Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: https://hdl.handle.net/1822/47637

TítuloThe pitfalls of qualified moral veganism. A critique of Jan Deckers' holistic health approach to animal ethics
Autor(es)Paez, Eze
Palavras-chaveAnimal Ethics
Holistic Health
Jan Deckers
Pan-Sentientism
Speciesism
Veganism
DataOut-2017
EditoraJohn Wiley and Sons
RevistaJournal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice
CitaçãoPaez, Eze. (2017). “The Pitfalls of Qualified Moral Veganism. A Critique of Jan Deckers' Holistic Health Approach to Animal Ethics”. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice.
Resumo(s)I critically examine Jan Deckers' position in Animal (De)liberation, where he defends two main views. The first is "qualified moral veganism": Most humans have a duty to abstain from consuming animal products, even if there are circumstances in which doing so is justified. The author argues, on the one hand, from a pan-sentientist view that attributes sentience to all elementary entities and their compounds. Thus, all living things (such as animals and plants) have a capacity for positive and negative experiences. On the other hand, he develops a consequentialist view that assigns moral agents the unconditional duty to promote their own "holistic health." This is partly constituted by the agent's "moral health," that is, her acting in a morally justified way. On Deckers' view, moral agents must care for the health of all living entities, give greater weight to the interests of organisms to which they are more closely biologically related, and respect the integrity of nature. Diets containing animal products have a very high negative health impact, because of how they affect the environment, human food security, and the well-being of nonhuman animals. In addition, even though plants are sentient, they are likely less so than animals, and their interests must be given less weight. Therefore, most humans should shift to a vegan diet. Deckers' second proposal is that a qualified ban on the consumption of animal products should be enacted. After discarding other alternative strategies, Deckers defends its feasibility relying on data obtained via a series of surveys. Though the argument partly succeeds in developing a coherent account accommodating the author's intuitions, I conclude that his ontological and normative frameworks remain too underdeveloped, his appeal to biological relatedness has implausible implications, and the methodology he uses in defence of his political position is problematic.
TipoArtigo
URIhttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/47637
DOI10.1111/jep.12786
ISSN1356-1294
e-ISSN1365-2753
Versão da editorahttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jep.12786/full
Arbitragem científicayes
AcessoAcesso aberto
Aparece nas coleções:CEPS - Publicações dos investigadores do CEPS

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