Quality provision in hospital markets with demand inertia: the role of patient expectations

dc.contributor.authorSá, Luíspor
dc.contributor.authorStraume, Odd Runepor
dc.date.accessioned2020-07-06T10:43:41Z
dc.date.available2020-07-06T10:43:41Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.description.abstractThe presence of switching costs and persistent patient preferences generates demand inertia and links current and future choices of hospital. Using a model of hospital competition with demand inertia, we investigate the effect of patient expectations (whether and how patients anticipate the future) on quality provision. We consider three types of expectations. Myopic patients choose a hospital based on current variables alone, forward-looking but naïve patients take the future into account but assume that quality remains constant, and forward-looking and rational patients foresee the evolution of quality. We rank equilibrium quality provision and show that it is higher under naïve than myopic expectations, while equilibrium quality under rational expectations may be highest or lowest. This result also holds for patient welfare, suggesting that rationality does not always benefit patients. We also show that only under rational expectations may quality be lower than in a market without inertia and switching cost reductions beneficial.por
dc.description.sponsorshipThis paper is financed by National Funds of the FCT (Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology) within the project UID/ECO/03182/2019. Sá acknowledges the PhD Studentship SFRH/BD/129073/2017 awarded by the FCT and financed by National Funds of the FCT and the European Social Fund.por
dc.distributioninternationalpor
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/65837
dc.language.isoengpor
dc.publisherUniversidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE)por
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/FCT/6817 - DCRRNI ID/UIDB%2F03182%2F2020/PTpor
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/FCT/6817 - DCRRNI ID/UID%2FECO%2F03182%2F2019/PTpor
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/FCT/POR_NORTE/SFRH%2FBD%2F129073%2F2017/PTpor
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://www.eeg.uminho.pt/pt/investigar/nipe/Paginas/publicacoes.aspxpor
dc.rightsopenAccesspor
dc.subjectHospital competitionpor
dc.subjectMyopic behaviourpor
dc.subjectForward-looking behaviourpor
dc.subjectRational expectationspor
dc.subjectSwitching costspor
dc.titleQuality provision in hospital markets with demand inertia: the role of patient expectationspor
dc.typeworkingPaperpor
dspace.entity.typePublicationen
oaire.citationEndPage34por
oaire.citationIssueNIPE WP 03/2020por
oaire.citationStartPage1por

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Quality provision in hospital markets with demand inertia: The role of patient expectations