Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: https://hdl.handle.net/1822/60130

TítuloWhen Is green too rosy? Evidence from a laboratory market experiment on green goods and externalities
Autor(es)Fernandes, Maria Eduarda
Valente, Marieta
Palavras-chaveAbstract instructions
External validity
Framing effect
Green goods
Laboratory experiments
Pro-environmental behaviour
Public goods
Data14-Set-2018
EditoraMultidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute
RevistaGames
Resumo(s)In a context where sustainable consumption and production need to be encouraged, economic experiments can provide significant insights into how individuals consider environmental externalities in their choices and how public policy can foster the environmental public good. Experimental studies aiming to evaluate market mitigation of externalities through the provision of green goods usually choose to adopt neutral language in terms of framing. Our study implements an incentivized economics experiment to explore how supply and demand consider negative externalities. Furthermore, the study addresses the impact of using non-abstract wording when describing negative externalities. Two types of goods can be produced and bought, namely goods generating negative externalities on other consumers (either labelled as B or brown) and goods that cause no harm to others (either labelled A or green). We conclude that the provision of green goods increases from 18.1% in the abstract frame to 70% in the environmental frame. Framing is, therefore, a relevant variable for the outcome of this experimental market. This has important implications for economic experiments aiming to evaluate pro-environmental behaviours and provide policy orientations for the provision of green goods.
TipoArtigo
URIhttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/60130
DOI10.3390/g9030070
ISSN2073-4336
Arbitragem científicayes
AcessoAcesso aberto
Aparece nas coleções:BUM - MDPI
NIMA - Artigos/Papers

Ficheiros deste registo:
Ficheiro Descrição TamanhoFormato 
games-09-00070.pdf1,28 MBAdobe PDFVer/Abrir

Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma Licença Creative Commons Creative Commons

Partilhe no FacebookPartilhe no TwitterPartilhe no DeliciousPartilhe no LinkedInPartilhe no DiggAdicionar ao Google BookmarksPartilhe no MySpacePartilhe no Orkut
Exporte no formato BibTex mendeley Exporte no formato Endnote Adicione ao seu ORCID