Political budget forecast cycles

dc.contributor.authorBohn, Frankpor
dc.contributor.authorVeiga, Francisco Josépor
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-09T09:00:32Z
dc.date.available2019-10-09T09:00:32Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.description.abstractBy forecasting overly optimistic revenues opportunistic governments can increase spending in order to appear more competent prior to elections. Ex post deficits emerge in election years, thereby producing political forecast cycles - as also found for US states in the empirical literature. In our theoretical moral hazard model we obtain three additional results which are tested with panel data for Portuguese municipalities. The extent of manipulations is reduced when (i) the winning margin is expected to widen; (ii) the incumbent is not re-running; and/or (iii) the share of informed voters (proxied by education) goes up.por
dc.description.sponsorshipFundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT); UID/ECO/03182/2019por
dc.distributioninternationalpor
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/61687
dc.language.isoengpor
dc.publisherUniversidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE)por
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/FCT/6817 - DCRRNI ID/UID%2FECO%2F03182%2F2019/PT
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://www.eeg.uminho.pt/pt/investigar/nipe/Paginas/publicacoes.aspxpor
dc.rightsopenAccesspor
dc.subjectOpportunistic political cyclespor
dc.subjectPolitical budget cyclespor
dc.subjectRevenue forecastspor
dc.subjectDeficitpor
dc.subjectTransferspor
dc.subjectAsymmetric informationpor
dc.subjectPolitical economypor
dc.subject.fosCiências Sociais::Economia e Gestãopor
dc.titlePolitical budget forecast cyclespor
dc.typeworkingPaperpor
dspace.entity.typePublicationen
oaire.citationConferencePlaceBraga, Portugalpor
oaire.citationVolumeNIPE WP 12/2019por

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Political Budget Forecast Cycles