level using a common anonymized firm identifier and then aggregated at the 3-digit industry level, allowing us to analyze the impact of grants concentration on industry performance and competition. Our dataset comprises 229 industries from 2008 to 2021.[4] Among these 229 industries, 220 have firms that received ERDF support, while 9 industries did not receive any grants.[5]

The total ERDF support between 2008 and 2021 in our sample amounts to 8.11 billion euros. Figure 20 shows that the manufacturing industry received the largest share of ERDF support. The shares of ERDF support allocated to services, manufacturing, and other industries are 26.5%, 69.07% and 4.42%, respectively. The distribution of ERDF support by industry at the NACE 1-digit level is presented in Table 57 in the Appendix.

Figure 21 presents the total amount of ERDF support between 2008 and 2021, along with the total amounts received by the top four and top eight firms that received the highest grants in each industry-year. Over the entire period, the top four supported firms received approximately 4.2 billion euros, while the top eight supported firms received 5.3 billion euros. The Figure 21 shows an increase in total grant

of SME; and Research and Technological Development.

[4]We include industries with complete data across all years, and exclude 37 industries with fewer than 10 observations per year to prevent miscomputations in industry and grants concentration measures. These industries account for 0.24% of total grants. The number of firms per industry is detailed in Table 56 in the Appendix. Manufacturing represents approximately 12% of the firms. Additionally, to ensure that COVID-19 does not affect our results, our regression analysis focuses on the period 2008–2019.

[5]These industries include hunting-related activities; extraction of cork, resin, and other forest products, except wood; fishing; steam and ice production; television activities; wireless telecommunications activities; financial services and credit activities; operations of facilities for individuals with mental health conditions; social assistance activities.




Figure 20: Percentage of ERDF by Industry

allocation until 2017, followed by a slight decline until 2021. For the top four and top eight supported firms, the amount of ERDF support follows a similar trend, increasing until 2016 and then stabilizing or slightly decreasing. Firms receiving the largest amounts of grants account for a significant share of total grants. In 2016, for example, the top eight supported firms in each industry received 557 million euros, while the top four supported firms received 429 million euros.




Figure 21: Total ERDF amount and ERDF allocation to the Top 8 and Top 4 supported firms

The percentage of ERDF support received by the top four and top eight supported firms each year is presented in Figure 22. This measure is computed as the sum of ERDF support received by the top four and top eight supported firms in each industry, divided by the total ERDF support in that year. In 2008, when total ERDF support was relatively low, the share of grants allocated to the top four and top eight

firms exceeded 90%. Between 2008 and 2016, this percentage declined, and after 2016, it stabilized at approximately 60% for the top eight supported firms and 50% for the top four supported firms.




Figure 22: Percentage of ERDF allocated to the Top 8 and Top 4 supported firms

Figure 30 in the Appendix shows the amount of ERDF support received by the four and eight largest firms in terms of sales. Both trends exhibit an increase from 2008 to 2016, followed by a slight decline until 2021. In 2016, the four and eight largest firms received 208 and 137 million euros, respectively. In the same vein, Figure 31 in the Appendix presents the percentage of ERDF support allocated to the four and eight largest firms in terms of sales. In 2008, the four and eight largest firms received 34% and 41% of ERDF support. After 2016, their shares remained relatively stable at approximately 15% and 21%, respectively. Despite the significant share of ERDF support received by the largest firms within each industry-year, an even larger share is concentrated among a small number of firms that do not belong to the four or eight largest firms in terms of sales, compared to Figure 22.

Figure 23 illustrates concentration trends for the four and eight largest firms in terms of sales, averaged across all industries. These trends remain broadly stable over the analysis period, consistent with the findings of Cavalleri et al. (2019), who report that concentration ratios have remained relatively stable in recent years at the national level in the euro area. The Figure 23 shows a slight increase in concentration up to 2012, followed by a slight decline until 2019. In 2012, the concentration ratios for the top eight and top four firms were 0.54 and 0.43, respectively, decreasing to 0.51 and 0.40 by 2021. However, Figure 23 also highlights that, on average, more than 50% of total market share belongs to the eight largest firms, while over 40% belongs to the four largest firms, which is in line with the fact that Portugal's economy is predominantly composed of micro and small-sized firms.

Figure 32 in the Appendix shows concentration trends by industry type, based on the eight largest firms in each industry. The manufacturing industry is the most concentrated industry, with concentration levels consistently above 60%. For manufacturing, concentration levels exhibit a stable or slightly increasing




Figure 23: Industry Concentration trends: C8 and C4 (Top 8 and Top 4 largest Firms)

trend from 2008 to 2021. By contrast, concentration in services and other industries has been declining. In 2008, concentration levels in services and other industries were 0.46 and 0.51, respectively, decreasing to 0.44 and 0.47 by 2021. The trends for the four largest firms follow a similar pattern – see Figure 33 in the Appendix.

The distribution of ERDF support across industry concentration quartiles from 2008 to 2021 is presented in Figure 24. Most ERDF support is allocated to less concentrated industries, with industries in the first quartile receiving 3.5 billion euros. The amount of ERDF support declines as industry concentration increases, meaning the second quartile receives the second-largest share of ERDF support, while the most concentrated industries (third and fourth quartiles) receive the least.[6]

Figure 34 in the Appendix presents the distribution of ERDF support by concentration quartiles over the years, considering the eight largest firms between 2008 and 2021. The first quartile, representing the least concentrated industries, consistently receives the highest amount of ERDF support throughout the period. Furthermore, the lower quartiles (first and second quartiles) receive the highest amount of ERDF support.

The descriptive statistics for 2019, including the main variables of interest, are presented in Table 16.[7] Our sample includes 229 industries per year. In 2019, the concentration levels considering the eight and four largest firms were 0.51 and 0.40, respectively, meaning that, on average, the eight largest firms held 51% of the market share within their industries. The 1st and 99th percentiles of concentration were 0.07 and 1, respectively. The average HHI was 0.11. The average concentration of grants, measured for the eight firms receiving the largest amounts of grants, was 0.72, with some industries receiving no ERDF

[6] The first quartile ranges from 0.03 to 0.29, the second from 0.29 to 0.51, the third from 0.51 to 0.80, and the fourth from 0.80 to 1. When considering equally spaced intervals of 0.25 rather than quartiles, most ERDF support remains concentrated in the lower intervals.

[7] Descriptive statistics for 2008 are provided in Table 58 in the Appendix.




Figure 24: ERDF support by Concentration Quantiles, C8 (1st quantile: least concentrated, 4th quantile: most concentrated)

support, thereby lowering the overall mean. However, in industries where firms were awarded grants, concentration was high, with a median of 0.91. The median of grants concentration for the top four supported firms was also relatively high, at 0.72. The average HHI for grants concentration was 0.30. Regarding business dynamism, in 2019, the average entry and exit rates were 6% and 3%, respectively. The average investment, value-added, exports, and assets across industries were 139, 416, 359 and 2,962 million euros, respectively. Industries had, on average, 13,210 employees, with firms having an average age of 15 years. The average labour productivity across all industries is 40 thousand euros per employee.

4.4 Empirical strategy

This section outlines the empirical strategy employed to evaluate the implications of grants concentration. The impact of funding distribution has been discussed across various fields, such as scientific research. For instance, Aagaard et al. (2020) analyzed the relationship between research funding distribution and scientific performance, raising the question of whether a limited number of elite scientists should receive a high share of funding or whether it is more effective to distribute resources in smaller portions to a larger number of individuals. However, the effects of grants concentration or dispersion on industry performance and competition, in fact, deserve further investigation.

Determining whether concentrating grants within specific industries enhances or hampers industry-wide growth is crucial for policymakers aiming to design effective industrial policies. To evaluate the impact of grants concentration on industry outcomes, we estimate a model at the industry level using a fixed-effects approach that includes both industry and year fixed effects. This approach addresses

Table 16: Descriptive Statistics in 2019

	N	mean	sd	p1	p25	p50	p75	p99
C8	229	0.51	0.28	0.07	0.26	0.45	0.75	1.00
C4	229	0.40	0.27	0.04	0.18	0.33	0.56	1.00
HHI	229	0.11	0.17	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.13	0.83
C8grants	229	0.72	0.37	0.00	0.51	0.91	1.00	1.00
C4grants	229	0.63	0.36	0.00	0.35	0.72	1.00	1.00
HHIgrants	229	0.30	0.31	0.00	0.06	0.18	0.46	1.00
Entry rate	229	0.06	0.04	0.00	0.03	0.06	0.09	0.19
Exit rate	229	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.10
Investment	229	139.25	289.98	0.31	15.60	56.44	139.81	1623.55
Employment	229	13210.75	21688.21	108.00	1826.00	5294.00	14250.00	1.3e+05
Value-added	229	415.92	620.06	2.37	65.86	203.58	454.13	2897.63
Exports	229	359.44	721.49	0.00	13.02	103.71	308.15	4073.77
Labour productivity	229	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.26
Assets	229	2962.81	8164.59	10.95	240.86	791.04	2120.78	53958.91
Age	229	14.81	6.20	5.81	10.16	13.63	19.01	31.14

Notes: Investment, value-added, exports, labour productivity, and assets are expressed in millions of euros.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

key endogeneity concerns. Industry fixed effects remove time-invariant heterogeneity across industries – such as persistent technological or capital-intensity differences – thereby mitigating the risk that structural attributes drive both grants concentration and industry outcomes. Year fixed effects capture economy-wide temporal shocks, for example, business cycles and other macroeconomic trends that are common to all industries. We also include the interaction between industry and year fixed effects to capture time-varying industry-specific shocks, such as commodity price changes or programme design features of grant schemes. This interaction helps mitigate bias from unobserved within-industry variation over time. These fixed effects mitigate the principal endogeneity threat, specifically the correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term, and yield more robust and consistent estimates of the impact of grants concentration on industry performance. In addition, we employ log-differences of various orders, which transform the dependent variables into growth rates of economically meaningful outcomes. This mitigates deterministic and stochastic trends and helps address serial correlation in persistent industry-level variables. Using longer differences also helps attenuate biases from contemporaneous policy responses to output shocks, allowing sufficient time for potential treatment effects to materialise and providing a reasonable interval to assess whether such effects emerge. Our specification follows the approach of Ganapati (2021), who analyzed the effects of market concentration, but in our case, we applied it to the context of grants concentration. The model is given by the following equation 4.1:

$$\Delta_k \log(Y_{it}) = f\Big[\Delta_k \log(\text{GrantsConcentration}_{it})\Big] + \alpha_s + \lambda_t + \gamma_{st} + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{4.1}$$

where the dependent variable, Y_{it}, represents industry performance outcomes, namely investment, employment, value-added, exports, and labour productivity, indexed by industry i and year t. The variable $GrantsConcentration_{it}$ denotes the concentration of grants in industry i and year t. We use three measures of grants concentration. First, we compute the share of total grants received by the eight firms that received the largest amounts of grants, following Calligaris, Chaves, et al. (2024a), which considers the eight largest firms when measuring market competition concentration. Second, we calculate the same concentration measure but for the top four grant-receiving firms, in line with Autor et al. (2020) and Ganapati (2021), who apply this approach to industry concentration. Finally, we use the HHI, which sums the squared grant shares of all firms in the industry-year, following Cavalleri et al. (2019) for industry concentration. The Δ_k operator takes time differences in the variables, ranging from one- to five-year differences, as allowed by data availability. The model includes industry fixed effects at the two-digit industry level, α_s, and year fixed effects, λ_t. The fixed effect γ_{st} refers to the interaction between two-digit industry and year. The term ε_{it} is the error term.

We employ 2-digit, rather than 3-digit, industry fixed effects to capture broader, time-invariant heterogeneity, such as differences in capital intensity, technological frontier, regulatory regime and exposure to global value chains, assuming that these characteristics are shared across all 3-digit industries nested within the same 2-digit industry. This choice avoids the model from becoming oversaturated and preserves degrees of freedom. Interacting the 2-digit industry with year fixed effects then absorbs sector-wide business-cycle or policy shocks that affect every 3-digit industry in a given year (for instance, commodity-price swings or sector-specific COVID-19 support programmes). Estimating the model at the 3-digit level while defining fixed effects at 2-digit is in line with Ganapati (2021).

Grants concentration may have significant implications for industry competition, potentially enabling subsidised firms to crowd out rivals or create barriers to market entry. Consequently, we investigate whether the concentration of grants is associated with changes in market structure metrics. To address this, we estimate the following industry-level model – see equation 4.2:

$$\Delta_k \log(Concentration_{it}) = f\Big[\Delta_k \log(\text{GrantsConcentration}_{it})\Big] + \alpha_s + \lambda_t + \gamma_{st} + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{4.2}$$

where the dependent variable, $Concentration_{it}$, represents industry concentration measures, including the market shares of the eight largest firms, the market share of the four largest firms, and the HHI. The variable $GrantsConcentration_{it}$ follows the same specification as in the previous model. The model incorporates the same fixed effects as in equation 4.1.

Finally, by explicitly accounting for market structure, we distinguish between the direct effects of grants concentration and the indirect effects operating through changes in industry concentration. We evaluate the effects of both grants concentration and industry concentration on industry performance by estimating the following model – see equation 4.3:

$$\Delta_k \log(Y_{it}) = \beta_1 \left[\Delta_k \log(\text{GrantsConcentration}_{it})\right] + \beta_2 \left[\Delta_k \log(\text{Concentration}_{it})\right] + \alpha_s + \lambda_t + \gamma_{st} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (4.3)$$

where Y_{it} stands for industry performance outcomes, including investment, employment, value-added, exports, and labour productivity. The variable $GrantsConcentration_{it}$ represents the concentration of grants, while $Concentration_{it}$ denotes industry concentration as previously defined. The fixed effects remain the same as in equation 4.1.

Following Ganapati (2021), we apply a logarithmic transformation to both the industry concentration and grants concentration measures in all models, rather than using their levels. This transformation mitigates potential distortions arising from extremely low market shares, which could otherwise artificially deflate values at the lower end of the distribution.

4.5 Results

This section presents the estimation results based on our empirical strategy. The regression analysis covers the period between 2008 and 2019 to ensure that the findings are not influenced by the effects of COVID-19.[8]

Table 17 presents the estimates of the impact of grants concentration on industry performance for time differences ranging from one to five years. Grants concentration is measured as the ratio of the sum of grants received by the eight firms that obtain the largest amounts of grants to the total amount of grants within each industry-year. The sample is at the 3-digit industry level, and industry fixed effects are at the 2-digit industry level, in line with Ganapati (2021). Standard errors are clustered at the 3-digit industry level to account for within-industry correlation patterns, such as inputs, technologies, supply chains, or regulatory frameworks, which might induce serial correlation or heteroskedasticity in the error terms.

The results show that grants concentration has no statistically significant effect on investment, employment, value-added, or exports. Similarly, there is no significant effect on short-run labour productivity. However, in the medium to long run, grants concentration is found to be negatively correlated with labour productivity. In the one- and two-year differences, no statistically significant effects are observed. However, in the three- and four-year differences, one additional percentage point (p.p.) in grants concentration growth is associated with a 0.04 p.p. decline in the labour productivity growth rate, statistically significant at the 5% level. For the five-year difference, the negative correlation remains but is slightly smaller, at 0.03 p.p., and is statistically significant at the 10% level. Specifically, for a four-year difference, a 10 p.p. increase in the growth rate of grants concentration, as measured by the eight firms receiving the most grants, is associated with a 0.4 p.p. decrease in the growth rate of labour productivity.

[8] Robustness checks replicating the estimations for the period 2008–2021 are presented in the Appendix.

Table 17: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (Top 8 Supported Firms) and Industry Performance

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_1$ln C8grants	0.08362	0.00320	-0.01550	-0.03013	-0.01263
	(0.060113)	(0.003753)	(0.019563)	(0.025243)	(0.012459)
N	2519	2519	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_2$ln C8grants	0.04828	0.00647	-0.02178	-0.00108	-0.01790
	(0.048275)	(0.006046)	(0.018835)	(0.038736)	(0.011135)
N	2290	2290	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_3$ln C8grants	0.02955	0.00895	-0.04114	-0.00861	-0.03572**
	(0.045646)	(0.007283)	(0.029306)	(0.039230)	(0.018118)
N	2061	2061	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_4$ln C8grants	0.03151	0.01078	-0.04685	-0.00088	-0.04190**
	(0.039703)	(0.007152)	(0.030506)	(0.046193)	(0.019407)
N	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_5$ln C8grants	0.02184	0.01118	-0.02974	0.03805	-0.03034*
	(0.042507)	(0.008061)	(0.029151)	(0.045927)	(0.017524)
N	1603	1603	1603	1603	1603

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 59 in the Appendix shows the results using the four firms that receive the largest amounts of grants as the measure of grants concentration. The findings remain consistent with those reported in Table 17. No statistically significant effects are found for investment, employment, value-added, or exports, while a negative correlation with labour productivity is observed for the three-, four-, and five-year differences. The relationship is statistically significant at the 5% level for three- and four-year differences, with a magnitude of 0.04 p.p. For the five-year difference, a 1 p.p. increase in the growth rate of grants concentration is associated with a decrease of 0.03 p.p. in the growth rate of labour productivity, statistically significant at the 10% level.

When applying the HHI to grants concentration, Table 60 in the Appendix, the results remain consistent with those from the previous estimations. A negative correlation with labour productivity is observed, with coefficient magnitudes closely aligning with earlier estimates. Additionally, the results indicate that grants concentration is negatively linked to labour productivity at the two-year difference, statistically significant at the 10% level.

Given the observed negative relationship between grants concentration and labour productivity, we conduct additional estimations incorporating control variables. Specifically, we include industry-level assets and the average firms' age within each industry. Table 18 presents the estimates using grants

concentration for the eight firms receiving the largest amounts of grants, with assets included in differences of logs in line with the main variables. The results confirm that grants concentration has no effect on investment, employment, or exports, but a negative impact on labour productivity persists. While no significant effect is detected in the short run, a negative impact emerges in the medium to long term, with the three- and four-year differences significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. In both cases, a 10 p.p. increase in the growth rate of grants concentration is associated with a 0.4 p.p. decline in the growth rate of labour productivity. Additionally, a negative effect on value-added is observed for the four-year difference, statistically significant at the 10% level. Regarding the control variables, assets are positively linked to investment, employment, value-added, and exports, but show no effect on labour productivity. While the impact on value-added is visible only in the short run (one- and two-year differences, statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively), the effects on investment, employment, and exports persist across all time differences, with coefficients statistically significant at the 1% level. For instance, at the four-year difference, a 1 p.p. increase in the growth rate of assets is associated with a 0.98 p.p. increase in the growth rate of investment, 0.43 p.p. increase in the growth rate of employment, and a 1 p.p. increase in the growth rate of exports. On the other hand, the average firms' age within industries is negatively linked to employment, suggesting that industries with older firms tend to employ fewer workers.

Estimates incorporating control variables with lags are presented in Table 61 in the Appendix. The results confirm that the impact of grants concentration on industry performance remains consistent, with the primary finding being a negative effect on labour productivity. The main difference arises in the impact of assets. Unlike in Table 18, where a positive relationship was found between assets and investment, employment, value-added, and exports, the results in Table 61 show that assets have a mild negative impact on investment with two lags, a negative impact on employment across all lags, and a negative impact on exports from one to four lags. No significant effects are found for value-added or labour productivity. These findings suggest that asset growth positively affects industry outcomes such as investment, employment, value-added, and exports, yet industries with higher levels of assets exhibit lower employment and export growth. The results regarding average firm age, which indicate a negative impact on employment, remain consistent.

We also estimate the impact of grants concentration, considering the four firms that receive the largest amounts of grants, while incorporating the control variables – see Table 62 in the Appendix. The results show that grants concentration only affects labour productivity, with a negative impact statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels for three- and four-year differences, respectively. The results are consistent in terms of significance and magnitude of the coefficients with those obtained in Table 18. The positive link between assets and industry outcomes, specifically investment, employment, value-added, and exports, remains unchanged. Additionally, the negative relationship between firms' industry age and employment also persists.

When using the HHI applied to grants concentration, Table 63 shows a negative impact of grants concentration on labour productivity. Specifically, a negative effect of 0.02 p.p. in the growth rate of labour productivity is observed at the two-year difference, while a 0.04 p.p. negative impact is found for

Table 18: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (Top 8 Supported Firms) and Industry Performance with Controls

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_1$ln C8grants	0.07926	0.00161	-0.01775	-0.03535	-0.01328
	(0.059492)	(0.003126)	(0.019205)	(0.023389)	(0.012277)
$\Delta_1$ln assets	0.95635***	0.36548***	0.50419***	1.19086***	0.13708
	(0.156257)	(0.043705)	(0.157566)	(0.348069)	(0.101917)
age	0.00417	-0.00268***	-0.00057	-0.00567	0.00159
	(0.004276)	(0.000858)	(0.001735)	(0.005823)	(0.001033)
N	2519	2519	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_2$ln C8grants	0.02596	-0.00015	-0.02914	-0.01899	-0.01883
	(0.048745)	(0.004953)	(0.020004)	(0.037545)	(0.011718)
$\Delta_2$ln assets	1.27400***	0.39422***	0.42743**	1.06221***	0.04855
	(0.252734)	(0.045083)	(0.185487)	(0.231870)	(0.122342)
age	0.01385*	-0.00501***	0.00037	-0.01130	0.00323
	(0.007504)	(0.001582)	(0.004946)	(0.011998)	(0.002846)
N	2290	2290	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_3$ln C8grants	0.00624	0.00127	-0.04761	-0.02952	-0.03538*
	(0.045945)	(0.006101)	(0.031211)	(0.038555)	(0.019047)
$\Delta_3$ln assets	1.10650***	0.39909***	0.32049	1.07644***	-0.02849
	(0.206804)	(0.044924)	(0.247497)	(0.219616)	(0.157620)
age	0.01467	-0.00791***	-0.00093	-0.01754	0.00421
	(0.009217)	(0.002262)	(0.007063)	(0.017986)	(0.004053)
N	2061	2061	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_4$ln C8grants	0.00366	-0.00055	-0.05369*	-0.02708	-0.03957**
	(0.040628)	(0.005728)	(0.030654)	(0.042833)	(0.019014)
$\Delta_4$ln assets	0.97638***	0.43010***	0.26035	1.00756***	-0.08825
	(0.170377)	(0.045169)	(0.297463)	(0.199666)	(0.191154)
age	0.01511	-0.01039***	-0.00663	-0.03067	0.00218
	(0.009160)	(0.002871)	(0.007608)	(0.025876)	(0.004377)
N	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_5$ln C8grants	-0.00078	-0.00082	-0.03710	0.01566	-0.02800
	(0.043434)	(0.005845)	(0.031143)	(0.040440)	(0.018898)
$\Delta_5$ln assets	0.75625***	0.44876***	0.27533	0.88197***	-0.08802
	(0.184735)	(0.043563)	(0.263031)	(0.189313)	(0.170208)
age	0.01004	-0.01304***	-0.00807	-0.04165	0.00282
	(0.010543)	(0.003502)	(0.008805)	(0.034727)	(0.005129)
N	1603	1603	1603	1603	1603

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: assets and firms' average age within the industry. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

three- and four-year differences, statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels. Additionally, the results indicate a negative impact on value-added for the four-year difference, significant at the 10% level.

To further test the robustness of the results, we modify the fixed effects structure and the clustering level. When using only 2-digit industry level and year fixed effects, without the interaction term for industry-year fixed effects, we continue to find a negative effect of grants concentration on labour productivity. In these estimates, the effect is statistically significant for the two- to five-year differences – see Table 64 in the Appendix.

We then adjust both the fixed effects and clustering level, applying 2-digit industry level and year fixed effects without the interaction term while clustering at the 2-digit industry level – see Table 65. The results confirm the negative impact of grants concentration on labour productivity, which remains statistically significant from the two- to five-year differences.

Furthermore, Table 66 presents estimations using 3-digit industry level fixed effects, while maintaining year fixed effects and clustering at the 3-digit level. The results are consistent, showing a negative impact of grants concentration on labour productivity for the two- to five-year differences. Across all these alternative specifications, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients remains stable, ranging between 0.02 p.p. and 0.05 p.p.

Regarding the relationship between grants concentration and industry competition, the results suggest no impact of grants concentration on industry concentration – see Table 19. This finding implies that grants concentration is not linked to industry competition nor to business dynamism, as measured by entry and exit rates. The results remain robust across alternative measures of grants concentration, namely estimations using the four firms that receive the largest amounts of grants, the HHI measure, and specifications both with and without control variables – see from Table 67 to Table 71 in the Appendix. As shown earlier, grants concentration is associated with a reduction in labour productivity growth in the medium and long run. The fact that industry competition appears unaffected suggests that this labour productivity drag is unlikely to stem from reduced market rivalry. Rather, it plausibly reflects inefficiencies in resource allocation, for example, through disproportionate support to less efficient incumbents, and the limited presence of positive externalities or spillovers to other firms. In addition, while asset growth does not show a statistically significant relationship with industry concentration or market dynamism, the average age of firms within an industry is consistently and positively associated with increases in concentration. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level across all time differences, suggesting that industries composed of older firms tend to be more concentrated, and hence potentially less competitive. Furthermore, in the short run, particularly over the one- and two-year differences, the average age of firms is negatively associated with growth in the exit rate, with the corresponding coefficients statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. These results suggest that industries with older firms are less dynamic.

