Does opportunism pay off?

dc.contributor.authorVeiga, Linda Gonçalves
dc.contributor.authorVeiga, Francisco José
dc.date.accessioned2006-07-14T15:39:32Z
dc.date.available2006-07-14T15:39:32Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.description.abstractThis article tests the hypothesis that the opportunistic manipulation of financial accounts by mayors increases their chances of re-election. Working with a large and detailed dataset comprising all Portuguese mainland municipalities, which covers the municipal elections that took place from 1979 to 2001, we clearly show that increases in investment expenditures and changes in the composition of spending favouring highly visible items are associated with higher vote percentages for incumbent mayors seeking re-election. Our results also indicate that the political payoff to opportunistic spending increased after democracy became well-established in the country.eng
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/5249
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.peerreviewednoeng
dc.publisherUniversidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE)eng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNIPE Working Paper serieseng
dc.relation.ispartofseries5/2006eng
dc.rightsopenAccesseng
dc.subjectVoting functionseng
dc.subjectOpportunismeng
dc.subjectLocal governmentseng
dc.subjectElectionseng
dc.subjectPortugaleng
dc.titleDoes opportunism pay off?eng
dc.typeworkingPapereng
dspace.entity.typePublicationen

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