The pitfalls of qualified moral veganism. A critique of Jan Deckers' holistic health approach to animal ethics

dc.contributor.authorPaez, Ezepor
dc.date.accessioned2017-11-22T11:44:39Z
dc.date.available2017-11-22T11:44:39Z
dc.date.issued2017-10
dc.description.abstractI critically examine Jan Deckers' position in Animal (De)liberation, where he defends two main views. The first is "qualified moral veganism": Most humans have a duty to abstain from consuming animal products, even if there are circumstances in which doing so is justified. The author argues, on the one hand, from a pan-sentientist view that attributes sentience to all elementary entities and their compounds. Thus, all living things (such as animals and plants) have a capacity for positive and negative experiences. On the other hand, he develops a consequentialist view that assigns moral agents the unconditional duty to promote their own "holistic health." This is partly constituted by the agent's "moral health," that is, her acting in a morally justified way. On Deckers' view, moral agents must care for the health of all living entities, give greater weight to the interests of organisms to which they are more closely biologically related, and respect the integrity of nature. Diets containing animal products have a very high negative health impact, because of how they affect the environment, human food security, and the well-being of nonhuman animals. In addition, even though plants are sentient, they are likely less so than animals, and their interests must be given less weight. Therefore, most humans should shift to a vegan diet. Deckers' second proposal is that a qualified ban on the consumption of animal products should be enacted. After discarding other alternative strategies, Deckers defends its feasibility relying on data obtained via a series of surveys. Though the argument partly succeeds in developing a coherent account accommodating the author's intuitions, I conclude that his ontological and normative frameworks remain too underdeveloped, his appeal to biological relatedness has implausible implications, and the methodology he uses in defence of his political position is problematic.por
dc.description.publicationversioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionpor
dc.distributioninternationalpor
dc.identifier.citationPaez, Eze. (2017). “The Pitfalls of Qualified Moral Veganism. A Critique of Jan Deckers' Holistic Health Approach to Animal Ethics”. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice.por
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/jep.12786por
dc.identifier.eissn1365-2753
dc.identifier.issn1356-1294por
dc.identifier.pmid28695684por
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/47637
dc.language.isoengpor
dc.peerreviewedyespor
dc.publisherJohn Wiley and Sonspor
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jep.12786/fullpor
dc.rightsopenAccesspor
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/por
dc.subjectAnimal Ethicspor
dc.subjectHolistic Healthpor
dc.subjectJan Deckerspor
dc.subjectPan-Sentientismpor
dc.subjectSpeciesismpor
dc.subjectVeganismpor
dc.subject.fosHumanidades::Filosofia, Ética e Religiãopor
dc.subject.wosScience & Technologypor
dc.titleThe pitfalls of qualified moral veganism. A critique of Jan Deckers' holistic health approach to animal ethicspor
dc.typearticlepor
dspace.entity.typePublicationen
oaire.citationEndPage1117por
oaire.citationIssue5por
oaire.citationStartPage1113por
oaire.citationVolume23por
sdum.journalJournal of Evaluation in Clinical Practicepor

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