Finally, Table 20 presents the estimates incorporating both grants concentration and industry concentration as explanatory variables for industry performance. The results confirm that grants concentration has a negative impact on labour productivity, particularly at the three- and four-year differences, statistically

Table 19: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (Top 8 Supported Firms) and Industry Concentration with Controls

	$\Delta_1$ln C8	$\Delta_1$ln entry rate	$\Delta_1$ln exit rate
$\Delta_1$ln C8grants	0.00090	0.05816	0.02854
	(0.003221)	(0.044435)	(0.023380)
$\Delta_1$ln assets	0.03622	-0.08720	-0.15270
	(0.044031)	(0.176616)	(0.162865)
age	0.00188***	0.00223	-0.00349*
	(0.000540)	(0.003890)	(0.001856)
N	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln C8	$\Delta_2$ln entry rate	$\Delta_2$ln exit rate
$\Delta_2$ln C8grants	0.00133	0.01215	0.00260
	(0.004653)	(0.029239)	(0.019999)
$\Delta_2$ln assets	0.02659	-0.09275	-0.01662
	(0.044705)	(0.135011)	(0.129591)
age	0.00398***	0.00364	-0.00787**
	(0.001141)	(0.006119)	(0.003707)
N	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln C8	$\Delta_3$ln entry rate	$\Delta_3$ln exit rate
$\Delta_3$ln C8grants	0.00334	0.03477	0.01263
	(0.004644)	(0.036334)	(0.017910)
$\Delta_3$ln assets	0.02468	-0.10737	0.07727
	(0.035802)	(0.130316)	(0.081060)
age	0.00635***	0.01101	-0.00509
	(0.001691)	(0.009971)	(0.004955)
N	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln C8	$\Delta_4$ln entry rate	$\Delta_4$ln exit rate
$\Delta_4$ln C8grants	0.00382	-0.00204	0.01229
	(0.004880)	(0.032114)	(0.016587)
$\Delta_4$ln assets	0.01794	-0.02947	0.05535
	(0.030609)	(0.113507)	(0.080194)
age	0.00885***	0.01479	-0.00873
	(0.002206)	(0.011419)	(0.006256)
N	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln C8	$\Delta_5$ln entry rate	$\Delta_5$ln exit rate
$\Delta_5$ln C8grants	0.00290	-0.02835	0.02629
	(0.005440)	(0.029799)	(0.018647)
$\Delta_5$ln assets	0.01188	0.04108	0.03577
	(0.029723)	(0.131487)	(0.077933)
age	0.01102***	0.02231	-0.01043
	(0.002792)	(0.015213)	(0.008242)
N	1603	1603	1603

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: assets and firms' average age within the industry. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. Additionally, there is a negative impact on value-added in the four-year difference at the 10% significance level. Industry concentration, in contrast, is positively associated with exports in the short run, with one- and two-year differences statistically significant at the 5% level, and shows a mild negative effect on employment in the medium to long run, with three- to five-year differences significant at the 10% level. We do not find any effects of industry concentration on investment, value-added, or labour productivity.

The results remain consistent when applying 2-digit industry and year fixed effects while excluding the interaction term for industry-year fixed effects, as shown in Table 72 in the Appendix. The estimates confirm a negative impact of grants concentration on labour productivity, which is statistically significant for the three- and four-year differences at the 5% significance level. Notably, Table 72 also shows statistical significance at the 5% level for the two- and five-year differences. Regarding industry concentration, the results indicate that its positive relationship with exports remains significant at the two- and five-year differences, while its negative effect on employment becomes more pronounced over time. Specifically, the negative effect on employment is visible from the two- to five-year differences, with statistical significance increasing at the four- and five-year differences, reaching the 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.

When applying 3-digit industry and year fixed effects, the results, presented in Table 73 in the Appendix, remain aligned with the main findings. We found a negative impact of grants concentration on labour productivity. The effect is statistically significant at the 10% level for the two- and five-year differences, while at the 5% level for the three- and four-year differences. Overall, the findings remain robust across different specifications, consistently suggesting a negative impact of grants concentration on labour productivity.

4.6 Robustness checks

This section presents several robustness checks to validate the estimations previously reported in Section 4.5.

As a first robustness check, we standardise the grants concentration variables to ensure that the estimator's scale is not affected by their units of measurement, following the approach of Ganapati (2021). We subtract the mean and divide by the standard deviation. The results, presented in Table 74 and Table 75, confirm that grants concentration remains negatively linked to labour productivity, while no significant relationship is found with other industry outcomes.

In the second robustness check, we extend the sample through 2021, which encompasses the COVID-19 pandemic. This enables us to test whether our estimates remain stable in the presence of a severe, economy-wide disturbance that might otherwise induce a structural break in the underlying economic relationships. We re-estimated for grants concentration measures based on the eight and four firms receiving the largest amounts of grants, as well as the HHI measure, both with and without control variables – see Table 76 to Table 81 in the Appendix. The findings remain consistent with previous

Table 20: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (Top 8 Supported Firms), Industry Concentration, and Industry Performance with Controls

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_1$ln C8grants	0.08016	0.00165	-0.01740	-0.03590	-0.01314
	(0.059127)	(0.003125)	(0.019250)	(0.023461)	(0.012278)
$\Delta_1$ln C8	-0.99546	-0.03842	-0.38603	0.60430**	-0.14700
	(1.059999)	(0.056279)	(0.375634)	(0.278524)	(0.215909)
$\Delta_1$ln assets	0.99241***	0.36688***	0.51817***	1.16897***	0.14240
	(0.177626)	(0.043197)	(0.164790)	(0.347300)	(0.106738)
age	0.00604	-0.00261***	0.00016	-0.00681	0.00187
	(0.004793)	(0.000837)	(0.002271)	(0.005978)	(0.001365)
N	2519	2519	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_2$ln C8grants	0.02767	-0.00002	-0.02869	-0.02001	-0.01877
	(0.047034)	(0.004836)	(0.019270)	(0.037707)	(0.011474)
$\Delta_2$ln C8	-1.28822	-0.10431	-0.34075	0.76430**	-0.05055
	(0.945809)	(0.066428)	(0.449009)	(0.369699)	(0.249394)
$\Delta_2$ln assets	1.30825***	0.39699***	0.43650**	1.04189***	0.04990
	(0.229369)	(0.044089)	(0.192948)	(0.223059)	(0.125594)
age	0.01897**	-0.00459***	0.00172	-0.01434	0.00344
	(0.009015)	(0.001489)	(0.006199)	(0.012230)	(0.003586)
N	2290	2290	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_3$ln C8grants	0.00863	0.00165	-0.04683	-0.03108	-0.03545*
	(0.044194)	(0.005911)	(0.030040)	(0.038688)	(0.018638)
$\Delta_3$ln C8	-0.71561	-0.11377*	-0.23116	0.46608	0.02250
	(0.668795)	(0.068454)	(0.383407)	(0.310967)	(0.216906)
$\Delta_3$ln assets	1.12416***	0.40190***	0.32620	1.06494***	-0.02904
	(0.204567)	(0.044692)	(0.250441)	(0.218925)	(0.158820)
age	0.01921*	-0.00719***	0.00054	-0.02050	0.00406
	(0.011227)	(0.002076)	(0.008536)	(0.018149)	(0.004975)
N	2061	2061	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_4$ln C8grants	0.00427	-0.00011	-0.05318*	-0.02904	-0.03987**
	(0.039855)	(0.005614)	(0.029855)	(0.043042)	(0.018776)
$\Delta_4$ln C8	-0.15905	-0.11578*	-0.13403	0.51470	0.07725
	(0.369985)	(0.069252)	(0.264327)	(0.363153)	(0.158914)
$\Delta_4$ln assets	0.97923***	0.43217***	0.26275	0.99832***	-0.08964
	(0.171491)	(0.045064)	(0.297595)	(0.199747)	(0.191286)
age	0.01651	-0.00936***	-0.00545	-0.03522	0.00150
	(0.010192)	(0.002587)	(0.008612)	(0.026322)	(0.005149)
N	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_5$ln C8grants	-0.00028	-0.00041	-0.03655	0.01353	-0.02817
	(0.042693)	(0.005697)	(0.030553)	(0.040543)	(0.018825)
$\Delta_5$ln C8	-0.17115	-0.14117*	-0.18963	0.73398*	0.05648
	(0.388947)	(0.073272)	(0.238976)	(0.399915)	(0.142280)
$\Delta_5$ln assets	0.75829***	0.45043***	0.27758	0.87324***	-0.08869
	(0.184578)	(0.043240)	(0.262229)	(0.188519)	(0.169933)
age	0.01193	-0.01148***	-0.00598	-0.04974	0.00220
	(0.011829)	(0.003072)	(0.009342)	(0.035407)	(0.005680)
N	1603	1603	1603	1603	1603

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: assets and firms' average age within the industry. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

estimations. Grants concentration continues to exhibit a negative impact on labour productivity in the medium to long term, while no statistically significant effects are observed on investment, employment, value-added, or exports.

4.7 Concluding remarks

Industrial policy plays a crucial role in shaping economic growth and competitiveness, as governments use it to address market failures and foster innovation and productivity. This study investigates how investment grants concentration, whereby a small subset of firms receives a substantial share of public subsidies, influences industry-level performance and competitive dynamics in Portugal. Drawing on a comprehensive administrative dataset that links annual balance-sheet information to detailed ERDF support, we develop grants concentration measures based on established industrial organization metrics – specifically, the share of total grants allocated to the top four or eight recipient firms and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Our analysis then analyze the effects of these measures on industry investment, employment, value-added, exports, labour productivity, as well as on market concentration, and entry–exit dynamics.

Our empirical analysis shows that, although concentrating grants among a small subset of firms does not significantly alter aggregate investment, employment, exports, or value-added, it is associated with a negative impact on labour productivity in the medium and long run. This suggests that allocating large subsidies disproportionately to a few firms may inadvertently limit the productivity gains that public support is intended to promote. While these few large recipients may expand, this expansion alone does not appear sufficient to generate positive effects on aggregate value-added or exports, and may even constrain smaller, potentially more innovative firms. Over time, such crowding out can erode the overall productivity of the industry.

Despite this adverse productivity effect, the evidence indicates that concerns regarding grants concentration distorting competition are not borne out. Higher grants concentration does not translate into greater industry concentration nor systematically affect entry–exit dynamics, suggesting that large recipients do not significantly deter market entry or drive incumbents out of business. Moreover, beneficiaries do not seem to use their advantage to erect barriers or engage in anti-competitive practices.

Lastly, standard concentration measures (top-4, top-8 ratios, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) do not appear to affect productivity. While there is some evidence suggesting a short-term positive relationship between market concentration and exports, it does not seem that market concentration alone is a major driver of industry-wide productivity outcomes in the Portuguese context. Instead, these findings underscore the importance of how public support is distributed in shaping longer-term productivity trajectories.

Taken together, these results highlight the need for careful distributional considerations in the design of public grant programmes. Mechanisms that restrict repeated large awards or reserve a share of funds for SMEs and emerging ventures can help broaden access to subsidies, avoid funneling excessive

resources into a narrow set of firms, and ultimately foster healthier competitive pressures. Policymakers might further enhance these practices by introducing clear guidelines to encourage a more diverse range of recipients – varying in size, age, and technological orientation – and by designing rigorous ex-post evaluations to track and monitor whether concentrated grants genuinely boost productivity at the industry level or merely displace smaller firms' innovations.

Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the potential limitations of this analysis. While the inclusion of fixed effects and industry-level controls helps mitigate endogeneity concerns, these methodological adjustments may not fully eliminate them. Reverse causality remains a possibility, for example, industries experiencing lower (or higher) growth might be strategically targeted for greater grants concentration. Future research could refine the identification strategy by incorporating additional control variables and further exploring the issue of reverse causality.

In conclusion, grants concentration seems detrimental to labour productivity over time, yet it does not significantly alter competitive dynamics. Evaluating the distribution and consequences of public subsidies is thus essential to ensure that industrial policy effectively fosters innovation, productivity, and a competitive economic environment.

5

Investment Grants and Firms' Productivity: What is the optimal time interval between grants?

5.1 Introduction

Investment grants have been widely used as a policy instrument to promote competitiveness and productivity.[1] This paper evaluates the impact of the time interval between two grants awarded to the same firm on firm performance. Several grant programmes allow firms to receive multiple grants, raising concerns about whether this strategy effectively enhances firm performance and contributes to national competitiveness. The empirical evidence on the impact of awarding multiple grants to the same firm remains scarce and mixed.

Analysing the U.S. SBIR programme, Feldman et al. (2022) highlight the benefits of awarding multiple R&D grants to the same firm, particularly in commercial activity, human capital development, and patenting. Muraközy and Telegdy (2022) examine the effects of multiple ERDF grants on Hungarian firms between 2004 and 2014, finding that firms awarded multiple grants experience higher growth in employment and sales compared to those receiving a single grant, resulting in a positive productivity effect. The study suggests that multiple grants could enhance the efficiency of the European Union's Structural and Cohesion Funds. However, the specific effect of the second grant is associated with increases in capital, employment, and sales, but does not yield any positive effect on productivity. Howell (2017) evaluated the two phases of the US Department of Energy's SBIR grant programme, in which only Phase I winners could apply for Phase II funding. The author concluded that the first grant had positive and large impacts on patenting and revenue, particularly for financially constrained firms, whereas the second-phase grant had no impact. Srhoj and Walde (2020) analyse the impact of two types of export-oriented grants: one for technology-oriented activities and another for commercialisation activities. Using a complete database of publicly co-financed projects in Croatia from 2009 to 2012, the study employs a differences-in-differences matching estimator, where the treated group consists of firms that received both export-oriented grants

[1] This chapter is co-authored with Fernando Alexandre and Miguel Portela.

and other government grants. The findings reveal a positive impact of the additional grant on export growth, particularly for firms benefiting from export-oriented grants.

The allocation of ERDF support to Portuguese firms reveals a notable pattern: multiple grants are awarded to a small subset of firms, resulting in a significant concentration of total funds. Alexandre et al. (2024) evaluated the effects of a second ERDF grant to Portuguese firms between 2007 and 2018, finding that a second investment grant had a stronger positive impact on firms' value-added and labour productivity compared to a single grant.

Beyond the heterogeneous effects of grants by firm size, as explored by Alexandre et al. (2024), Criscuolo et al. (2022), Santoleri et al. (2022), Srhoj, Lapinski, and Walde (2021), Criscuolo et al. (2019), Bronzini and Iachini (2014), and Bronzini and Piselli (2016), who consistently find stronger and more positive effects for small-sized firms, the effectiveness of a second grant may also depend on additional factors, such as the design of the grant allocation programme.

Thus, this paper aims to explore a characteristic of grant allocation programmes that potentially influences the effectiveness of a second grant on firms' performance: the time interval between two investment grants awarded to the same firm. It seeks to determine whether shorter or longer intervals between grants lead to greater improvements in firm performance, particularly with respect to productivity. We use a firm-level administrative database from the AdC, which contains information on the entire population of applications for ERDF grants between 2007 and 2019. This dataset includes firm identification, and application evaluation scores for both selected and non-selected firms, assigned by a committee of independent experts. Among 11,454 firms that received ERDF grants, 3,540 firms received more than one grant, accounting for 68% of total ERDF grant allocations. We link this dataset to the CBS database from the Bank of Portugal, which provides annual firm-level data on balance sheets and other accounting information. This linkage allows us to implement a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to evaluate the optimal time interval between grants. Firms that received two grants are categorised into subgroups based on the time interval between grants, while the control group consists of firms that were awarded a first grant, applied for a second grant, but were not selected. We implement an RDD approach to identify the causal effect of receiving two grants with different time intervals.

The results show that a shorter time interval between grants, specifically, receiving two grants within four years, seems to be more beneficial than a longer interval of two grants at five or more years. We find a positive impact on employment, value-added, and labour productivity when firms receive two grants within four years. Furthermore, the results suggest that two grants awarded in exactly two or four years yield positive effects on value-added and labour productivity, whereas two grants awarded in exactly three years do not significantly improve firms' performance. For two grants awarded in exactly five years, no impact on labour productivity is observed, but there is a positive effect on TFP.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the ERDF framework for supporting firms' investment and describes the databases. Section 5.3 outlines the empirical strategy. Section 5.4 presents the descriptive statistics, while Section 5.5 discusses the results of the econometric analysis. Section 6 concludes and discusses the policy implications, focusing on the optimal time interval

between firms' grants.

5.2 Data and Institutional framework

Our empirical analysis is based on the linkage of two rich longitudinal firm-level administrative databases. The first dataset is provided by the AdC, containing detailed information on investment support to Portuguese firms funded through the ERDF. The ERDF seeks to promote economic and social cohesion within the EU. It is one of five funding mechanisms established under the ESIF, which are jointly managed by the EC and the EU member states. ERDF grants to firms are intended to enhance firms' productivity and competitiveness, thereby fostering economic specialisation, regional development, and internationalisation. These objectives are particularly relevant in the Portuguese context, which has experienced persistent low growth, productivity stagnation, and economic divergence in the 21st century (e.g., Blanchard & Portugal, 2017 and Eichenbaum et al., 2017).

This dataset covers two multi-annual financial frameworks: the NSRF for 2007–2013, and PT2020 for 2014–2019. Within these frameworks, the ERDF programme comprises three main instruments supporting different types of firms' investment: the Innovation Incentive System, the Qualification Incentive System, and the Research and Development Incentive System.[2]

The Innovation Incentive System supports firms' investment in innovation and internationalisation, aiming to increase production, improve production processes, and expand the production capacity of high-technology goods. It accounts for around 66% of total ERDF support in both NSRF and PT2020. The Qualification Incentive System targets SME productivity and internationalisation through investment in intangible assets, accounting for roughly 18% of total ERDF support. The Research and Development Incentive System focuses on promoting R&D investment and the development of new products and services, involving scientific and technological entities. It represents approximately 16% of total ERDF support and aims to stimulate technological innovation and productivity growth. Although the three instruments support different types of investment, and the channels through which they affect productivity may vary (Dimos et al., 2022, Dvouletý et al., 2021 and Srhoj et al., 2023), our empirical analysis includes grants from all three, given their common overarching objective of enhancing firms' productivity.

ERDF grants to support Portuguese firms' investment projects are awarded through calls for tender, with specific selection criteria set out in each call. Applications are evaluated by independent experts, including academics from major Portuguese universities, and scored on a scale from 0 to 5. Grants are awarded to the highest-scoring projects within the available budget. Selected applications receive funding based on their project scope, implementation plans, and contractual targets.

[2]The naming of these three ERDF instruments differs slightly between the NSRF and PT2020 frameworks. Under the NSRF, the incentive systems were: Innovation; SME Qualification; and Research and Technological Development. Under PT2020, they were: Entrepreneurial Innovation and Entrepreneurship; Qualification and Internationalization of SME; and Research and Technological Development.

The AdC database contains detailed information on all ERDF applications, including firm identification, application evaluation scores for both selected and non-selected applications, application and contract dates, the amount of ERDF funding, and total project investment (see Banco de Portugal Microdata Research Laboratory (BPLIM), 2019). It allows us to track the number and timing of grants awarded to each firm between 2007 and 2019.

This dataset is linked, via a common anonymised firm identifier, to the CBS database from the Bank of Portugal (see Banco de Portugal Microdata Research Laboratory (BPLIM), 2020). The CBS provides annual economic and financial information for the population of Portuguese non-financial private sector firms from 2006 to 2019, covering approximately 390 thousand firms per year. This firm-level administrative dataset includes information on turnover, value-added, labour costs, leverage, total assets, and employment. It allows us to construct two key productivity measures. First, labour productivity, defined as the ratio of value-added to the number of workers. Second, TFP, computed following the methodology of Gandhi et al. (2020) at the NACE 1-digit sector level (10 sectors). The outcome variable is the logarithm of real sales, while the inputs include fixed assets, hours worked, and intermediate inputs. The intermediate inputs, treated as a measure of flexible inputs, are defined as the sum of cost of goods sold, materials consumed, supplies, and external services. All variables are expressed in logarithms, with monetary values deflated and winsorised. The ratio of intermediate inputs to sales is also included in the estimation as a regressor.

By integrating these two longitudinal datasets and leveraging the availability of firm-level scores from ERDF applications, we are able to analyse the distribution of ERDF grants and implement a Regression Discontinuity Design to identify the optimal time interval between two grants.[3]

Between 2007 and 2019, a total of 25,959 firms applied for ERDF grants. Of these, 11,454 firms were successful in securing funding, while 14,505 firms did not receive any support. Consequently, 56% of applicants were not awarded ERDF grants. In both ERDF programmes, a significant proportion of firms received multiple grants. Specifically, 3,540 awarded firms (31%) received more than one grant.

The distribution of firms by the number of grants received, and their corresponding share of ERDF funding, reveals that single grants were awarded to 7,914 firms (approximately 70% of supported firms), accounting for just 32% of the total ERDF support. In contrast, around 30% of awarded firms received multiple grants, representing 68% of total ERDF support. Among these, 2,013 firms received exactly two grants, corresponding to 22% of the total ERDF allocated to firms.

The number of years between the first and last ERDF grant received by the same firm varies considerably. For firms that received multiple grants (up to a maximum of five), we compute the duration between the first and last grant as the difference between the year of the last grant and the year of the first grant, plus one. The minimum observed duration is two years, and the maximum is twelve years.[4] Generally, the number of firms decreases as the support period increases. Most firms received ERDF support over a short period (two years), but a considerable number of firms received support over a longer duration.

[3] A full description of the variables used in the empirical analysis is provided in Table 82 in the Appendix.

[4] See Table 83 in the Appendix.

This reflects heterogeneity in the timing of grant allocation: some firms were supported intensively over a short window, while others received grants that were spaced out over time.

To analyze the pattern of ERDF distribution among firms with multiple grants, we construct a treatment intensity index, defined as the number of grants received divided by the number of years from the first to the last grant (last year minus first year plus one). A high index reflects concentrated ERDF support over a short period, while a low index suggests that grants were distributed over a longer time span. Figure 25 presents the treatment intensity index by the number of grants received. The size of each circle represents the number of firms. For example, three grants received within three years corresponds to a treatment intensity of 100. Values above 50% indicate that a firm received a grant in two years or fewer, on average.

For each number of grants received, we observe both patterns of ERDF support distribution: concentrated and spaced. Most firms that received two grants obtained them within a two-year period, resulting in a treatment intensity index of 100. Nevertheless, there are also firms with two grants distributed over a longer time span. Among firms with five grants, many exhibit a treatment intensity index above 45.




Figure 25: Treatment Intensity Index by the Number of Grants

As the focus of this paper is on the time interval between two grants, we now turn to the distribution of the number of years between the first and second grants among firms that received more than one grant – see Figure 26. There is considerable variation in this interval. While over 1 thousand firms received two grants within a two-year period, others experienced much longer intervals, up to 12 years. Most firms received their second grant after a shorter interval, typically within four years, and the number of firms declines as the interval increases.

5.3 Empirical strategy

This section outlines the empirical strategy used to assess the impact of the time interval between two investment grants on firms' performance. By leveraging the availability of evaluation scores for both successful and unsuccessful applications, we are able to implement a robust identification strategy. Specifically, we apply a sharp RDD to estimate the causal effect of the time interval between two grants on firms' investment, employment, value added, labour productivity, and TFP.




Figure 26: Distribution of Firms by Number of Years between First and Second Grant

In our econometric framework, the dependent variable is denoted as Y_i, which represents the potential outcomes depending on grant assignment. A firm's outcome is denoted by $Y_i(1)$ if the firm receives a grant, and $Y_i(0)$ if it does not receive a grant. The running variable is the standardised application score, S_i, which determines grant assignment – see, for example, Angrist and Rokkanen (2015). Firms with scores equal to or above the threshold of zero, $S_i \geq 0$, are awarded a grant, and the binary grant variable, G_i, takes the value 1. Conversely, if the application score is below zero, $S_i < 0$, firms are not awarded a grant, and the binary grant variable assumes the value 0. The two potential firms' outcomes are presented in Equation (5.1):

$$Y_i = (1 - G_i) \cdot Y_i(0) + G_i \cdot Y_i(1) = \begin{cases} Y_i(0) & \text{if } S_i < 0 \\ Y_i(1) & \text{if } S_i \geq 0 \end{cases} \tag{5.1}$$

Assuming that firms with application scores close to the cut-off are similar and have the same expected outcome, we identify the causal effect of receiving a grant by comparing treated and control groups in a neighbourhood around the threshold (e.g., Alexandre et al., 2024, M. D. Cattaneo et al., 2020, M. D. Cattaneo & Titiunik, 2022, and Lee & Lemieux, 2010). The average treatment effect is identified as the discontinuity in the outcome variable at the cut-off (c) – as shown in equation (5.2):

$$\tau_{RDD} = E\left[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0) | S_i = c\right] \tag{5.2}$$

To assess the role of the time interval between two investment grants on firms' performance, we follow the empirical strategy of Alexandre et al. (2024), which evaluates the impact of a second grant. Our sample consists of a treated group, composed of firms that received a second grant, and a control group, composed of firms that had previously received a first grant, applied for a second, but were not selected. To examine whether the time interval between the two grants leads to heterogeneous effects, we further divide the treated group into subgroups based on the number of years between the first and second grant.

Given that our econometric strategy only allows one application per firm per year, and the administrative dataset includes multiple applications submitted by the same firm in a given year, we apply a selection rule to retain a single observation per firm-year. If one or more applications were successful, we select the funded application with the highest score; if none were successful, we retain the application with the highest score.

5.4 Descriptive statistics

This Section presents the descriptive statistics of the sample used in the empirical analysis. The sample includes 1,089 firms from 262 calls for the allocation of ERDF grants supporting firm investments between 2007 and 2019. Of these, 822 firms received a second grant, while 267 firms applied but were not selected to receive a second grant.

When implementing the RDD, several factors must be considered in building the final sample. First, calls without a cut-off are excluded from the analysis, such as those in which all applications were either funded or rejected. Second, for firms that submitted multiple non-selected applications across different years, we retain only the first non-selected application.[5]

To avoid underestimating or overestimating the impact of the second grant in our identification strategy, we impose two restrictions on the sample. First, we include only firms that had already received a single grant and subsequently submitted a non-selected application, excluding those whose non-selected application occurred in the same year as the first grant. Second, we retain only firms that received two grants and did not obtain a third grant within three years after receiving the second grant, in order to isolate the effect of the second grant.

Applications are scored by a committee of independent experts on a scale from 0 to 5. Each call has a specific cut-off score that determines which applications are funded. Since calls vary in the number of applicants, award grants, and cut-offs, we standardise scores by centring them around the cut-off, in line with Alexandre et al. (2024) and Howell (2017). Specifically, we subtract the cut-off from each raw score, such that the standardised score equals zero at the threshold. This procedure allows us to merge all calls into a unified dataset, with one observation per firm.

