Hospital competition with soft budgets

dc.contributor.authorBrekke, Kurt R.
dc.contributor.authorSiciliani, Luigi
dc.contributor.authorStraume, Odd Rune
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:02:46Z
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:02:46Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.description.abstractWe study the incentives for hospitals to provide quality and expend cost-reducing effort when their budgets are soft, i.e., the payer may cover deficits or confiscate surpluses. The basic set up is a Hotelling model with two hospitals that differ in location and face demand uncertainty, where the hospitals run deficits (surpluses) in the high (low) demand state. Softer budgets reduce cost efficiency, while the effect on quality is ambiguous. For given cost efficiency, softer budgets increase quality since parts of the expenditures may be covered by the payer. However, softer budgets reduce cost-reducing effort and the profit margin, which in turn weakens quality incentives. We also find that profit confiscation reduces quality and cost-reducing effort. First best is achieved by a strict no-bailout and no-profit-confiscation policy when the regulated price is optimally set. However, for suboptimal prices a more lenient bailout policy can be welfare improving.por
dc.description.sponsorshipFundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT)por
dc.description.sponsorshipCOMPETEpor
dc.description.sponsorshipQRENpor
dc.description.sponsorshipFEDERpor
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/18522
dc.language.isoengpor
dc.peerreviewednopor
dc.publisherUniversidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE)por
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/por
dc.rightsopenAccesspor
dc.subjectHospital competitionpor
dc.subjectCost efficiencypor
dc.subjectSoft budgetspor
dc.subjectQualitypor
dc.titleHospital competition with soft budgetspor
dc.typeworkingPaperpor
dspace.entity.typePublicationen
oaire.citationTitlenipewp:04/2012por
oaire.citationVolumeNIPE WP 04/2012por
sdum.publicationstatuspublishedpor

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