Price discrimination with private and imperfect information

dc.contributor.authorEsteves, Rosa Branca
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-10T17:16:22Z
dc.date.available2012-12-10T17:16:22Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the competitive and welfare effects of information accuracy improvements in markets where firms can price discriminate after observing a private and noisy signal about a consumer’s brand preference. It shows that firms charge more to customers they believe have a brand preference for them, and that this price has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the signal’s accuracy. In contrast, the price charged after a disloyal signal has been observed falls as the signal’s accuracy rises. While industry profit and overall welfare fall monotonically as price discrimination is based on increasingly more accurate information, the reverse happens to consumer surplus.por
dc.description.sponsorshipCOMPETE; QREN; FEDER; Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT)por
dc.distributioninternationalpor
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/21382
dc.language.isoengpor
dc.peerreviewednopor
dc.publisherUniversidade do Minhopor
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/docs/2012/NIPE_WP_12_2012.pdfpor
dc.rightsopenAccesspor
dc.subjectCompetitive price discriminationpor
dc.subjectImperfect customer recognitionpor
dc.subjectImperfect informationpor
dc.titlePrice discrimination with private and imperfect informationpor
dc.typeworkingPaperpor
dspace.entity.typePublicationen
oaire.citationConferencePlaceBragapor
oaire.citationIssue12por
oaire.citationTitleNIPE Working Paperpor
sdum.publicationstatuspublishedpor

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NIPE WP 12/2012