The distribution of application scores after standardisation is shown in Figure 27, with scores ranging from -4.4 to 5. Firms awarded a second grant have standardised scores equal to or above zero, while firms not selected for a second grant have scores below zero. Following M. Cattaneo et al. (2020), we conduct a manipulation test on the density of application scores around the cut-off. The test reveals no statistically significant discontinuity in the number of observations just above and just below the cut-off, with a test statistic of 1.43 and a p-value of 0.15.

Table 21 presents descriptive statistics for the control and treated groups, measured in the year prior to the application for a second grant. Panel A reports statistics for the full sample, while Panel B provides

[5] We replicated the estimations using the non-selected application with the highest score. Results are reported in Tables 96 to 97 in the Appendix and are consistent with the main findings.




Figure 27: Distribution of Standardised Scores: Single Grant vs. Two Grants

statistics for the sub-sample within the bandwidth used in the regression analysis.The bandwidth is defined as the 50% of applications with scores closest to the cut-off, in line with Alexandre et al. (2024).[6]

Table 21 also reports results from $t-tests$ assessing differences in mean firms' performance between the treated and control groups in the pre-application year. In the full sample (Panel A), there are statistically significant differences in value-added and labour productivity between treated and control firms. Firms that received a second grant exhibit significantly higher value-added and labour productivity. However, when the sample is restricted to observations within the bandwidth (Panel B), we do not find statistically significant differences between the treated and control groups.

Given that the main objective of the paper is to assess the effect of the second grant over different time intervals, we split the treated group according to the number of years between the first and second grants. Table 22 presents descriptive statistics for the control group, as well as for two treated subgroups: firms that received two grants within four years, and firms that received two grants at five or more years. Table 22 also reports $t-tests$ that assess differences in the outcome variables between each treated group and the control group.

The subgroup of firms that received two grants within four years comprises 564 firms, with 143 receiving the grants in exactly two years, 224 in exactly three years, and 197 in exactly four years. The second subgroup, consisting of firms with two grants at five or more years, includes 258 firms. Among these, 123 received the grants in exactly five years, and 135 received them with after five years.

Table 22 shows that in the full sample, firms receiving two grants within four years perform significantly better than the control group. The differences are statistically significant at the 10% level for employment and labour productivity, and at the 5% level for value-added. However, when restricting the analysis to the bandwidth, the significance level of value-added decreases to 10%, while labour productivity is no longer statistically significant. Differences in investment, on the other hand, become significant at the

[6]Bandwidth sensitivity checks are presented in Section 5.6.

Table 21: Descriptive Statistics for Outcome Variables in the Year Prior to Application (2007 – 2017)

	Control				Treated				
	Obs.	Mean	Median	s.d.	Obs.	Mean	Median	s.d.	$t-test$
Panel A: a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Full Sample									
Investment	267	486.29	63.49	1502.13	822	486.13	106.81	1111.48	0.00
Employment	267	46.78	16.00	124.71	822	60.32	24.00	117.22	-1.61
Value-Added	267	1581.38	463.93	4810.35	822	2316.64	757.52	5351.29	-2.00**
Labour Productivity	267	33.43	27.05	25.33	822	36.94	30.78	24.21	-2.04**
TFP	260	0.04	0.04	0.04	811	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.32
Panel B: a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Inside the Bandwidth									
Investment	142	289.05	45.84	986.61	411	431.82	87.17	1068.57	-1.40
Employment	142	37.79	14.50	99.47	411	51.97	20.00	109.33	-1.36
Value-Added	142	1291.64	459.15	3895.99	411	2000.31	604.61	5067.54	-1.52
Labour Productivity	142	34.33	27.44	24.51	411	37.50	31.44	25.71	-1.28
TFP	141	0.04	0.04	0.04	403	0.04	0.04	0.04	-0.05

Notes: Investment, value-added, and labour productivity are expressed in thousands of euros. The $t-test$ assesses the difference in mean values between the treated and control groups. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. 'Obs.' stands for the number of observations, and 's.d.' represents the standard-deviation.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

10% level. In contrast, for firms that received two grants at five or more years, there are no statistically significant differences between the treated and control groups in either the full sample or the bandwidth-restricted sample. Nonetheless, the $t-test$ statistics for investment and labour productivity are smaller in magnitude, suggesting convergence in performance. This supports the notion that narrowing the sample improves the comparability between treated and control firms.

We also conduct manipulation tests on the density of application scores for these two subsamples, in line with M. Cattaneo et al. (2020). The tests confirm the absence of manipulation, as there are no statistically significant differences in the number of observations just above and just below the threshold. The test statistics are -0.86 (p-value = 0.39) and -1.52 (p-value = 0.13) for the subsamples of two grants received within four years, and at five or more years, respectively.

Table 22: Descriptive Statistics for Outcome Variables in the Year Prior to Application, by Time Interval (2007 – 2017)

	Control				2 Grants in less or equal to 4 years					2 Grants in more or equal to 5 years				
	Obs.	Mean	Median	s.d.	Obs.	Mean	Median	s.d.	$t-test$	Obs.	Mean	Median	s.d.	$t-test$
Panel A: Full Sample														
Investment	267	486.29	63.49	1502.13	564	561.06	118.51	1251.06	-0.75	258	322.33	89.27	691.77	1.60
Employment	267	46.78	16.00	124.71	564	64.10	25.00	125.23	-1.86*	258	52.07	23.50	97.17	-0.54
Value-Added	267	1581.38	463.93	4810.35	564	2544.99	730.66	5985.67	-2.30**	258	1817.46	815.77	3553.61	-0.64
Labour Productivity	267	33.43	27.05	25.33	564	37.07	30.78	25.25	-1.94*	258	36.67	30.85	21.81	-1.57
TFP	260	0.04	0.04	0.04	555	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.27	256	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.30
Panel B: Inside the Bandwidth														
Investment	142	289.05	45.84	986.61	283	505.92	98.67	1184.88	-1.88*	130	269.09	74.96	722.40	0.19
Employment	142	37.79	14.50	99.47	283	53.69	19.00	105.37	-1.49	130	50.23	21.00	118.57	-0.94
Value-Added	142	1291.64	459.15	3895.99	283	2194.32	604.23	5435.58	-1.76*	130	1618.50	621.69	4127.98	-0.67
Labour Productivity	142	34.33	27.44	24.51	283	37.86	32.05	26.33	-1.33	130	36.73	30.17	24.23	-0.81
TFP	141	0.04	0.04	0.04	276	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	129	0.04	0.04	0.04	-0.30

Notes: Investment, value-added, and labour productivity are expressed in thousands of euros. The $t-test$ assesses the difference in mean values between the treated and control groups. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. 'Obs.' stands for the number of observations, and 's.d.' represents the standard-deviation.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

5.5 Results

This section presents the results of the RDD estimations for different time intervals between the first and second grants. Table 23 shows the estimated effects for firms that received a second grant within four years while Table 24 shows the corresponding estimates for firms that received two grants at five or more years. We evaluate the impact of the time interval between grants at three points in time: one ($t+1$), two ($t+2$) and three ($t+3$) years after the firm receives the second grant.

Following the empirical strategy in Alexandre et al. (2024), we define the bandwidth as the 50% of applications closest to the cut-off, include covariates using a non-parametric approach (see Calonico et al., 2019), and cluster standard errors (see M. D. Cattaneo et al., 2020). The control variables used in our estimations include the amount received in the first grant, profitability, leverage, sales growth, total assets, firm age, firm size, and sector of activity (classified using a one-letter code). Since the application year varies by call, we cluster standard errors at the application year level. All estimations use local linear RDD estimators, in line with Gelman and Imbens (2019), as higher-order polynomials tend to yield noisy estimates, are sensitive to the polynomial degree, and result in poor coverage of confidence intervals.

Table 23 presents the regression results for each dependent variable (in logarithmic form), listed in the first column. The dependent variables include investment, employment, value-added, labour productivity, and TFP.[7] Each block of results corresponds to a given dependent variable and its estimated impact at $t+1$, $t+2$, and $t+3$. We report two estimates per outcome and lead, based on different kernel functions: triangular and Epanechnikov. The triangular kernel function assigns weights that decline symmetrically and linearly with distance from the cut-off, while the Epanechnikov kernel function assigns weights that decrease quadratically relative to the cut-off – see M. D. Cattaneo et al. (2020). Both kernel functions assign zero weight to observations outside the bandwidth.

For firms receiving two grants within four years, the results show that a second grant has a positive impact on firms' investment, employment, value added, and labour productivity, but no effect on TFP – see Table 23. The effect on investment is statistically significant only in the first year, at the 10% level. There is a positive impact on employment and value-added in the second and third leads. For example, using the Epanechnikov kernel function, the effect on employment two years after the second grant is approximately 26% (computed as $(e^{0.234}-1)\times 100$), significant at the 1% level, and 21% three years after the second grant, significant at the 10% level. The effect on value-added in the second lead reaches 31% (computed as $(e^{0.267}-1)\times 100$) at the 5% significance level, and 44% in the third lead, significant at the 1% level. We find a positive impact on labour productivity of 18% three years after the second grant, statistically significant at the 5% level. Given the average labour productivity of 37 thousand euros (see Panel A of Table 22), this corresponds to an increase of approximately 6.7 thousand euros.

Table 24 presents the results for firms receiving two grants at five or more years. In this case, there is no significant impact on investment, employment, labour productivity, or TFP. The only statistically significant effect is on value-added in the third lead, where the impact is 37% (computed as $(e^{0.315}-1)\times$

[7] Observations with zero values for employment, value-added, labour productivity, or TFP are excluded.

Table 23: RDD Estimation Results: Two Grants within Four Years

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.959*	0.966*	-0.118	-0.050	-0.335	-0.274
	(0.572)	(0.553)	(0.744)	(0.729)	(0.761)	(0.791)
N	831	831	780	780	748	748
Employment	-0.010	0.005	0.215***	0.234***	0.161*	0.187*
	(0.094)	(0.096)	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.097)	(0.102)
N	831	831	780	780	748	748
Value-Added	0.097	0.095	0.276**	0.267**	0.330***	0.367***
	(0.138)	(0.137)	(0.126)	(0.121)	(0.114)	(0.126)
N	820	820	768	768	748	748
Labour Productivity	0.085	0.065	0.114	0.087	0.159**	0.169**
	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.101)	(0.095)	(0.077)	(0.082)
N	819	819	768	768	748	748
TFP	-0.012	-0.057	0.114	0.065	0.119	0.109
	(0.225)	(0.228)	(0.239)	(0.235)	(0.192)	(0.188)
N	817	817	768	768	730	730

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of subsidy in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

100) statistically significant at the 5% level. This effect is smaller than the 44% observed for shorter intervals (see Table 23). These results suggest that shorter time intervals between two grants are associated with stronger positive effects on firms' performance.

To evaluate the overall impact of receiving a second grant, we also compare firms with a single grant to those with two grants, regardless of the time interval, in line with Alexandre et al. (2024) – see Table 84 in the Appendix. The results show positive effects on employment and value-added two and three years after the second grant. For employment, the effects are statistically significant at the 1% and 10% levels, while for value added, they are significant at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively. We also find a positive effect on labour productivity in the third lead, although it is only statistically significant at the 10% level. Compared to these overall estimates, the findings on receiving two grants within shorter intervals, such as within four years (Table 23), suggest that shorter intervals are more effective in improving firms' performance.

To further investigate the role of the time interval between two grants on firms' performance, we disaggregate the treated group and estimate the impact of receiving two grants in exactly two, three, four, or five years – see Tables 25 to 28.

Table 25 reports the results of the impact of a second grant received one year after the first grant,

Table 24: RDD Estimation Results: Two Grants at Five or More Years

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.792	0.823	0.660	0.652	-0.346	-0.075
	(0.680)	(0.615)	(0.723)	(0.721)	(0.694)	(0.690)
N	525	525	474	474	442	442
Employment	0.022	0.030	0.151	0.158	0.133	0.156
	(0.117)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.125)	(0.122)	(0.127)
N	525	525	474	474	442	442
Value-Added	0.175	0.179	0.068	0.093	0.259**	0.315***
	(0.140)	(0.142)	(0.091)	(0.094)	(0.103)	(0.116)
N	517	517	466	466	442	442
Labour Productivity	0.099	0.088	-0.052	-0.036	0.052	0.082
	(0.114)	(0.118)	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.104)	(0.117)
N	517	517	466	466	442	442
TFP	0.197	0.176	0.272	0.253	0.205	0.208
	(0.246)	(0.249)	(0.247)	(0.248)	(0.213)	(0.215)
N	515	515	464	464	432	432

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of subsidy in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

corresponding to two grants in exactly two years, on firms' performance. The results show a positive effect on value-added. Two years after the second grant, the estimated impact is 33% (computed as $(e^{0.287}-1)\times 100$), statistically significant at the 5% level, while the effect increases to 42% after three years, significant at the 1% level. There is also a positive effect on employment in the second lead when using the Epanechnikov kernel function, although this result is not confirmed when using the triangular kernel. We observe no effect on investment or TFP, and a negligible positive effect on labour productivity in $t+2$, which is statistically significant at the 10% level when using the triangular kernel.

When examining the impact of receiving two grants in exactly three years, we find a positive effect on investment and employment (Table 26). The effect on investment is statistically significant at the 1% level but seems to be transitory, lasting only one year. Employment shows positive effects two and three years after the second grant, statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. In the second lead, the magnitude of the effect is approximately 25% (computed as $(e^{0.222}-1)\times 100$). No statistically significant effects are observed for value-added, labour productivity, or TFP.

The results for firms receiving two grants in exactly four years, presented in Table 27, show positive and statistically significant effects on employment, value-added, and labour productivity. The impact on employment in the second lead is 38% (computed as $(e^{0.325}-1)\times 100$), statistically significant at the 1%

Table 25: RDD Estimation Results: Two Grants in Exactly Two Years

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	1.178	1.309	0.039	0.104	-0.238	-0.099
	(1.077)	(1.046)	(0.726)	(0.721)	(0.824)	(0.884)
N	410	410	359	359	327	327
Employment	-0.065	-0.042	0.159	0.201**	0.075	0.129
	(0.129)	(0.130)	(0.096)	(0.101)	(0.110)	(0.114)
N	410	410	359	359	327	327
Value-Added	0.162	0.165	0.290**	0.287**	0.291**	0.352***
	(0.170)	(0.167)	(0.122)	(0.115)	(0.132)	(0.137)
N	402	402	352	352	327	327
Labour Productivity	0.184	0.160	0.224*	0.176	0.249	0.248
	(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.131)	(0.134)	(0.155)	(0.160)
N	401	401	352	352	327	327
TFP	-0.186	-0.212	0.000	-0.044	0.050	0.056
	(0.341)	(0.358)	(0.311)	(0.327)	(0.225)	(0.227)
N	400	400	351	351	317	317

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of subsidy in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

level, while in the third lead it is 30%, significant at the 5% level. The effect on value-added is statistically significant at the 10% and 1% levels in the second and third leads, respectively, reaching 62% (computed as $(e^{0.485}-1)\times 100$) in the third year. The results also indicate a positive effect on labour productivity of 23% (computed as $(e^{0.209}-1)\times 100$) in the third lead, statistically significant at the 10% level. However, no significant effects are found for investment or TFP.

Taken together, the results in Tables 25, 26 and 27 suggest that the positive effects on value-added and labour productivity observed in Table 23 are primarily driven by firms that received two grants either in exactly two or four years. To confirm this, we estimate the results by combining in the treated group the firms that received two grants in exactly two and four years – see Table 85 in the Appendix. These estimates confirm the earlier findings from Table 23, showing statistically significant increases in employment, value-added, and labour productivity. In particular, value-added increases in the second and third leads at the 1% significance level, and labour productivity rises three years after the second grant at the 5% significance level. These results suggest that receiving two grants in either two or four years is the most effective time interval for improving firms' performance.

Comparing the cases of two grants received in two and four years, the results show that although two grants in two years have a positive impact on value added, particularly in the third lead, amounting

Table 26: RDD Estimation Results: Two Grants in Exactly Three Years

Dependent variable (in logs)	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	1.672***	1.532***	0.422	0.438	-0.351	-0.271
	(0.604)	(0.575)	(0.715)	(0.651)	(1.199)	(1.124)
N	491	491	440	440	408	408
Employment	-0.061	-0.032	0.191**	0.222***	0.173*	0.206**
	(0.094)	(0.090)	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.093)	(0.097)
N	491	491	440	440	408	408
Value-Added	0.009	0.018	0.196	0.207	0.205	0.254
	(0.164)	(0.157)	(0.182)	(0.172)	(0.216)	(0.196)
N	482	482	431	431	408	408
Labour Productivity	0.055	0.031	0.077	0.061	0.033	0.051
	(0.098)	(0.101)	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.177)	(0.176)
N	482	482	431	431	408	408
TFP	-0.177	-0.205	-0.036	-0.073	-0.122	-0.107
	(0.268)	(0.283)	(0.274)	(0.283)	(0.194)	(0.198)
N	482	482	432	432	396	396

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of subsidy in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

to a 42% increase (Table 25), the impact of two grants in four years is even more substantial, with value added increasing by 62% (Table 27). Moreover, while two grants in two years show mild positive effects, namely statistically significant increases in employment and labour productivity in one lead year under a single kernel function, these results are weaker and less consistent than those observed for two grants in four years, which yield improvements across all three performance indicators. Specifically for labour productivity, receiving a second grant in four years increases labour productivity by 23%, which is higher than the magnitude of the coefficient estimated for two grants within four years (Table 23).

Thus, receiving two grants in exactly two years appears to be effective, though not the most effective time interval between grants. The second grant may arrive before the firm has fully assimilated the benefits of the first, leading to gains in scale but only partial assimilation of knowledge. In the case of two grants in three years, firms seem to increase employment, yet do not convert investment into productivity gains, suggesting that the additional funds are primarily used for payroll expansion rather than for investments aimed at improving efficiency. In contrast, receiving two grants in four years appears to be the optimal time interval between two grants. Since firms have absorbed the learning from the first project and have acquired the necessary know-how, the second grant might then be used to finance expansion with high marginal returns, enabling firms to scale up more effectively.

Table 27: RDD Estimation Results: Two Grants in Exactly Four Years

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	-0.411	-0.325	-0.621	-0.565	-0.516	-0.466
	(1.007)	(0.991)	(0.905)	(0.902)	(0.946)	(0.981)
N	464	464	413	413	381	381
Employment	0.043	0.055	0.317***	0.325***	0.249**	0.261**
	(0.112)	(0.117)	(0.090)	(0.098)	(0.105)	(0.117)
N	464	464	413	413	381	381
Value-Added	0.129	0.132	0.404*	0.400*	0.456***	0.485***
	(0.150)	(0.151)	(0.209)	(0.215)	(0.170)	(0.183)
N	456	456	405	405	381	381
Labour Productivity	0.051	0.039	0.111	0.102	0.192*	0.209*
	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.162)	(0.159)	(0.106)	(0.112)
N	456	456	405	405	381	381
TFP	0.186	0.135	0.274	0.217	0.178	0.149
	(0.192)	(0.189)	(0.212)	(0.203)	(0.171)	(0.164)
N	455	455	405	405	371	371

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of subsidy in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Evaluating the results for firms that received two grants in exactly five years, as shown in Table 28, we find a positive and statistically significant effect on investment and TFP. The effect on investment is significant only in the first year. For TFP, we observe positive effects across all three leads, with statistical significance at the 5% level in the second and third years. In contrast, we find no significant impact on employment or labour productivity, and only a mild positive effect on value-added in the third year ($t+3$), which is statistically significant at the 10% level. The positive effect on TFP, alongside the absence of significant impacts on other performance outcomes, suggests that a longer interval between two grants, such as two grants in five years, may shift the focus more towards technological improvements rather than increases in employment, value-added, or labour productivity.

Alexandre et al. (2024) find that a second grant has a positive impact on firms' performance, particularly for small-sized firms, with effects on value-added and labour productivity exceeding those of a single grant. Building on this, our analysis of the optimal time interval between investment grants reveals that shorter intervals between two grants are more effective, especially two grants in four years, though two grants in two years also yield positive results. These findings suggest that a second grant may be used as a policy instrument, awarded conditional on milestone completion, while avoiding excessive delays that could dilute its effectiveness.

Table 28: RDD Estimation Results: Two Grants in Exactly Five Years

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	1.483***	1.475***	1.139	1.098	-1.113	-0.918
	(0.538)	(0.528)	(0.706)	(0.733)	(1.265)	(1.176)
N	390	390	339	339	307	307
Employment	-0.001	0.005	0.106	0.106	0.075	0.089
	(0.099)	(0.097)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.095)	(0.092)
N	390	390	339	339	307	307
Value-Added	0.222	0.218	0.043	0.065	0.293*	0.320*
	(0.222)	(0.213)	(0.136)	(0.134)	(0.163)	(0.177)
N	382	382	332	332	307	307
Labour Productivity	0.113	0.093	-0.023	-0.003	0.122	0.129
	(0.182)	(0.185)	(0.163)	(0.173)	(0.136)	(0.152)
N	382	382	332	332	307	307
TFP	0.336*	0.303*	0.410**	0.382**	0.348**	0.333**
	(0.176)	(0.172)	(0.187)	(0.183)	(0.168)	(0.165)
N	381	381	330	330	298	298

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of subsidy in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

5.6 Robustness checks

To assess the robustness of our RDD estimations, we conducted a series of robustness checks, focusing on bandwidth sensitivity, donut RDDs, and alternative criteria for selecting the non-selected application.

We first replicate our main estimations using alternative bandwidths of 45% and 55% of observations around the cut-off, as well as the bandwidth employed in the single versus two grants analysis (Table 84 in the Appendix), which does not account for the time interval between grants. The results for firms receiving two grants within four years using alternative bandwidths remain generally robust – see Tables 86, 87 and 88 in the Appendix. We consistently find positive and statistically significant effects on employment and value-added across all bandwidths used. For instance, in Table 23, the estimated effect on value-added in the third lead is 44% (computed as $(e^{0.367}-1)\times 100$), while in the robustness checks, the magnitude varies between 33% and 45% (Tables 86, 87 and 88 in the Appendix). The results for labour productivity and investment are also generally robust (Tables 87 and 88 in the Appendix), although their statistical significance weakens when the bandwidth is narrowed to 45% (Table 86). No effects are found on TFP, a result that holds consistently across all bandwidth specifications. For firms receiving two grants at five or more years, the results confirm the absence of significant effects on investment, employment, labour productivity, and TFP, with a positive and statistically significant impact on value-added only in the third

year – see Tables 89, 90, and 91 in the Appendix.

As a second robustness check, we conduct donut RDDs excluding observations closest to the cut-off to address potential manipulation. The results remain largely consistent with our main findings. For two grants within four years, excluding scores at 0 and between -0.02 and 0.02 confirms positive and statistically significant effects on employment, value-added, and labour productivity, with no impact on TFP (Tables 92 and 93 in the Appendix). For two grants at five or more years, the results continue to show no effect on investment, employment, labour productivity, or TFP, and a positive impact on value-added only in the third lead (Tables 94 and 95). These results reinforce the robustness of the main findings and support the conclusion that two grants within four years remain the most consistently effective interval.

Finally, we re-estimate the RDDs using an alternative criterion for the control group, selecting the non-selected application with the highest score, rather than the first submitted after the first grant. The results, reported in Tables 96 to 97 in the Appendix, confirm the robustness of our main findings. Two grants received within four years continue to exhibit stronger positive effects on value-added and labour productivity than those received at five or more years.

5.7 Concluding remarks

A global wave of investment grants has been deployed as a policy tool to foster economic development and enhance firms' productivity and competitiveness. In the case of ERDF support for firms' investment in Portugal between 2007 and 2019, a significant share of firms received more than one grant, accounting for a substantial proportion of total ERDF grants. However, empirical evidence on the impact of multiple grants on firms' performance remains mixed, possibly due to heterogeneous effects arising from differences in programme design. Understanding the most effective allocation strategy is therefore essential to improving the effectiveness of public support.

In this context, the paper investigates whether the time interval between the first and second grant influences the impact on firms' performance. Our findings suggest that shorter intervals are more effective in improving firms' performance. Specifically, receiving two grants within four years is associated with positive effects on employment, value-added, and labour productivity. By contrast, when the two grants are received at five or more years, the only observable effect is a negligible positive effect on value-added.

Further disaggregation indicates that two grants awarded in exactly two or four years are the main drivers of the positive effects on value-added and labour productivity. Moreover, two grants in four years appear to have stronger and more consistent effects on employment, value-added, and labour productivity than two grants in two years. Receiving two grants in exactly four years emerges as the optimal time interval. Firms have likely absorbed the learning from the first project and acquired the necessary know-how, allowing the second grant to be deployed for expansion with high marginal returns, thereby enabling firms to scale up more effectively. On the other hand, two grants in two years also yield positive effects on firms' performance, though they are less pronounced. This suggests that the second grant may arrive

before the firm has fully assimilated the benefits of the first grant, leading to gains in scale but only partial absorption of knowledge. In contrast, two grants in three years seem to boost employment but do not generate meaningful improvements in value-added or labour productivity, indicating that the second grant may have primarily financed payroll expansion rather than enhancing firms' performance. No significant effects on total factor productivity (TFP) are found for shorter intervals. However, when the two grants are received exactly five years apart, we observe no impact on labour productivity or employment, but a positive and statistically significant effect on TFP. This suggests that longer intervals may shift the focus towards technological improvements, rather than gains in firms' performance.

From a policy perspective, the results underscore that timing is critical in maximising the returns to public investment. A well-timed second grant can magnify the impact of investment grants by aligning with firms' strategic development stages. To mitigate the risk of grant dependency, the second grant should be made conditional on the completion of externally verifiable milestones, such as demonstrated technological adoption or measurable productivity improvements. This ensures that public funds are allocated based on tangible progress, rather than continuing support to underperforming firms.

Furthermore, public policy should seek to align funding cycles with firms' learning trajectories, thereby converting subsidies into strategic catalysts rather than continuous lifelines. This alignment encourages firms to integrate public funding into a coherent investment plan, enhancing scale-up potential and long-term productivity without fostering chronic reliance on state support. Excessive delays, on the other hand, should be discouraged, as they risk weakening the impact of the second grant and diminishing the overall effectiveness of public grants.

