A detection and defense approach for content privacy in named data network

Abstract

The Named Data Network (NDN) is a promising network paradigm for content distribution based on caching. However, it may put consumer privacy at risk, as the adversary may identify the content, the name and the signature (namely a certificate) through side-channel timing responses from the cache of the routers. The adversary may identify the content name and the consumer node by distinguishing between cached and uncached contents. In order to mitigate the timing attack, effective countermeasure methods have been proposed by other authors, such as random caching, random freshness, and probabilistic caching. In this work, we have implemented a timing attack scenario to evaluate the efficiency of these countermeasures and to demonstrate how the adversary can be detected. For this goal, a brute force timing attack scenario based on a real topology was developed, which is the first brute force attack model applied in NDN. Results show that the adversary nodes can be effectively distinguished from other legitimate consumers during the attack period. It is also proposed a multi-level mechanism to detect an adversary node. Through this approach, the content distribution performance can be mitigated against the attack.