Our findings suggest that a second grant arriving too soon may outpace a firm's capacity to fully benefit from the first grant, while an excessively long delay may undermine the purpose of strategic support, ultimately reducing the grant's effectiveness. Receiving two grants in four years appears to have the right balance between learning and expansion, delivering the most consistent and broad-based performance improvements.

In conclusion, the effectiveness of public investment grants is central to economic development and industrial policy. This paper strengthens the relevance of considering the timing between grants and highlights how this timing shapes the impact on firms' performance. Future research could further explore the heterogeneity of grant effects across sectors, firm sizes, and the interaction between the timing of multiple grants and other policy instruments. Such work would deepen our understanding of how to design public support mechanisms that improve the effectiveness and efficiency of public grants programmes.

6

Conclusion

The essays in this thesis provide a comprehensive analysis of the role of investment grants and market competition. Together, they contribute to the literature on how public grants can shape both microeconomic outcomes and broader industry dynamics. In this section, we present the main findings and policy recommendations from each chapter.

Chapter 2 evaluates the effectiveness of investment grants on firms' performance. Employing an identification strategy based on a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), this chapter demonstrates that while a single grant positively influences the performance of micro and small-sized firms, a second grant has an even stronger impact on value-added and labour productivity. These findings suggest that allocating multiple grants to the same firm may be an effective strategy for enhancing firms' performance. On the other hand, the absence of significant effects on total factor productivity suggests that there is scope to improve programmes funded by ERDF.

Chapter 3 focuses on industry concentration trends in Europe by introducing refined measures that account for detailed market structures, geographical dimensions of competition, and business group linkages. The analysis reveals that average concentration across 15 European countries increased by five percentage points between 2000 and 2019, with domestic markets experiencing the most pronounced rises. This evidence underscores the importance for policymakers to monitor changes in industry structure, as growing concentration may signal emerging challenges for competition and market efficiency, potentially leading to monopolistic tendencies and adversely affecting innovation and productivity.

Building on these insights, Chapter 4 explores how the allocation of investment grants influences industry performance and competition. While public grants are intended to address market failures and enhance competitiveness and productivity, a significant concentration of grants among a small number of firms may increase their market power, distort competitive dynamics, and fail to boost aggregate output. The findings indicate that increased grants concentration is associated with lower labour productivity and does not significantly affect other performance outcomes, such as investment or employment. Additionally, the chapter finds no relationship between grants concentration and competition or market dynamism. In light of these results, although grants concentration does not appear to directly affect competition, the

design of public grant programmes should carefully consider the funding allocated per firm, as concentrating grants among a few firms may not effectively enhance overall industry labour productivity; indeed, it may even decrease it.

Finally, Chapter 5 returns to the firm level to investigate the optimal time interval between multiple investment grants. The analysis, based on an RDD approach applied to ERDF data from 2007 to 2019, finds that a shorter interval – specifically, the receipt of two grants within four years – is more beneficial for enhancing employment, value-added, and labour productivity. Conversely, longer intervals yield less effective performance improvements. This chapter underscores the importance of considering the time interval between grants as a critical dimension in the design of public grant programmes in order to maximise the effectiveness of public support.

In conclusion, these essays provide new insights into competition and the heterogeneous impacts of investment grants. The evidence suggests that, on the one hand, competition warrants policymakers' attention to ensure a dynamic market environment, and on the other hand, while targeted public funding can enhance firms' performance, the frequency, firm size, timing, concentration, and distribution of these grants are critical determinants of their success. Policymakers should consider tailoring grant programmes to the specific needs of different firms, economies, and market contexts, ensuring that support measures promote productivity without undermining competition. By integrating firm-level analyses with industry-level assessments and employing specific identification strategies and methodologies, this thesis contributes to a more nuanced understanding of how public grants can foster both firms' performance and a competitive economic environment.

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A

Appendix to Chapter 2

A.1 Statistical power analysis

A.1.1 Descriptive statistics

The number of observations for some samples underlying the descriptive statistics and $t-tests$ analysis is small. Consequently, we conducted a statistical power analysis (for further discussion, see Cohen, 2013, for example). In this discussion we adopt a significance level of 0.05. When data from all years are aggregated in Table 3, the smallest samples are observed in 'a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Inside the Bandwidth', Panel D, with 413 to 422 observations. In these subsets of samples, the $t-tests$ do not reveal any statistically significant differences between control and treated groups. The power of the $t-tests$ for investment, employment, value-added, labour productivity and TFP are as low as 0.07, 0.18, 0.26, 0.26 and 0.23, respectively. Further power analysis reveals that, in the case of investment, a sample size of 20,098 would be needed to achieve statistically significant differences with a power of 0.8, compared to the actual sample size of 422 observations. For the same power level and a sample size of 422, the effect size is 446.2, in contrast to the current difference in means of 59.2. Taking the average investment of 494.9 for the control group, the average for the treated group would have to increase to 941.0 thousand euros (an increase of 70%). For employment, value-added, labour productivity, and TFP, detecting statistically significant differences between the control and treated groups' means would necessitate increasing the sample size by at least 308% (for labour productivity). Moreover, the effect size implies that the difference in means between control and treated groups would need to increase by at least 113% (the case of value-added). The concern over small sample sizes and low statistical power is particularly relevant for the yearly statistics reported in Tables 31 and 32 in the Appendix, especially in the comparison of 'a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Inside the Bandwidth' as detailed in Table 32. For example, when examining the year 2014 in Table 32, which compares 'a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Inside the Bandwidth', with a sample of 70 observations we find no statistically significant differences in mean TFP between the control and treated groups. However, the power of the $t-test$ is 0.19. For investment, employment, value-added, and labour productivity, the respective power values are 0.39,

0.19, 0.21, and 0.05. Nevertheless, similar to the aggregate sample, achieving statistically significant differences between control and treated groups requires substantial increases in sample size and effect size.

A.1.2 Regression analysis

In the context of the RDD regression analysis, two scenarios with a limited number of observations necessitate a power analysis due to potential concerns about insufficient statistical power to detect economically relevant effects. These scenarios pertain to the analysis of 'a Single Grant vs. Two Grants' for both micro-sized firms and medium- and large-sized firms. The majority of estimations in these sets of regressions rely on samples with fewer than 200 observations. In our discussion of power in the context of the RDD regressions, we reference the work of M. D. Cattaneo et al., 2019, M. D. Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2022, and its application in Bagues and Campa, 2021. The computations are conducted using the Stata command $rdpower$, as detailed in M. D. Cattaneo et al., 2019.

When estimating the investment booster shot's effect on micro-sized firms, we observe that most estimates are not statistically significant.[1] All the non-significant estimates, including for labour productivity, are generally underpowered, with estimated statistical power ranging from 0.05 to 0.56. For medium- and large-sized firms, despite the statistical power of insignificant estimates for employment ranging between 0.77 and 0.93, the statistical power of the non-significant estimates for labour productivity at leads $t + 1$ and $t + 2$ are as low as 0.05 and 0.15, respectively. Therefore, the insufficient statistical power of those estimations led us, first, to combine micro- and small-sized firms, and second, to not present the results for medium- and large-sized firms in the analysis of a single grant versus two grants.

[1] The results are available upon request.

A.2 Variables description and additional computations

Table 29: Variables Description and Sources

Variable	Description	Source
Gross Capital Formation	Investment (€)	CBS
Employment	Number of workers	CBS
Value-added	Gross value-added (€)	CBS
Labour Productivity	Gross value-added / Employment (€)	CBS
TFP	Total factor productivity	CBS
Profitability	EBITDA / Total assets	CBS
Turnover	Growth rate of sales (%)	CBS
Assets	Total assets (€)	CBS
Leverage	Total liabilities / Total assets	CBS
Score	Application evaluation score	AdC

Notes: TFP is computed by the authors using data from the CBS and following the methodology proposed by Gandhi et al., 2020. CBS: Central Balance Sheet. AdC: Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion.

Table 30: Descriptive statistics for the calls excluded from the sample

	All applications selected	No application selected
Number of calls	94	110
Number of applications	173	275
Number of firms	154	267
Average employment	66.32	44.44
Median employment	15	9
Average grant amount (€)	442,546	-
Median grant amount (€)	144,145	-

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 31: Descriptive Statistics for the Outcome Variables in the Year Before Application – No Grant vs. a Single Grant Sample, Inside the Bandwidth (2007 – 2012, 2014 – 2016)

	Control				Treated				
	Obs.	Mean	Median	s.d.	Obs.	Mean	Median	s.d.	$t-test$
	2007				2007				
Investment	90	418.80	38.59	1014.98	203	304.84	58.09	784.47	1.04
Employment	90	38.16	11	74.49	203	32.31	12	55.42	0.75
Value-Added	90	1483.45	358.88	3098.37	203	1151.78	387.80	2212.45	1.04
Labour Productivity	90	33.38	24.62	26.38	203	35.41	26.63	26.71	-0.60
TFP	90	0.05	0.03	0.05	201	0.05	0.03	0.06	-0.76
	2008				2008				
Investment	57	369.78	67.02	765.41	235	299.60	30.89	815.29	0.59
Employment	57	52.23	21	88.93	235	35.81	11	69.12	1.52
Value-Added	57	1630.08	463.14	2975.31	235	1203.66	291.32	2661.94	1.06
Labour Productivity	57	28.55	22.61	24.67	235	31.06	23.79	26.99	-0.64
TFP	56	0.05	0.02	0.06	233	0.04	0.01	0.05	0.82
	2009				2009				
Investment	38	356.86	41.37	867.26	73	606.52	48.24	1218.78	-1.12
Employment	38	35.29	9	60.75	73	61.70	19	99.63	-1.49
Value-Added	38	1323.01	317.85	2691.66	73	1892.43	553.95	3300.93	-0.92
Labour Productivity	38	27.91	22.97	24.33	73	33.52	25.81	27.90	-1.05
TFP	37	0.03	0.01	0.04	73	0.04	0.02	0.05	-1.09
	2010				2010				
Investment	47	204.39	42.24	622.36	159	275.36	28.66	719.48	-0.61
Employment	47	25.45	13	53.47	159	27.10	9	54.75	-0.18
Value-Added	47	998.98	297.35	2374.19	159	1048.87	248.76	2414.54	-0.12
Labour Productivity	47	31.37	24.26	28.72	159	33.09	27.27	26.48	-0.38
TFP	46	0.05	0.03	0.05	157	0.05	0.03	0.06	-0.56
	2011				2011				
Investment	76	102.83	10.51	258.62	515	91.32	8.47	382.37	0.25
Employment	76	27.13	6	63.57	515	14.08	5	34.11	2.71***
Value-Added	76	891.45	154.22	2462.33	515	442.26	117.45	1315.49	2.42**
Labour Productivity	76	26.81	19.95	24.24	515	27.42	21.47	23.44	-0.21
TFP	72	0.05	0.02	0.05	497	0.05	0.01	0.06	0.09
	2012				2012				
Investment	231	30.85	3.13	96.17	316	110.71	7.10	441.91	-2.70***
Employment	231	7.98	4	16.75	316	18.03	5	41.65	-3.47***
Value-Added	231	168.54	72.16	414.05	316	575.84	120.25	1580.17	-3.82***
Labour Productivity	231	19.54	16.93	13.14	316	25.64	20.32	23.78	-3.53***
TFP	221	0.04	0.01	0.05	294	0.05	0.03	0.06	-2.21**
	2014				2014				
Investment	28	132.95	38.30	252.85	356	255.06	50.49	583.96	-1.10
Employment	28	14.11	14	11.61	356	33.19	15	51.58	-1.95*
Value-Added	28	493.19	446.35	413.07	356	1092.73	427.65	1967.31	-1.61
Labour Productivity	28	39.76	30.56	34.74	356	32.26	26.37	22.93	1.59
TFP	27	0.05	0.02	0.06	349	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.68
	2015				2015				
Investment	53	145.40	21.26	303.42	519	169.72	30.76	468.62	-0.37
Employment	53	17.40	10	24.64	519	25.19	13	41.18	-1.35
Value-Added	53	535.33	300.54	814.08	519	731.08	291.03	1272.75	-1.10
Labour Productivity	53	32.85	26.43	24.23	519	29.76	24.75	21.31	0.99
TFP	53	0.03	0.01	0.04	500	0.04	0.03	0.04	-1.83*
	2016				2016				
Investment	51	65.64	14.25	133.68	37	109.21	22.89	204.80	-1.21
Employment	51	16.69	6	27.99	37	19.14	9	30.54	-0.39
Value-Added	51	539.34	183.45	1006.20	37	710.64	286.36	1148.83	-0.74
Labour Productivity	51	27.96	23.87	18.95	37	32.87	27.14	21.06	-1.15
TFP	45	0.04	0.03	0.05	33	0.06	0.04	0.05	-1.34

Notes: Investment, value-added, and labour productivity are expressed in thousands of euros. The $t-test$ assesses the difference in mean values between the treated and control groups. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. 'Obs.' stands for the number of observations, and 's.d.' represents the standard-deviation.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 32: Descriptive Statistics for the Outcome Variables in the Year Before Application – a Single Grant vs. Two Grants Sample, Inside the Bandwidth (2010, 2011, 2012, 2014)

	Control				Treated				
	Obs.	Mean	Median	s.d.	Obs.	Mean	Median	s.d.	$t-test$
	2010				2010				
Investment	12	1449.04	194.37	2482.26	60	526.54	94.65	1346.42	1.85*
Employment	12	158.17	27	297.80	60	55.05	22	130.86	1.94*
Value-Added	12	4294.50	645.73	6872.34	60	2911.21	766.54	9239.28	0.49
Labour Productivity	12	30.32	26.46	17.79	60	41.76	35.52	29.93	-1.28
TFP	12	0.05	0.05	0.04	60	0.06	0.04	0.06	-0.65
	2011				2011				
Investment	16	713.52	33.60	2340.18	78	479.57	106.36	1214.71	0.59
Employment	16	106.00	14	259.61	78	68.92	15	166.55	0.73
Value-Added	16	4303.86	299.90	14066.45	78	2604.01	495.98	7886.98	0.67
Labour Productivity	16	30.83	19.26	33.65	78	36.05	27.99	21.03	-0.81
TFP	16	0.03	0.01	0.04	76	0.06	0.04	0.05	-1.70*
	2012				2012				
Investment	36	394.01	20.88	1623.69	58	355.07	76.53	1004.75	0.14
Employment	36	16.36	8	17.86	58	57.62	19	136.53	-1.80*
Value-Added	36	988.18	268.15	2548.53	58	2051.21	649.51	5562.98	-1.08
Labour Productivity	36	34.99	25.31	32.39	58	31.50	28.02	21.69	0.63
TFP	34	0.06	0.03	0.06	58	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.66
	2014				2014				
Investment	19	103.39	69.60	97.63	53	344.78	75.89	1012.26	-1.03
Employment	19	26.95	16	31.09	53	48.00	18	132.22	-0.68
Value-Added	19	762.46	538.23	720.11	53	2032.68	430.57	7753.58	-0.71
Labour Productivity	19	34.75	26.04	25.86	53	34.04	27.06	27.64	0.10
TFP	18	0.04	0.02	0.04	52	0.05	0.03	0.05	-0.99

Notes: Investment, value-added, and labour productivity are expressed in thousands of euros. The $t-test$ assesses the difference in mean values between the treated and control groups. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. 'Obs.' stands for the number of observations, and 's.d.' represents the standard-deviation.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 33: Average Amount of Grants

	Average grant amount (€)
Single treatment	249,756
Single treatment: Micro	100,549
Single treatment: Small	259,892
Single treatment: Medium and large	612,805
Second treatment	570,208
Second treatment: Micro	140,625
Second treatment: Small	340,942
Second treatment: Medium and large	1,286,468

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 34: RDD Estimation Results – No Grant vs. a Single Grant, Micro- and Small-sized Firms

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	1.960***	1.935***	1.517***	1.415***	1.693***	1.688***
	(0.301)	(0.292)	(0.269)	(0.243)	(0.314)	(0.321)
N	5590	5590	4819	4819	4044	4044
Employment	0.076	0.070	0.056	0.045	0.079	0.073
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.048)
N	5559	5559	4792	4792	4044	4044
Value-Added	0.201***	0.196***	0.098	0.093	0.215**	0.211**
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.096)	(0.091)
N	5428	5428	4707	4707	4044	4044
Labour Productivity	0.126***	0.125***	0.099***	0.107***	0.111***	0.110***
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.033)
N	5409	5409	4692	4692	4044	4044
TFP	0.049	0.042	0.026	0.023	0.024	0.015
	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.057)	(0.059)
N	5477	5477	4703	4703	3951	3951

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 35: RDD Estimation Results – a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Optimised Bandwidth

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.775	0.823	-0.282	-0.402	0.623	0.477
	(0.512)	(0.538)	(1.163)	(1.366)	(0.937)	(0.916)
N	817	817	756	756	729	729
Employment	0.010	-0.006	0.160*	0.156*	0.181	0.147
	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.154)	(0.189)
N	817	817	756	756	729	729
Value-Added	0.213*	0.227*	-0.096	-0.140	-0.011	0.163
	(0.120)	(0.128)	(0.143)	(0.157)	(0.227)	(0.206)
N	804	804	744	744	729	729
Labour Productivity	0.224**	0.195**	-0.002	0.006	0.061	0.075
	(0.102)	(0.090)	(0.134)	(0.128)	(0.195)	(0.186)
N	803	803	744	744	729	729
TFP	0.213	0.208	0.201	0.185	0.181	0.205
	(0.255)	(0.244)	(0.306)	(0.296)	(0.306)	(0.299)
N	808	808	747	747	716	716

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of grant in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 36: RDD Estimation Results – a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Optimised Bandwidth, Small-sized Firms

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	1.921**	1.781**	1.425	1.505	2.651	3.427
	(0.841)	(0.774)	(1.082)	(1.029)	(1.985)	(2.249)
N	435	435	405	405	385	385
Employment	0.084	0.102	-0.134	0.111	0.036	-0.022
	(0.091)	(0.096)	(0.210)	(0.138)	(0.275)	(0.320)
N	435	435	405	405	385	385
Value-Added	0.514***	0.517***	-0.027	0.231	0.429	0.382
	(0.195)	(0.199)	(0.189)	(0.216)	(0.264)	(0.254)
N	431	431	403	403	385	385
Labour Productivity	0.367**	0.364**	0.170	0.170	0.391***	0.383***
	(0.156)	(0.157)	(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.100)	(0.105)
N	431	431	403	403	385	385
TFP	0.546	0.505	0.501	0.467	0.385	0.407
	(0.361)	(0.359)	(0.456)	(0.445)	(0.666)	(0.685)
N	435	435	404	404	382	382

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of grant in the first grant and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

Table 37: Distribution of Firms by Sector of Activity in the Sample for the Analysis of No Grant vs. a Single Grant

Sector	%
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	1.11
Mining and quarrying	1.08
Manufacturing	34.18
Electricity, gas, steam and air-conditioning supply	0.17
Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation	0.78
Construction	6.34
Retail	22.41
Transport services	2.48
Accommodation and food services	4.78
Telecommunications services	6.20
Financial and insurance activities	0.03
Real estate activities	0.33
Consulting, scientific and technical services	13.57
Administrative services	3.12
Education	0.91
Human health services	0.88
Arts, entertainment and recreation	1.10
Other service	0.53

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 38: Distribution of Firms by Sector of Activity in the Sample for the Analysis of a Single Grant vs. Two Grants

Sector	%
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	1.22
Mining and quarrying	1.34
Manufacturing	47.87
Electricity, gas, steam and air-conditioning supply	0.12
Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation	1.10
Construction	2.92
Retail	13.64
Transport services	0.97
Accommodation and food services	2.68
Telecommunications services	10.60
Consulting, scientific and technical services	13.15
Administrative services	2.44
Education	0.49
Human health services	0.24
Arts, entertainment and recreation	0.97
Other service	0.24

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 39: RDD Estimation Results – No Grant vs. a Single Grant, Manufacturing Sector, Micro-sized Firms

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	4.343***	4.267***	3.257***	3.215***	4.230***	4.167***
	(1.327)	(1.324)	(1.235)	(1.165)	(1.417)	(1.433)
N	445	445	362	362	288	288
Employment	0.265	0.275	0.428*	0.436*	0.587**	0.575**
	(0.187)	(0.185)	(0.221)	(0.225)	(0.241)	(0.248)
N	442	442	359	359	288	288
Value-Added	0.378*	0.367*	0.555**	0.549**	0.941**	0.934**
	(0.207)	(0.190)	(0.270)	(0.269)	(0.390)	(0.395)
N	424	424	348	348	288	288
Labour Productivity	0.043	0.013	0.138	0.141	0.213	0.157
	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.139)	(0.153)	(0.239)	(0.222)
N	422	422	347	347	288	288
TFP	-0.092	-0.101	0.102	0.086	0.003	0.035
	(0.298)	(0.298)	(0.334)	(0.336)	(0.337)	(0.382)
N	439	439	352	352	287	287

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, firm age and assets. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 40: RDD Estimation Results – No Grant vs. a Single Grant, Manufacturing Sector, Small-sized Firms

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	1.785**	1.763***	1.326**	1.273**	1.014*	0.924
	(0.708)	(0.684)	(0.529)	(0.505)	(0.606)	(0.584)
N	1324	1324	1136	1136	841	841
Employment	0.043	0.045	0.053	0.041	0.073	0.048
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.132)	(0.127)	(0.146)	(0.140)
N	1324	1324	1136	1136	841	841
Value-Added	0.132	0.105	0.063	0.046	0.219	0.057
	(0.094)	(0.086)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.158)	(0.125)
N	1307	1307	1130	1130	841	841
Labour Productivity	0.111***	0.104***	0.034	0.052	0.208*	0.219*
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.117)	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.113)
N	1307	1307	1130	1130	841	841
TFP	0.292*	0.307**	0.396**	0.418***	0.189	0.183
	(0.157)	(0.146)	(0.155)	(0.140)	(0.206)	(0.200)
N	1322	1322	1134	1134	837	837

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, firm age and assets. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 41: RDD Estimation Results – No Grant vs. a Single Grant, Manufacturing Sector, Micro- and Small-sized Firms

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	2.401***	2.348***	2.455***	2.379***	2.118***	1.997***
	(0.491)	(0.472)	(0.658)	(0.641)	(0.529)	(0.545)
N	1769	1769	1498	1498	1129	1129
Employment	0.143	0.142	0.230	0.220	0.298**	0.292**
	(0.107)	(0.109)	(0.140)	(0.136)	(0.142)	(0.144)
N	1766	1766	1495	1495	1129	1129
Value-Added	0.213***	0.194**	0.267***	0.268***	0.422**	0.401**
	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.091)	(0.095)	(0.164)	(0.157)
N	1731	1731	1478	1478	1129	1129
Labour Productivity	0.084	0.079	0.041	0.064	0.188*	0.196*
	(0.057)	(0.054)	(0.123)	(0.119)	(0.102)	(0.101)
N	1729	1729	1477	1477	1129	1129
TFP	0.274	0.268	0.281*	0.192	0.116	0.056
	(0.175)	(0.167)	(0.159)	(0.161)	(0.146)	(0.144)
N	1761	1761	1486	1486	1124	1124

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, firm age and assets. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 42: RDD Estimation Results – a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Manufacturing Sector, Micro- and Small-sized Firms

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.460	0.634	0.116	0.332	0.278	0.504
	(0.966)	(1.025)	(0.731)	(0.763)	(1.828)	(1.950)
N	254	254	232	232	223	223
Employment	0.249	0.264	0.256	0.278	0.209	0.235
	(0.163)	(0.167)	(0.270)	(0.273)	(0.473)	(0.483)
N	254	254	232	232	223	223
Value-Added	0.456***	0.466***	0.253	0.261	0.514	0.546
	(0.166)	(0.171)	(0.185)	(0.183)	(0.355)	(0.390)
N	250	250	231	231	223	223
Labour Productivity	0.193	0.185	-0.019	-0.027	0.275	0.278
	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.141)	(0.136)	(0.230)	(0.232)
N	250	250	231	231	223	223
TFP	0.811*	0.779*	0.851	0.808	1.225	1.159
	(0.417)	(0.428)	(0.521)	(0.517)	(0.816)	(0.791)
N	253	253	231	231	222	222

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age and amount of grant in the first grant. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

Table 43: RDD Estimation Results – No Grant vs. a Single Grant, Excluding R&D Grants, Micro- and Small-sized Firms

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	1.940***	1.915***	1.491***	1.411***	1.637***	1.649***
	(0.321)	(0.313)	(0.257)	(0.225)	(0.360)	(0.365)
N	5386	5386	4627	4627	3874	3874
Employment	0.064	0.058	0.046	0.035	0.065	0.052
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.052)
N	5356	5356	4601	4601	3874	3874
Value-Added	0.163**	0.156**	0.069	0.069	0.197**	0.197**
	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.082)	(0.079)	(0.094)	(0.093)
N	5226	5226	4519	4519	3874	3874
Labour Productivity	0.106***	0.105***	0.083**	0.094***	0.109***	0.108***
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.033)
N	5208	5208	4505	4505	3874	3874
TFP	0.044	0.035	0.019	-0.001	0.015	0.014
	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.059)
N	5275	5275	4515	4515	3782	3782

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

Table 44: RDD Estimation Results – a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Excluding R&D Grants, Micro- and Small-sized Firms

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	1.105**	1.096**	0.301	0.400	1.092	1.356
	(0.489)	(0.482)	(0.749)	(0.675)	(1.064)	(1.076)
N	499	499	450	450	426	426
Employment	-0.010	0.010	0.007	0.031	-0.036	-0.017
	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.196)	(0.191)
N	499	499	450	450	426	426
Value-Added	0.227*	0.245*	0.097	0.114	0.282	0.305
	(0.136)	(0.139)	(0.128)	(0.123)	(0.185)	(0.192)
N	488	488	440	440	426	426
Labour Productivity	0.276**	0.270**	0.170*	0.157*	0.288***	0.295***
	(0.107)	(0.109)	(0.090)	(0.084)	(0.110)	(0.107)
N	487	487	440	440	426	426
TFP	0.213	0.193	0.198	0.175	0.271	0.263
	(0.319)	(0.330)	(0.367)	(0.369)	(0.313)	(0.313)
N	491	491	443	443	415	415

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of grant in the first grant and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

Table 45: RDD Estimation Results – No Grant vs. a Single Grant, Excluding R&D Grants, Small-sized Firms

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	1.938***	1.892***	1.015***	0.984***	0.965***	0.954***
	(0.496)	(0.473)	(0.323)	(0.323)	(0.351)	(0.356)
N	2877	2877	2492	2492	2030	2030
Employment	0.026	0.052	0.049	0.119	-0.001	0.013
	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.096)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.090)
N	2875	2875	2491	2491	2030	2030
Value-Added	0.160*	0.169**	0.104	0.112	0.116	0.114
	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.100)	(0.099)
N	2834	2834	2459	2459	2030	2030
Labour Productivity	0.136**	0.131**	0.126*	0.130**	0.158*	0.151*
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.087)	(0.084)
N	2832	2832	2459	2459	2030	2030
TFP	-0.029	-0.024	-0.070	-0.090	-0.078	-0.089
	(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.114)	(0.114)
N	2867	2867	2483	2483	2021	2021

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

Table 46: RDD Estimation Results – a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Excluding R&D Grants, Small-sized Firms

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	1.743***	1.684***	1.575*	1.686*	2.250*	2.213**
	(0.551)	(0.510)	(0.941)	(0.909)	(1.198)	(1.128)
N	357	357	327	327	307	307
Employment	0.010	0.026	-0.005	0.006	0.011	0.012
	(0.087)	(0.089)	(0.131)	(0.133)	(0.251)	(0.249)
N	357	357	327	327	307	307
Value-Added	0.515***	0.514***	0.240	0.223	0.528*	0.502
	(0.191)	(0.192)	(0.181)	(0.183)	(0.297)	(0.309)
N	354	354	325	325	307	307
Labour Productivity	0.435***	0.417***	0.268**	0.245**	0.444***	0.418***
	(0.145)	(0.143)	(0.108)	(0.111)	(0.146)	(0.153)
N	354	354	325	325	307	307
TFP	0.441	0.372	0.368	0.283	0.337	0.267
	(0.316)	(0.324)	(0.393)	(0.391)	(0.532)	(0.531)
N	357	357	326	326	304	304

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of grant in the first grant and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

Table 47: RDD "donut" Estimation Results – No Grant vs. a Single Grant, Exclude Applications With a Score Equal to 0

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	2.109***	2.117***	1.656***	1.517***	2.022***	1.959***
	(0.297)	(0.271)	(0.278)	(0.246)	(0.290)	(0.310)
N	6110	6110	5251	5251	4389	4389
Employment	0.159**	0.150**	-0.005	0.038	0.006	0.094
	(0.066)	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.068)
N	6081	6081	5223	5223	4389	4389
Value-Added	0.248***	0.240***	0.136*	0.137*	0.136**	0.257***
	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.064)	(0.083)
N	5943	5943	5133	5133	4389	4389
Labour Productivity	0.126***	0.131***	0.051	0.094**	0.124***	0.122***
	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.043)
N	5925	5925	5119	5119	4389	4389
TFP	0.013	0.016	0.010	-0.017	0.006	-0.002
	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.063)
N	6007	6007	5144	5144	4306	4306

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 48: RDD "donut" Estimation Results – No Grant vs. a Single Grant, Exclude Applications With a Score Between -0.02 and 0.02

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	2.266***	2.216***	1.806***	1.524***	1.864***	1.842***
	(0.273)	(0.231)	(0.332)	(0.284)	(0.315)	(0.332)
N	6049	6049	5202	5202	4348	4348
Employment	0.161**	0.138**	-0.026	-0.007	-0.005	0.103*
	(0.070)	(0.062)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.061)
N	6020	6020	5174	5174	4348	4348
Value-Added	0.239***	0.213***	0.096	0.100	0.127**	0.138**
	(0.062)	(0.054)	(0.062)	(0.074)	(0.053)	(0.057)
N	5886	5886	5085	5085	4348	4348
Labour Productivity	0.135***	0.137***	0.074	0.089**	0.126***	0.121***
	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.043)
N	5868	5868	5071	5071	4348	4348
TFP	-0.036	-0.033	-0.008	-0.026	-0.002	0.004
	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.074)
N	5947	5947	5098	5098	4268	4268

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

Table 49: RDD "donut" Estimation Results – No Grant vs. a Single Grant, Exclude Applications With a Score Between -0.05 and 0.05

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	2.221***	2.260***	1.526***	1.421***	1.761***	1.684***
	(0.279)	(0.270)	(0.320)	(0.303)	(0.445)	(0.433)
N	5967	5967	5138	5138	4297	4297
Employment	0.166*	0.161**	-0.109**	-0.063	-0.075	0.000
	(0.085)	(0.078)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.060)
N	5939	5939	5111	5111	4297	4297
Value-Added	0.259***	0.203***	-0.045	-0.033	0.038	0.151**
	(0.079)	(0.066)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.055)	(0.070)
N	5806	5806	5024	5024	4297	4297
Labour Productivity	0.154***	0.147***	0.104**	0.110**	0.123***	0.122***
	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.037)	(0.039)
N	5788	5788	5010	5010	4297	4297
TFP	-0.005	-0.010	-0.037	-0.050	-0.050	-0.040
	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.073)	(0.066)	(0.077)	(0.080)
N	5867	5867	5036	5036	4218	4218

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

Table 50: RDD "donut" Estimation Results – a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Exclude Applications With a Score Equal to 0

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.674	0.682	0.192	0.289	0.875	1.061
	(0.457)	(0.425)	(0.567)	(0.544)	(0.963)	(0.944)
N	790	790	729	729	702	702
Employment	0.118	0.125	0.223*	0.230**	0.175	0.176
	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.116)	(0.112)	(0.176)	(0.166)
N	790	790	729	729	702	702
Value-Added	0.308***	0.307***	0.295**	0.290**	0.514***	0.513***
	(0.112)	(0.107)	(0.139)	(0.129)	(0.187)	(0.196)
N	778	778	718	718	702	702
Labour Productivity	0.181**	0.178**	0.093	0.082	0.264***	0.268***
	(0.083)	(0.081)	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.083)	(0.092)
N	778	778	718	718	702	702
TFP	0.156	0.116	0.142	0.105	0.332	0.306
	(0.235)	(0.235)	(0.252)	(0.252)	(0.217)	(0.215)
N	784	784	722	722	690	690

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, amount of grant in the first grant, firm age, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

Table 51: RDD "donut" Estimation Results – a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Exclude Applications With a Score Between -0.02 and 0.02

Dependent	t+1		t+2		t+3	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.576	0.589	-0.115	0.018	0.801	1.007
	(0.614)	(0.560)	(0.602)	(0.569)	(0.975)	(0.961)
N	776	776	717	717	690	690
Employment	0.168*	0.169**	0.321**	0.312**	0.300	0.279
	(0.088)	(0.085)	(0.135)	(0.127)	(0.191)	(0.177)
N	776	776	717	717	690	690
Value-Added	0.365***	0.356***	0.360**	0.341**	0.606***	0.585***
	(0.126)	(0.118)	(0.153)	(0.139)	(0.196)	(0.203)
N	764	764	706	706	690	690
Labour Productivity	0.184*	0.177*	0.050	0.041	0.212**	0.220**
	(0.097)	(0.092)	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.103)	(0.108)
N	764	764	706	706	690	690
TFP	-0.112	-0.115	-0.190	-0.178	0.169	0.169
	(0.271)	(0.265)	(0.263)	(0.262)	(0.240)	(0.241)
N	770	770	710	710	679	679

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, amount of grant in the first grant, firm age, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

Table 52: RDD "donut" Estimation Results – a Single Grant vs. Two Grants, Exclude Applications With a Score Between -0.05 and 0.05

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.286	0.345	-0.123	0.014	0.617	0.855
	(0.743)	(0.659)	(0.690)	(0.640)	(0.921)	(0.943)
N	762	762	706	706	680	680
Employment	0.159**	0.165***	0.328***	0.319***	0.300*	0.280*
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.154)	(0.146)
N	762	762	706	706	680	680
Value-Added	0.379**	0.369***	0.374***	0.350***	0.558***	0.546**
	(0.153)	(0.143)	(0.122)	(0.112)	(0.204)	(0.213)
N	751	751	695	695	680	680
Labour Productivity	0.246*	0.229*	0.050	0.039	0.206**	0.216**
	(0.141)	(0.127)	(0.080)	(0.074)	(0.084)	(0.095)
N	751	751	695	695	680	680
TFP	-0.114	-0.120	-0.268	-0.243	0.111	0.121
	(0.368)	(0.348)	(0.354)	(0.342)	(0.304)	(0.300)
N	756	756	699	699	669	669

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, amount of grant in the first grant, firm age, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

B

Appendix to Chapter 3

B.0.1 Sample of industries

The final sample used for studying the concentration measure spans 20 years (2000-2019) and is composed by 127 distinct industries allocated to the three different geographical buckets (27 are domestic, 80 are European, and 20 are global). Out of these, 112 (88%) are 3-digit, 10 (8%) are 2-digit, and 5 (4%) are aggregation of two or more 2-digit. The difference from the number of industries included in the production sample is due essentially to combined data limitation either in Orbis at the firm level, in gross in gross output at the industry level or in the trade data. In particular, a number of sectors that might be relevant from a competition perspective - either because structurally oriented towards high concentration levels or because historically under the lens of competition authorities – had to be excluded due to severe data limitations both at the numerator and at the denominator of the concentration measure. Table A A.1 reports the list of industries used in this paper and their associated geographic market.

Table 53: Taxonomy list of industries and geographical dimension

Industry Code	Industry Description	Taxonomy Geography
081	Quarrying of stone, sand and clay	European
089	Mining and quarrying n.e.c.	Global
091	Support activities for petroleum and natural gas extraction	Domestic
099	Support activities for other mining and quarrying	Domestic
101	Processing and preserving of meat and production of meat products	Domestic
102	Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs	European
103	Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables	European
104	Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats	European
105	Manufacture of dairy products	Domestic
106	Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch products	European
107	Manufacture of bakery and farinaceous products	Domestic
108	Manufacture of other food products	European
109	Manufacture of prepared animal feeds	Domestic
110	Manufacture of beverages	Domestic
131	Preparation and spinning of textile fibres	European
132	Weaving of textiles	European
133	Finishing of textiles	Domestic
139	Manufacture of other textiles	European
14	Manufacture of apparel	Global
151	Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage	Global
152	Manufacture of footwear	European
161	Sawmilling and planning of wood	European
162	Manufacture of products of wood, cork, straw and plaiting materials	European
171	Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard	European
172	Manufacture of articles of paper and paperboard	European
181	Printing and service activities related to printing	Domestic
182	Reproduction of recorded media	European
19	Manufacture of coke / petroleum	European
201	Manufacture of basic chemicals, fertilisers and nitrogen compounds, plastics	European
202	Manufacture of pesticides and other agrochemical products	European
203	Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and mastics	European
204	Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations,	European
205	Manufacture of other chemical products	European
206	Manufacture of man-made fibres	European
211	Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products	Global
212	Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations	Global
221	Manufacture of rubber products	European
222	Manufacture of plastic products	European
231	Manufacture of glass and glass products	European
232	Manufacture of refractory products	European
233	Manufacture of clay building materials	European
234	Manufacture of other porcelain and ceramic products	European
235	Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster	European

Industry Code	Industry Description	Taxonomy Geography
236	Manufacture of articles of concrete, cement and plaster	Domestic
237	Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone	Global
239	Manufacture of abrasive products and non-metallic mineral products	European
241	Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys	European
242	Manufacture of tubes, pipes, hollow profiles and related fittings, of steel	European
243	Manufacture of other products of first processing of steel	European
244	Manufacture of basic precious and other non-ferrous metals	European
245	Casting of metals	European
251	Manufacture of structural metal products	European
252	Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal	European
253	Manufacture of weapons and ammunition	Global
254	Manufacture of weapons and ammunition	Domestic
255	Forging, pressing, stamping and roll-forming of metal; powder metallurgy	Domestic
256	Treatment and coating of metals; machining	European
257	Manufacture of cutlery, tools and general hardware	European
259	Manufacture of other fabricated metal products	European
261	Manufacture of electronic components and boards	Global
262	Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment	European
263	Manufacture of communication equipment	Global
264	Manufacture of consumer electronics	European
265	Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and navigation	Global
266	Manufacture of irradiation, electromedical and electrotherapeutic equipment	Global
267	Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment	Global
271	Manufacture of electric motors, generators, transformers and electricity	European
272	Manufacture of batteries and accumulators	European
273	Manufacture of wiring and wiring devices	European
274	Manufacture of electric lighting equipment	European
275	Manufacture of domestic appliances	European
279	Manufacture of other electrical equipment	European
281	Manufacture of general-purpose machinery	European
282	Manufacture of other general-purpose machinery	European
283	Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery	European
284	Manufacture of metal forming machinery and machine tools	European
289	Manufacture of other special-purpose machinery	European
291	Manufacture of motor vehicles	European
292	Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles	European
293	Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles	European
301	Building of ships and boats	Global
302	Manufacture of railway locomotives and rolling stock	European
303	Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery	Global
309	Manufacture of transport equipment n.e.c.	European
310	Manufacture of furniture	European
321	Manufacture of jewellery, bijouterie and related articles	European
322	Manufacture of musical instruments	Global

Industry Code	Industry Description	Taxonomy Geography
323	Manufacture of sports goods	European
324	Manufacture of games and toys	European
325	Manufacture of medical and dental instruments and supplies	Global
329	Manufacturing n.e.c.	European
331	Repair of fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment	Domestic
332	Installation of industrial machinery and equipment	Domestic
352	Manufacture of gas; distribution of gaseous fuels through mains	Domestic
353	Steam and air conditioning supply	Domestic
360	Water collection, treatment and supply	Domestic
37T39	Sewerage; Waste; Other waste	Domestic
45T47	Motor vehicles; Wholesale; Retail	European
491	Passenger rail transport, interurban	European
492	Freight rail transport	Domestic
493	Other passenger land transport	Domestic
494	Freight transport by road and removal services	European
501	Sea and coastal passenger water transport	Domestic
502	Sea and coastal freight water transport	Global
503	Inland passenger water transport	Domestic
504	Inland freight water transport	Domestic
51	Air transport	Global
52	Warehousing	European
53	Postal and courier activities	European
55T56	Accommodation and food services	Domestic
581	Publishing of books, periodicals and other publishing activities	Domestic
582	Software publishing	Global
59T60	Motion picture andbroadcasting	Domestic
61	Telecommunications	Domestic
62T63	Computer programming and information	European
71	Architectural and engineering	European
72	Scientific R&D	European
73	Advertising and market research	European
77	Rental and leasing	European
781	Activities of employment placement agencies	European
782	Temporary employment agency activities	European
783	Other human resources provision	European
791	Travel agency and tour operator activities	European
799	Other reservation service and related activities	European
801	Private security activities	European
802	Security systems service activities	European
803	Investigation activities	European
812	Cleaning activities	Domestic

Notes: The table presents the list of industries used to compute the baseline concentration measure and their associated geographic market.

Source: OECD compilation.

Table 54: Industries included in the 4-digit analysis

2-digit	3-digit	4-digit
10 Manufacture of food products	10.1 Processing and preserving of meat and production of meat products	10.11 Processing and preserving of meat 10.12 Processing and preserving of poultry meat 10.13 Production of meat and poultry meat products
	10.2 Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs	10.20 Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs
	10.3 Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables	10.31 Processing and preserving of potatoes 10.32 Manufacture of fruit and vegetable juice 10.39 Other processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables
	10.4 Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats	10.41 Manufacture of oils and fats
	10.5 Manufacture of dairy products	10.51 Operation of dairies and cheese making 10.52 Manufacture of ice cream
	10.6 Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch products	10.61 Manufacture of grain mill products 10.62 Manufacture of starches and starch products
	10.7 Manufacture of bakery and farinaceous products	10.71 Manufacture of bread, manufacture of fresh pastry goods and cakes 10.72 Manufacture of rusks and biscuits; manufacture of preserved pastry goods and cakes 10.73 Manufacture of macaroni, noodles, couscous and similar farinaceous products
	10.8 Manufacture of other food products	10.81 Manufacture of sugar 10.82 Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery 10.83 Processing of tea and coffee 10.84 Manufacture of condiments and seasonings 10.85 Manufacture of prepared meals and dishes 10.86 Manufacture of homogenised food preparations and dietetic food
	10.9 Manufacture of prepared animal feeds	10.91 Manufacture of prepared feeds for farm animals 10.92 Manufacture of prepared pet foods
11 Manufacture of beverages	11.0 Manufacture of beverages	11.01 Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits 11.02 Manufacture of wine from grape 11.03 Manufacture of cider and other fruit wines 11.04 Manufacture of other non-distilled fermented beverages 11.05 Manufacture of beer 11.06 Manufacture of malt 11.07 Manufacture of soft drinks; production of mineral waters and other bottled waters

Notes: This table reports the NACE Rev. 2 code and description of the industries included in the 4-digit level of analysis of concentration.
Source: NACE Rev.2 manual.

B.0.2 Firm-level financial data

This section provides a summary of the cleaning procedures applied to the Orbis dataset used in the report. Orbis data have been used to identify the top firms in a market in order to compute concentration. While the initial database is the same, some different cleaning procedures have been adopted for the two purposes. Both are described in this Annex.

As explained in Section 2, financial information within Orbis is available both at the business group

level (consolidated financial data aggregated across subsidiaries belonging to the same owner) and at individual firm level (unconsolidated information referring to an individual firm). In this work, unconsolidated accounts are used in the analysis.[1] Consolidated accounts are used only in two cases in which they can be considered equivalent to unconsolidated accounts: for independent firms (i.e., firms that are not part of a business group), and for subsidiaries at the bottom of the ownership hierarchy (subsidiaries not owning further subsidiaries) that do not have unconsolidated accounts, because for such firms consolidated and unconsolidated accounts coincide.

In the following two sub-sections, additional details on the data cleaning preparation for the two different samples are provided.

B.0.2.1 Sample for concentration

The methodology outlined in Section 3, computing concentration requires good coverage of both business group and individual subsidiaries' financial information. To ensure that all economic activity of each group's subsidiaries is captured, information for firms of all sizes and in all sectors are used.[2]

Following Bajgar et al. (2023), some steps are taken to improve the coverage of the data (see Bajgar et al., 2019) for a discussion on the impact of these steps on the sample). First, the coverage of Orbis has been expanded by using available consolidated information to infer missing years in the unconsolidated information of the same firm and vice-versa. Second, to increase the coverage of consolidated accounts of listed firms, Worldscope database has been used. Worldscope is merged to Orbis through firms' International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) numbers, which uniquely identify listed firms. For some countries, such as the United States, Worldscope can improve the coverage of Orbis substantially. The same cleaning rules used for Orbis data have been applied to Worldscope data. Worldscope reports consolidated financial data and contains very similar values to Orbis consolidated data for observations present in both datasets.[3]

As discussed in Section 3, the methodology developed to aggregate sales across all subsidiaries operating in a given market only uses unconsolidated sales of each firm. Consolidated accounts are used only to correct the unconsolidated information in cases where the total subsidiary sales exceed group sales (presumably due to inter-company transactions) or where unconsolidated data are missing. In the latter case, if a headquarter company reports always consolidated accounts but unconsolidated accounts only in some years, the missing years in the unconsolidated accounts are interpolated using growth rates of the

[1] As explained in Section 3, the measure of concentration built in this report look at business group activities rather than at single firms. The approach adopted in this paper fundamentally relies upon unconsolidated data of the individual subsidiaries within a business group, to identify the precise industry and location of all the subsidiaries belonging to a group, and correctly apportion the group sales to the markets in which the business group is active.

[2] Note that this sample is used at an initial stage of the data construction, in the attempt to consider the worldwide sales of business groups across all sectors in which they are active. This is important because it allows to have similar numbers when comparing the consolidated accounts of the headquarters and the sum of the unconsolidated sales of all their subsidiaries. Subsequently, as explained in Section 2, due mainly to data coverage and comparability across countries, the sample of countries and industries is restricted to those specified in the report.

[3] See Bajgar et al. (2019) for a discussion on the comparability between the two sources for firms present in both databases.

consolidated accounts and assuming a constant share of unconsolidated accounts relative to consolidated accounts.

B.0.3 Ownership data

As explained in Section 3, the business group structure is used to apportion the overall sales of the group across all the relevant market where it is active. To do so requires detailed ownership information on parent- subsidiary linkages. The primary source of firm ownership information is Orbis, which is supplemented with data from the Orbis M&A database of Mergers and Acquisitions. Importantly, both datasets are provided by Moody's and share a common firm identifier which allows to merge the two datasets.

Orbis contains comprehensive information on ownership linkages among firms, extensively used in the existing literature (Cravino & Levchenko, 2017; Fons-Rosen et al., 2021), which allow to detail ownership linkages between shareholders and their subsidiaries, as well as the identity of the global ultimate owner of subsidiaries (calculated at each calendar year from 2007 until 2020). The global ultimate owner is defined as the firm owning at least 50.01% of total shares of a subsidiary. This is a commonly used threshold for the definition of control of another firm and, thus, to understand whether the subsidiary's financial information is consolidated into the parent accounts.

To calculate ultimate owners, Orbis uses the tree of ownership linkages for each firm and year. They identify each for each firm its shareholder (the immediate owner), then the shareholder's shareholders and so on. So, for each firm, they start at the bottom and work up the tree of ownership linkages until they find a shareholder that is independent (not controlled by anyone) or controlled by an individual. That shareholder is classified as the ultimate owner of the subsidiary firm at the bottom of the tree.

However, in Orbis the data primarily start in 2007 and later for some firms. Thus, the main data source is complemented with the Orbis M&A database to measure earlier changes in ownership, enabling the construction of a series starting as early as 2000 whenever data allow, as discussed in the following subsections. [4] The Orbis M&A database contains deal-level information on M&As from 1997 onwards for European firms, from 2000 onwards for North American firms, and for other geographic regions from 2003. Overall, Orbis M&A contains about 2 million M&A deals from 2000 to 2020.

In the following sub-sections, a summary of the methodology is provided. For further details and a more complete discussion, please refer to Bajgar et al. (2019), Bajgar et al. (2023).

[4] Whilst ultimate ownership data starts in 2007, for some firms it is not available until later years. Common approaches to correcting for this in the literature are either to assume that firms without an Orbis ultimate owner are independent or to take data from a recent year - assuming ownership has not changed over time. Both approaches are problematic. With increasing coverage of ownership over time in Orbis, the former approach will falsely equate missing data with independence and lead to an overstatement of ownership changes over time. The latter approach will lead to an understatement of ownership changes over time and will typically overstate the number of markets and countries in which a firm operates.

B.0.3.1 Identifying business groups

The procedure to clean and harmonise Orbis and Orbis M&A relies on the work of (Bajgar et al., 2023). Following their approach, several steps are undertaken to expand the coverage of the ultimate owner from Orbis. The first step is to use Orbis M&A to identify changes in immediate (rather than global ultimate) owners not available from Orbis M&A. For each deal, Orbis M&A contains information on the target, acquiror and vendor firms. About 700,000 deals represent either changes in majority ownership – such as a firm increasing from 10% to 51% equity ownership – or a majority owner further increasing its stake – such as a firm increasing from 51% to 60% ownership. Both types of deal allow to identify the immediate owner of each target firm at the time of the deal. Furthermore, for changes in majority ownership – when the target firm switches hands – the vendor firm represents the previous immediate owner.

A second step is to use the information available from the table "current" Orbis linkages, which provides direct and indirect ownership linkages. These are used to retrieve the identity of the ultimate owner in cases where the latter is missing but it is possible to identify a shareholder with indirect share higher that 50.01

The third step is to translate the changes in immediate owners (from the first two steps above) to changes in the ultimate owner. The immediate owner who acquired the target firm may not be the ultimate owner. To find the ultimate owner, the same procedure used by Orbis is followed. Orbis M&A immediate owner and available information on ownership linkages are combined to find the shareholders of the immediate owners, and the shareholders of their shareholders, and so on. The 50.01% criterium is used until the procedure arrives to a shareholder that is either independent or controlled by an individual. This final shareholder is deemed the ultimate owner.

The fourth step is to impute missing years of ownership information and information and roll the owner backwards and forwards until there was an M&A or change in ownership (from the steps above). The additional information on ownership changes allows to roll the ownership information forwards and/or backwards until there was a change in owner, rather than simply assuming that a missing ultimate owner implies independence between firms. For example, if firm C is the ultimate owner of firm A in 2010, and from Orbis M&A data it is know that firm A was acquired in 2008, then the ultimate ownership information is rolled backwards until 2008. Moreover, in about half of the acquisition cases in the M&A sample, it is also known that firm A was acquired from vendor firm B in 2008, so it is possible to infer that firm B was the (immediate) owner of firm A and roll back further until an earlier M&A transaction.

B.0.3.2 Data cleaning

Numerous steps are undertaken to identify and correct potential issues in the ownership data, specially to identify missing linkages among the largest firms. Spot checking revealed that some large firm groups are missing ownership linkages between the parent firm and their subsidiaries for some years. This can be problematic because it can lead to a double counting of group activity, with both the parent's consolidated financials and their subsidiary information included as separate groups.

Accordingly, the following checks are undertaken to mitigate this risk. First, ultimate owners that are themselves majority owned by another firm cannot be true ultimate owners and are therefore adjusted in the data. Second, temporary (one or two year) deviations in ultimate owner relationships, whereby a firm's ultimate owner changes for just one or two years and then reverts to its previous owner, are removed, as this is an unusual phenomenon in ownership and is most likely to be measurement error. These two steps affect approximately 10,000 firms per year.

Third, to detect missing linkages, large firms that change from having no subsidiaries to a large number of subsidiaries from one year to the next are examined and manually updated, if necessary. Spot checking revealed cases of intermediate holding companies (that often have no financial information) being temporarily incorrectly identified as the ultimate owner. To address this issue, large groups of subsidiaries (in terms of sales) that have a parent with no financials but switch to a new parent in the following period that does have financials are examined manually. Cases of M&As identified by Orbis M&A have been excluded, and only cases where more than 90% of subsidiaries transfer to the new parent have been considered. The 1500 largest groups identified, corresponding to groups with sales larger than 10 million of Euro, have been corrected in the following way. For the 150 largest groups, each group has been manually inspected against their financial statements, while for other groups a name-matching algorithm has been used to semi-automate the identification of whether the prior owner was in fact a holding company of the new parent. Those with very similar names have been considered as part of the same group, correcting 147 groups.

Fourth, large firms that never have any subsidiary and, vice-versa, large groups of subsidiaries that never have a parent with financials are examined to identify missing links. This builds on the previous step, identifying large groups of subsidiaries that never have a parent with financials, and large parents that never have subsidiaries. In total, 1,031 parents with sales of more than 1 billion euros that never have subsidiaries have been found, and 251 groups of subsidiaries with more than 1 billion euros of sales that never have a parent with financials. Again, a name-matching algorithm has been used to semi-automate the identification of whether the prior owner was in fact a holding company of the new parent. This process applies to cases of groups (large groups of subsidiaries or large parents) with sales larger than 40 million and treats those with very similar names part of the same group. In total, based on visual inspection of the name-matching string-matching similarity, 287 groups per year have been corrected.

Fifth, missing links where there are ownership changes among firms with very similar names – and are so very likely part of the same group (e.g., ABC Motors acquired by ABC Motors Thailand) – are identified and corrected. This considers any ownership change where the owners have a similar root to their name (e.g., "XYZ Inc" and "XYZ Plc"). These remaining firms are not large, or do not have completely missing subsidiaries; if they had, they would have been encompassed in the earlier cleaning steps. These firms are therefore somewhat less problematic for the resulting concentration metrics. Given this reduced risk and the fact that all firms in the data are considered as part of this step, an automated check using namematching is carried out, which requires an identical match of the cleaned name. Common company type abbreviations (e.g., Plc, Ltd, SA, Gmbh etc.), country names (e.g., ABC

(Viet Nam) Ltd) and punctuation are removed, and the resulting root of the name is required to be identical. The global ultimate owner is modified only when the ownership change involves two companies with almost exact name and the ownership change happens between one ultimate owner that has financials and the other one that has not financials. In total, approximately 5,000 cases are corrected.

Finally, a further check for groups with total gross output (considered as the sum of the unconsolidated accounts of all its subsidiaries) in a given country, industry, and year larger than 150 million of Euro is conducted. Within this subset of business groups, firms with similar names in the same country and industry are checked using a string-matching algorithm to select relevant cases. As this algorithm captures situations where the ownership tree is partially missing some links, the spotted cases might be particularly relevant for concentration measures. For example, the company ACCO brands Europe was reported as a GUO, while it is part of the group ACCO Brands Corporation. Both were active in the same country-industry and year, therefore leading to a downward biased measure of concentration. In this situation, there are two groups (or simple firms), both with large revenues, but that do not have complete ownership structure. The subsample of GUOs with similar names and active in the same year has been manual inspected in order to understand when the GUO was indeed the same, correcting approximately 300 cases.

B.0.4 Robustness graphs




Figure 28: Concentration across geographical buckets (weighted)




Figure 29: Concentration across geographical buckets (CR8)

C

Appendix to Chapter 4

Table 55: Variables Description and Sources

Variable	Description	Source
C8	Aggregated sales of the 8 largest firms / Total sales of the industry	CBS
C4	Aggregated sales of the 4 largest firms / Total sales of the industry	CBS
HHI	Herfindal-Hirshman Index	CBS
C8Grants	Aggregated grants of the top 8 supported firms / Total grants of the industry	CBS and AdC
C4Grants	Aggregated grants of the top 4 supported firms / Total grants of the industry	CBS and AdC
HHIGrants	Herfindal-Hirshman Index applied to grants	CBS and AdC
Investment	Gross Capital Formation (€)	CBS
Employment	Number of workers	CBS
Value-added	Gross value-added (€)	CBS
Labour Productivity	Gross value-added / Employment (€)	CBS
Assets	Total assets (€)	CBS
Age	Firms average age	CBS

Notes: Variables are computed at the industry 3-digit level. CBS: Central Balance Sheet. AdC: Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion.




Figure 30: Total ERDF amount and ERDF allocation to the Top 8 and Top 4 largest firms (in terms of sales)

Table 56: Number of Firms by Industry at the NACE 1-Digit Level in 2008

Industries Description	**Number of firms**
Agriculture, animal production, hunting, forestry, and fishing	8872
Mining and quarrying	879
Manufacturing industries	39015
Electricity, gas, steam, hot and cold water, and air conditioning supply	612
Water collection, treatment, and supply; sewerage, waste management, and remediation activities	798
Construction	45124
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	91786
Transportation and storage	18910
Accommodation and food service activities	28566
Information and communication activities	6561
Financial and insurance activities	2985
Real estate activities	22625
Professional, scientific, and technical activities	28593
Administrative and support service activities	10462
Education	4163
Human health and social work activities	14869
Arts, entertainment, sports, and recreation activities	3480
Other service activities	7138
Total	335438

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.




Figure 31: Percentage of ERDF allocated to the Top 8 and Top 4 largest firms (in terms of sales)

Table 57: ERDF by Industry at the NACE 1-Digit Level (2008-2021)

Industries Description	**Grants (Million €)**	**Share of Grants (%)**
Agriculture, animal production, hunting, forestry, and fishing	46.01	0.57
Mining and quarrying	114.18	1.41
Manufacturing industries	5595.27	69.03
Electricity, gas, steam, hot and cold water, and air conditioning supply	4.23	0.05
Water collection, treatment, and supply; sewerage, waste management, and remediation activities	81.54	1.00
Construction	112.79	1.39
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	404.18	4.99
Transportation and storage	44.35	0.55
Accommodation and food service activities	556.04	6.86
Information and communication activities	461.27	5.69
Financial and insurance activities	0.13	0.00
Real estate activities	17.62	0.22
Professional, scientific, and technical activities	416.21	5.13
Administrative and support service activities	81.75	1.01
Education	9.65	0.12
Human health and social work activities	24.02	0.30
Arts, entertainment, sports, and recreation activities	127.47	1.57
Other service activities	8.73	0.11
Total	8105.44	100

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.




Figure 32: Concentration trends by industry: C8 (Top 8 largest Firms)




Figure 33: Concentration trends by industry: C4 (Top 4 largest Firms)




Figure 34: ERDF support by Concentration Quantiles by year, C8 (1st quantile: least concentrated, 4th quantile: most concentrated)

Table 58: Descriptive Statistics in 2008

	N	mean	sd	p1	p25	p50	p75	p99
C8	229	0.52	0.29	0.06	0.30	0.48	0.75	1.00
C4	229	0.42	0.28	0.04	0.20	0.34	0.62	1.00
HHI	229	0.12	0.16	0.00	0.02	0.05	0.16	0.74
C8grants	229	0.48	0.49	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
C4grants	229	0.46	0.48	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
HHIgrants	229	0.31	0.39	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.60	1.00
Entry rate	229	0.08	0.07	0.00	0.04	0.06	0.10	0.35
Exit rate	229	0.04	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.15
Investment	229	127.05	289.33	-11.58	8.11	32.71	119.46	1252.33
Employment	229	11381.65	19676.87	80.00	1467.00	4331.00	11647.00	87342.00
Value-added	229	371.16	586.32	1.20	51.48	159.48	428.42	2734.72
Exports	229	217.27	392.08	0.00	4.71	53.61	205.65	1877.08
Labour productivity	229	0.05	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.43
Assets	229	2967.53	11894.61	7.35	185.20	661.75	1765.74	36631.06
Age	229	13.23	5.61	4.29	8.62	12.74	16.41	29.69

Notes: Investment, value-added, exports, labour productivity, and assets are expressed in millions of euros.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 59: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (Top 4 Supported Firms) and Industry Performance

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_1$ln C4grants	0.08248	0.00299	-0.01560	-0.02977	-0.01254
	(0.059089)	(0.003709)	(0.019317)	(0.024988)	(0.012308)
N	2519	2519	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_2$ln C4grants	0.04753	0.00633	-0.02165	0.00054	-0.01769
	(0.047983)	(0.005977)	(0.018595)	(0.038287)	(0.010995)
N	2290	2290	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_3$ln C4grants	0.02890	0.00885	-0.04054	-0.00613	-0.03527**
	(0.045029)	(0.007209)	(0.028942)	(0.038825)	(0.017898)
N	2061	2061	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_4$ln C4grants	0.03190	0.01072	-0.04636	0.00253	-0.04153**
	(0.039446)	(0.007127)	(0.030182)	(0.045889)	(0.019205)
N	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_5$ln C4grants	0.02342	0.01106	-0.02906	0.04148	-0.02985*
	(0.042383)	(0.008035)	(0.028757)	(0.046002)	(0.017271)
N	1603	1603	1603	1603	1603

We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 60: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (HHI) and Industry Performance

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_1$ln HHIgrants	0.08681	0.00289	-0.01926	-0.02668	-0.01491
	(0.054515)	(0.003694)	(0.019721)	(0.023415)	(0.012381)
N	2519	2519	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_2$ln HHIgrants	0.05254	0.00676	-0.02155	0.00707	-0.01811*
	(0.048484)	(0.005823)	(0.017704)	(0.036011)	(0.010553)
N	2290	2290	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_3$ln HHIgrants	0.03346	0.00943	-0.03940	0.00088	-0.03545**
	(0.043637)	(0.006978)	(0.028185)	(0.037232)	(0.017541)
N	2061	2061	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_4$ln HHIgrants	0.03604	0.01144*	-0.04743	0.00942	-0.04329**
	(0.038581)	(0.006909)	(0.030548)	(0.044820)	(0.019431)
N	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_5$ln HHIgrants	0.03249	0.01187	-0.02844	0.04709	-0.03077*
	(0.041527)	(0.007992)	(0.029035)	(0.046325)	(0.017427)
N	1603	1603	1603	1603	1603

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 61: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (Top 8 Supported Firms) and Industry Performance with Controls Lagged

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_1$ln C8grants	0.08266	0.00293	-0.01683	-0.03221	-0.01329
	(0.060446)	(0.003665)	(0.019668)	(0.025246)	(0.012533)
L1.ln assets	-0.01680	-0.00744***	-0.02545	-0.04332***	-0.01127
	(0.011057)	(0.002728)	(0.016442)	(0.013377)	(0.009553)
L1.age	0.00106	-0.00415***	-0.00218	-0.00848	0.00128
	(0.004315)	(0.000999)	(0.001809)	(0.005313)	(0.001022)
N	2519	2519	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_2$ln C8grants	0.04521	0.00557	-0.02523	-0.00599	-0.01939
	(0.048720)	(0.005937)	(0.021241)	(0.038445)	(0.012459)
L2.ln assets	-0.03830*	-0.01475***	-0.04632	-0.07064**	-0.01851
	(0.020855)	(0.005531)	(0.038312)	(0.028548)	(0.022395)
L2.age	0.00305	-0.00776***	-0.00466	-0.01816	0.00155
	(0.007093)	(0.002009)	(0.003489)	(0.011530)	(0.001952)
N	2290	2290	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_3$ln C8grants	0.02619	0.00802	-0.04482	-0.01427	-0.03732*
	(0.046523)	(0.007096)	(0.032633)	(0.039209)	(0.019972)
L3.ln assets	-0.04024	-0.01912**	-0.05039	-0.08528**	-0.01852
	(0.028157)	(0.007794)	(0.046158)	(0.042606)	(0.027790)
L3.age	0.00075	-0.01163***	-0.00861*	-0.02452	0.00125
	(0.008063)	(0.003036)	(0.004574)	(0.018381)	(0.002445)
N	2061	2061	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_4$ln C8grants	0.02912	0.00939	-0.05136	-0.00820	-0.04374**
	(0.039626)	(0.006583)	(0.034016)	(0.046051)	(0.021347)
L4.ln assets	-0.02256	-0.02462**	-0.05613	-0.10112*	-0.01916
	(0.026806)	(0.010269)	(0.054025)	(0.059710)	(0.033537)
L4.age	0.00430	-0.01534***	-0.01280**	-0.03627	0.00073
	(0.009680)	(0.004172)	(0.005870)	(0.026747)	(0.002967)
N	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_5$ln C8grants	0.01666	0.00939	-0.03531	0.02967	-0.03264
	(0.043398)	(0.007085)	(0.034547)	(0.044973)	(0.020922)
L5.ln assets	-0.04613	-0.02935**	-0.06401	-0.11068	-0.02197
	(0.034518)	(0.012839)	(0.061701)	(0.072961)	(0.038834)
L5.age	0.00443	-0.01962***	-0.01805**	-0.04987	-0.00034
	(0.011688)	(0.005302)	(0.007536)	(0.036586)	(0.003776)
N	1603	1603	1603	1603	1603

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables lagged: assets and firms' average age within the industry. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 62: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (Top 4 Supported Firms) and Industry Performance with Controls

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_1$ln C4grants	0.07836	0.00154	-0.01770	-0.03460	-0.01316
	(0.058496)	(0.003091)	(0.018989)	(0.023168)	(0.012139)
$\Delta_1$ln assets	0.95723***	0.36551***	0.50402***	1.19040***	0.13693
	(0.156122)	(0.043714)	(0.157659)	(0.348034)	(0.101964)
age	0.00412	-0.00268***	-0.00056	-0.00565	0.00160
	(0.004275)	(0.000858)	(0.001734)	(0.005827)	(0.001032)
N	2519	2519	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_2$ln C4grants	0.02563	-0.00007	-0.02882	-0.01677	-0.01863
	(0.048485)	(0.004902)	(0.019738)	(0.037085)	(0.011551)
$\Delta_2$ln assets	1.27430***	0.39417***	0.42712**	1.06095***	0.04836
	(0.252502)	(0.045086)	(0.185235)	(0.231677)	(0.122193)
age	0.01383*	-0.00501***	0.00039	-0.01130	0.00325
	(0.007504)	(0.001582)	(0.004956)	(0.011992)	(0.002851)
N	2290	2290	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_3$ln C4grants	0.00592	0.00143	-0.04686	-0.02638	-0.03498*
	(0.045372)	(0.006040)	(0.030831)	(0.038102)	(0.018814)
$\Delta_3$ln assets	1.10668***	0.39901***	0.32002	1.07475***	-0.02876
	(0.206695)	(0.044921)	(0.247238)	(0.219384)	(0.157455)
age	0.01467	-0.00791***	-0.00088	-0.01755	0.00425
	(0.009223)	(0.002262)	(0.007085)	(0.017976)	(0.004065)
N	2061	2061	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_4$ln C4grants	0.00445	-0.00027	-0.05298*	-0.02273	-0.03928**
	(0.040396)	(0.005684)	(0.030329)	(0.042406)	(0.018805)
$\Delta_4$ln assets	0.97590***	0.42992***	0.25983	1.00485***	-0.08850
	(0.170279)	(0.045152)	(0.297186)	(0.199477)	(0.190976)
age	0.01509	-0.01039***	-0.00656	-0.03070	0.00224
	(0.009164)	(0.002872)	(0.007635)	(0.025864)	(0.004392)
N	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_5$ln C4grants	0.00128	-0.00051	-0.03614	0.02015	-0.02760
	(0.043241)	(0.005798)	(0.030701)	(0.040382)	(0.018618)
$\Delta_5$ln assets	0.75508***	0.44858***	0.27468	0.87946***	-0.08832
	(0.184476)	(0.043551)	(0.262707)	(0.189214)	(0.169997)
age	0.01000	-0.01304***	-0.00804	-0.04178	0.00285
	(0.010542)	(0.003502)	(0.008824)	(0.034711)	(0.005141)
N	1603	1603	1603	1603	1603

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: assets and firms' average age within the industry. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 63: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (HHI) and Industry Performance with Controls

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_1$ln HHIgrants	0.08489	0.00238	-0.02012	-0.02851	-0.01523
	(0.054174)	(0.003053)	(0.019627)	(0.021762)	(0.012332)
$\Delta_1$ln assets	0.96425***	0.36559***	0.50252***	1.18650***	0.13584
	(0.154930)	(0.043755)	(0.158460)	(0.347888)	(0.102460)
age	0.00399	-0.00269***	-0.00052	-0.00563	0.00162
	(0.004285)	(0.000858)	(0.001733)	(0.005831)	(0.001030)
N	2519	2519	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_2$ln HHIgrants	0.03446	0.00186	-0.02727	-0.00625	-0.01898*
	(0.049099)	(0.004735)	(0.018646)	(0.034865)	(0.010927)
$\Delta_2$ln assets	1.27246***	0.39331***	0.42410**	1.05492***	0.04700
	(0.251165)	(0.045047)	(0.183629)	(0.231191)	(0.121298)
age	0.01365*	-0.00503***	0.00047	-0.01136	0.00331
	(0.007500)	(0.001582)	(0.004985)	(0.011975)	(0.002866)
N	2290	2290	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_3$ln HHIgrants	0.01440	0.00398	-0.04433	-0.01415	-0.03542*
	(0.044171)	(0.005849)	(0.029681)	(0.036362)	(0.018183)
$\Delta_3$ln assets	1.10346***	0.39801***	0.31502	1.06721***	-0.03147
	(0.205267)	(0.044782)	(0.244709)	(0.218881)	(0.155933)
age	0.01448	-0.00797***	-0.00070	-0.01765	0.00443
	(0.009244)	(0.002263)	(0.007154)	(0.017958)	(0.004106)
N	2061	2061	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_4$ln HHIgrants	0.01280	0.00295	-0.05247*	-0.00966	-0.04152**
	(0.039841)	(0.005423)	(0.030444)	(0.040904)	(0.018904)
$\Delta_4$ln assets	0.97191***	0.42821***	0.25494	0.99600***	-0.09075
	(0.170145)	(0.044971)	(0.295031)	(0.199409)	(0.189758)
age	0.01488	-0.01046***	-0.00633	-0.03089	0.00247
	(0.009160)	(0.002870)	(0.007711)	(0.025859)	(0.004442)
N	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_5$ln HHIgrants	0.01368	0.00285	-0.03391	0.03132	-0.02900
	(0.042524)	(0.005670)	(0.030242)	(0.040051)	(0.018286)
$\Delta_5$ln assets	0.74909***	0.44689***	0.27078	0.87554***	-0.08978
	(0.183952)	(0.043407)	(0.260107)	(0.189581)	(0.168545)
age	0.00966	-0.01313***	-0.00796	-0.04215	0.00299
	(0.010516)	(0.003492)	(0.008850)	(0.034704)	(0.005173)
N	1603	1603	1603	1603	1603

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: assets and firms' average age within the industry. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 64: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (Top 8 Supported Firms) and Industry Performance with Controls, 2-Digit Industry and Year Fixed Effects (Excluding Industry-Year Interaction)

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_1$ln C8grants	0.05923	0.00411	-0.02549	-0.01700	-0.02127
	(0.053483)	(0.003767)	(0.022503)	(0.025842)	(0.014501)
$\Delta_1$ln assets	1.03278***	0.34058***	0.55674***	0.98211**	0.18409**
	(0.278507)	(0.051405)	(0.141875)	(0.384567)	(0.087230)
age	0.00655	-0.00294***	0.00017	-0.00472	0.00218*
	(0.003980)	(0.000758)	(0.002117)	(0.005308)	(0.001209)
N	2519	2519	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_2$ln C8grants	0.00317	0.00192	-0.03450	-0.01113	-0.02444*
	(0.046996)	(0.004792)	(0.022107)	(0.036647)	(0.012868)
$\Delta_2$ln assets	1.35405***	0.36022***	0.47689***	0.83992***	0.11556
	(0.326884)	(0.051894)	(0.165717)	(0.212354)	(0.102339)
age	0.01726**	-0.00551***	0.00126	-0.01130	0.00413
	(0.007022)	(0.001392)	(0.005390)	(0.010680)	(0.003074)
N	2290	2290	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_3$ln C8grants	-0.00570	0.00280	-0.05262	-0.01400	-0.03886*
	(0.045376)	(0.005922)	(0.034196)	(0.032128)	(0.020224)
$\Delta_3$ln assets	1.12577***	0.36403***	0.38971*	0.79619***	0.05248
	(0.269282)	(0.048615)	(0.217444)	(0.206271)	(0.131416)
age	0.01745*	-0.00856***	-0.00013	-0.02085	0.00509
	(0.009164)	(0.001989)	(0.007370)	(0.015921)	(0.004206)
N	2061	2061	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_4$ln C8grants	0.00474	0.00118	-0.05833*	-0.01224	-0.04392**
	(0.037944)	(0.005141)	(0.035211)	(0.034965)	(0.021306)
$\Delta_4$ln assets	1.04456***	0.39773***	0.35313	0.82764***	0.00347
	(0.215269)	(0.046648)	(0.264316)	(0.167966)	(0.164614)
age	0.01653**	-0.01104***	-0.00647	-0.03525	0.00256
	(0.008305)	(0.002507)	(0.007187)	(0.022461)	(0.004048)
N	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_5$ln C8grants	0.00011	0.00098	-0.05668	0.01341	-0.04193*
	(0.042520)	(0.005165)	(0.037835)	(0.036495)	(0.022299)
$\Delta_5$ln assets	0.95314***	0.42225***	0.38903	0.66516***	0.01171
	(0.198996)	(0.045241)	(0.253863)	(0.187616)	(0.158989)
age	0.01357	-0.01376***	-0.00791	-0.04705	0.00324
	(0.009464)	(0.003023)	(0.008665)	(0.029148)	(0.004982)
N	1603	1603	1603	1603	1603

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: assets and firms' average age within the industry. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year and industry (2-digits level) fixed effects, dropping the interaction term of industry-year fixed effect.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 65: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (Top 8 Supported Firms) and Industry Performance with Controls, 2-Digit Industry and Year Fixed Effects (Excluding Industry-Year Interaction), and Clustered at 2-Digit Industry Level

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_1$ln C8grants	0.05923	0.00411	-0.02549	-0.01700	-0.02127
	(0.052712)	(0.004307)	(0.025255)	(0.026878)	(0.017124)
$\Delta_1$ln assets	1.03278***	0.34058***	0.55674***	0.98211**	0.18409*
	(0.268095)	(0.049232)	(0.144882)	(0.405487)	(0.093018)
age	0.00655	-0.00294***	0.00017	-0.00472	0.00218
	(0.004626)	(0.000896)	(0.002608)	(0.005829)	(0.001505)
N	2519	2519	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_2$ln C8grants	0.00317	0.00192	-0.03450	-0.01113	-0.02444*
	(0.046283)	(0.005549)	(0.022908)	(0.035290)	(0.013007)
$\Delta_2$ln assets	1.35405***	0.36022***	0.47689***	0.83992***	0.11556
	(0.331543)	(0.048999)	(0.177276)	(0.229073)	(0.111468)
age	0.01726**	-0.00551***	0.00126	-0.01130	0.00413
	(0.008506)	(0.001682)	(0.006201)	(0.011413)	(0.003527)
N	2290	2290	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_3$ln C8grants	-0.00570	0.00280	-0.05262	-0.01400	-0.03886*
	(0.044700)	(0.006630)	(0.035299)	(0.031614)	(0.020434)
$\Delta_3$ln assets	1.12577***	0.36403***	0.38971*	0.79619***	0.05248
	(0.272855)	(0.043321)	(0.219021)	(0.228342)	(0.140470)
age	0.01745	-0.00856***	-0.00013	-0.02085	0.00509
	(0.010926)	(0.002395)	(0.008000)	(0.017089)	(0.004603)
N	2061	2061	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_4$ln C8grants	0.00474	0.00118	-0.05833	-0.01224	-0.04392**
	(0.037166)	(0.005829)	(0.036409)	(0.037941)	(0.021380)
$\Delta_4$ln assets	1.04456***	0.39773***	0.35313	0.82764***	0.00347
	(0.218010)	(0.039472)	(0.258752)	(0.190798)	(0.172770)
age	0.01653	-0.01104***	-0.00647	-0.03525	0.00256
	(0.010207)	(0.003067)	(0.007779)	(0.025445)	(0.004585)
N	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_5$ln C8grants	0.00011	0.00098	-0.05668	0.01341	-0.04193*
	(0.042172)	(0.005995)	(0.039153)	(0.039368)	(0.022617)
$\Delta_5$ln assets	0.95314***	0.42225***	0.38903	0.66516***	0.01171
	(0.207210)	(0.036933)	(0.248601)	(0.207499)	(0.167264)
age	0.01357	-0.01376***	-0.00791	-0.04705	0.00324
	(0.012024)	(0.003735)	(0.009337)	(0.033328)	(0.005565)
N	1603	1603	1603	1603	1603

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: assets and firms' average age within the industry. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 2-digits level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year and industry (2-digits level) fixed effects, dropping the interaction term of industry-year fixed effect.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 66: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (Top 8 Supported Firms) and Industry Performance with Controls, 3-Digit Industry and Year Fixed Effects, and Clustered at 3-Digit Industry Level

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_1$ln C8grants	0.06044	0.00394	-0.02605	-0.02033	-0.02157
	(0.053190)	(0.003778)	(0.022588)	(0.025906)	(0.014553)
$\Delta_1$ln assets	1.04969***	0.32663***	0.54137***	0.99428**	0.18516**
	(0.295416)	(0.052221)	(0.142510)	(0.399482)	(0.087649)
age	0.02095	-0.00232	0.01027	0.01262	0.00849
	(0.022872)	(0.002674)	(0.009804)	(0.024144)	(0.005514)
N	2519	2519	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_2$ln C8grants	0.00110	0.00227	-0.03312	-0.01935	-0.02410*
	(0.046528)	(0.004931)	(0.022231)	(0.037437)	(0.012929)
$\Delta_2$ln assets	1.42240***	0.33115***	0.42332**	0.83449***	0.10478
	(0.355676)	(0.054294)	(0.167680)	(0.233036)	(0.104197)
age	0.05306	-0.00390	0.03149	0.01502	0.02119
	(0.035474)	(0.004126)	(0.028735)	(0.044250)	(0.016616)
N	2290	2290	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_3$ln C8grants	-0.00724	0.00307	-0.05206	-0.02714	-0.03916*
	(0.046055)	(0.006283)	(0.035243)	(0.033993)	(0.020844)
$\Delta_3$ln assets	1.22736***	0.32127***	0.30472	0.78046***	0.03143
	(0.314103)	(0.052088)	(0.246203)	(0.239213)	(0.148339)
age	0.07342	-0.00547	0.05595	-0.00836	0.03608
	(0.053081)	(0.005494)	(0.048211)	(0.063982)	(0.028490)
N	2061	2061	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_4$ln C8grants	0.00603	0.00173	-0.05856	-0.03065	-0.04578**
	(0.039986)	(0.005789)	(0.038376)	(0.037032)	(0.023149)
$\Delta_4$ln assets	1.21490***	0.34309***	0.21572	0.84017***	-0.04220
	(0.270432)	(0.052415)	(0.335712)	(0.210101)	(0.208752)
age	0.04147	-0.00445	0.02128	-0.04899	0.01131
	(0.046855)	(0.006436)	(0.032016)	(0.086159)	(0.020566)
N	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_5$ln C8grants	0.00718	0.00206	-0.06019	-0.01255	-0.04685*
	(0.047986)	(0.006131)	(0.044533)	(0.039382)	(0.025986)
$\Delta_5$ln assets	1.16157***	0.34683***	0.19880	0.63270**	-0.05010
	(0.266403)	(0.055424)	(0.373121)	(0.259446)	(0.233522)
age	-0.01338	-0.00186	0.05454	-0.05101	0.02750
	(0.055112)	(0.007278)	(0.054027)	(0.078389)	(0.033759)
N	1603	1603	1603	1603	1603

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: assets and firms' average age within the industry. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year and industry (3-digit level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 67: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (Top 8 Supported Firms) and Industry Concentration

	$\Delta_1$ln C8	$\Delta_1$ln entry rate	$\Delta_1$ln exit rate
$\Delta_1$ln C8grants	0.00109	0.05781	0.02780
	(0.003156)	(0.044398)	(0.023623)
N	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln C8	$\Delta_2$ln entry rate	$\Delta_2$ln exit rate
$\Delta_2$ln C8grants	0.00191	0.01067	0.00208
	(0.004453)	(0.029419)	(0.020605)
N	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln C8	$\Delta_3$ln entry rate	$\Delta_3$ln exit rate
$\Delta_3$ln C8grants	0.00420	0.03320	0.01392
	(0.004556)	(0.036604)	(0.018193)
N	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln C8	$\Delta_4$ln entry rate	$\Delta_4$ln exit rate
$\Delta_4$ln C8grants	0.00480	-0.00204	0.01335
	(0.004932)	(0.032370)	(0.016814)
N	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln C8	$\Delta_5$ln entry rate	$\Delta_5$ln exit rate
$\Delta_5$ln C8grants	0.00407	-0.02549	0.02655
	(0.005840)	(0.030455)	(0.019152)
N	1603	1603	1603

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 68: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (Top 4 Supported Firms) and Industry Concentration

	$\Delta_1$ln C4	$\Delta_1$ln entry rate	$\Delta_1$ln exit rate
$\Delta_1$ln C4grants	0.00076	0.05876	0.02719
	(0.004450)	(0.043815)	(0.023415)
N	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln C4	$\Delta_2$ln entry rate	$\Delta_2$ln exit rate
$\Delta_2$ln C4grants	0.00220	0.01018	0.00245
	(0.006065)	(0.028856)	(0.020412)
N	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln C4	$\Delta_3$ln entry rate	$\Delta_3$ln exit rate
$\Delta_3$ln C4grants	0.00497	0.03292	0.01393
	(0.005883)	(0.036155)	(0.017894)
N	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln C4	$\Delta_4$ln entry rate	$\Delta_4$ln exit rate
$\Delta_4$ln C4grants	0.00672	-0.00185	0.01366
	(0.006209)	(0.032118)	(0.016678)
N	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln C4	$\Delta_5$ln entry rate	$\Delta_5$ln exit rate
$\Delta_5$ln C4grants	0.00659	-0.02486	0.02680
	(0.007206)	(0.030387)	(0.018996)
N	1603	1603	1603

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 69: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (HHI) and Industry Concentration

	$\Delta_1$ln HHI	$\Delta_1$ln entry rate	$\Delta_1$ln exit rate
$\Delta_1$ln HHIgrants	-0.00064	0.05500	0.02570
	(0.008772)	(0.042202)	(0.021978)
N	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln HHI	$\Delta_2$ln entry rate	$\Delta_2$ln exit rate
$\Delta_2$ln HHIgrants	0.00033	0.00003	0.00480
	(0.012262)	(0.028214)	(0.019354)
N	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln HHI	$\Delta_3$ln entry rate	$\Delta_3$ln exit rate
$\Delta_3$ln HHIgrants	-0.00040	0.02535	0.01308
	(0.012271)	(0.035709)	(0.017151)
N	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln HHI	$\Delta_4$ln entry rate	$\Delta_4$ln exit rate
$\Delta_4$ln HHIgrants	0.00123	-0.00310	0.00974
	(0.011805)	(0.032367)	(0.016497)
N	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln HHI	$\Delta_5$ln entry rate	$\Delta_5$ln exit rate
$\Delta_5$ln HHIgrants	0.00003	-0.02327	0.02500
	(0.013328)	(0.031865)	(0.019249)
N	1603	1603	1603

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 70: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (Top 4 Supported Firms) and Industry Concentration with Controls

	$\Delta_1$ln C4	$\Delta_1$ln entry rate	$\Delta_1$ln exit rate
$\Delta_1$ln C4grants	0.00044	0.05906	0.02792
	(0.004539)	(0.043846)	(0.023185)
$\Delta_1$ln assets	0.05896	-0.08684	-0.15232
	(0.062012)	(0.176535)	(0.162870)
age	0.00247***	0.00219	-0.00351*
	(0.000664)	(0.003890)	(0.001857)
N	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln C4	$\Delta_2$ln entry rate	$\Delta_2$ln exit rate
$\Delta_2$ln C4grants	0.00122	0.01158	0.00305
	(0.006284)	(0.028688)	(0.019817)
$\Delta_2$ln assets	0.04527	-0.09239	-0.01684
	(0.059892)	(0.134997)	(0.129616)
age	0.00540***	0.00363	-0.00788**
	(0.001436)	(0.006125)	(0.003707)
N	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln C4	$\Delta_3$ln entry rate	$\Delta_3$ln exit rate
$\Delta_3$ln C4grants	0.00370	0.03433	0.01273
	(0.006000)	(0.035861)	(0.017627)
$\Delta_3$ln assets	0.03667	-0.10708	0.07724
	(0.046764)	(0.130211)	(0.081095)
age	0.00839***	0.01097	-0.00511
	(0.002104)	(0.009972)	(0.004953)
N	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln C4	$\Delta_4$ln entry rate	$\Delta_4$ln exit rate
$\Delta_4$ln C4grants	0.00514	-0.00200	0.01273
	(0.006170)	(0.031862)	(0.016470)
$\Delta_4$ln assets	0.03018	-0.02950	0.05510
	(0.040228)	(0.113496)	(0.080287)
age	0.01163***	0.01479	-0.00875
	(0.002770)	(0.011423)	(0.006246)
N	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln C4	$\Delta_5$ln entry rate	$\Delta_5$ln exit rate
$\Delta_5$ln C4grants	0.00477	-0.02787	0.02666
	(0.006752)	(0.029693)	(0.018501)
$\Delta_5$ln assets	0.02186	0.04073	0.03563
	(0.038802)	(0.131415)	(0.077960)
age	0.01453***	0.02234	-0.01047
	(0.003518)	(0.015214)	(0.008221)
N	1603	1603	1603

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: assets and firms' average age within the industry. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 71: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (HHI) and Industry Concentration with Controls

	$\Delta_1$ln HHI	$\Delta_1$ln entry rate	$\Delta_1$ln exit rate
$\Delta_1$ln HHIgrants	-0.00122	0.05503	0.02614
	(0.008874)	(0.042227)	(0.021849)
$\Delta_1$ln assets	0.18663	-0.08075	-0.14945
	(0.168636)	(0.176274)	(0.163424)
age	0.00495***	0.00213	-0.00354*
	(0.001356)	(0.003892)	(0.001858)
N	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln HHI	$\Delta_2$ln entry rate	$\Delta_2$ln exit rate
$\Delta_2$ln HHIgrants	-0.00257	0.00092	0.00562
	(0.012621)	(0.028089)	(0.018849)
$\Delta_2$ln assets	0.15908	-0.08672	-0.01773
	(0.154236)	(0.134542)	(0.130074)
age	0.01040***	0.00372	-0.00792**
	(0.002842)	(0.006140)	(0.003709)
N	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln HHI	$\Delta_3$ln entry rate	$\Delta_3$ln exit rate
$\Delta_3$ln HHIgrants	-0.00384	0.02576	0.01239
	(0.012594)	(0.035275)	(0.016991)
$\Delta_3$ln assets	0.11195	-0.10047	0.07845
	(0.112008)	(0.129438)	(0.081514)
age	0.01541***	0.01097	-0.00517
	(0.003919)	(0.009974)	(0.004956)
N	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln HHI	$\Delta_4$ln entry rate	$\Delta_4$ln exit rate
$\Delta_4$ln HHIgrants	-0.00278	-0.00398	0.00935
	(0.011878)	(0.032068)	(0.016347)
$\Delta_4$ln assets	0.08366	-0.02863	0.05799
	(0.097330)	(0.113222)	(0.080602)
age	0.02093***	0.01485	-0.00873
	(0.004991)	(0.011428)	(0.006237)
N	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln HHI	$\Delta_5$ln entry rate	$\Delta_5$ln exit rate
$\Delta_5$ln HHIgrants	-0.00395	-0.02678	0.02532
	(0.012505)	(0.031016)	(0.018821)
$\Delta_5$ln assets	0.03971	0.03803	0.03836
	(0.091056)	(0.130714)	(0.078120)
age	0.02610***	0.02242	-0.01054
	(0.006270)	(0.015205)	(0.008179)
N	1603	1603	1603

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: assets and firms' average age within the industry. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 72: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (Top 8 Supported Firms), Industry Concetration, and Industry Performance with Controls, 2-Digit Industry and Year Fixed Effects (Excluding Industry-Year Interaction)

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_1$ln C8grants	0.06199	0.00425	-0.02434	-0.01790	-0.02079
	(0.052218)	(0.003757)	(0.022701)	(0.025790)	(0.014591)
$\Delta_1$ln C8	-1.38809	-0.07199	-0.57875	0.45521	-0.23961
	(1.387398)	(0.076809)	(0.674089)	(0.331384)	(0.383239)
$\Delta_1$ln assets	1.08659***	0.34337***	0.57917***	0.96446**	0.19337*
	(0.313380)	(0.050801)	(0.163890)	(0.381171)	(0.101223)
age	0.00907*	-0.00281***	0.00122	-0.00554	0.00261
	(0.005207)	(0.000760)	(0.003150)	(0.005416)	(0.001816)
N	2519	2519	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_2$ln C8grants	0.01078	0.00247	-0.03157	-0.01381	-0.02337**
	(0.040898)	(0.004711)	(0.019548)	(0.036135)	(0.011576)
$\Delta_2$ln C8	-1.88658	-0.13682*	-0.72453	0.66645*	-0.26378
	(1.268032)	(0.080212)	(0.901160)	(0.384935)	(0.506954)
$\Delta_2$ln assets	1.39642***	0.36329***	0.49316***	0.82496***	0.12148
	(0.295026)	(0.050075)	(0.181021)	(0.205684)	(0.112235)
age	0.02445**	-0.00499***	0.00403	-0.01384	0.00514
	(0.009733)	(0.001342)	(0.008099)	(0.010878)	(0.004646)
N	2290	2290	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_3$ln C8grants	0.00241	0.00357	-0.04928*	-0.01731	-0.03787**
	(0.038160)	(0.005696)	(0.029428)	(0.031566)	(0.018106)
$\Delta_3$ln C8	-1.43270	-0.13576*	-0.58927	0.58434	-0.17503
	(1.036242)	(0.075135)	(0.780837)	(0.359961)	(0.434929)
$\Delta_3$ln assets	1.14813***	0.36615***	0.39891*	0.78707***	0.05521
	(0.250512)	(0.047645)	(0.223330)	(0.204673)	(0.134969)
age	0.02634**	-0.00772***	0.00353	-0.02448	0.00618
	(0.013030)	(0.001864)	(0.010796)	(0.016130)	(0.006187)
N	2061	2061	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_4$ln C8grants	0.00823	0.00204	-0.05561*	-0.01613	-0.04339**
	(0.035080)	(0.004917)	(0.031092)	(0.034699)	(0.019594)
$\Delta_4$ln C8	-0.57032	-0.14054**	-0.44490	0.63761	-0.08632
	(0.506037)	(0.069499)	(0.639968)	(0.416666)	(0.356191)
$\Delta_4$ln assets	1.05071***	0.39925***	0.35793	0.82075***	0.00440
	(0.209781)	(0.046175)	(0.266987)	(0.166667)	(0.166044)
age	0.02154**	-0.00981***	-0.00255	-0.04086*	0.00332
	(0.010285)	(0.002302)	(0.011307)	(0.022813)	(0.006469)
N	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_5$ln C8grants	0.00345	0.00194	-0.05416	0.00918	-0.04151**
	(0.039503)	(0.004911)	(0.034146)	(0.036220)	(0.020844)
$\Delta_5$ln C8	-0.57706	-0.16618***	-0.43518	0.73002*	-0.07155
	(0.551467)	(0.062180)	(0.518190)	(0.370745)	(0.286591)
$\Delta_5$ln assets	0.95459***	0.42267***	0.39012	0.66333***	0.01189
	(0.193053)	(0.044581)	(0.254448)	(0.187097)	(0.159347)
age	0.01983	-0.01195***	-0.00319	-0.05497*	0.00402
	(0.012202)	(0.002667)	(0.012359)	(0.029369)	(0.007157)
N	1603	1603	1603	1603	1603

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: assets and firms' average age within the industry. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year and industry (2-digits level) fixed effects, dropping the interaction term of industry-year fixed effect.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

Table 73: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (Top 8 Supported Firms), Industry Concetration, and Industry Performance with Controls, 3-Digit Industry and Year Fixed Effects, and Clustered at 3-Digit Industry Level

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_1$ln C8grants	0.06344	0.00407	-0.02479	-0.02132	-0.02103
	(0.051818)	(0.003765)	(0.022818)	(0.025843)	(0.014660)
$\Delta_1$ln C8	-1.42325	-0.06118	-0.59761	0.46901	-0.25693
	(1.406844)	(0.079850)	(0.688059)	(0.336311)	(0.390249)
$\Delta_1$ln assets	1.11233***	0.32932***	0.56767***	0.97364**	0.19647*
	(0.336769)	(0.051895)	(0.167762)	(0.396219)	(0.103767)
age	0.02209	-0.00227	0.01074	0.01224	0.00870
	(0.022914)	(0.002685)	(0.009925)	(0.024113)	(0.005628)
N	2519	2519	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_2$ln C8grants	0.00892	0.00271	-0.03030	-0.02213	-0.02302*
	(0.039984)	(0.004847)	(0.019771)	(0.036978)	(0.011690)
$\Delta_2$ln C8	-2.05121	-0.11511	-0.73990	0.72782*	-0.28138
	(1.333935)	(0.087927)	(0.952198)	(0.411159)	(0.534020)
$\Delta_2$ln assets	1.49571***	0.33527***	0.44977**	0.80848***	0.11483
	(0.328302)	(0.052714)	(0.191342)	(0.225343)	(0.119007)
age	0.05660	-0.00370	0.03277	0.01376	0.02167
	(0.035868)	(0.004099)	(0.029092)	(0.044108)	(0.016959)
N	2290	2290	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_3$ln C8grants	0.00201	0.00363	-0.04849	-0.03104	-0.03795**
	(0.037612)	(0.006058)	(0.029957)	(0.033527)	(0.018475)
$\Delta_3$ln C8	-1.66510	-0.10050	-0.64295	0.70287*	-0.21734
	(1.160533)	(0.086831)	(0.895472)	(0.405015)	(0.497884)
$\Delta_3$ln assets	1.28376***	0.32467***	0.32650	0.75665***	0.03879
	(0.300179)	(0.051356)	(0.258879)	(0.237082)	(0.155833)
age	0.07924	-0.00512	0.05820	-0.01082	0.03684
	(0.054006)	(0.005461)	(0.048975)	(0.063785)	(0.029061)
N	2061	2061	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_4$ln C8grants	0.01059	0.00236	-0.05505*	-0.03527	-0.04477**
	(0.036205)	(0.005556)	(0.032986)	(0.036826)	(0.020855)
$\Delta_4$ln C8	-0.74231	-0.10326	-0.57118	0.75321	-0.16366
	(0.620357)	(0.085764)	(0.848214)	(0.520436)	(0.474119)
$\Delta_4$ln assets	1.23913***	0.34646***	0.23437	0.81558***	-0.03686
	(0.266148)	(0.052010)	(0.344635)	(0.208841)	(0.213701)
age	0.04539	-0.00391	0.02429	-0.05296	0.01217
	(0.047790)	(0.006392)	(0.034432)	(0.085809)	(0.021964)
N	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_5$ln C8grants	0.01251	0.00279	-0.05675	-0.01815	-0.04592*
	(0.042826)	(0.005812)	(0.038849)	(0.039391)	(0.023647)
$\Delta_5$ln C8	-0.96530	-0.13121	-0.62312	1.01502*	-0.16877
	(0.817194)	(0.081127)	(0.809001)	(0.526583)	(0.450549)
$\Delta_5$ln assets	1.18844***	0.35049***	0.21614	0.60445**	-0.04540
	(0.255332)	(0.054622)	(0.379541)	(0.259196)	(0.237039)
age	-0.00685	-0.00098	0.05876	-0.05788	0.02864
	(0.056472)	(0.007150)	(0.056335)	(0.077267)	(0.035099)
N	1603	1603	1603	1603	1603

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: assets and firms' average age within the industry. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year and industry (3-digit level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

Table 74: Estimation Results: Standardized Grants Concentration (Top 8 Supported Firms) and Industry Performance

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
Stand$\Delta_1$ln C8grants	0.09865	0.00377	-0.01829	-0.03554	-0.01490
	(0.070913)	(0.004428)	(0.023078)	(0.029778)	(0.014697)
N	2519	2519	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
Stand$\Delta_2$ln C8grants	0.07068	0.00947	-0.03189	-0.00158	-0.02621
	(0.070671)	(0.008851)	(0.027573)	(0.056707)	(0.016301)
N	2290	2290	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
Stand$\Delta_3$ln C8grants	0.04795	0.01452	-0.06676	-0.01396	-0.05797**
	(0.074068)	(0.011818)	(0.047554)	(0.063657)	(0.029399)
N	2061	2061	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
Stand$\Delta_4$ln C8grants	0.05478	0.01874	-0.08146	-0.00153	-0.07285**
	(0.069035)	(0.012436)	(0.053043)	(0.080320)	(0.033745)
N	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
Stand$\Delta_5$ln C8grants	0.03989	0.02042	-0.05432	0.06949	-0.05540*
	(0.077630)	(0.014721)	(0.053237)	(0.083874)	(0.032003)
N	1603	1603	1603	1603	1603

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 75: Estimation Results: Standardized Grants Concentration (Top 8 Supported Firms) and Industry Performance with Controls

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
Stand$\Delta_1$ln C8grants	0.09350	0.00190	-0.02094	-0.04171	-0.01566
	(0.070181)	(0.003688)	(0.022655)	(0.027591)	(0.014482)
Stand$\Delta_1$ln assets	0.17370***	0.06638***	0.09158***	0.21630***	0.02490
	(0.028381)	(0.007938)	(0.028619)	(0.063219)	(0.018511)
age	0.00417	-0.00268***	-0.00057	-0.00567	0.00159
	(0.004276)	(0.000858)	(0.001735)	(0.005823)	(0.001033)
N	2519	2519	2519	2519	2519
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
Stand$\Delta_2$ln C8grants	0.03801	-0.00023	-0.04266	-0.02780	-0.02757
	(0.071359)	(0.007251)	(0.029284)	(0.054963)	(0.017154)
Stand$\Delta_2$ln assets	0.34082***	0.10546***	0.11435**	0.28417***	0.01299
	(0.067612)	(0.012061)	(0.049622)	(0.062031)	(0.032729)
age	0.01385*	-0.00501***	0.00037	-0.01130	0.00323
	(0.007504)	(0.001582)	(0.004946)	(0.011998)	(0.002846)
N	2290	2290	2290	2290	2290
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
Stand$\Delta_3$ln C8grants	0.01012	0.00207	-0.07725	-0.04790	-0.05741*
	(0.074553)	(0.009900)	(0.050645)	(0.062561)	(0.030907)
Stand$\Delta_3$ln assets	0.36830***	0.13284***	0.10668	0.35830***	-0.00948
	(0.068835)	(0.014953)	(0.082380)	(0.073100)	(0.052465)
age	0.01467	-0.00791***	-0.00093	-0.01754	0.00421
	(0.009217)	(0.002262)	(0.007063)	(0.017986)	(0.004053)
N	2061	2061	2061	2061	2061
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
Stand$\Delta_4$ln C8grants	0.00637	-0.00096	-0.09336*	-0.04708	-0.06881**
	(0.070643)	(0.009960)	(0.053300)	(0.074478)	(0.033062)
Stand$\Delta_4$ln assets	0.37818***	0.16659***	0.10084	0.39026***	-0.03418
	(0.065992)	(0.017495)	(0.115216)	(0.077336)	(0.074039)
age	0.01511	-0.01039***	-0.00663	-0.03067	0.00218
	(0.009160)	(0.002871)	(0.007608)	(0.025876)	(0.004377)
N	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
Stand$\Delta_5$ln C8grants	-0.00142	-0.00150	-0.06776	0.02861	-0.05114
	(0.079322)	(0.010674)	(0.056876)	(0.073855)	(0.034512)
Stand$\Delta_5$ln assets	0.32481***	0.19274***	0.11826	0.37881***	-0.03780
	(0.079345)	(0.018711)	(0.112974)	(0.081311)	(0.073105)
age	0.01004	-0.01304***	-0.00807	-0.04165	0.00282
	(0.010543)	(0.003502)	(0.008805)	(0.034727)	(0.005129)
N	1603	1603	1603	1603	1603

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: assets and firms' average age within the industry. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 76: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (Top 8 Supported Firms) and Industry Performance Up to 2021

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_1$ln C8grants	0.07919	0.00379	-0.01491	-0.03480	-0.01326
	(0.054256)	(0.003461)	(0.017665)	(0.024823)	(0.011353)
N	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_2$ln C8grants	0.04820	0.00678	-0.01917	-0.03350	-0.01709*
	(0.042121)	(0.005710)	(0.016141)	(0.043466)	(0.009732)
N	2746	2746	2746	2746	2746
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_3$ln C8grants	0.03048	0.01065	-0.03473	-0.04852	-0.03320**
	(0.039043)	(0.007409)	(0.024548)	(0.045093)	(0.015509)
N	2517	2517	2517	2517	2517
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_4$ln C8grants	0.03736	0.01197	-0.03911	-0.01739	-0.03759**
	(0.035632)	(0.007267)	(0.026532)	(0.040300)	(0.017101)
N	2288	2288	2288	2288	2288
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_5$ln C8grants	0.02186	0.01095	-0.02535	0.03584	-0.02756*
	(0.042519)	(0.007735)	(0.025208)	(0.041700)	(0.015287)
N	2059	2059	2059	2059	2059

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

Table 77: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (Top 4 Supported Firms) and Industry Performance Up to 2021

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_1$ln C4grants	0.07835	0.00353	-0.01491	-0.03424	-0.01301
	(0.053357)	(0.003415)	(0.017457)	(0.024616)	(0.011227)
N	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_2$ln C4grants	0.04772	0.00659	-0.01906	-0.03155	-0.01682*
	(0.041977)	(0.005680)	(0.015993)	(0.043453)	(0.009644)
N	2746	2746	2746	2746	2746
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_3$ln C4grants	0.02996	0.01053	-0.03418	-0.04552	-0.03268**
	(0.038665)	(0.007391)	(0.024334)	(0.045361)	(0.015377)
N	2517	2517	2517	2517	2517
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_4$ln C4grants	0.03762	0.01180	-0.03871	-0.01343	-0.03717**
	(0.035438)	(0.007258)	(0.026283)	(0.040484)	(0.016941)
N	2288	2288	2288	2288	2288
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_5$ln C4grants	0.02338	0.01065	-0.02487	0.03996	-0.02706*
	(0.042249)	(0.007720)	(0.024866)	(0.042076)	(0.015063)
N	2059	2059	2059	2059	2059

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 78: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (HHI) and Industry Performance Up to 2021

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_1$ln HHIgrants	0.08140*	0.00310	-0.01816	-0.02970	-0.01479
	(0.048921)	(0.003351)	(0.017752)	(0.023320)	(0.011250)
N	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_2$ln HHIgrants	0.05175	0.00665	-0.01876	-0.02463	-0.01658*
	(0.042517)	(0.005685)	(0.015399)	(0.043077)	(0.009368)
N	2746	2746	2746	2746	2746
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_3$ln HHIgrants	0.03321	0.01072	-0.03272	-0.03800	-0.03202**
	(0.037400)	(0.007384)	(0.023694)	(0.046355)	(0.015072)
N	2517	2517	2517	2517	2517
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_4$ln HHIgrants	0.04038	0.01162	-0.03961	-0.00583	-0.03794**
	(0.034478)	(0.007148)	(0.026409)	(0.040872)	(0.017028)
N	2288	2288	2288	2288	2288
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_5$ln HHIgrants	0.02774	0.01027	-0.02467	0.04767	-0.02715*
	(0.041100)	(0.007652)	(0.024860)	(0.043352)	(0.015062)
N	2059	2059	2059	2059	2059

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 79: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (Top 8 Supported Firms) and Industry Performance with Controls Up to 2021

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_1$ln C8grants	0.07550	0.00249	-0.01686	-0.03897*	-0.01387
	(0.053637)	(0.002916)	(0.017484)	(0.023508)	(0.011248)
$\Delta_1$ln assets	0.94915***	0.36916***	0.51008***	1.15944***	0.13953
	(0.150949)	(0.041052)	(0.145987)	(0.323824)	(0.094846)
age	0.00036	-0.00173**	-0.00022	-0.00431	0.00105
	(0.004506)	(0.000696)	(0.001471)	(0.004724)	(0.000873)
N	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_2$ln C8grants	0.03040	0.00147	-0.02565	-0.04859	-0.01831*
	(0.042535)	(0.004635)	(0.017245)	(0.042997)	(0.010277)
$\Delta_2$ln assets	1.20998***	0.39635***	0.45287***	1.11310***	0.07045
	(0.231805)	(0.044077)	(0.170075)	(0.233141)	(0.117639)
age	0.00775	-0.00350***	0.00083	-0.00787	0.00252
	(0.007165)	(0.001271)	(0.004244)	(0.009949)	(0.002484)
N	2746	2746	2746	2746	2746
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_3$ln C8grants	0.01166	0.00430	-0.04082	-0.06689	-0.03349**
	(0.039493)	(0.006054)	(0.026136)	(0.045421)	(0.016197)
$\Delta_3$ln assets	1.06451***	0.40492***	0.36038	1.14400***	-0.00091
	(0.181505)	(0.044284)	(0.219916)	(0.226842)	(0.144891)
age	0.00860	-0.00613***	-0.00033	-0.01223	0.00357
	(0.008561)	(0.001809)	(0.005883)	(0.014857)	(0.003426)
N	2517	2517	2517	2517	2517
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_4$ln C8grants	0.01360	0.00195	-0.04630*	-0.04248	-0.03637**
	(0.036505)	(0.005663)	(0.026822)	(0.037905)	(0.016800)
$\Delta_4$ln assets	0.95042***	0.44023***	0.31340	1.10237***	-0.05711
	(0.145471)	(0.043156)	(0.260686)	(0.205123)	(0.168277)
age	0.00725	-0.00835***	-0.00522	-0.02087	0.00194
	(0.008702)	(0.002242)	(0.006211)	(0.020699)	(0.003645)
N	2288	2288	2288	2288	2288
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_5$ln C8grants	0.00235	0.00026	-0.03318	0.01477	-0.02638
	(0.043723)	(0.005968)	(0.026734)	(0.036989)	(0.016283)
$\Delta_5$ln assets	0.77134***	0.46660***	0.33761	0.95641***	-0.05617
	(0.158121)	(0.041639)	(0.233595)	(0.180515)	(0.149325)
age	0.00077	-0.01063***	-0.00672	-0.03003	0.00236
	(0.009822)	(0.002692)	(0.007015)	(0.026947)	(0.004176)
N	2059	2059	2059	2059	2059

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: assets and firms' average age within the industry. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 80: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (Top 4 Supported Firms) and Industry Performance with Controls Up to 2021

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_1$ln C4grants	0.07499	0.00237	-0.01669	-0.03797	-0.01358
	(0.052767)	(0.002878)	(0.017303)	(0.023306)	(0.011135)
$\Delta_1$ln assets	0.95010***	0.36921***	0.50985***	1.15882***	0.13932
	(0.150817)	(0.041064)	(0.146081)	(0.323762)	(0.094897)
age	0.00031	-0.00173**	-0.00021	-0.00429	0.00106
	(0.004506)	(0.000695)	(0.001471)	(0.004731)	(0.000872)
N	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_2$ln C4grants	0.03038	0.00148	-0.02535	-0.04606	-0.01802*
	(0.042418)	(0.004610)	(0.017072)	(0.042954)	(0.010169)
$\Delta_2$ln assets	1.21022***	0.39636***	0.45254***	1.11157***	0.07018
	(0.231569)	(0.044085)	(0.169867)	(0.233033)	(0.117522)
age	0.00772	-0.00350***	0.00085	-0.00785	0.00254
	(0.007165)	(0.001271)	(0.004253)	(0.009957)	(0.002489)
N	2746	2746	2746	2746	2746
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_3$ln C4grants	0.01147	0.00441	-0.04012	-0.06329	-0.03300**
	(0.039155)	(0.006039)	(0.025913)	(0.045623)	(0.016059)
$\Delta_3$ln assets	1.06463***	0.40489***	0.35994	1.14217***	-0.00123
	(0.181400)	(0.044283)	(0.219724)	(0.226738)	(0.144767)
age	0.00859	-0.00614***	-0.00029	-0.01220	0.00361
	(0.008568)	(0.001809)	(0.005905)	(0.014868)	(0.003437)
N	2517	2517	2517	2517	2517
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_4$ln C4grants	0.01431	0.00212	-0.04566*	-0.03760	-0.03600**
	(0.036354)	(0.005636)	(0.026575)	(0.037956)	(0.016638)
$\Delta_4$ln assets	0.95007***	0.44014***	0.31294	1.09960***	-0.05740
	(0.145384)	(0.043145)	(0.260466)	(0.204884)	(0.168127)
age	0.00721	-0.00836***	-0.00516	-0.02090	0.00199
	(0.008714)	(0.002243)	(0.006237)	(0.020702)	(0.003659)
N	2288	2288	2288	2288	2288
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_5$ln C4grants	0.00456	0.00050	-0.03232	0.02015	-0.02595
	(0.043428)	(0.005924)	(0.026354)	(0.037238)	(0.016039)
$\Delta_5$ln assets	0.77022***	0.46648***	0.33700	0.95372***	-0.05652
	(0.157924)	(0.041626)	(0.233306)	(0.180266)	(0.149130)
age	0.00071	-0.01064***	-0.00668	-0.03019	0.00240
	(0.009833)	(0.002694)	(0.007043)	(0.026949)	(0.004190)
N	2059	2059	2059	2059	2059

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: assets and firms' average age within the industry. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 81: Estimation Results: Grants Concentration (HHI) and Industry Performance with Controls Up to 2021

	$\Delta_1$ln investment	$\Delta_1$ln employment	$\Delta_1$ln value-added	$\Delta_1$ln exports	$\Delta_1$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_1$ln HHIgrants	0.08068*	0.00300	-0.01851	-0.03012	-0.01499
	(0.048616)	(0.002793)	(0.017840)	(0.021985)	(0.011288)
$\Delta_1$ln assets	0.95877***	0.36946***	0.50795***	1.15388***	0.13777
	(0.149777)	(0.041121)	(0.146978)	(0.323194)	(0.095463)
age	0.00019	-0.00174**	-0.00018	-0.00430	0.00108
	(0.004504)	(0.000695)	(0.001472)	(0.004745)	(0.000871)
N	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975
	$\Delta_2$ln investment	$\Delta_2$ln employment	$\Delta_2$ln value-added	$\Delta_2$ln exports	$\Delta_2$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_2$ln HHIgrants	0.03893	0.00318	-0.02329	-0.03453	-0.01756*
	(0.043138)	(0.004558)	(0.016269)	(0.042557)	(0.009752)
$\Delta_2$ln assets	1.21055***	0.39592***	0.44904***	1.10247***	0.06804
	(0.229843)	(0.044108)	(0.168415)	(0.232019)	(0.116713)
age	0.00753	-0.00353***	0.00086	-0.00794	0.00257
	(0.007158)	(0.001272)	(0.004269)	(0.009997)	(0.002497)
N	2746	2746	2746	2746	2746
	$\Delta_3$ln investment	$\Delta_3$ln employment	$\Delta_3$ln value-added	$\Delta_3$ln exports	$\Delta_3$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_3$ln HHIgrants	0.01973	0.00683	-0.03682	-0.04954	-0.03245**
	(0.038087)	(0.005996)	(0.024876)	(0.046337)	(0.015519)
$\Delta_3$ln assets	1.06307***	0.40455***	0.35436	1.13045***	-0.00508
	(0.179372)	(0.044225)	(0.217397)	(0.225005)	(0.143292)
age	0.00838	-0.00620***	-0.00022	-0.01227	0.00371
	(0.008579)	(0.001812)	(0.005944)	(0.014938)	(0.003459)
N	2517	2517	2517	2517	2517
	$\Delta_4$ln investment	$\Delta_4$ln employment	$\Delta_4$ln value-added	$\Delta_4$ln exports	$\Delta_4$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_4$ln HHIgrants	0.02248	0.00493	-0.04442*	-0.02242	-0.03715**
	(0.035679)	(0.005477)	(0.026593)	(0.038128)	(0.016669)
$\Delta_4$ln assets	0.94805***	0.43914***	0.30745	1.08889***	-0.06080
	(0.144905)	(0.043052)	(0.258657)	(0.204270)	(0.166981)
age	0.00694	-0.00844***	-0.00499	-0.02112	0.00218
	(0.008728)	(0.002250)	(0.006304)	(0.020753)	(0.003698)
N	2288	2288	2288	2288	2288
	$\Delta_5$ln investment	$\Delta_5$ln employment	$\Delta_5$ln value-added	$\Delta_5$ln exports	$\Delta_5$ln labour productivity
$\Delta_5$ln HHIgrants	0.01352	0.00337	-0.02978	0.03497	-0.02646*
	(0.042445)	(0.005827)	(0.025812)	(0.038284)	(0.015658)
$\Delta_5$ln assets	0.76693***	0.46534***	0.33281	0.94950***	-0.05882
	(0.157511)	(0.041551)	(0.231064)	(0.180378)	(0.147796)
age	0.00042	-0.01072***	-0.00660	-0.03073	0.00254
	(0.009830)	(0.002700)	(0.007087)	(0.026981)	(0.004219)
N	2059	2059	2059	2059	2059

Notes: We report the estimates for Δ_1, Δ_2, Δ_3, Δ_4, and Δ_5 year difference. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: assets and firms' average age within the industry. Robust standard-errors clustered at the industry 3-digit level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. All models are estimated by year-industry (2-digits level) fixed effects.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

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Appendix to Chapter 5

Table 82: Variables Description and Sources

Variable	Description	Source
Gross Capital Formation	Investment (€)	CBS
Employment	Number of workers	CBS
Value-added	Gross value-added (€)	CBS
Labour Productivity	Gross value-added / Employment (€)	CBS
TFP	Total factor productivity	CBS
Profitability	EBITDA / Total assets	CBS
Turnover	Growth rate of sales (%)	CBS
Assets	Total assets (€)	CBS
Leverage	Total liabilities / Total assets	CBS
Score	Application evaluation score	AdC

Notes: TFP is computed by the authors using data from the CBS and following the methodology proposed by Gandhi et al., 2020. CBS: Central Balance Sheet. AdC: Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion.

Table 83: Number of Years from First to Last Grant for Firms Receiving Multiple Grants

Number of Years	**Number of firms**	**Share of firms (%)**
2	521	14.72
3	432	12.20
4	498	14.07
5	438	12.37
6	367	10.37
7	357	10.08
8	296	8.36
9	259	7.32
10	180	5.08
11	134	3.79
12	58	1.64
Total	3,540	100.00

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion.*

Table 84: RDD Estimation Results: Single Grant vs. Two Grants

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.899	0.892	0.083	0.148	-0.214	-0.078
	(0.586)	(0.561)	(0.705)	(0.675)	(0.697)	(0.722)
N	1089	1089	1038	1038	1006	1006
Employment	-0.002	0.008	0.200***	0.213***	0.155*	0.176*
	(0.091)	(0.093)	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.089)	(0.094)
N	1089	1089	1038	1038	1006	1006
Value-Added	0.117	0.120	0.217*	0.219*	0.310***	0.355***
	(0.142)	(0.141)	(0.125)	(0.118)	(0.112)	(0.124)
N	1077	1077	1024	1024	1006	1006
Labour Productivity	0.090	0.079	0.053	0.041	0.123*	0.145*
	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.093)	(0.087)	(0.074)	(0.082)
N	1076	1076	1024	1024	1006	1006
TFP	0.042	0.010	0.138	0.105	0.152	0.147
	(0.200)	(0.197)	(0.222)	(0.214)	(0.186)	(0.180)
N	1072	1072	1022	1022	985	985

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of subsidy in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 85: RDD Estimation Results: Two Grants in Exactly Two and Four Years

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.378	0.469	-0.473	-0.369	-0.481	-0.407
	(0.805)	(0.763)	(0.847)	(0.835)	(0.788)	(0.845)
N	607	607	556	556	524	524
Employment	-0.001	0.014	0.241***	0.261***	0.179**	0.204**
	(0.102)	(0.105)	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.089)	(0.096)
N	607	607	556	556	524	524
Value-Added	0.124	0.126	0.323***	0.314***	0.380***	0.411***
	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.116)	(0.113)	(0.120)	(0.129)
N	598	598	547	547	524	524
Labour Productivity	0.088	0.072	0.133	0.104	0.218**	0.217**
	(0.103)	(0.106)	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.101)	(0.105)
N	597	597	547	547	524	524
TFP	0.049	0.006	0.140	0.091	0.158	0.138
	(0.228)	(0.227)	(0.243)	(0.235)	(0.197)	(0.188)
N	595	595	546	546	511	511

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of subsidy in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 86: RDD Estimation Results: Two Grants within Four Years (45%)

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.855	0.822	-0.289	-0.239	-0.630	-0.676
	(0.619)	(0.574)	(0.794)	(0.785)	(0.719)	(0.737)
N	831	831	780	780	748	748
Employment	-0.023	-0.005	0.195***	0.226***	0.118	0.158
	(0.098)	(0.101)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.094)	(0.098)
N	831	831	780	780	748	748
Value-Added	0.109	0.121	0.292**	0.301**	0.229**	0.282***
	(0.142)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.139)	(0.102)	(0.104)
N	820	820	768	768	748	748
Labour Productivity	0.116	0.097	0.144	0.122	0.107	0.117
	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.109)	(0.103)	(0.078)	(0.079)
N	819	819	768	768	748	748
TFP	0.042	-0.001	0.156	0.106	0.104	0.101
	(0.234)	(0.238)	(0.262)	(0.254)	(0.217)	(0.205)
N	817	817	768	768	730	730

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of subsidy in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 87: RDD Estimation Results: Two Grants within Four Years (55%)

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	1.012*	1.044**	-0.006	0.086	-0.054	0.100
	(0.537)	(0.515)	(0.701)	(0.678)	(0.764)	(0.791)
N	831	831	780	780	748	748
Employment	-0.005	0.008	0.203***	0.211***	0.154	0.169*
	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.096)	(0.101)
N	831	831	780	780	748	748
Value-Added	0.093	0.091	0.255**	0.241**	0.341***	0.370***
	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.124)	(0.121)	(0.123)	(0.137)
N	820	820	768	768	748	748
Labour Productivity	0.082	0.066	0.104	0.081	0.174**	0.185**
	(0.087)	(0.089)	(0.097)	(0.092)	(0.078)	(0.084)
N	819	819	768	768	748	748
TFP	-0.048	-0.095	0.072	0.021	0.098	0.081
	(0.220)	(0.221)	(0.232)	(0.227)	(0.186)	(0.182)
N	817	817	768	768	730	730

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of subsidy in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 88: RDD Estimation Results: Two Grants within Four Years (same bandwidth as Single Grant vs. Two Grants)

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.953*	0.955*	-0.120	-0.053	-0.334	-0.275
	(0.573)	(0.555)	(0.746)	(0.731)	(0.760)	(0.789)
N	831	831	780	780	748	748
Employment	-0.011	0.004	0.214***	0.233***	0.161*	0.186*
	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.097)	(0.102)
N	831	831	780	780	748	748
Value-Added	0.097	0.096	0.279**	0.270**	0.333***	0.370***
	(0.138)	(0.137)	(0.127)	(0.121)	(0.114)	(0.127)
N	820	820	768	768	748	748
Labour Productivity	0.087	0.066	0.118	0.091	0.162**	0.173**
	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.102)	(0.096)	(0.078)	(0.083)
N	819	819	768	768	748	748
TFP	-0.009	-0.055	0.117	0.069	0.122	0.111
	(0.224)	(0.227)	(0.239)	(0.235)	(0.192)	(0.188)
N	817	817	768	768	730	730

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of subsidy in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

Table 89: RDD Estimation Results: Two Grants at Five or More Years (45%)

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.616	0.641	0.519	0.477	-0.830	-0.682
	(0.765)	(0.676)	(0.777)	(0.781)	(0.707)	(0.688)
N	525	525	474	474	442	442
Employment	0.005	0.020	0.129	0.152	0.091	0.136
	(0.123)	(0.130)	(0.119)	(0.127)	(0.122)	(0.131)
N	525	525	474	474	442	442
Value-Added	0.183	0.202	0.049	0.097	0.134	0.204**
	(0.143)	(0.149)	(0.102)	(0.108)	(0.084)	(0.094)
N	517	517	466	466	442	442
Labour Productivity	0.132	0.121	-0.052	-0.029	-0.032	-0.012
	(0.121)	(0.124)	(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.096)	(0.099)
N	517	517	466	466	442	442
TFP	0.227	0.203	0.285	0.257	0.164	0.168
	(0.258)	(0.265)	(0.265)	(0.266)	(0.232)	(0.231)
N	515	515	464	464	432	432

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of subsidy in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 90: RDD Estimation Results: Two Grants at Five or More Years (55%)

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.836	0.868	0.726	0.735	0.090	0.423
	(0.632)	(0.566)	(0.694)	(0.689)	(0.695)	(0.700)
N	525	525	474	474	442	442
Employment	0.025	0.032	0.138	0.135	0.125	0.136
	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.119)	(0.124)	(0.120)	(0.123)
N	525	525	474	474	442	442
Value-Added	0.178	0.183	0.066	0.082	0.286**	0.331**
	(0.137)	(0.138)	(0.093)	(0.096)	(0.115)	(0.129)
N	517	517	466	466	442	442
Labour Productivity	0.102	0.097	-0.044	-0.028	0.085	0.117
	(0.115)	(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.119)	(0.114)	(0.127)
N	517	517	466	466	442	442
TFP	0.163	0.134	0.226	0.194	0.178	0.168
	(0.237)	(0.236)	(0.238)	(0.234)	(0.203)	(0.201)
N	515	515	464	464	432	432

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of subsidy in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet*.

Table 91: RDD Estimation Results: Two Grants at Five or More Years (same bandwidth as Single Grant vs. Two Grants)

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.790	0.827	0.642	0.634	-0.295	-0.022
	(0.670)	(0.606)	(0.723)	(0.722)	(0.688)	(0.687)
N	525	525	474	474	442	442
Employment	0.019	0.026	0.147	0.153	0.131	0.153
	(0.117)	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.124)	(0.121)	(0.125)
N	525	525	474	474	442	442
Value-Added	0.174	0.178	0.065	0.087	0.257**	0.312***
	(0.140)	(0.142)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.102)	(0.115)
N	517	517	466	466	442	442
Labour Productivity	0.101	0.091	-0.050	-0.036	0.052	0.082
	(0.115)	(0.118)	(0.123)	(0.121)	(0.106)	(0.119)
N	517	517	466	466	442	442
TFP	0.196	0.175	0.268	0.248	0.201	0.204
	(0.245)	(0.247)	(0.246)	(0.245)	(0.212)	(0.212)
N	515	515	464	464	432	432

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of subsidy in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

Table 92: RDD Estimation Results: Two Grants within Four Years, Dropping Scores Equal to 0 (Donut RDD)

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.383	0.479	-0.229	-0.152	-0.737	-0.626
	(0.822)	(0.783)	(0.875)	(0.862)	(0.750)	(0.781)
N	808	808	757	757	725	725
Employment	0.024	0.041	0.236***	0.256***	0.165	0.192
	(0.106)	(0.110)	(0.085)	(0.091)	(0.110)	(0.118)
N	808	808	757	757	725	725
Value-Added	0.096	0.098	0.304*	0.288*	0.335***	0.371***
	(0.154)	(0.154)	(0.168)	(0.163)	(0.117)	(0.133)
N	797	797	745	745	725	725
Labour Productivity	0.057	0.039	0.102	0.067	0.165**	0.170**
	(0.087)	(0.090)	(0.111)	(0.104)	(0.077)	(0.082)
N	797	797	745	745	725	725
TFP	-0.102	-0.137	0.050	0.002	0.138	0.113
	(0.236)	(0.237)	(0.245)	(0.240)	(0.174)	(0.175)
N	797	797	747	747	709	709

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of subsidy in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

Table 93: RDD Estimation Results: Two Grants within Four Years, Dropping Scores between –0.02 and 0.02 (Donut RDD)

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.397	0.499	-0.493	-0.370	-1.105*	-0.922
	(0.931)	(0.874)	(0.859)	(0.846)	(0.639)	(0.698)
N	799	799	748	748	717	717
Employment	0.059	0.072	0.283**	0.298***	0.207	0.229*
	(0.111)	(0.114)	(0.110)	(0.113)	(0.131)	(0.136)
N	799	799	748	748	717	717
Value-Added	0.159	0.151	0.365*	0.337*	0.374***	0.405***
	(0.150)	(0.151)	(0.189)	(0.180)	(0.128)	(0.142)
N	788	788	736	736	717	717
Labour Productivity	0.082	0.057	0.113	0.073	0.162*	0.167*
	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.110)	(0.102)	(0.090)	(0.089)
N	788	788	736	736	717	717
TFP	-0.186	-0.213	-0.076	-0.108	0.125	0.097
	(0.246)	(0.247)	(0.265)	(0.254)	(0.199)	(0.199)
N	788	788	738	738	702	702

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of subsidy in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

Table 94: RDD Estimation Results: Two Grants at Five or More Years, Dropping Scores Equal to 0 (Donut RDD)

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.398	0.470	0.495	0.499	0.011	0.254
	(0.628)	(0.567)	(0.690)	(0.687)	(0.816)	(0.780)
N	517	517	466	466	434	434
Employment	-0.041	-0.023	0.075	0.092	0.078	0.109
	(0.132)	(0.136)	(0.157)	(0.160)	(0.157)	(0.160)
N	517	517	466	466	434	434
Value-Added	0.141	0.151	0.088	0.115	0.318***	0.369***
	(0.165)	(0.164)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.111)	(0.124)
N	509	509	458	458	434	434
Labour Productivity	0.130	0.113	0.042	0.050	0.147	0.165
	(0.155)	(0.154)	(0.129)	(0.128)	(0.112)	(0.127)
N	509	509	458	458	434	434
TFP	0.128	0.113	0.218	0.204	0.145	0.152
	(0.315)	(0.313)	(0.315)	(0.310)	(0.271)	(0.268)
N	507	507	456	456	424	424

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of subsidy in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

Table 95: RDD Estimation Results: Two Grants at Five or More Years, Dropping Scores between –0.02 and 0.02 (Donut RDD)

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	0.320	0.408	0.120	0.179	0.525	0.729
	(0.577)	(0.568)	(0.711)	(0.727)	(1.039)	(0.981)
N	511	511	460	460	429	429
Employment	-0.092	-0.065	0.030	0.057	0.072	0.108
	(0.129)	(0.133)	(0.176)	(0.171)	(0.194)	(0.187)
N	511	511	460	460	429	429
Value-Added	0.157	0.161	0.080	0.109	0.362***	0.408***
	(0.158)	(0.156)	(0.131)	(0.128)	(0.122)	(0.134)
N	503	503	452	452	429	429
Labour Productivity	0.185	0.154	0.089	0.087	0.184	0.193
	(0.138)	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.136)	(0.129)	(0.139)
N	503	503	452	452	429	429
TFP	-0.051	-0.042	-0.009	0.008	0.049	0.068
	(0.351)	(0.344)	(0.320)	(0.315)	(0.310)	(0.302)
N	501	501	450	450	420	420

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of subsidy in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

Table 96: RDD Estimation Results: Two Grants within Four Years, Non-Selected Application with the Highest Score

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	1.275*	1.229*	0.314	0.325	-0.107	-0.203
	(0.682)	(0.634)	(0.800)	(0.777)	(0.897)	(0.899)
N	826	826	777	777	743	743
Employment	-0.053	-0.031	0.127*	0.160**	0.075	0.117
	(0.074)	(0.080)	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.088)	(0.096)
N	826	826	777	777	743	743
Value-Added	0.098	0.107	0.222*	0.227*	0.231**	0.274**
	(0.106)	(0.103)	(0.122)	(0.116)	(0.100)	(0.115)
N	815	815	765	765	743	743
Labour Productivity	0.136*	0.114	0.147	0.117	0.151**	0.148**
	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.092)	(0.085)	(0.066)	(0.073)
N	814	814	765	765	743	743
TFP	0.084	0.053	0.209	0.176	0.113	0.099
	(0.212)	(0.220)	(0.229)	(0.229)	(0.184)	(0.178)
N	812	812	765	765	725	725

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of subsidy in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*

Table 97: RDD Estimation Results: Two Grants at Five or More Years, Non-Selected Application with the Highest Score

Dependent	$t+1$		$t+2$		$t+3$	
variable (in logs)	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov	Triangular	Epanechnikov
Investment	1.040	1.034	1.011	0.946	-0.359	-0.258
	(0.772)	(0.703)	(0.749)	(0.743)	(0.772)	(0.745)
N	520	520	471	471	437	437
Employment	-0.008	0.008	0.034	0.059	0.004	0.047
	(0.102)	(0.110)	(0.122)	(0.128)	(0.122)	(0.128)
N	520	520	471	471	437	437
Value-Added	0.212*	0.220*	0.017	0.053	0.139*	0.188**
	(0.121)	(0.120)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.074)	(0.089)
N	512	512	463	463	437	437
Labour Productivity	0.164	0.148	0.023	0.031	0.054	0.058
	(0.116)	(0.118)	(0.129)	(0.127)	(0.085)	(0.096)
N	512	512	463	463	437	437
TFP	0.292	0.281	0.375	0.367	0.204	0.198
	(0.239)	(0.245)	(0.239)	(0.241)	(0.200)	(0.199)
N	510	510	461	461	427	427

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression is defined in the first column. In the columns, we report the RDD estimates for leads, $t+1$, $t+2$ and $t+3$, based on the kernel function identified in the respective column. 'N' stands for the number of observations. All regressions include the following control variables: profitability, leverage, sales growth, assets, firm age, amount of subsidy in the first grant, size and sector of activity. Robust standard-errors clustered at the application year level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.

Source: Own computations using data from the *Portuguese Agency for Development and Cohesion* and *Central Balance Sheet.*